Revolution) is a man of another sort of birth, fashion, and occupation
from Brissot,--but in every principle, and every disposition to the
lowest as well as the highest and most determined villanies, fully his
equal. He seconds Brissot in the Assembly, and is at once his coadjutor
and his rival in a newspaper, which, in his own name, and as successor
to M. Garat, a member also of the Assembly, he has just set up in that
empire of gazettes. Condorcet was chosen to draw the first declaration
presented by the Assembly to the king, as a threat to the Elector of
Treves, and the other princes on the Rhine. In that piece, in which both
Feuillants and Jacobins concurred, they declared publicly, and most
proudly and insolently, the principle on which they mean to proceed in
their future disputes with any of the sovereigns of Europe; for they
say, "that it is not with fire and sword they mean to attack their
territories, but by what will be _more dreadful_ to them, the
introduction of liberty."--I have not the paper by me, to give the exact
words, but I believe they are nearly as I state them.--_Dreadful_,
indeed, will be their hostility, if they should be able to carry it on
according to the example of _their_ modes of introducing liberty. They
have shown a perfect model of their whole design, very complete, though
in little. This gang of murderers and savages have wholly laid waste and
utterly ruined the beautiful and happy country of the Comtat Venaissin
and the city of Avignon. This cruel and treacherous outrage the
sovereigns of Europe, in my opinion, with a great mistake of their honor
and interest, have permitted, even without a remonstrance, to be carried
to the desired point, on the principles on which they are now themselves
threatened in their own states; and this, because, according to the poor
and narrow spirit now in fashion, their brother sovereign, whose
subjects have been thus traitorously and inhumanly treated in violation
of the law of Nature and of nations, has a name somewhat different from
theirs, and, instead of being styled King, or Duke, or Landgrave, is
usually called Pope.
[Sidenote: State of the Empire.]
The Electors of Treves and Mentz were frightened with the menace of a
similar mode of war. The Assembly, however, not thinking that the
Electors of Treves and Mentz had done enough under their first terror,
have again brought forward Condorcet, preceded by Brissot, as I have
just stated. The declaration, which they have ordered now to be
circulated in all countries, is in substance the same as the first, but
still more insolent, because more full of detail. There they have the
impudence to state that they aim at no conquest: insinuating that all
the old, lawful powers of the world had each made a constant, open
profession of a design of subduing his neighbors. They add, that, if
they are provoked, their war will be directed only against those who
assume to be _masters_; but to the _people_ they will bring peace, law,
liberty, &c, &c. There is not the least hint that they consider those
whom they call persons "_assuming to be matters_" to be the lawful
government of their country, or persons to be treated with the least
management or respect. They regard them as usurpers and enslavers of the
people. If I do not mistake, they are described by the name of tyrants
in Condorcet's first draught. I am sure they are so in Brissot's speech,
ordered by the Assembly to be printed at the same time and for the same
purposes. The whole is in the same strain, full of false philosophy and
false rhetoric,--both, however, calculated to captivate and influence
the vulgar mind, and to excite sedition in the countries in which it is
ordered to be circulated. Indeed, it is such, that, if any of the
lawful, acknowledged sovereigns of Europe had publicly ordered such a
manifesto to be circulated in the dominions of another, the ambassador
of that power would instantly be ordered to quit every court without an
audience.
[Sidenote: Effect of fear on the sovereign powers.]
The powers of Europe have a pretext for concealing their fears, by
saying that this language is not used by the king; though they well know
that there is in effect no such person,--that the Assembly is in
reality, and by that king is acknowledged to be, _the master_,--that
what he does is but matter of formality,--and that he can neither cause
nor hinder, accelerate nor retard, any measure whatsoever, nor add to
nor soften the manifesto which the Assembly has directed to be
published, with the declared purpose of exciting mutiny and rebellion in
the several countries governed by these powers. By the generality also
of the menaces contained in this paper, (though infinitely aggravating
the outrage,) they hope to remove from each power separately the idea of
a distinct affront. The persons first pointed at by the menace are
certainly the princes of Germany, who harbor the persecuted House of
Bourbon and the nobility of France; the declaration, however, is
general, and goes to every state with which they may have a cause of
quarrel. But the terror of France has fallen upon all nations. A few
months since all sovereigns seemed disposed to unite against her; at
present they all seem to combine in her favor. At no period has the
power of France ever appeared with so formidable an aspect. In
particular the liberties of the Empire can have nothing more than an
existence the most tottering and precarious, whilst France exists with a
great power of fomenting rebellion, and the greatest in the
weakest,--but with neither power nor disposition to support the smaller
states in their independence against the attempts of the more powerful.
I wind up all in a full conviction within my own breast, and the
substance of which I must repeat over and over again, that the state of
France is the first consideration in the politics of Europe, and of each
state, externally as well as internally considered.
Most of the topics I have used are drawn from fear and apprehension.
Topics derived from fear or addressed to it are, I well know, of
doubtful appearance. To be sure, hope is in general the incitement to
action. Alarm some men,--you do not drive them to provide for their
security; you put them to a stand; you induce them, not to take measures
to prevent the approach of danger, but to remove so unpleasant an idea
from their minds; you persuade them to remain as they are, from a new
fear that their activity may bring on the apprehended mischief before
its time. I confess freely that this evil sometimes happens from an
overdone precaution; but it is when the measures are rash, ill-chosen,
or ill-combined, and the effects rather of blind terror than of
enlightened foresight. But the few to whom I wish to submit my thoughts
are of a character which will enable them to see danger without
astonishment, and to provide against it without perplexity.
To what lengths this method of circulating mutinous manifestoes, and of
keeping emissaries of sedition in every court under the name of
ambassadors, to propagate the same principles and to follow the
practices, will go, and how soon they will operate, it is hard to say;
but go on it will, more or less rapidly, according to events, and to the
humor of the time. The princes menaced with the revolt of their
subjects, at the same time that they have obsequiously obeyed the
sovereign mandate of the new Roman senate, have received with
distinction, in a public character, ambassadors from those who in the
same act had circulated the manifesto of sedition in their dominions.
This was the only thing wanting to the degradation and disgrace of the
Germanic body.
The ambassadors from the rights of man, and their admission into the
diplomatic system, I hold to be a new era in this business. It will be
the most important step yet taken to affect the existence of sovereigns,
and the higher classes of life: I do not mean to exclude its effects
upon all classes; but the first blow is aimed at the more prominent
parts in the ancient order of things.
What is to be done?
It would be presumption in me to do more than to make a case. Many
things occur. But as they, like all political measures, depend on
dispositions, tempers, means, and external circumstances, for all their
effect, not being well assured of these, I do not know how to let loose
any speculations of mine on the subject. The evil is stated, in my
opinion, as it exists. The remedy must be where power, wisdom, and
information, I hope, are more united with good intentions than they can
be with me. I have done with this subject, I believe, forever. It has
given me many anxious moments for the two last years. If a great change
is to be made in human affairs, the minds of men will be fitted to it,
the general opinions and feelings will draw that way. Every fear, every
hope, will forward it; and then they who persist in opposing this mighty
current in human affairs will appear rather to resist the decrees of
Providence itself than the mere designs of men. They will not be
resolute and firm, but perverse and obstinate.
FOOTNOTES:
[30] See Vattel, B. II. c. 4, sect 56, and B. III. c 18, sect. 296.
[31] Originally called the Bengal Club; but since opened to persons from
the other Presidencies, for the purpose of consolidating the whole
Indian interest.
[32] "Until now, they [the National Assembly] have prejudged nothing.
Reserving to themselves a right to appoint a preceptor to the Dauphin,
they did not declare _that this child was to reign_, but only that
_possibly_ the Constitution _might_ destine him to it: they willed,
that, while education should efface from his mind all the prejudices
arising from _the delusions of the throne_ respecting his pretended
birthright, it should also teach him not to forget that it is _from the
people_ he is to receive the title of King, and that _the people do not
even possess the right of giving up their power to take it from him_.
"They willed that this education should render him worthy, by his
knowledge and by his virtues, both to receive _with submission_ the
dangerous burden of a crown, and _to resign it with pleasure_ into the
hands of his brethren; that he should be conscious that the hastening of
that moment when he is to be only a common citizen constitutes the duty
and the glory of a king of a free people.
"They willed that _the uselessness of a king_, the necessity of seeking
means to establish something in lieu of _a power founded on illusions_,
should be one of the first truths offered to his reason; _the obligation
of conforming himself to this, the first of his moral duties; and the
desire of no longer being freed from the yoke of the law by an injurious
inviolability, the first and chief sentiment of his heart_. They are not
ignorant that in the present moment the object is less to form a king
than to teach him _that he should know how to wish no longer to be
such_."
HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
ON THE
PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS.
WRITTEN IN NOVEMBER, 1792.
That France by its mere geographical position, independently of every
other circumstance, must affect every state of Europe: some of them
immediately, all of them through mediums not very remote.
That the standing policy of this kingdom ever has been to watch over the
_external_ proceedings of France, (whatever form the _interior_
government of that kingdom might take,) and to prevent the extension of
its dominion or its ruling influence over other states.
That there is nothing in the present _internal_ state of things in
France which alters the national policy with regard to the exterior
relations of that country.
That there are, on the contrary, many things in the internal
circumstances of France (and perhaps of this country, too) which tend to
fortify the principles of that fundamental policy, and which render the
active assertion of those principles more pressing at this than at any
former time.
That, by a change effected in about three weeks, France has been able to
penetrate into the heart of Germany, to make an absolute conquest of
Savoy, to menace an immediate invasion of the Netherlands, and to awe
and overbear the whole Helvetic body, which is in a most perilous
situation: the great aristocratic Cantons having, perhaps, as much or
more to dread from their own people, whom they arm, but do not choose
or dare to employ, as from the foreign enemy, which against all public
faith has butchered their troops serving by treaty in France. To this
picture it is hardly necessary to add the means by which Prance has been
enabled to effect all this,--namely, the apparently entire destruction
of one of the largest and certainly the highest disciplined and best
appointed army ever seen, headed by the first military sovereign in
Europe, with a captain under him of the greatest renown; and that
without a blow given or received on any side. This state of things seems
to me, even if it went no further, truly serious.
Circumstances have enabled France to do all this by _land_. On the other
element she has begun to exert herself; and she must succeed in her
designs, if enemies very different from those she has hitherto had to
encounter do not resist her.
She has fitted out a naval force, now actually at sea, by which she is
enabled to give law to the whole Mediterranean. It is known as a fact,
(and if not so known, it is in the nature of things highly probable,)
that she proposes the ravage of the Ecclesiastical State and the pillage
of Rome, as her first object; that nest she means to bombard Naples,--to
awe, to humble, and thus to command, all Italy,--to force it to a
nominal neutrality, but to a real dependence,--to compel the Italian
princes and republics to admit the free entrance of the French commerce,
an open intercourse, and, the sure concomitant of that intercourse, the
_affiliated societies_, in a manner similar to those she has established
at Avignon, the Comtat, Chambéry, London, Manchester, &c, &c., which are
so many colonies planted in all these countries, for extending the
influence and securing the dominion of the French republic.
That there never has been hitherto a period in which this kingdom would
have suffered a French fleet to domineer in the Mediterranean, and to
force Italy to submit to such terms as France would think fit to
impose,--to say nothing of what has been done upon land in support of
the same system. The great object for which we preserved Minorca, whilst
we could keep it, and for which we still retain Gibraltar, both at a
great expense, was, and is, to prevent the predominance of France over
the Mediterranean.
Thus far as to the certain and immediate effect of that armament upon
the Italian States. The probable effect which that armament, and the
other armaments preparing at Toulon and other ports, may have upon
Spain, on the side of the Mediterranean, is worthy of the serious
attention of the British councils.
That it is most probable, we may say in a manner certain, that, if there
should be a rupture between France and Spain, France will not confine
her offensive piratical operations against Spain to her efforts in the
Mediterranean; on which side, however, she may grievously affect Spain,
especially if she excites Morocco and Algiers, which undoubtedly she
will, to fall upon that power.
That she will fit out armaments upon the ocean, by which the flota
itself may be intercepted, and thus the treasures of all Europe, as well
as the largest and surest resources of the Spanish monarchy, may be
conveyed into France, and become powerful instruments for the annoyance
of all her neighbors.
That she makes no secret of her designs.
That, if the inward and outward bound flota should escape, still France
has more and better means of dissevering many of the provinces in the
West and East Indies from the state of Spain than Holland had, when she
succeeded in the same attempt. The French marine resembles not a little
the old armaments of the Flibustiers, which about a century back, in
conjunction with pirates of our nation, brought such calamities upon the
Spanish colonies. They differ only in this,--that the present piratical
force is out of all measure and comparison greater: one hundred and
fifty ships of the line and frigates being ready-built, most of them in
a manner new, and all applicable in different ways to that service.
Privateers and Moorish corsairs possess not the best seamanship, and
very little discipline, and indeed can make no figure in regular
service; but in desperate adventures, and animated with a lust of
plunder, they are truly formidable.
That the land forces of France are well adapted to concur with their
marine in conjunct expeditions of this nature. In such expeditions,
enterprise supplies the want of discipline, and perhaps more than
supplies it. Both for this, and for other service, (however contemptible
their military is in other respects,) one arm is extremely good, the
engineering and artillery branch. The old officer corps in both being
composed for the greater part of those who were not gentlemen, or
gentlemen newly such, few have abandoned the service, and the men are
veterans, well enough disciplined, and very expert. In this piratical
way they must make war with good advantage. They must do so, even on the
side of Flanders, either offensively or defensively. This shows the
difference between the policy of Louis the Fourteenth, who built a wall
of brass about his kingdom, and that of Joseph the Second, who
premeditatedly uncovered his whole frontier.
That Spain, from the actual and expected prevalence of French power, is
in a most perilous situation,--perfectly dependent on the mercy of that
republic. If Austria is broken, or even humbled, she will not dare to
dispute its mandates.
In the present state of things, we have nothing at all to dread from the
power of Spain by sea or by land, or from any rivalry in commerce.
That we have much to dread from the connections into which Spain may be
forced.
From the circumstances of her territorial possessions, of her resources,
and the whole of her civil and political state, we may be authorized
safely and with undoubted confidence to affirm that
_Spain is not a substantive power_.
That she must lean on France or on England.
That it is as much for the interest of Great Britain to prevent the
predominancy of a French interest in that kingdom as if Spain were a
province of the crown of Great Britain, or a state actually dependent on
it,--full as much so as ever Portugal was reputed to be. This is a
dependency of much greater value; and its destruction, or its being
carried to any other dependency, of much more serious misfortune.
One of these two things must happen: either Spain must submit to
circumstances and take such conditions as France will impose, or she
must engage in hostilities along with the Emperor and the king of
Sardinia.
If Spain should be forced or awed into a treaty with the republic of
France, she must open her ports and her commerce, as well as the land
communication for the French laborers, who were accustomed annually to
gather in the harvest in Spain. Indeed, she must grant a free
communication for travellers and traders through her whole country. In
that case it is not conjectural, it is certain, the clubs will give law
in the provinces; Bourgoing, or some such miscreant, will give law at
Madrid.
In this England may acquiesce, if she pleases; and France will conclude
a triumphant peace with Spain under her absolute dependence, with a
broad highway into that, and into every state of Europe. She actually
invites Great Britain to divide with her the spoils of the New World,
and to make a partition of the Spanish monarchy. Clearly, it is better
to do so than to suffer France to possess those spoils and that
territory alone; which, without doubt, unresisted by us, she is
altogether as able as she is willing to do.
This plan is proposed by the French in the way in which they propose all
their plans,--and in the only way in which, indeed, they can propose
them, where there is no regular communication between his Majesty and
their republic.
What they propose is _a plan_. It is _a plan_ also to resist their
predatory project. To remain quiet, and to suffer them to make their own
use of a naval power before our face, so as to awe and bully Spain into
a submissive peace, or to drive them into a ruinous war, without any
measure on our part, I fear is no plan at all.
However, if the plan of coöperation which France desires, and which her
affiliated societies here ardently wish and are constantly writing up,
should not be adopted, and the war between the Emperor and France
should continue, I think it not at all likely that Spain should not be
drawn into the quarrel. In that case, the neutrality of England will be
a thing absolutely impossible. The time only is the subject of
deliberation.
Then the question will be, whether we are to defer putting ourselves
into a posture for the common defence, either by armament, or
negotiation, or both, until Spain is actually attacked,--that is,
whether our court will take a decided part for Spain, whilst Spain, on
her side, is yet in a condition to act with whatever degree of vigor she
may have, whilst that vigor is yet unexhausted,--or whether we shall
connect ourselves with her broken fortunes, after she shall have
received material blows, and when we shall have the whole slow length of
that always unwieldy and ill-constructed, and then wounded and crippled
body, to drag after us, rather than to aid us. Whilst our disposition is
uncertain, Spain will not dare to put herself in such a state of defence
as will make her hostility formidable or her neutrality respectable.
If the decision is such as the solution of this question (I take it to
be the true question) conducts to, no time is to be lost. But the
measures, though prompt, ought not to be rash and indigested. They ought
to be well chosen, well combined, and well pursued. The system must be
general; but it must be executed, not successively, or with
interruption, but all together, _uno flatu_, in one melting, and one
mould.
For this purpose we must put Europe before us, which plainly is, just
now, in all its parts, in a state of dismay, derangement, and confusion,
and, very possibly amongst all its sovereigns, full of secret
heartburning, distrust, and mutual accusation. Perhaps it may labor
under worse evils. There is no vigor anywhere, except the distempered
vigor and energy of France. That country has but too much life in it,
when everything around is so disposed to tameness and languor. The very
vices of the French system at home tend to give force to foreign
exertions. The generals _must_ join the armies. They must lead them to
enterprise, or they are likely to perish by their hands. Thus, without
law or government of her own, France gives law to all the governments in
Europe.
This great mass of political matter must have been always under the view
of thinkers for the public, whether they act in office or not. Amongst
events, even the late calamitous events were in the book of contingency.
Of course they must have been in design, at least, provided for. A plan
which takes in as many as possible of the states concerned will rather
tend to facilitate and simplify a rational scheme for preserving Spain
(if that were our sole, as I think it ought to be our principal object)
than to delay and perplex it.
If we should think that a provident policy (perhaps now more than
provident, urgent and necessary) should lead us to act, we cannot take
measures as if nothing had been done. We must see the faults, if any,
which have conducted to the present misfortunes: not for the sake of
criticism, military or political, or from the common motives of blaming
persons and counsels which have not been successful, but in order, if we
can, to administer some remedy to these disasters, by the adoption of
plans more bottomed in principle, and built on with more discretion.
Mistakes may be lessons.