Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States appointed to reside at
the Court of his Britannic Majesty. The only powers, therefore, which
circumstances permit Mr Adams to announce, are those which authorise
him to take a part in the negotiations for peace. The two other powers
can be of no avail until the conclusion of that peace, so that it
would be at least useless to produce them at present; and
consequently Mr Adams will not act inconsistent with the design and
nature of his appointment by concealing them from the Court of London.
Although the Count de Vergennes is unacquainted with the instructions
of Mr Adams, yet he is persuaded that they are conformable to the
foregoing reflections, and that they do not direct him to make an
immediate communication of his powers relative to a treaty of
commerce, any more than they order him to make a separate peace with
Great Britain. This opinion is founded on that which the King's
Ministry entertain of the wisdom, prudence and fidelity of Congress.
III. It is to be observed, that the English Ministry would consider
that communication as ridiculous; so that it is deceiving one's self
to suppose, that it will engage them to enter into any conference, or
so say anything more than what is contained in the resolutions of
Parliament, namely, that they will listen to the Americans and receive
them into favor, when they return to their former allegiance. It can
answer no good purpose to draw from them such an answer, nor can the
United States want such an answer, to inform them of the present
sentiments of the Court of London, and much less to prepare with
councils and arms to resist them. It is astonishing to talk of
preparations of councils and arms, when the war is raging in all its
fury, when it has now lasted six years, and England has not yet made
one overture to the Americans, that can authorise them to believe that
she would agree to their independence.
IV. The English Ministry would either return no answer, or if they did
it would be an insolent one. In case of the latter, why should a man
needlessly expose himself to insult, and thereby make himself the
laughing-stock of all the nations who have not yet acknowledged the
independence of the United States? But there is reason to believe that
Mr Adams would receive no answer, because the British Ministry would
not think themselves bound to return one to a man who assumes a
character, which the Court of London must consider as an insult. It
should not be forgotten, that that Court always considers the
Americans as rebellious subjects. With such an opinion, how could Lord
Germain receive a letter from Mr Adams, taking upon himself the
character of Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of North
America? How could that Minister bear the mention of a treaty of
commerce, which can only take place between independent nations? These
observations will convince Mr Adams, that France has no occasion for
the expedient which he proposes, to discover the sentiments and
dispositions of the Court of London, and that we are already perfectly
acquainted with what we ought and may expect from it, in the present
situation of affairs.
V. The silence, or the answer of the English Ministry, let which will
happen, will neither alarm nor arouse the people of England. That
people, without doubt, desire peace and an accommodation with America.
But we find that only some individuals talk of independence, and
these, more from a spirit of opposition than from conviction. There
never has been a single motion made in Parliament tending to grant
that independence. Yet the people have friends and protectors in
Parliament. From this, Mr Adams may judge into what embarrassment the
announcing his powers would throw the Ministry.
VI. England, as well as the rest of Europe, is perfectly acquainted
with the nature of the engagements, which subsist between France and
the United States. The King caused a declaration to be made by his
Ministry on the 13th of March, 1778, that he had not secured to
himself any exclusive privilege by the treaty of commerce of the 6th
of February of the same year, and his Majesty has confirmed that
declaration in a writing published by his order. So that the
plenipotentiary powers of Mr Adams can disclose nothing new, either to
England or to the other powers of Europe, and the false opinion of the
Court of London in this matter can be no obstacle to a peace. If any
such obstacle existed, the English Ministry would themselves find
means to remove it, if they were determined to make peace; depend upon
that.
VII. It is certain that the whole English nation, and even the
Ministers themselves, wish for peace. But it has been observed, that
there has not been a single motion made in favor of the independence
of America. Certainly the plenipotentiary powers of Mr Adams will not
change the present dispositions of the people in that respect, and
consequently the communication that might be made of them, will
neither facilitate nor accelerate the conclusion of peace.
VIII. This is a sensible reflection. It proves that Mr Adams is
himself convinced that there are circumstances, which may induce him
to conceal his powers. The King's Ministry think that such
circumstances will continue till the English nation shall show a
disposition to acknowledge the independence of the United States. That
acknowledgment will not be facilitated by proposing a treaty of
commerce. For the English are at present well persuaded, that they
will have such a treaty with America when they shall judge it proper.
They have besides, as Mr Adams has himself mentioned in his letter of
the 19th of February last, a full knowledge of his commission, so
that the communication of his full powers will teach them nothing new
in this respect.
IX. In answer to this paragraph it may be observed, that there is not
an Englishman who is not persuaded that the United States are disposed
to grant the advantages of commerce to their ancient metropolis; but
it would be a very difficult task to persuade an Englishman or any
thinking being, that by granting independence in exchange for these
advantages, the Court of London would make an honorable and
advantageous peace. If this was the real sentiment of the people of
England, why have they for these six years past, without murmuring,
furnished ruinous supplies for subduing America?
X. The English Ministry either have sincere intentions of making
peace, or they mean to amuse and penetrate the designs of Spain. In
the first case, they will express the conditions on which they desire
to treat; they will then be obliged to explain their views and their
demands with regard to America. They assuredly forget nothing which
they think will forward peace, and upon agreeing to her independence,
their first care will be to demand equal privileges with France in
regard to commerce. On the contrary, if the English Ministry only
means to amuse Spain, to penetrate her designs and to slacken her
preparations for war, Mr Adams should do the Ministry of Madrid
justice to believe that they will have sagacity enough to discover
their views, and have understanding and prudence sufficient to
determine on the conduct they ought to pursue.
XI. If Mr Adams is as sure as he is of his existence, that the English
Ministry have no intention of making peace on terms which France and
America can agree to, to what purpose communicate to them at present
powers, which cannot be made use of until after the peace. How can Mr
Adams persuade himself, that the Court of London will be seduced by
the bait of a treaty of commerce, while it still manifests an
invincible repugnance to acknowledge the independence of America.
Whenever it shall be disposed to acknowledge that independence, it
will of itself propose the conditions on which it will be then proper
to grant it, and Mr Adams may rest assured, that it will not forget
the article of commerce. Then will be the proper time for him to
produce his plenipotentiary powers. In the meantime, it is necessary
to pursue measures for the establishing the foundation of that
negotiation, namely, the independence of America, and that can only be
effected by carrying on the war with vigor and success.
* * * * *
TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.
Paris, July 26th, 1780.
Sir,
I have received the letter, which your Excellency did me the honor to
write me on the 25th of this month.
The sincere respect I entertain for your Excellency's sentiments would
have determined me, upon the least intimation, to have communicated my
letter and your answer to Congress, and to suspend, until I should
receive orders on their part, all measures towards the British
Ministry, without your Excellency's requisition in the name of the
King.
I shall transmit these papers to Congress, and I doubt not the
reasons your Excellency has adduced will be sufficient to induce them
to suspend any communication to the British Ministry, as it is
undoubtedly their wisdom to conduct all such measures in concert with
their allies.
There is a great body of people in America, as determined as any to
support their independence, and their alliances, who notwithstanding
wish that no measure may be left unattempted by Congress, or their
servants, to manifest their readiness for peace, upon such terms as
they think honorable and advantageous to all parties. Your
Excellency's arguments, or indeed your authority, will probably be
sufficient to satisfy these people, and to justify me, whereas without
them I might have been liable to the censure of numbers. For it is
most certain, that all due deference will be shown by the people of
the United States and their servants, both in and out of Congress, to
the sentiments of the Ministry of France.
This deference, however, by no means extends so far as to agree in all
cases to those sentiments without examination. I cannot, therefore,
agree in the sentiment, that proposing a treaty of peace and commerce,
is discovering a great deal of weakness, or that the Americans have
forgotten the British system of tyranny, cruelty, or perfidy, or to
invite her to believe the Americans have an irresistible predilection
for England, or to fortify her in the opinion that the American
patriots will submit through weariness, or through fear of the
preponderant influence of the tories.
And so far from thinking it would give credit to the opinion, if there
be such a one in all Europe, that the United States incline towards a
defection, and that they will not be faithful to their engagements, it
seems to me on the contrary, it would discredit the opinion which
prevails too much in Europe, that there is some secret treaty between
France and the United States, by which the former is entitled to
exclusive privileges in the American trade.
It is very true, that the independence of America must be acknowledged
before a treaty of peace can be made. But a prospect of a free trade
with America, upon principles of perfect equality and reciprocity,
like that between France and the United States, might be a powerful
inducement with the people of England, to acknowledge American
independence. Indeed I do not see any other considerable motive, that
England can ever have to make that acknowledgment. The Congress have
given no positive instructions respecting the time or manner of making
these powers known to one Court or another. All this is left at
discretion, and to a construction of the Commissioners themselves. It
is very certain, that all the belligerent powers are busily occupied
every winter in their councils, and preparations for the ensuing
campaign. And it is also certain, that the artifice of the British
Ministry, in holding up to view every winter some semblance of a
design of reconciliation formerly, and of peace latterly, has been a
real engine of hostility against America, equal to a considerable part
of the British army. Neither the people of America, nor Mr Adams, have
the least dread upon their minds, of an insolent answer from one of
the British Ministers, nor of the ridicule of those nations who have
not yet acknowledged the independence of America. No man of any
knowledge, justice, or humanity, in any of those nations, would laugh
upon such an occasion, on the contrary, he would feel a just
indignation against a Minister who should insult a message so
obviously calculated for the good of England, and of all Europe, in
the present circumstances of affairs.
I am very much mistaken, for I speak upon memory, if the Duke of
Richmond did not make a motion two years ago in the House of Lords,
and if Mr Hartley did not make another about a year ago, which was
seconded by Lord North himself, in the House of Commons, tending to
grant independence to America. And it is very certain, that a great
part of the people of England think that peace can be had upon no
other terms. It is most clear, that the present Ministry will not
grant independence; the only chance of obtaining it is by change of
that Ministry, The King is so attached to that Ministry, that he will
not change them, until it appears that they have so far lost the
confidence of the people, that their representatives in Parliament
dare no longer to support them, and in the course of the last winter
the weight and sentiment of the people were so considerable, as to
bring many great questions nearly to a balance, and particularly to
carry two votes, one against the increase of the influence of the
Crown, and another against the Board of Trade and Plantations, a vote
that seemed almost to decide the American question, and they came
within a very few votes of deciding against the American Secretary.
Now where parties are approaching so near to a balance, even a small
weight thrown into either scale may turn it.
In my letter of the 19th of February, I said, that my appointment was
notorious in America, and that therefore it was probably known to the
Court of London, although they had not regular evidence of it. The
question then, was more particularly concerning a commission to assist
in the pacification. This was published in the American newspapers,
in a general way, but I have no reason to think they are particularly
informed of these matters; if they were, no evil that I am aware of
could result from giving them the information officially. Certainly
they have no official information, and it is denied, that they know
the nature of Mr Adams' commission.
Without any great effort of genius, I think it is easy to demonstrate
to any thinking being, that by granting American independence, and
making a treaty of commerce upon principles of perfect reciprocity,
England would in the present circumstances of affairs make an
honorable and an advantageous peace. It would have been more for their
honor and advantage never to have made this war against America, it is
true, but having made it, all the dishonor and disadvantage there is
in it are indelible, and after thirteen colonies have been driven to
throw off their government and annihilate it in every root and branch,
becoming independent in fact, maintaining this independence against a
force of forty thousand men and fifty ships of war, that would have
shaken most of the States of Europe to the foundation, after
maintaining this independence four years, and having made an honorable
treaty with the first power in Europe, after another power had fallen
into the war in consequence of the same system, after the voice of
mankind had so far declared against the justice of their cause, that
they could get no ally, but on the contrary all the maritime powers
are entering into a confederacy against them, upon a point which has
been a principal source of their naval superiority in Europe; in these
circumstances, the only honorable part they can act, is to conform to
the opinion of mankind, and the dishonorable and ruinous part for them
to act is to continue the war. For the principle, that the people
have a right to a form of government according to their own judgments
and inclinations, is, in this intelligent age so well agreed on in the
world, that it would be thought dishonorable by mankind in general,
for the English to govern three millions of people against their wills
by military force, and this is all they can ever hope for, even
supposing they could bribe and tempt deserters enough from our army
and apostates from our cause to make it impossible for us to carry on
the war. This, however, I know to be impossible, and that they never
will get quiet possession again of the government of any one whole
State in the thirteen; no, not for an hour. If England considers
further, that America is now known all over Europe to be such a
magazine of raw materials for manufactures, such a nursery of seamen,
and such a source of commerce and naval power, that it would be
dangerous to all the maritime powers to suffer any one of them to
establish a domination and a monopoly again in America.
I know there exists in some European minds, a prejudice against
America, and a jealousy that she will be hurtful to Europe, and
England may place some dependence upon this prejudice and jealousy,
but the motions of the maritime powers begin to convince her, that
this jealousy and prejudice do not run so deep as they thought, and
surely there never was a more groundless prejudice entertained among
men, and it must be dissipated as soon as the subject is considered.
America is a nation of husbandmen, planted on a vast continent of wild
uncultivated land, and there is, and will be for centuries, no way in
which these people can get a living, and advance their interest so
much as by agriculture. They can apply themselves to manufactures,
only to fill up interstices of time, in which they cannot labor on
their lands, and to commerce, only to carry the produce of their
lands, the raw materials of manufactures, to the European market.
Europe is a country whose land is all cultivated nearly to perfection,
where the people have no way to advance themselves but by manufactures
and commerce; here are two worlds then, fitted by God and nature, to
benefit each other, one by furnishing raw materials, the other
manufactures, and they can never interfere. The number of States in
America, their position and extension over such a great continent, and
their fundamental constitution that nine States must concur to war,
show that nine of these States never can agree in any foreign war, or
any other, but for self defence, if they should ever become powerful.
But in this case, however disagreeable a prospect it may open to
Americans, Europe has an everlasting warranty against their becoming
dangerous to her in the nature of men, the nature of her governments,
and their position towards one another.
All these circumstances serve to show, and the people of England begin
to be sensible of it, that Europe will never suffer them to regain
their domination and monopoly, even if the English were able to extort
a forced submission. In this situation then, the only honorable and
advantageous course for England is to make peace, and open commerce
with America, in perfect consistency with her independence and her
alliances. The people of England cannot be said to furnish subsidies
without murmuring, for it is certain there never was so much murmuring
and such radical discontent in that nation nor any other, but at the
eve of a revolution.
I very cheerfully agree with your Excellency in opinion, that the
Court of Spain has sagacity enough to penetrate and to defeat the
deceitful designs of the English, and am not under other apprehensions
from thence, than that the report of a negotiation with Spain will
leave some impressions in America, where I believe the English
Ministry chiefly intend it. I have already said, that from the present
British Ministry I expect no peace. It is for the nation and for the
change of Ministry, as a step towards peace, that I thought it might
have some effect to make the communication, and to satisfy those
people in America, who without the most distant thought of departing
from their independence or their alliances, wish still to take every
reasonable measure towards peace. Your Excellency's letter will
convince them, that my apprehensions were wrong, and your advice will
undoubtedly be followed, as it ought to be; for they cannot promise
themselves any advantages from the communication equivalent to the
inconveniency of taking a measure of this kind, which ought not to be
done but in concert, against the opinion of the Ministry of France.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.
Paris, July 27th, 1780.
Sir,
Since my letter of the 21st, and upon reading over again your
Excellency's letter to me of the 20th, I observed one expression,
which I think it my duty to consider more particularly. The expression
I have in view, is this, "that the King without having been solicited
by the Congress, had taken measures the most efficacious to sustain
the American cause."
Upon this part of your letter, I must entreat your Excellency to
recollect, that the Congress did as long, ago as the year 1776, before
Dr Franklin was sent off for France, instruct him, Mr Deane, and Mr
Lee, to solicit the King for six ships of the line, and I have reason
to believe, that the Congress have been from that moment to this,
persuaded that this object has been constantly solicited by their
Ministers at this Court.
In addition to this, I have every personal, as well as public motive
to recall to your Excellency's recollection, a letter or memorial,
which was presented to your Excellency in the latter end of the month
of December, 1778, or the beginning of January, 1779, in which a great
variety of arguments were adduced to show, that it was not only good
policy, but absolutely necessary, to send a superiority of naval force
to the coasts of the Continent of America.[7] This letter, together
with your Excellency's answer, acknowledging the receipt of it, I
transmitted to Congress myself, and their Journals show, that they
received them near a year ago, so that Congress I am persuaded, rest
in the most perfect security in the persuasion, that everything has
been done by themselves and their servants at this Court, to obtain
this measure, and that the necessary arrangements of the King's naval
service have hitherto prevented it.
But if it was only suspected by Congress, that a direct application
from them to the King was expected, I am assured they would not
hesitate a moment to make it. I am so convinced by experience, of the
absolute necessity of more consultations and communications between
his Majesty's Ministers and the Ministers of Congress, that I am
determined to omit no opportunity of communicating my sentiments to
your Excellency, upon everything that appears to me of importance to
the common cause, in which I can do it with propriety. And the
communications shall be direct in person, or by letter to your
Excellency, without the intervention of any third person. And I shall
be very happy, and think myself highly honored, to give my poor
opinion and advice to his Majesty's Ministers upon anything that
relates to the United States, or the common cause, whenever they shall
be asked.
I wish I may be mistaken, but it could answer no good purpose to
deceive myself; and I certainly will not disguise my sentiments from
your Excellency. I think that Admiral Graves, with the ships before in
America, will be able to impede the operations of M. de Ternay, of M.
de Rochambeau, and of General Washington, if their plan is to attack
New York.