principles on which the war was entered into, as well as in the plans
upon which it was conducted,--some of them very fundamental, and not
only visibly, but I may say palpably erroneous; and I think him to have
less than the discernment of a very ordinary statesman, who could not
foresee, from the very beginning, unpleasant consequences from those
plans, though not the unparalleled disgraces and disasters which really
did attend them: for they were, both principles and measures, wholly new
and out of the common course, without anything apparently very grand in
the conception to justify this total departure from all rule.
For, in the first place, the united sovereigns very much injured their
cause by admitting that they had nothing to do with the interior
arrangements of France,--in contradiction to the whole tenor of the
public law of Europe, and to the correspondent practice of all its
states, from the time we have any history of them. In this particular,
the two German courts seem to have as little consulted the publicists of
Germany as their own true interests, and those of all the sovereigns of
Germany and Europe. This admission of a false principle in the law of
nations brought them into an apparent contradiction, when they insisted
on the reëstablishment of the royal authority in France. But this
confused and contradictory proceeding gave rise to a practical error of
worse consequence. It was derived from one and the same root: namely,
that the person of the monarch of France was everything; and the
monarchy, and the intermediate orders of the state, by which the
monarchy was upheld, were nothing. So that, if the united potentates had
succeeded so far as to reëstablish the authority of that king, and that
he should be so ill-advised as to confirm all the confiscations, and to
recognize as a lawful body and to class himself with that rabble of
murderers, (and there wanted not persons who would so have advised him,)
there was nothing in the principle or in the proceeding of the united
powers to prevent such an arrangement.
An expedition to free a brother sovereign from prison was undoubtedly a
generous and chivalrous undertaking. But the spirit and generosity would
not have been less, if the policy had been more profound and more
comprehensive,--that is, if it had taken in those considerations and
those persons by whom, and, in some measure, for whom, monarchy exists.
This would become a bottom for a system of solid and permanent policy,
and of operations conformable to that system.
The same fruitful error was the cause why nothing was done to impress
the people of France (so far as we can at all consider the inhabitants
of France as a people) with an idea that the government was ever to be
really French, or indeed anything else than the nominal government of a
monarch, a monarch absolute as over them, but whose sole support was to
arise from foreign potentates, and who was to be kept on his throne by
German forces,--in short, that the king of France was to be a viceroy to
the Emperor and the king of Prussia.
It was the first time that foreign powers, interfering in the concerns
of a nation divided into parties, have thought proper to thrust wholly
out of their councils, to postpone, to discountenance, to reject, and,
in a manner, to disgrace, the party whom those powers came to support.
The single person of a king cannot be a party. Woe to the king who is
himself his party! The royal party, with the king or his representatives
at its head, is the _royal cause_. Foreign powers have hitherto chosen
to give to such wars as this the appearance of a civil contest, and not
that of an hostile invasion. When the Spaniards, in the sixteenth
century, sent aids to the chiefs of the League, they appeared as allies
to that league, and to the imprisoned king (the Cardinal de Bourbon)
which that league had set up. When the Germans came to the aid of the
Protestant princes, in the same series of civil wars, they came as
allies. When the English came to the aid of Henry the Fourth, they
appeared as allies to that prince. So did the French always, when they
intermeddled in the affairs of Germany: they came to aid a party there.
When the English and Dutch intermeddled in the succession of Spain, they
appeared as allies to the Emperor, Charles the Sixth. In short, the
policy has been as uniform as its principles were obvious to an ordinary
eye.
According to all the old principles of law and policy, a regency ought
to have been appointed by the French princes of the blood, nobles, and
parliaments, and then recognized by the combined powers. Fundamental law
and ancient usage, as well as the clear reason of the thing, have always
ordained it during an imprisonment of the king of France: as in the case
of John, and of Francis the First. A monarchy ought not to be left a
moment without a representative having an interest in the succession.
The orders of the state ought also to have been recognized in those
amongst whom alone they existed in freedom, that is, in the emigrants.
Thus, laying down a firm foundation on the recognition of the
authorities of the kingdom of France, according to Nature and to its
fundamental laws, and not according to the novel and inconsiderate
principles of the usurpation which the united powers were come to
extirpate, the king of Prussia and the Emperor, as allies of the ancient
kingdom of France, would have proceeded with dignity, first, to free the
monarch, if possible,--if not, to secure the monarchy as principal in
the design; and in order to avoid all risks to that great object, (the
object of other ages than the present, and of other countries than that
of France,) they would of course avoid proceeding with more haste or in
a different manner than what the nature of such an object required.
Adopting this, the only rational system, the rational mode of proceeding
upon it was to commence with an effective siege of Lisle, which the
French generals must have seen taken before their faces, or be forced to
fight. A plentiful country of friends, from whence to draw supplies,
would have been behind them; a plentiful country of enemies, from whence
to force supplies, would have been before them. Good towns were always
within reach to deposit their hospitals and magazines. The march from
Lisle to Paris is through a less defensible country, and the distance is
hardly so great as from Longwy to Paris.
If the _old_ politic and military ideas had governed, the advanced guard
would have been formed of those who best knew the country and had some
interest in it, supported by some of the best light troops and light
artillery, whilst the grand solid body of an army disciplined to
perfection proceeded leisurely, and in close connection with all its
stores, provisions, and heavy cannon, to support the expedite body in
case of misadventure, or to improve and complete its success.
The direct contrary of all this was put in practice. In consequence of
the original sin of this project, the army of the French princes was
everywhere thrown into the rear, and no part of it brought forward to
the last moment, the time of the commencement of the secret negotiation.
This naturally made an ill impression on the people, and furnished an
occasion for the rebels at Paris to give out that the faithful subjects
of the king were distrusted, despised, and abhorred by his allies. The
march was directed through a skirt of Lorraine, and thence into a part
of Champagne, the Duke of Brunswick leaving all the strongest places
behind him,--leaving also behind him the strength of his artillery,--and
by this means giving a superiority to the French, in the only way in
which the present France is able to oppose a German force.
In consequence of the adoption of those false politics, which turned
everything on the king's sole and single person, the whole plan of the
war was reduced to nothing but a _coup de main_, in order to set that
prince at liberty. If that failed, everything was to be given up.
The scheme of a _coup de main_ might (under favorable circumstances) be
very fit for a partisan at the head of a light corps, by whose failure
nothing material would be deranged. But for a royal army of eighty
thousand men, headed by a king in person, who was to march an hundred
and fifty miles through an enemy's country,--surely, this was a plan
unheard of.
Although this plan was not well chosen, and proceeded upon principles
altogether ill-judged and impolitic, the superiority of the military
force might in a great degree have supplied the defects, and furnished a
corrective to the mistakes. The greater probability was, that the Duke
of Brunswick would make his way to Paris over the bellies of the rabble
of drunkards, robbers, assassins, rioters, mutineers, and half-grown
boys, under the ill-obeyed command of a theatrical, vaporing, reduced
captain of cavalry, who opposed that great commander and great army.
But--_Diis aliter visum_. He began to treat,--the winds blew and the
rains beat,--the house fell, because it was built upon sand,--and great
was the fall thereof. This march was not an exact copy of either of the
two marches made by the Duke of Parma into France.
There is some secret. Sickness and weather may defeat an army pursuing a
wrong plan: not that I believe the sickness to have been so great as it
has been reported; but there is a great deal of superfluous humiliation
in this business, a perfect prodigality of disgrace. Some advantage,
real or imaginary, must compensate to a great sovereign and to a great
general for so immense a loss of reputation. Longwy, situated as it is,
might (one should think) be evacuated without a capitulation with a
republic just proclaimed by the king of Prussia as an usurping and
rebellious body. He was not far from Luxembourg. He might have taken
away the obnoxious French in his flight. It does not appear to have been
necessary that those magistrates who declared for their own king, on the
faith and under the immediate protection of the king of Prussia, should
be delivered over to the gallows. It was not necessary that the
emigrant nobility and gentry who served with the king of Prussia's army,
under his immediate command, should be excluded from the cartel, and
given up to be hanged as rebels. Never was so gross and so cruel a
breach of the public faith, not with an enemy, but with a friend.
Dumouriez has dropped very singular hints. Custine has spoken out more
broadly. These accounts have never been contradicted. They tend to make
an eternal rupture between the powers. The French have given out, that
the Duke of Brunswick endeavored to negotiate some name and place for
the captive king, amongst the murderers and proscribers of those who
have lost their all for his cause. Even this has not been denied.
It is singular, and, indeed, a thing, under all its circumstances,
inconceivable, that everything should by the Emperor be abandoned to the
king of Prussia. That monarch was considered as principal. In the nature
of things, as well as in his position with regard to the war, he was
only an ally, and a new ally, with crossing interests in many
particulars, and of a policy rather uncertain. At best, and supposing
him to act with the greatest fidelity, the Emperor and the Empire to him
must be but secondary objects. Countries out of Germany must affect him
in a still more remote manner. France, other than from the fear of its
doctrinal principles, can to him be no object at all. Accordingly, the
Rhine, Sardinia, and the Swiss are left to their fate. The king of
Prussia has no _direct_ and immediate concern with France;
_consequentially_, to be sure, a great deal: but the Emperor touches
France _directly_ in many parts; he is a near neighbor to Sardinia, by
his Milanese territories; he borders on Switzerland; Cologne, possessed
by his uncle, is between Mentz, Treves, and the king of Prussia's
territories on the Lower Rhine. The Emperor is the natural guardian of
Italy and Germany,--the natural balance against the ambition of France,
whether republican or monarchical. His ministers and his generals,
therefore, ought to have had their full share in every material
consultation,--which I suspect they had not. If he has no minister
capable of plans of policy which comprehend the superintendency of a
war, or no general with the least of a political head, things have been
as they must be. However, in all the parts of this strange proceeding
there must be a secret.
It is probably known to ministers. I do not mean to penetrate into it.
My speculations on this head must be only conjectural. If the king of
Prussia, under the pretext or on the reality of some information
relative to ill practice on the part of the court of Vienna, takes
advantage of his being admitted into the heart of the Emperor's
dominions in the character of an ally, afterwards to join the common
enemy, and to enable France to seize the Netherlands, and to reduce and
humble the Empire, I cannot conceive, upon every principle, anything
more alarming for this country, separately, and as a part of the general
system. After all, we may be looking in vain in the regions of politics
for what is only the operation of temper and character upon accidental
circumstances. But I never knew accidents to decide the _whole_ of any
great business; and I never knew temper to act, but that some system of
politics agreeable to its peculiar spirit was blended with it,
strengthened it, and got strength from it. Therefore the politics can
hardly be put out of the question.
Great mistakes have been committed: at least I hope so. If there have
been none, the case in future is desperate. I have endeavored to point
out some of those which have occurred to me, and most of them very
early.
Whatever may be the cause of the present state of things, on a full and
mature view and comparison of the historical matter, of the transactions
that have passed before our eyes, and of the future prospect, I think I
am authorized to form an opinion without the least hesitation.
That there never was, nor is, nor ever will be, nor ever can be, the
least rational hope of making an impression on France by any Continental
powers, if England is not a part, is not the directing part, is not the
soul, of the whole confederacy against it.
This, so far as it is an anticipation of future, is grounded on the
whole tenor of former history. In speculation it is to be accounted for
on two plain principles.
First, That Great Britain is likely to take a more fair and equal part
in the alliance than the other powers, as having less of crossing
interest or perplexed discussion with any of them.
Secondly, Because France cannot have to deal with any of these
Continental sovereigns, without their feeling that nation, as a maritime
power, greatly superior to them all put together,--a force which is only
to be kept in check by England.
England, except during the eccentric aberration of Charles the Second,
has always considered it as her duty and interest to take her place in
such a confederacy. Her chief disputes must ever be with France; and if
England shows herself indifferent and unconcerned, when these powers are
combined against the enterprises of France, she is to look with
certainty for the same indifference on the part of these powers, when
she may be at war with that nation. This will tend totally to disconnect
this kingdom from the system of Europe, in which if she ought not rashly
to meddle, she ought never wholly to withdraw herself from it.
If, then, England is put in motion, whether by a consideration of the
general safety, or of the influence of France upon Spain, or by the
probable operations of this new system on the Netherlands, it must
embrace in its project the whole as much as possible, and the part it
takes ought to be as much as possible a leading and presiding part.
I therefore beg leave to suggest,--
First, That a minister should forthwith be sent to Spain, to encourage
that court to persevere in the measures they have adopted against
France,--to make a close alliance and guaranty of possessions, as
against France, with that power,--and, whilst the formality of the
treaty is pending, to assure them of our protection, postponing any
lesser disputes to another occasion.
Secondly, To assure the court of Vienna of our desire to enter into our
ancient connections with her, and to support her effectually in the war
which France has declared against her.
Thirdly, To animate the Swiss and the king of Sardinia to take a part,
as the latter once did on the principles of the Grand Alliance.
Fourthly, To put an end to our disputes with Russia, and mutually to
forget the past. I believe, if she is satisfied of this oblivion, she
will return to her old sentiments with regard to this court, and will
take a more forward part in this business than any other power.
Fifthly, If what has happened to the king of Prussia is only in
consequence of a sort of panic or of levity, and an indisposition to
persevere long in one design, the support and concurrence of Russia will
tend to steady him, and to give him resolution. If he be ill-disposed,
with that power on his back, and without one ally in Europe, I conceive
he will not be easily led to derange the plan.
Sixthly, To use the joint influence of our court, and of our then allied
powers, with Holland, to arm as fully as she can by sea, and to make
some addition by land.
Seventhly, To acknowledge the king of France's next brother (assisted by
such a council and such representatives of the kingdom of France as
shall be thought proper) regent of France, and to send that prince a
small supply of money, arms, clothing, and artillery.
Eighthly, To give force to these negotiations, an instant naval armament
ought to be adopted,--one squadron for the Mediterranean, another for
the Channel. The season is convenient,--most of our trade being, as I
take it, at home.
After speaking of a plan formed upon the ancient policy and practice of
Great Britain and of Europe, to which this is exactly conformable in
every respect, with no deviation whatsoever, and which is, I conceive,
much more strongly called for by the present circumstances than by any
former, I must take notice of another, which I hear, but cannot persuade
myself to believe, is in agitation. This plan is grounded upon the very
same view of things which is here stated,--namely, the danger to all
sovereigns, and old republics, from the prevalence of French power and
influence.
It is, to form a congress of all the European powers for the purpose of
a general defensive alliance, the objects of which should be,--
First, The recognition of this new republic, (which they well know is
formed on the principles and for the declared purpose of the destruction
of all kings,) and, whenever the heads of this new republic shall
consent to release the royal captives, to make peace with them.
Secondly, To defend themselves with their joint forces against the open
aggressions, or the secret practices, intrigues, and writings, which are
used to propagate the French principles.
It is easy to discover from whose shop this commodity comes. It is so
perfectly absurd, that, if that or anything like it meets with a serious
entertainment in any cabinet, I should think it the effect of what is
called a judicial blindness, the certain forerunner of the destruction
of all crowns and kingdoms.
An _offensive_ alliance, in which union is preserved by common efforts
in common dangers against a common active enemy, may preserve its
consistency, and may produce for a given time some considerable effect:
though this is not easy, and for any very long period can hardly be
expected. But a _defensive_ alliance, formed of long discordant
interests, with innumerable discussions existing, having no one pointed
object to which it is directed, which is to be held together with an
unremitted vigilance, as watchful in peace as in war, is so evidently
impossible, is such a chimera, is so contrary to human nature and the
course of human affairs, that I am persuaded no person in his senses,
except those whose country, religion, and sovereign are deposited in the
French funds, could dream of it. There is not the slightest petty
boundary suit, no difference between a family arrangement, no sort of
misunderstanding or cross purpose between the pride and etiquette of
courts, that would not entirely disjoint this sort of alliance, and
render it as futile in its effects as it is feeble in its principle. But
when we consider that the main drift of that defensive alliance must be
to prevent the operation of intrigue, mischievous doctrine, and evil
example, in the success of unprovoked rebellion, regicide, and
systematic assassination and massacre, the absurdity of such a scheme
becomes quite lamentable. Open the communication with France, and the
rest follows of course.
How far the interior circumstances of this country support what is said
with regard to its foreign polities must be left to bettor judgments. I
am sure the French faction here is infinitely strengthened by the
success of the assassins on the other side of the water. This evil in
the heart of Europe must be extirpated from that centre, or no part of
the circumference can be free from the mischief which radiates from it,
and which will spread, circle beyond circle, in spite of all the little
defensive precautions which can be employed against it.
I do not put my name to these hints submitted to the consideration of
reflecting men. It is of too little importance to suppose the name of
the writer could add any weight to the state of things contained in this
paper. That state of things presses irresistibly on my judgment, and it
lies, and has long lain, with a heavy weight upon my mind. I cannot
think that what is done in France is beneficial to the human race. If it
were, the English Constitution ought no more to stand against it than
the ancient Constitution of the kingdom in which the new system
prevails. I thought it the duty of a man not unconcerned for the public,
and who is a faithful subject to the king, respectfully to submit this
state of facts, at this new step in the progress of the French arms and
politics, to his Majesty, to his confidential servants, and to those
persons who, though not in office, by their birth, their rank, their
fortune, their character, and their reputation for wisdom, seem to me to
have a large stake in the stability of the ancient order of things.
BATH, November 5, 1792.
REMARKS
ON
THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES
WITH RESPECT TO FRANCE.
BEGUN IN OCTOBER, 1793.
ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
As the proposed manifesto is, I understand, to promulgate to the world
the general idea of a plan for the regulation of a great kingdom, and
through the regulation of that kingdom probably to decide the fate of
Europe forever, nothing requires a more serious deliberation with regard
to the time of making it, the circumstances of those to whom it is
addressed, and the matter it is to contain.
As to the time, (with the due diffidence in my own opinion,) I have some
doubts whether it is not rather unfavorable to the issuing any manifesto
with regard to the intended government of France, and for this reason:
that it is (upon the principal point of our attack) a time of calamity
and defeat. Manifestoes of this nature are commonly made when the army
of some sovereign enters into the enemy's country in great force, and
under the imposing authority of that force employs menaces towards those
whom he desires to awe, and makes promises to those whom he wishes to
engage in his favor.
As to a party, what has been done at Toulon leaves no doubt that the
party for which we declare must be that which substantially declares for
royalty as the basis of the government.