duty. Lying is a creation of the evil spirits, and the most
efficacious weapon against it is the holy religion revealed to
man by Zarathustra.[190] In one of the Pahlavi texts it is said
that when the Spirit of Wisdom was asked, "Through how many ways
and motives and good works do people arrive most at heaven?" he
answered thus: "The first good work is liberality, the second
truth."[191] Contracts are inviolable, both those which are
pledged with hand or pawn, and those by a mere word.[192] It is a
duty to keep faith even with an unbeliever:--"Break not the
contract, O Spitama, neither the one that thou hadst entered into
with one of the unfaithful, nor the one that thou hadst entered
into with one of the faithful who is one of thy own faith."[193]
Greek historians and cuneiform inscriptions also bear witness to
the great detestation in which falsehood was held by the ancient
Persians. Herodotus writes:--"Their sons are carefully instructed
from their fifth to their twentieth year in three things
alone--to ride, to draw the bow, and to speak the truth. . . .
The most disgraceful thing in the world, they think, is to tell a
lie; the next worse, to owe a debt: because, among other reasons,
the debtor is obliged to tell lies."[194] In the inscriptions of
Darius lying is taken as representative of all evil. He is
favoured by Ormuzd "because he was not a heretic, nor a liar, nor
a tyrant." His great fear is lest it may be thought that any part
of the record which he has set up has been falsely related; and
he even abstains from narrating certain events of his reign "lest
to him who may hereafter peruse the tablet, the many deeds that
have been done by him may seem to be falsely recorded."[195]
Professor Spiegel tries to prove that {94} falsehood, not
truthfulness, was a national characteristic of the ancient
Eranians, to which their noblest men offered fruitless
resistance;[196] but the facts he quotes in support of his
opinion refer to their dealings with foreign nations, and have
consequently little bearing on the subject. The modern Persians
are notorious liars, who do not even claim to be believed, and
smile when detected in a lie.[197] The nomad alone is faithful to
his word; the expression, "I am a nomad," means, "You may trust
me."[198]
[Footnote 190: _Bundahis_, i. 24; xxviii. 14, 16. _Dînâ-î
Maînôg-î Khirad_, xix. 4, 6; xxx. 5; xxxvi. 29. Darmesteter, in
_Sacred Books of the East_, iv. p. lxii. Spiegel, _Erânische
Alterthumskunde_, iii. 684 _sq._ Geiger, _Civilization of the
Eastern Ir[=a]nians_, i. 164 _sq._ Meyer, _Geschichte des
Alterthums_, i. 534, 536.]
[Footnote 191: _Dînâ-î Maînôg-î Khirad_, xxxvii. 2 _sqq._]
[Footnote 192: _Vendîdâd_, iv. 5 _sqq._]
[Footnote 193: _Yasts_, x. 2.]
[Footnote 194: Herodotus, i. 136, 138. _Cf._ Stobæus,
_Florilegium_, 44, vol. ii. 227; Xenophon, _Cyri Institutio_,
i. 6. 33.]
[Footnote 195: Rawlinson, in his translation of Herodotus, i. 262
_sq._ n. 3.]
[Footnote 196: Spiegel, _op. cit._ iii. 686.]
[Footnote 197: Polak, _Persien_, i. 10. Wallin, _Reseanteckningar
från Orienten_, iv. 192, 247. Wilson, _Persian Life and Customs_,
p. 229 _sqq._]
[Footnote 198: Polak, _op. cit._ ii. 95.]
Falsehood is a prevailing vice in other Muhammedan countries
also. "Constant veracity," says Mr. Lane, "is a virtue extremely
rare in modern Egypt"; and a deceitful disposition in commercial
transactions is one of the most notorious faults of the
Egyptian.[199] Mr. Lane partly ascribes this habit to the
influence of Islam, which allows, and even commands, falsehood in
certain cases. The common Moslem doctrine is, that a lie is
permissible when told in order to save one's own life, or to
reconcile persons at variance with each other, or to please or
persuade one's wife, or to obtain any advantage in a war with the
enemies of the faith.[200] But in other cases lying was highly
reprobated by the Prophet; and that the people have not forgotten
its sinfulness appears from the phrase, "No, I beg forgiveness of
God, it was so and so," which they seldom omit when retracting an
unintentional mis-statement.[201] I think it is erroneous to
regard the want of truthfulness among Muhammedan nations as a
result of their religion. The Eastern Christians and Buddhists
are no less addicted to falsehood than the Muhammedans.[202]
[Footnote 199: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern
Egyptians_, i. 382 _sq._ _Cf._ Burckhardt, _Arabic Proverbs_,
p. 100.]
[Footnote 200: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, i. 383. Muir, _Life of
Mahomet_, i. p. lxxiii. _sq._ n. [dagger].]
[Footnote 201: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, i. 383 _sq._]
[Footnote 202: Vámbéry, _Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert_,
p. 232.]
The Homeric poems make us acquainted with gods and men who have
recourse to fraud and lying whenever it suits their purpose.[203]
The great Zeus makes no difficulty {95} in sending a lying dream
to Agamemnon. Pallas Athene is guilty of gross deceit and
treachery to Hector; she expressly recommends dissimulation, and
loves Odysseus on account of his deceitful character.[204] No man
deals more in feigned stories than this master of cunning, who
makes a boast of his falsehood.[205] In the period which lies
between the Homeric age and the Persian wars veracity made
perhaps some progress among the Greeks,[206] but it never became
one of their national virtues.[207] Yet in the Greek literature
deceit is frequently condemned as a vice, and truthfulness
praised as a virtue.[208] Achilles expresses his horror of
lying.[209] "Not to tell a lie," was one of the maxims of
Solon.[210] Pindar strongly censures a character like that of
Odysseus,[211] and ends up his eulogy on Psaumis by the assurance
that he never would contaminate his speech with a lie.[212]
According to Pythagoras, men become like gods when they speak the
truth.[213] According to Plato, the habit of lying makes the soul
ugly[214]; "truth is the beginning of every good thing, both to
gods and men."[215] Yet a distinction should be made between
different kinds of untruth. Though the many are too fond of
saying that at proper times and places falsehood may often be
right,[216] it must be admitted that a lie is in certain cases
useful and not hateful, as in dealing with enemies, or when those
whom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are
going to do some harm.[217] Moreover, the rulers of the State are
allowed to lie for the public good, just as physicians make use
of medicines; and they will find a considerable dose of falsehood
and deceit necessary for this purpose.[218] On the other hand, if
the ruler catches anybody besides himself lying in the {96}
State, lie will punish him for introducing a practice "which is
equally subversive and destructive of ships or State."[219] Next
to him who takes a false oath, he who tells a falsehood in the
presence of his superiors--elders, parents, or rulers--is most
hateful to the gods.[220]
[Footnote 203: _Cf._ Kames, _Sketches of the History of Man_, iv.
150 _sq._; Mahaffy, _Social Life in Greece_, p. 26 _sqq._]
[Footnote 204: _Odyssey_, xiii. 331 _sq._]
[Footnote 205: _Ibid._ ix. 19 _sq._]
[Footnote 206: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 413.]
[Footnote 207: _Cf._ Thucydides, iii. 83.]
[Footnote 208: See Schmidt, _op. cit._ ii. 403 _sqq._]
[Footnote 209: _Iliad_, ix. 312 _sq._]
[Footnote 210: Diogenes Laertius, _Vitæ philosophorum_, i. 2 (60).]
[Footnote 211: Pindar, _Nemea_, viii. 26.]
[Footnote 212: _Idem_, _Olympia_, iv. 17.]
[Footnote 213: Stobæus, _op. cit._ xi. 25, vol. i. 312.]
[Footnote 214: Plato, _Gorgias_, p. 524 _sq._]
[Footnote 215: _Idem_, _Leges_, v. 730.]
[Footnote 216: _Ibid._ xi. 916.]
[Footnote 217: Plato, _Respublica_, ii. 382.]
[Footnote 218: _Ibid._ iii. 389; v. 459.]
[Footnote 219: Plato, _Respublica_, iii. 389.]
[Footnote 220: _Idem_, _Leges_, xi. 917. _Idem_, _Respublica_,
iii. 389.]
Not without reason did the Romans of the republican age contrast
their own _fides_ with the mendacity of the Greeks and the
perfidy of the Ph[oe]nicians. "The goddess of faith (of human and
social faith)," says Gibbon, "was worshipped, not only in her
temples, but in the lives of the Romans; and if that nation was
deficient in the more amiable qualities of benevolence and
generosity, they astonished the Greeks by their sincere and
simple performance of the most burdensome engagements."[221]
Their annals are adorned with signal examples of uprightness,
which, though to a great extent fictitious, yet bear testimony to
the estimation in which that quality was held.[222] The Greeks
had no Regulus who "chose to deliver himself up to a cruel death
rather than to falsify his word to the enemy."[223] The basest
forms of falsehood were severely punished by law. According to
the Twelve Tables, any one who had slandered or libelled another
by imputing to him a wrongful or immoral act, was to be scourged
to death,[224] and capital punishment was also inflicted on false
witnesses[225] and corrupt judges.[226] However, already before
the end of the Republic dishonesty, perjuries, and forgeries
became common in Rome.[227]
[Footnote 221: Gibbon, _History of the Decline and Fall of the
Roman Empire_, v. 311.]
[Footnote 222: _Cf._ Inge, _Society in Rome under the Cæsars_,
p. 33 _sq._]
[Footnote 223: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 13.]
[Footnote 224: _Lex Duodecim Tabularum_, viii. 1.]
[Footnote 225: _Ibid._ viii. 23. Aulus Gellius, _Noctes Atticæ_,
xx. i. 53.]
[Footnote 226: _Lex Duodecim Tabularum_, ix. 3. Aulus Gellius,
_op. cit._ xx. i. 7.]
[Footnote 227: Inge, _op. cit._ p. 35.]
The ancient Scandinavians considered it disgraceful for a man to
tell a lie, to break a promise, or to commit a treacherous
act.[228] To kill or rob openly was a pardonable offence, if an
offence at all; but he who did it secretly was a _nithinger_, a
"hateful man," unless indeed he afterwards {97} openly declared
his deed.[229] In the Irish Senchus Mór it is said that not only
false witness, but lying in general, deprives the guilty person
of "half his honour-price up to the third time";[230] and,
according to the commentary to the Book of Aicill, the double of
his own full honour-price is due from each person who commits the
crime of secret murder.[231]
[Footnote 228: Maurer, _Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes_, ii.
154, 183 _sq._ Rosenberg, _Nordboernes Aandsliv_, i. 487.]
[Footnote 229: Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 569.
Nordström, _Bidrag till den svenska samhälls-författningens
historia_, ii. 320 _sqq._ Keyser, _Efterladte Skrifter_, ii. pt.
i. 361. Rosenberg, _Nordboernes Aandsliv_, i. 487. von Amira,
'Recht,' in Paul's _Grundriss der germanischen Philologie_, ii.
pt. ii. 173.]
[Footnote 230: _Ancient Laws of Ireland_, i. 57.]
[Footnote 231: _Ibid._ iii. 99.]
In the Old Testament there are recorded, from the patriarchal
age, some cases of lying, which, far from being condemned, in no
way prevented the liar being a special object of divine favour.
It must be admitted, however, that undue importance has been
attached to some of these acts of falsehood,[232] which were
committed among foreigners with a view to escaping an impending
danger.[233] For instance, when Isaac, dwelling in Gerar, said of
his wife that she was his sister, for fear lest the men of the
place should kill him,[234] he did a thing which few
conscientious men under similar circumstances would hesitate to
do. As for Jacob's long course of double-dealing with his
father-in-law, who was equally greedy and unscrupulous, it should
be remembered that they were natives of different lands.[235]
Again, when Jacob, at the instigation of his mother, grossly
deceived his own blind father, the intriguers, as has been pointed
out,[236] manifestly felt that the blessing extorted from Isaac
ought to descend upon Jacob rather than upon Esau, and inasmuch as
the word of the father was held to carry with it divine validity
and potency, the securing of it by fair means or foul was deemed an
urgent necessity. It is obvious that the ancient Hebrews did not
condemn deceit as wrong in the abstract, and that they were very
unscrupulous in the use of means. Whenever {98} David was
threatened by any danger, he immediately employed a falsehood
which served his turn; though not incapable of generosity, he
deceived enemies and friends indifferently, and there is probably
no record of treachery and lying consistently pursued which
surpasses in baseness his affair with his faithful servant Uriah
the Hittite.[237] It is true that his conduct towards Uriah was
condemned; "the thing that David had done displeased the
Lord."[238] But it is significant that Yahveh himself
occasionally had recourse to deceit for the purpose of carrying
out his plans. In order to ruin Ahab he commissioned a lying
spirit to deceive his prophets;[239] and once he threatened to
use deception as a means of taking revenge upon idolaters.[240]
But to bear false witness against a neighbour was strictly
prohibited;[241] the false witness should suffer the punishment
which he was minded to bring upon the person whom he
calumniated.[242] In Ecclesiasticus lying is severely
censured:--"A lie is a foul blot in a man, yet it is continually
in the mouth of the untaught. A thief is better than a man that
is accustomed to lie: but they both shall have destruction to
heritage. The disposition of a liar is dishonourable, and his
shame is ever with him."[243] "Lying lips are abomination to the
Lord: but they that deal truly are his delight."[244] According
to the Talmud, "four shall not enter Paradise: the scoffer, the
liar, the hypocrite, and the slanderer."[245] Only for the sake
of peace, and especially domestic peace, may a man tell a lie
without sinning;[246] but he who changes his word commits as
heavy a sin as he who worships idols.[247] The duty of
truthfulness was particularly emphasised by the Essenes.[248] He
who entered their sect had to pledge himself always to love {99}
truth and strive to reclaim all liars.[249] "They are eminent for
fidelity," says Josephus. "Whatsoever they say also is firmer
than an oath; but swearing is avoided by them, and they esteem it
worse than perjury; for they say that he who cannot be believed
without [swearing by] God is already condemned."[250]
[Footnote 232: _E.g._, by McCurdy, 'Moral Evolution of the Old
Testament,' in _American Journal of Theology_, i. 665 _sq._; von
Jhering, _Zweck im Recht_, ii. 606 _sq._; Spencer, _Principles of
Ethics_, i. 402.]
[Footnote 233: _Genesis_, xii. 12 _sq._; xx. 2.]
[Footnote 234: _Ibid._ xxvi. 7.]
[Footnote 235: _Ibid._ ch. xxix. _sqq._]
[Footnote 236: McCurdy, _loc. cit._ p. 666.]
[Footnote 237: _Cf._ Kuenen, _Religion of Israel_, i. 327;
McCurdy, _loc. cit._ p. 681.]
[Footnote 238: _2 Samuel_, xi. 27; xii. 1 _sqq._]
[Footnote 239: _1 Kings_, xxii. 20 _sqq._]
[Footnote 240: _Ezekiel_, xiv. 7 _sqq._ _Cf._ Spencer,
_Principles of Ethics_, i. 402.]
[Footnote 241: _Deuteronomy_, v. 20.]
[Footnote 242: _Ibid._ xix. 1 6 _sqq._]
[Footnote 243: _Ecclesiasticus_, xx. 24 _sqq._]
[Footnote 244: _Proverbs_, xii. 22.]
[Footnote 245: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 57.]
[Footnote 246: Hershon, _Treasures of the Talmud_, p. 69 _sq._]
[Footnote 247: _Sanhedrin_, fol. 92 A, quoted by Montefiore,
_Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of the Ancient Hebrews_,
p. 558.]
[Footnote 248: Philo Judæus, _Quod liber sit quisque virtuti
studet_, p. 877 (_Opera_, ii. 458).]
[Footnote 249: Josephus, _De bello Judaico_, ii. 8. 7.]
[Footnote 250: _Ibid._ ii. 8. 6.]\
"Speak every man truth with his neighbour,"[251] was from early
times regarded as one of the most imperative of Christian
maxims.[252] According to St. Augustine, a lie is not permissible
even when told with a view to saving the life of a neighbour;
"since by lying eternal life is lost, never for any man's
temporal life must a lie be told."[253] Yet all lies are not
equally sinful; the degree of sinfulness depends on the mind of
the liar and on the nature of the subject on which the lie is
told.[254] This became the authorised doctrine of the
Church.[255] Thomas Aquinas says that, although lying is always
sinful, it is not a mortal sin if the end intended be not
contrary to charity, "as appears in a jocose lie, that is
intended to create some slight amusement, and in an officious
lie, in which is intended even the advantage of our
neighbour."[256] Yet from early times we meet within the
Christian Church a much less rigorous doctrine, which soon came
to exercise a more powerful influence on the practice and
feelings of men than did St. Augustine's uncompromising love of
truth. The Greek Fathers maintained that an untruth is not a lie
when there is a "just cause" {100} for it; and as a just cause
they regarded not only self-defence, but also zeal for God's
honour.[257] This zeal, together with an indiscriminate devotion
to the Church, led to those "pious frauds," those innumerable
falsifications of documents, inventions of legends, and forgeries
of every description, which made the Catholic Church a veritable
seat of lying, and most seriously impaired the sense of truth in
the minds of Christians.[258] By a fiction, Papacy, as a divine
institution, was traced back to the age of the Apostles, and in
virtue of another fiction Constantine was alleged to have
abdicated his imperial authority in Italy in favour of the
successor of St. Peter.[259] The Bishop of Rome assumed the
privilege of disengaging men from their oaths and promises. An
oath which was contrary to the good of the Church was declared
not to be binding.[260] The theory was laid down that, as faith
was not to be kept with a tyrant, pirate, or robber, who kills
the body, it was still less to be kept with an heretic, who kills
the soul.[261] Private protestations were thought sufficient to
relieve men in conscience from being bound by a solemn treaty or
from the duty of speaking the truth; and an equivocation, or play
upon words in which one sense is taken by the speaker and another
sense intended by him for the hearer, was in some cases held
permissible.[262] According to Alfonso de' Liguori--who lived in
the eighteenth century and was beatified in the nineteenth, and
whose writings were declared by high authority not to contain a
word that could be justly found fault with,[263]-- {101} there
are three sorts of equivocation which may be employed for a good
reason, even with the addition of a solemn oath. We are allowed
to use ambiguously words having two senses, as the word _volo_,
which means both to "wish" and to "fly"; sentences bearing two
main meanings, as "This book is Peter's," which may mean either
that the book belongs to Peter or that Peter is the author of it;
words having two senses, one more common than the other or one
literal and the other metaphorical--for instance, if a man is
asked about something which it is in his interest to conceal,
he may answer, "No, I say," that is "I say the word 'no'"[264]
As for mental restrictions, again, such as are "purely mental,"
and on that account cannot in any manner be discovered by other
persons, are not permissible; but we may, for a good reason,
make use of a "non-pure mental restriction," which, in the
nature of things, is discoverable, although it is not discovered
by the person with whom we are dealing.[265] Thus it would be
wrong secretly to insert the word "no" in an affirmative oath
without any external sign; but it would not be wrong to insert
it in a whispering voice or under the cover of a cough. The
"good reason" for which equivocations and non-pure mental
restrictions may be employed is defined as "any honest object,
such as keeping our goods spiritual or temporal."[266] In
support of this casuistry it is uniformly said by Catholic
apologists that each man has a right to act upon the defensive,
that he has a right to keep guard over the knowledge which he
possesses in the same way as he may defend his goods; and as for
there being any deceit in the matter--why, soldiers use
stratagems in war, and opponents use feints in fencing.[267]
[Footnote 251: _Ephesians_, iv. 25.]
[Footnote 252: Gass, _Geschichte der christlichen Ethik_, i. 90.]
[Footnote 253: St. Augustine, _De mendacio_, 6 (Migne,
_Patrologiæ cursus_, xl. 494 _sq._).]
[Footnote 254: _Idem_, _Enchiridion_, 18 (Migne, _op. cit._ xl.
240); _Idem_, _De mendacio_, 21 (Migne, xl. 516). For St.
Augustine's views on lying see also his treatise _Contra
mendacium_, addressed to Consentius (Migne, xl. 517 _sqq._), and
Bindemann, _Der heilige Augustinus_, ii. 465 _sqq._]
[Footnote 255: Gratian, _Decretum_, ii. 22. 2. 12, 17. _Catechism
of the Council of Trent_, iii. 9. 23.]
[Footnote 256: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologica_, ii.-ii. **110.
3 _sq._ St. Augustine says (_De mendacio_, 2 [Migne, _op. cit._
xl. 487 _sq._]; _Quæstiones in Genesim_, 145, _ad Gen._ xliv. 15
[Migne, xxxiv. 587]) that jokes which "bear with them in the tone
of voice, and in the very mood of the joker a most evident
indication that he means no deceit," are not accounted lies,
though the thing he utters be not true. This statement is also
incorporated in Gratian's _Decretum_ (ii. 22. 2. 18).]
[Footnote 257: Gass, _op. cit._ i. 91, 92, 236 _sqq._ Newman,
_Apologia pro vita sua_, p. 349 _sq._]
[Footnote 258: von Mosheim, _Institutes of Ecclesiastical
History_, i. 275. Middleton, _Free Inquiry into the Miraculous
Powers, which are supposed to have subsisted in the Christian
Church_, _passim_. Lecky, _Rise, and Influence of Rationalism in
Europe_, i. 396 _sqq._ Gass, _op. cit._ i. 91, 235. von Eicken,
_System der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung_, pp. 654-656, 663.]
[Footnote 259: von Eicken, _op. cit._ p. 656. Poole,
_Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought_, p. 249.]
[Footnote 260: Gregory IX. _Decretales_, ii. 24. 27.]
[Footnote 261: Simancas, _De catholicis institutionibus_, xlvi.
52 _sq._ p. 365 _sq._]
[Footnote 262: Alagona, _Compendium manualis D. Navarri_, xii.
88, p. 94 _sq._:--"Fur, qui est furatus aliquid, si interrogetur
a judice non competenti, vel non juridice, an sit furatus tale
quid, potest secura conscientia respondere simpliciter, non sum
furatus, intelligendo intra se in tali die, vel anno." See also
Kames, _op. cit._ iv. 158 _sq._]
[Footnote 263: Meyrick, _Moral and Devotional Theology of the
Church of Rome_, i. 3.]
[Footnote 264: Alfonso de' Liguori, _Theologia moralis_, iii.
151, vol. i. 249.]
[Footnote 265: _Ibid._ iii. 152, vol. i. 249.]
[Footnote 266: _Ibid._ iii. 151, vol. i. 249.]
[Footnote 267: Meyrick, _op. cit._ i. 25]
Adherence to truth and especially perfect fidelity to a promise
were strongly insisted upon by the code of Chivalry.[268] However
exacting or absurd the vow might {102} be, a knight was compelled
to perform it in all the strictness of the letter. A man
frequently promised to grant whatever another should ask, and he
would have lost the honour of his knighthood if he had declined
from his word.[269] We are told by Lancelot du Lac that when King
Artus had given his word to a knight to make him a present of his
wife, he would neither listen to the lamentations of the
unfortunate woman, nor to any representations which could be made
him; he replied that a king must not go from his word, and the
queen was accordingly delivered to the knight.[270] The knights
taken in war were readily allowed liberty for the time they
asked, on their word of honour that they would return of their
own accord, whenever it should be required.[271] So great, it is
said, was the knight's respect for an oath, a promise, or a vow,
that when they lay under any of these restrictions, they appeared
everywhere with little chains attached to their arms or habits to
show all the world that they were slaves to their word; nor were
these chains taken off till their promise had been performed,
which sometimes extended to a term of four or five years.[272] It
cannot be expected, of course, that reality should have always
come up to the ideal. In the thirteenth century the Count of
Champagne declared that he confided more in the lowest of his
subjects than in his knights.[273] Moreover, the knightly duty of
sincerity seems to have gone little beyond the formal fulfilment
of an engagement. "The age of Chivalry was an age of chicane, and
fraud, and trickery, which were not least conspicuous among the
knightly classes."[274] It is significant that the English law of
the thirteenth century, though quite willing to admit in vague
phrase that no one should be suffered to gain anything by fraud,
was inclined to hold that a man has himself to thank if he is
misled by deceit, the king's court generally providing no remedy
for him who to {103} his disadvantage had trusted the word of a
liar.[275] Towards the end of the Middle Ages and later, crimes
against the Mint and the offence of counterfeiting seals, usually
accompanied by that of forging letters or official documents,
were extremely common in England;[276] and false weights, false
measures, and false pretences of all kinds were ordinary
instruments of commerce.[277]
[Footnote 268: _Book of the Ordre of Chyualry_, foll. 18 b, 31 b,
34 b. Robertson, _History of the Reign of Charles V._ i. 84.
Sainte-Palaye, _Mémoires sur l'ancienne chevalerie_, i. 76 _sq._]
[Footnote 269: Mills, _History of Chivalry_, p. 152.]
[Footnote 270: Lancelot du Lac, vol. ii. fol. 2 a.]
[Footnote 271: Sainte-Palaye, _op. cit._ i. 135.]
[Footnote 272: _Ibid._ i. 236 _sq._]
[Footnote 273: _Ibid._ ii. 47. _Cf._ Kames, _op. cit._ iv. 157.]
[Footnote 274: Pike, _History of Crime in England_, i. 283.]
[Footnote 275: Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law
before the Time of Edward I._ ii. 535 _sq._]
[Footnote 276: Pike, _op. cit._ i. 265, 269; ii. 392.]
[Footnote 277: _Ibid._ i. 142; ii. 238.]
In modern times, according to Mr. Pike, the Public Records
testify a decrease of deception in England.[278] Commercial
honesty has improved, and those mean arts to which, during the
reigns of the Tudors, even men in the highest positions
frequently had recourse, have now, at any rate, descended to a
lower grade of society.[279] At present, in the civilised
countries of the West, opinion as to what the duty of sincerity
implies varies not only in different individuals, but among
different classes or groups of people, as also among different
nations. Duplicity is held more reprehensible in a gentleman than
in a shopkeeper or a peasant. The notion which seems to be common
in England, that an advocate is over-scrupulous who refuses to
say what he knows to be false if he is instructed to say it,[280]
appears strange at least to some foreigners;[281] and in certain
countries it is commonly regarded as blamable if a person
ostensibly professes a religion in which he does not believe,
say, by going to church. The Quakers deem all complimentary modes
of speech, for instance in addressing people, to be objectionable
as being inconsistent with truth.[282] Certain philosophers have
expressed the opinion that veracity is an unconditional duty,
which is not to be limited by any expediency, but must be
respected in all circumstances. According to Kant, it would be a
crime to tell a falsehood to a murderer who asked us whether
{104} our friend, of whom he was in pursuit, had taken refuge in
our house.[283] Fichte maintains that the defence of so-called
necessary lies is "the most wicked argument possible amongst
men."[284] Dymond says, "If I may tell a falsehood to a robber in
order to save my property, I may commit parricide for the same
purpose."[285] But this rigorous view is not shared by common
sense, nor by orthodox Protestant theology.[286] Jeremy Taylor
asks, "Who will not tell a harmless lie to save the life of his
friend, of his child, of himself, of a good and brave man?"[287]
Where deception is designed to benefit the person deceived, says
Professor Sidgwick, "common sense seems to concede that it may
sometimes be right: for example, most persons would not hesitate
to speak falsely to an invalid, if this seemed the only way of
concealing facts that might produce a dangerous shock: nor do I
perceive that any one shrinks from telling fictions to children,
on matters upon which it is thought well that they should not
know the truth."[288] In the case of grown-up people, however,
this principle seems to require the modification made by
Hutcheson, that there is no wrong in false speech when the party
deceived himself does not consider it an injury to be
deceived.[289] Otherwise it might easily be supposed to give
support to "pious fraud," which in its crudest form is nowadays
generally disapproved of, but which in subtle disguise still has
many advocates among religious partisans. It is argued that the
most important truths of religion cannot be conveyed into the
minds of ordinary men, except by being enclosed, as it were, in a
shell of fiction, and that by relating such fictions as if they
were facts we are really performing an act of substantial
veracity.[290] But this argument seems chiefly to have been
invented for the {105} purpose of supporting a dilapidated
structure of theological teaching, and can hardly be accepted by
any person unprejudiced by religious bias. As a means of
self-defence deviation from truth has been justified not only in
the case of grosser injuries, but in the case of illegitimate
curiosity, as it seems unreasonable that a person should be
obliged to supply another with information which he has no right
to exact.[291] The obligation of keeping a promise, again, is
qualified in various ways. Thoughtful persons would commonly
admit that such an obligation is relative to the promisee, and
may be annulled by him.[292] A promise to do an immoral act is
held not to be binding, because the prior obligation not to do
the act is paramount.[293] If, before the time comes to fulfil a
promise, circumstances have altered so much that the effects of
keeping it are quite different from those which were foreseen
when it was made, all would agree that the promisee ought to
release the promiser; but if he declines to do so, some would say
that the latter is in every case bound by his promise, whilst
others would maintain that a considerable alteration of
circumstances has removed the obligation.[294] How far promises
obtained by force or fraud are binding is a much disputed
question.[295] According to Hutcheson, for instance, no regard is
due to a promise which has been extorted by unjust violence.[296]
Adam Smith, on the other hand, considers that whenever such a
promise is violated, though for the most necessary reason, it is
always with some degree of dishonour to the person who made
it, and that "a brave man ought to die rather than make a promise
{106} which he can neither keep without folly nor violate without
ignominy."[297]
[Footnote 278: _Ibid._ i. 264. _Cf._ _ibid._ ii. 474.]
[Footnote 279: _Ibid._ ii. 14 _sq._]
[Footnote 280: Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 316. Paley,
_Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy_, iii. 15
(_Complete Works_, ii. 117). The same view was expressed by
Cicero (_De officiis_, ii. 14).]
[Footnote 281: See also Dymond, _Essays on the Principles of
Morals_, ii. 5, p. 50 _sqq._]
[Footnote 282: Gurney, _Views and Practices of the Society of
Friends_, p. 401.]
[Footnote 283: Kant, 'Ueber ein vermeintes Recht, aus
Menschenliebe zu Lügen,' in _Sämmtliche Werke_, vii.
309.]
[Footnote 284: Fichte, _Das System der Sittenlehre_, p. 371;
English translation, p. 303 _sq._]
[Footnote 285: Dymond, _op. cit._ ii. 6, p. 57.]
[Footnote 286: Reinhard, _System der Christlichen Moral_, iii.
193 _sqq._ Martensen, _Christian Ethics_, 'Individual Ethics,'
p. 216 _sqq._ Newman, _Apologia pro vita sua_, p. 274.]
[Footnote 287: Taylor, _Whole Works_, xii. 162.]
[Footnote 288: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 316.]
[Footnote 289: Hutcheson, _System of Moral Philosophy_, ii. 32.]
[Footnote 290: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 316.]
[Footnote 291: Schopenhauer, _Die Grundlage der Moral_, § 17
(_Sämmtliche Werke_, vi. 247 _sqq._).]
[Footnote 292: Whewell, _Elements of Morality_, p. 156. Sidgwick,
_op. cit._ p. 305.]
[Footnote 293: Dymond, _op. cit._ ii. 6, p. 55. Whewell, _op.
cit._ p. 156 _sq._ Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 305. This is also the
opinion of Thomas Aquinas (_op. cit._ ii.-ii. 110. 3. 5).]
[Footnote 294: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 306 _sq._ Thomas Aquinas
says (_op. cit._ ii.-ii. 110. 3. 5) that a person who does not do
what he has promised is excused "if the conditions of persons and
things are changed."]
[Footnote 295: Dymond, _op. cit._ ii. 6, p. 55 _sq._ Whewell,
_op. cit._ pp. 155, 159 _sqq._ Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 305 _sq._
Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 486 _sqq._]
[Footnote 296: Hutcheson, _System of Moral Philosophy_, ii. 34.]
[Footnote 297: Adam Smith, _op. cit._ p. 489.]
In point of veracity and good faith the old distinction between
duties which we owe to our fellow-countrymen and such as we owe
to foreigners is still preserved in various cases. It is
particularly conspicuous in the relations between different
states, in peace or war. Stratagems and the employment of
deceptive means necessary to procure intelligence respecting the
enemy or the country are held allowable in warfare, independently
of the question whether the war is defensive or aggressive.[298]
Deceit has, in fact, often constituted a great share of the glory
of the most celebrated commanders; and particularly in the
eighteenth century it was a common opinion that successes gained
through a spy are more creditable to the skill of a general than
successes in regular battles.[299] Lord Wolseley writes:--"As a
nation we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by
falsehood; the word spy conveys something as repulsive as slave;
we will keep hammering along with the conviction that honesty is
the best policy, and that truth always wins in the long run.
These pretty little sentences do well for a child's copy-book,
but the man who acts upon them in war had better sheathe his
sword for ever."[300] At the same time, there are some exceptions
to the general rule that deceit is permitted against an enemy.
Under the customs of war it has been agreed that particular acts
and signs shall have a specific meaning in order that
belligerents {107} may carry on certain necessary intercourse,
and it is forbidden to employ such acts or signs in deceiving an
enemy. Thus information must not be surreptitiously obtained
under the shelter of a flag of truce; buildings not used as
hospitals must not be marked with an hospital flag; and persons
not covered by the provisions of the Geneva Convention must not
be protected by its cross.[301] A curious arbitrary rule affects
one class of stratagems by forbidding certain permitted means of
deception from the moment at which they cease to deceive. It is
perfectly legitimate to use the distinctive emblems of an enemy
in order to escape from him or to draw his forces into action;
but it is held that soldiers clothed in the uniforms of their
enemy must put on a conspicuous mark by which they can be
recognised before attacking, and that a vessel using the enemy's
flag must hoist its own flag before firing with shot or
shell.[302] Disobedience to this rule is considered to entail
grave dishonour; for "in actual battle enemies are bound to
combat loyally, and are not free to ensure victory by putting on
a mask of friendship."[303] But, as Mr. Hall observes, it is not
easy to see why it is more disloyal to wear a disguise when it is
obviously useless, than when it serves its purpose.[304] Finally,
it is universally agreed that promises given to the enemy ought
to be kept;[305] this was admitted even by Machiavelli[306] and
Bynkershoek,[307] who did not in general burden belligerents with
particularly heavy duties. But the restrictions which
"international law" {108} lays on deceit against enemies do not
seem to be taken very seriously. Treaties between nations and
promises given by one state to another, either in war or peace,
are hardly meant to be kept longer than it is convenient to keep
them. And when an excuse for the breach of faith is felt
necessary, that excuse itself is generally a lie.
[Footnote 298: _Conférence de Bruxelles_, art. 14. _Instructions
for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field_,
art. 16, 101. _Conférence internationale de la paix, La Haye_,
1899, 'Règlement concernant les lois de la guerre sur terre,'
art. 24, pt. i. p. 245. Roman Catholicism admits the employment
of stratagems in wars which are just (Gratian, _op. cit._ ii. 23.
2. 2; Ayala, _De jure et officiis bellicis et disciplina
militari_, i. 8. 1 _sq._; Ferraris, quoted by Adds, _Catholic
Dictionary_, p. 945; Nys, _Le droit de la guerre et les
précurseurs de Grotius_, p. 128 _sq._), on the authority of St.
Augustine, the great advocate of general truthfulness
(_Quæstiones in Jesum Nave_, 10, _ad Jos._ viii. 2 [Migne, _op.
cit._ xxxiv. 781]:--"Cum autem justum bellum susceperit, utrum
aperta pugna utrum insidiis vincat, nihil ad justitiam interest").]
[Footnote 299: Halleck, _International Law_, i. 567. Maine,
_International Law_, p. 149 _sqq._]
[Footnote 300: Wolseley, _Soldier's Pocket-Book for Field
Service_, p. 169.]
[Footnote 301: _Conférence de Bruxelles_, art. 13 _sq._
_Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States
in the Field_, art. 101, 114, 117. _Manual of the Laws of War on
Land, prepared by the Institute of International Law_, (art. 8
(_d_). Hall, _Treatise on International Law_, p. 537 _sq._]
[Footnote 302: Hall, _op. cit._ p. 538 _sq._ Bluntschli, _Droit
international_, § 565, p. 328 _sq._]
[Footnote 303: Bluntschli, _op. cit._ § 565, p. 329.]
[Footnote 304: Hall, _op. cit._ p. 539.]
[Footnote 305: Heffter, _Das Europäische Völkerrecht der
Gegenwart_, § 125, p. 262.]
[Footnote 306: Machiavelli, _Discorsi_, iii. 40 (_Opere_,
iii. 164).]
[Footnote 307: Bynkershoek, _Quæstiones juris publici_, i. 1,
p. 4. The maxim of Canon Law, "Fides servanda hosti" (Gratian,
_Decretum_, ii. 23. i. 3), however, was greatly impaired by the
principle, "Juramentum contra utilitatem ecclesiasticam
praestitum non tenet" (Gregory IX. _Decretales_, ii. 24, 27. See
Nys, _Le droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius_,
p. 126 _sq._).]
CHAPTER XXXI
THE REGARD FOR TRUTH AND GOOD FAITH (_concluded_)
THE condemnation of untruthfulness and bad faith springs from a
variety of sources. In the first place, he who tells a lie, or
who breaks a promise, generally commits an injury against another
person. His act consequently calls forth sympathetic resentment,
and becomes an object of moral censure.
Men have a natural disposition to believe what they are told.
This disposition is particularly obvious in young children; it is
acquired wisdom and experience only that teach incredulity, and,
as Adam Smith observes, they very seldom teach it enough.[1] Even
people who are themselves pre-eminent liars are often deceived by
the falsehoods of others.[2] When detected a deception always
implies a conflict between two irreconcilable ideas; and such a
conflict gives rise to a feeling of pain,[3] which may call forth
resentment against its volitional cause, the deceiver.
[Footnote 1: Reid, _Inquiry into the Human Mind_, vi. 24, p. 430
_sqq._ Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 494 _sq._
Dugald Stewart, _Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of
Man_, ii. 340 _sq._]
[Footnote 2: Burton, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 106 (Mpongwe).]
[Footnote 3: Lehmann, _Hovedlovene for det menneskelige
Følelseliv_, p. 181. _Cf._ Bain, _Emotions and the Will_, p. 218.]
But men are not only ready to believe what they are told, they
also like to know the truth. Curiosity, or the love of truth, is
coeval with the first operations of the intellect; it seems to be
an ultimate fact in the human {110} frame.[4] In our endeavour to
learn the truth we are frustrated by him who deceives us, and he
becomes an object of our resentment.
[Footnote 4: Dugald Stewart, _op. cit._ ii. 334, 340.]
Nor are we injured by a deception merely because we like to know
the truth, but, chiefly, because it is of much importance for us
that we should know it. Our conduct is based upon our ideas;
hence the erroneous notion as regards some fact in the past,
present, or future, which is produced by a lie or false promise,
may lead to unforeseen events detrimental to our interests.
Moreover, on discovering that we have been deceived, we have the
humiliating feeling that another person has impertinently made
our conduct subject to his will. This is a wound on our pride, a
blot on our honour. Francis I. of France laid down as a
principle, "that the lie was never to be put up with without
satisfaction, but by a base-born fellow."[5] "The lie," says
Sainte-Palaye, "has always been considered the most fatal and
irreparable affront that a man of honour could receive."[6]
[Footnote 5: Millingen, _History of Duelling_, i. 71.]
[Footnote 6: Sainte-Palaye, _Mémoires sur l'ancienne chevalerie_,
i. 78.]
How largely the condemnation of falsehood and bad faith is due to
the harm suffered by the victim appears from the fact that a lie
or breach of faith is held more condemnable in proportion to the
magnitude of the harm caused by it. But even in apparently
trifling cases the reflective mind strongly insists upon the
necessity of truthfulness and fidelity to a given word. Every lie
and every unfulfilled promise has a tendency to lessen mutual
confidence, to predispose the perpetrator to commit a similar
offence in the future, and to serve as a bad example for others.
"The importance of truth," says Bentham, "is so great, that the
least violation of its laws, even in frivolous matters, is always
attended with a certain degree of danger. The slightest deviation
from it is an attack upon the respect we owe to it. It is a first
transgression which facilitates a second, and familiarises the
odious ideal {111} of falsehood."[7] Contrariwise, as Aristotle
observes, he who is truthful in unimportant matters will be all
the more so in important ones.[8] Similar considerations,
however, require a certain amount of reflection and
farsightedness; hence intellectual development tends to increase
the emphasis laid on the duties of sincerity and good faith. At
the earlier stages of civilisation it is frequently considered
good form to tell an untruth to a person in order to please him,
and ill-mannered to contradict him, however much he be
mistaken,[9] for the reason that farther consequences are left
out of account. The utilitarian basis of the duty of truthfulness
also accounts for those extreme cases in which a deception is
held permissible or even a duty, when promoting the true
interests of the person subject to it.
[Footnote 7: Bentham, _Theory of Legislation_, p. 260.]
[Footnote 8: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, iv. 7. 8.]
[Footnote 9: Besides statements referred to above, see
Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 137; Hennepin, _New
Discovery of a Vast Country in America between New France and New
Mexico_, ii. 70; Dall, _Alaska_, p. 398 (Aleuts); Oldfield, in
_Trans. Ethn. Soc._ N.S. iii. 255 (West Australian natives). "The
natives of Africa," says Livingstone (_Expedition to the
Zambesi_, p. 309), "have an amiable of desire to please, and
often tell what they imagine will be gratifying, rather than the
uninteresting naked truth." An English sportsman, after firing at
an antelope, inquired of his dark attendant, "Is it wounded?" The
answer was, "Yes! the ball went right into his heart." These
mortal wounds never proving fatal, he asked a friend, who
understood the language, to explain to the man that he preferred
the truth in every case. "He is my father," replied the native,
"and I thought he would be displeased if I told him that he never
hits at all." The wish to please is likewise a fertile source of
untruth in children, especially girls (Sully, _Studies of
Childhood_, p. 256).]
The detestation of falsehood is in a very large measure due to
the motive which commonly is at the bottom of a lie. It is
doubtful whether a lie ever is told simply from love of
falsehood.[10] The intention to produce a wrong belief has a
deeper motive than the mere desire to produce such a belief; and
in most cases this motive is the deceiver's hope of benefiting
himself at the expense of the person deceived. A better motive
makes the act less detestable, or may even serve as a
justification. But the broad doctrine that the end sanctifies the
means is generally rejected; and the principle which sometimes
allows {112} deceit from a benevolent motive has been restricted
within very narrow limits by a higher conception of individual
freedom and individual rights. Thus the emancipation of morality
from theology has brought discredit on the old theory that
religious deception is permissible when it serves the object of
saving human souls from eternal perdition. The opinion that no
motive whatsoever can justify an act of falsehood has been
advocated not only by intuitional moralists, but on utilitarian
grounds.[11] But it certainly seems absurd to the common sense of
mankind that we should be allowed to save our own life or the
life of a fellow-man by killing the person who wants to take it,
but not by deceiving him.
[Footnote 10: Dugald Stewart, _op. cit._ ii. 342.]
[Footnote 11: Macmillan, _Promotion of General Happiness_,
p. 166 _sq._]
It is easy to see why falsehood is so frequently held
permissible, praiseworthy, or even obligatory, when directed
against a stranger. In early society an injury inflicted on a
stranger calls forth no sympathetic resentment. On the contrary,
being looked upon with suspicion or hated as an enemy, he is
considered a proper object of deception. Among the Bushmans "no
one dare give any information in the absence of the chief or
father of the clan."[12] "A Bedouin," says Burckhardt, "who does
not know the person interrogating him, will seldom answer with
truth to questions concerning his family or tribe. The children
are taught never to answer similar questions, lest the
interrogator may be a secret enemy and come for purposes of
revenge."[13] Among the Beni Amer a stranger can never trust a
man's word on account of "their contempt for everything
foreign."[14] That even civilised nations allow stratagem in
warfare is the natural consequence of war itself being allowed;
and if good faith is to be preserved between enemies, that is
because only thereby useless cruelty can be avoided and an end be
put to hostilities.
[Footnote 12: Chapman, _Travels in the Interior of South Africa_,
i. 76.]
[Footnote 13: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys_,
p. 210.]
[Footnote 14: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 337.]
However, deceit is not condemned merely because it is {113} an
injury to the party deceived and as such apt to arouse
sympathetic resentment, but it is an object of disinterested,
moral resentment also because it is intrinsically antipathetic.
Lying is a cheap and cowardly method of gaining an undue
advantage, and is consequently despised where courage is
respected.[15] It is the weapon of the weak, the woman,[16] and
the slave.[17] Fraud, says Cicero, is the property of a fox,
force that of a lion; "both are utterly repugnant to society, but
fraud is the more detestable."[18] "To lie is servile," says
Plutarch, "and most hateful in all men, hardly to be pardoned
even in poor slaves."[19] On account of its cowardliness, lying
was incompatible with Teutonic and knightly notions of manly
honour; and among ourselves the epithets "liar" and "coward" are
equally disgraceful to a man. "All . . . in the rank and station
of gentlemen," Sir Walter Scott observes, "are forcibly called
upon to remember that they must resent the imputation of a
voluntary falsehood as the most gross injury."[20] Fichte asks,
"Whence comes that internal shame for one's self which manifests
itself even stronger in the case of a lie than in the case of any
other violation of conscience?" And his answer is, that the lie
is accompanied by cowardice, and that nothing so much dishonours
us in our own eyes as want of courage.[21] According to Kant,
"a lie is the abandonment, and, as it were, the annihilation,
of the dignity of a man."[22]
[Footnote 15: _Cf._ Schopenhauer, _Die Grundlage der Moral_, § 17
(_Sämmtliche Werke_, vi. 250); Grote, _Treatise on the Moral
Ideals_, p. 254.]
[Footnote 16: Women are commonly said to be particularly addicted
to falsehood (Schopenhauer, _Parerga und Paralipomena_, ii. 497
_sq._ Galton, _Inquiries into Human Faculty_, p. 56 _sq._ Krauss,
_Sitte und Brauch der Südslaven_, pp. 508, 514. Maurer,
_Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammmes_, ii. 159 [ancient
Scandinavians]. Döllinger, _The Gentile and the Jew_, ii. 234
[ancient Greeks]. Lane, _Arabian Society in the Middle Ages_,
p. 219. Le Bon, _La civilisation des Arabes_, p. 433. Loskiel,
_History of the Mission of the United Brethren_, i. 16
[Iroquois]. Hearne, _Journey to the Northern Ocean_, p. 307 _sq._
[Northern Indians]. Lyon, _Private Journal_, p. 349 [Eskimo of
Igloolik]. Dalager, _Grønlandske Relationer_, p. 69; Cranz,
_History of Greenland_, i. 175).]
[Footnote 17: See _infra_, p. 129 _sq._]
[Footnote 18: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 13.]
[Footnote 19: Plutarch, _De educatione puerorum_, 14.]
[Footnote 20: Scott, 'Essay on Chivalry,' in _Miscellaneous Prose
Works_, vi. 58.]
[Footnote 21: Fichte, _Das System der Sittenlehre_, p. 370;
English translation, p. 302 _sq._]
[Footnote 22: Kant, _Metaphysische Anfangungsgründe der
Tugendlehre_, p. 84.]
{114} But a lie may also be judged of from a very different point
of view. It may be not only a sign of cowardice, but a sign of
cleverness. Hence a successful lie may excite admiration, a
disinterested kindly feeling towards the liar, genuine moral
approval; whereas to be detected in a lie is considered shameful.
And not only is the clever liar an object of admiration, but the
person whom he deceives is an object of ridicule. To the mind of
a West African native, Miss Kingsley observes, there is no
intrinsic harm in lying, "because a man is a fool who believes
another man on an important matter unless he puts on the
oath."[23] A Syrian proverb says, "Lying is the salt (goodness)
of men, and shameful only to one who believes."[24]
[Footnote 23: Kingsley, _West African Studies_, p. 414. _Cf._
Sommerville, 'Ethnogr. Notes in New Georgia,' _Jour. Anthr.
Inst._ xxvi. 394.]
[Footnote 24: Burton and Drake, _Unexplored Syria_, i. 275. See
also Burckhardt, _Arabic Proverbs_, p. 44 _sq._]
The duties of sincerity and good faith are also to some extent,
and in certain cases principally, founded on prudential
considerations. Although, as the _Märchen_ tells us, it happens
every day in the world that the fraudulent is successful,[25]
there is a widespread notion that, after all, "honesty is the
best policy." "Nothing that is false can be lasting," says
Cicero.[26] "The liar is short-lived" (that is, soon detected),
say the Arabs.[27] According to a Wolof proverb, "lies, however
numerous, will be caught by truth when it rises up."[28] The
Basutos have a saying that "cunning devours its master."[29] It
has been remarked that "if there were no such thing as honesty,
it would be a good speculation to invent it, as a means of making
one's fortune."[30]
[Footnote 25: Grimm, _Kinder und Hausmärchen_, 'Katze und Maus in
Gesellschaft,' 'Die drei Spinnerinnen,' 'Das tapfere
Schneiderlein,' &c.]
[Footnote 26: Cicero, _De officiis_, ii. 12.]
[Footnote 27: Burckhardt, _Arabic Proverbs_, p. 119.]
[Footnote 28: Burton, _Wit and Wisdom from West Africa_, p. 15.]
[Footnote 29: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 307.]
[Footnote 30: Quoted by Bentham, _Theory of Legislation_, p. 64.]
Moreover, lying is attended not only with social disadvantages,
but with supernatural danger. The West African Fjort have a tale
about a fisherman who every day used to catch and smuggle into
his house great quantities of fish, {115} but denied to his
brother and relatives that he had caught anything. All this time
the fetish Sunga was watching, and was grieved to hear him lie
thus. The fetish punished him by depriving him of the power of
speech, that he might lie no more, and so for the future he could
only make his wants known by signs.[31] In another instance, the
Fjort tell us, the earth-spirit turned into a pillar of clay a
woman who said that she had no peas for sale, when she had her
basket full of them.[32] The Nandi of the Uganda Protectorate
believe that "God punishes lying by striking the untruthful
person with lightning."[33] The Dyaks of Borneo think that the
lightning god is made angry even by the most nonsensical untruth,
such as the statement that a man has a cat for his mother or that
vermin can dance.[34] In Aneiteum, of the New Hebrides, the
belief prevailed that liars would be punished in the life to
come;[35] according to the Banks Islanders, they were excluded
from the true Panoi or Paradise after death.[36] We have already
noticed the emphasis which some of the higher religions lay on
veracity and good faith, and other statements maybe added
testifying the interest which gods of a more civilised type take
in the fulfilment of these duties. In ancient Egypt Amon Ra, "the
chief of all the gods," was invoked as "Lord of Truth";[37] and
Ma[=a], or Maat, represented as his daughter, was the goddess of
truth and righteousness.[38] In a Babylonian hymn the moon god is
appealed to as the guardian of truth.[39] The Vedic gods are
described as "true" and "not deceitful," as friends of honesty
and righteousness;[40] and Agni was the lord of vows.[41] The
{116} Zoroastrian Mithra was a protector of truth, fidelity, and
covenants;[42] and Rashnu Razista, "the truest true," was the
genius of truth.[43] According to the Iliad, Zeus is "no abettor
of falsehoods";[44] according to Plato, a lie is hateful not only
to men but to gods.[45] Among the Romans Jupiter and Dius Fidius
were gods of treaties,[46] and Fides was worshipped as the deity
of faithfulness.[47] How shall we explain this connection between
religious beliefs and the duties of veracity and fidelity to
promises?
[Footnote 31: Dennett, _Folklore of the Fjort_, p. 88 _sq._]
[Footnote 32: _Ibid._ p. 5.]
[Footnote 33: Johnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 879.]
[Footnote 34: Selenka, _Sonnige Welten_, p. 47.]
[Footnote 35: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 326.]
[Footnote 36: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 274.]
[Footnote 37: Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_,
p. 112. _Cf._ Brugsch, _Die Aegyptologie_, pp. 49, 91, 92, 97;
Amélineau, _Essai sur l'évolution des idées morales dans l'Égypte
Ancienne_, pp. 182, 188, 251.]
[Footnote 38: Wiedemann, 'Ma[=a], déesse de la vérité,' in
_Annales du Musée Guimet_, x. 561 _sqq._ Amélineau, _op. cit._
p. 187. _Infra_, p. 699.]
[Footnote 39: Mürdter-Delitzsch, _Geschichte Babyloniens und
Assyriens_, p. 37.]
[Footnote 40: Bergaigne, _La religion védique_, iii. 199.
Macdonell, _Vedic Mythology_, p. 18.]
[Footnote 41: _Satapatha-Brâhmana_, iii. 2. 2. 24.]
[Footnote 42: Darmesteter, _Ormazd et Ahriman_, p. 78. Geiger,
_Civilization of the Eastern Ir[=a]nians_, pp. lvii., 164.
Spiegel, _Erânische Alterthumskunde_, iii. 685.]
[Footnote 43: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, xxiii.
168.]
[Footnote 44: _Iliad_, iv. 235.]
[Footnote 45: Plato, _Respublica_, ii. 382.]
[Footnote 46: Fowler, _Roman Festivals of the Period of the
Republic_, pp. 141, 229 _sq._]
[Footnote 47: Cicero, _De officiis_, iii. 29. _Idem_, _De natura
deorum_, ii. 23; iii. 18. _Idem_, _De legibus_, ii. 8, 11.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, _Antiquitates Romanæ_, ii. 75.]
Apart from the circumstances which in some cases make gods
vindicators of the moral law in general, as conceived of by their
worshippers, there are quite special reasons for their
disapproval of insincerity and bad faith. Here again we notice
the influence of magic beliefs on the religious sanction of
morality.
There is something uncanny in the untrue word itself. As
Professor Stanley Hall points out, children not in frequently
regard every deviation from the most painfully literal truth as
alike heinous, with no perspective or degrees of difference
between the most barefaced intended and unintended lies. In some
children this fear of telling an untruth becomes so neurotic that
to every statement, even to yes or no, a "perhaps" or "I think"
is added mentally, whispered, or aloud. One boy had a long period
of fear that, like Ananias and Sapphira, he might some moment
drop down dead for a chance and perhaps unconscious lie.[48] On
the other hand, an acted lie is felt to be much less harmful than
a spoken one; to point the wrong way when asked where some one is
gone is less objectionable than to speak wrongly, to nod is less
sinful than to say yes. Indeed, acted lies are for the most {117}
part easily gotten away with, whereas some mysterious baneful
energy seems to be attributed to the spoken untruth. That its
evil influence is looked upon as quite mechanical appears from
the palliatives used for it. Many American children are of
opinion that a lie may be reversed by putting the left hand on
the right shoulder and that even an oath may be neutralised or
taken in an opposite sense by raising the left instead of the
right hand.[49] Among children in New York "it was sufficient to
cross the fingers, elbows, or legs, though the act might not be
noticed by the companion accosted, and under such circumstances
no blame attached to a falsehood."[50] To think "I do not mean
it," or to attach to a statement a meaning quite different from
the current one, is a form of reservation which is repeatedly
found in children.[51] Nor are feelings and ideas of this kind
restricted to the young; they are fairly common among grown-up
people, and have even found expression in ethical doctrines.
They lie at the root of the Jesuit theory of mental reservations.
According to Thomas Aquinas, again, though it is wrong to tell a
lie for the purpose of delivering another from any danger
whatever, it is lawful "to hide the truth prudently under some
dissimulation, as Augustine says."[52] It is not uncommonly
argued that in defence of a secret we may not "lie," that is,
produce directly beliefs contrary to facts; but that we may
"turn a question aside," that is, produce indirectly, by
natural inference from our answer, a negatively false belief; or
that we may "throw the inquirer on a wrong scent," that is,
produce similarly a positively false belief.[53] This extreme
formalism may no doubt to some extent be traced to the influence
of early training. From the day we learned to speak, the duty of
telling the truth has been strenuously enjoined upon us, and the
word "lie" has been associated with sin of the {118} blackest
hue; whereas other forms of falsehood, being less frequent, less
obvious, and less easy to define, have also been less emphasised.
But after full allowance is made for this influence, the fact
still remains that a mystic efficacy is very commonly ascribed to
the spoken word. Even among ourselves many persons would not dare
to praise their health or fortune for fear lest some evil should
result from their speech; and among less civilised peoples much
greater significance is given to a word than among us. Herodotus,
after mentioning the extreme importance which the ancient
Persians attached to the duty of speaking the truth, adds that
they held it unlawful even "to talk of anything which it is
unlawful to do."[54] I think, then, we may assume that, if for
some reason or other, falsehood is stigmatised, the mysterious
tendency inherent in the word easily develops into an avenging
power which, as often happens in similar cases, is associated
with the activity of a god.
[Footnote 48: Stanley Hall, 'Children's Lies,' in _American
Journal of Psychology_, iii. 59 _sq._]
[Footnote 49: Stanley Hall, 'Children's Lies,' in _American
Journal of Psychology_, iii. 68 _sq._]
[Footnote 50: Bergen and Newell, 'Current Superstitions,' in
_Journal of American Folk-lore_, ii. 111.]
[Footnote 51: Stanley Hall, _loc. cit._ p. 68.]
[Footnote 52: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologica_, ii.-ii. 110.
3. 4.]
[Footnote 53: See Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 317.]
[Footnote 54: Herodotus, i. 139.]
The punishing power of a word is particularly conspicuous in the
case of an oath. But the evil attending perjury does not come
from the lie as such: it is in the first place a result of the
curse which constitutes the oath. An oath is essentially a
conditional self-imprecation, a curse by which a person calls
down upon himself some evil in the event of what he says not
being true. The efficacy of the oath is originally entirely
magical, it is due to the magic power inherent in the cursing
words. In order to charge them with supernatural energy various
methods are adopted. Sometimes the person who takes the oath puts
himself in contact with some object which represents the state
referred to in the oath, so that the oath may absorb, as it were,
its quality and communicate it to the perjurer. Thus the Kandhs
swear upon the lizard's skin, "whose scaliness they pray may be
their lot if forsworn," or upon the earth of an ant-hill, "like
which they desire that, if false, they may be reduced to
powder."[55] The Tunguses regard it as the most dreadful {119} of
all their oaths when an accused person is compelled to drink some
of the blood of a dog which, after its throat has been cut, is
impaled near a fire and burnt, or has its flesh scattered about
piece-meal, and to swear:--"I speak the truth, and that is as
true as it is that I drink this blood. If I lie, let me perish,
burn, or be dried up like this dog."[56] In other cases the
person who is to swear takes hold of a certain object and calls
it to inflict on him some injury if he perjure himself. The
Kandhs frequently take oath upon the skin of a tiger, "from which
animal destruction to the perjured is invoked."[57] The Angami
Nagas, when they swear to keep the peace, or to perform any
promise, "place the barrel of a gun, or a spear, between their
teeth, signifying by this ceremony that, if they do not act up to
their agreement, they are prepared to fall by either of the two
weapons."[58] The Chuvashes, again, put a piece of bread and a
little salt in the mouth and swear, "May I be in want of these,
if I say not true!" or "if I do not keep my word!"[59] Another
method of charging an oath with supernatural energy is to touch,
or to establish some kind of contact with, a holy object on the
occasion when the oath is taken. The Iowa have a mysterious iron
or stone, wrapped in seven skins, by which they make men swear to
speak the truth.[60] The people of Kesam, in the highlands of
Palembang, swear by an old sacred knife,[61] the Bataks of South
Tóba on their village idols,[62] the Ostyaks on the nose of a
bear, which is regarded by them as an animal endowed with
supernatural power.[63] Among the Tunguses a criminal may be
compelled to climb one {120} of their sacred mountains, repeating
as he mounts, "May I die if I am guilty," or, "May I lose my
children and my cattle," or, "I renounce for ever all success in
hunting and fishing if I am guilty."[64] In Tibetan law-courts,
when the great oath is taken, "it is done by the person placing a
holy scripture on his head, and sitting on the reeking hide of an
ox and eating part of the ox's heart."[65] Hindus swear on a copy
of the Sanskrit _haribans_, or with Ganges water in their hands,
or touch the legs of a Brâhmana in taking an oath.[66]
Muhammedans swear on the Koran, as Christians do on the Bible. In
Morocco an oath derives efficacy from contact with, or the
presence of, any lifeless object, animal, or person endowed with
_baraka_, or holiness, such as a saint-house or a mosque, corn or
wool, a flock of sheep or a horse, or a shereef. In mediæval
Christendom sacred relics were generally adopted as the most
effective means of adding security to oaths, and "so little
respect was felt for the simple oath that, ere long, the adjuncts
came to be looked upon as the essential feature, and the
imprecation itself to be divested of binding force without
them."[67]
[Footnote 55: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 83.]
[Footnote 56: Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 86.]
[Footnote 57: Macpherson, _op. cit._ p. 83. _Cf._ Hose, 'Natives
of Borneo,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxiii. 165 (Kayans).]
[Footnote 58: Butler, _Travels in Assam_, p. 154. Mac Mahon, _Far
Cathay_, p. 253. Prain, 'Angami Nagas,' in _Revue coloniale
internationale_, v. 490. _Cf._ Lewin, _Wild Races of
South-Eastern India_, pp. 193 (Toungtha), 244 _sq._ (Pankhos and
Bunjogees); St. John, 'Hill Tribes of North Aracan,' in _Jour.
Anthr. Inst._ ii. 242.]
[Footnote 59: Georgi, _op. cit._ i. 110.]
[Footnote 60: Hamilton, quoted by Dorsey, 'Siouan Cults,' in
_Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 427.]
[Footnote 61: _Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 104.]
[Footnote 62: von Brenner, _Besuch bei den Kannibalen Sumatras_,
p. 213.]
[Footnote 63: Castrén, _Nordiska resor och forskningar_, i. 307,
309; iv. 123 _sq._ _Cf._ Ahlqvist, 'Unter Wogulen und Ostjaken,'
in _Acta Societatis Scientiarum Fennicæ_, xiv. 298.]
[Footnote 64: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 86.]
[Footnote 65: Waddell, _Buddhism of Tibet_, p. 569, n. 7.]
[Footnote 66: Grierson, _Bih[=a]r Peasant Life_, p. 401. Sleeman,
_Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official_, ii. 116.]
[Footnote 67: Lea, _Superstition and Force_, p. 29. See also
Kaufmann, _Deutsche Geschichte_, ii. 297; Ellinger, _Das
Verhältniss der öffentlichen Meinung zu Wahrheit und Lüge im 10.
11. und 12. Jahrhundert_, pp. 30, 111.]
Finally, as an ordinary curse, so an oath is made efficacious by
bringing in the name of a supernatural being, to whom an appeal
is made. When the Comanches of Texas make a sacred pledge or
promise, "they call upon the great spirit as their father, and
the earth as their mother, to testify to the truth of their
asseverations."[68] Of the Chukchi we are told that "as often as
they would certify the truth of any thing by oath or solemn
protestations they take the sun for their guarantee and
security."[69] Among the Tunguses an accused person takes a knife
in his hand, brandishes it towards the sun, and says, "If I {121}
am guilty, may the sun send diseases into my bowels as mortal as
a stab with this knife would be!"[70] An Arab from the province
of Dukkâla in Morocco presses a dagger against his chest, saying,
"By this poison, may God thrust it into my heart if I did so or
so!" If a Masai is accused of having done something wrong, he
drinks some blood, which is given him by the spokesman, and says,
"If I have done this deed may God kill me"; and it is believed
that if he has committed the crime he dies, whereas no harm
befalls him if he is innocent.[71] Among the Tshi-speaking peoples
of the Gold Coast, "to make an oath binding on the person who
takes it, it is usual to give him something to eat or to drink
which in some way appertains to a deity, who is then invoked to
visit a breach of faith with punishment."[72] Among the Shekani
and Bakele people of Southern Guinea, when a covenant between
different tribes is about to be formed, their great spirit,
Mwetyi, "is always invoked as a witness, and is commissioned with
the duty of visiting vengeance upon the party who shall violate
the engagement."[73] It seems to be a common practice in certain
parts of Africa to swear by some fetish.[74] The Efatese, of the
New Hebrides, invoked punishment from the gods in their oaths.[75]
In Florida, of the Solomon Group, a man will deny an accusation by
some _tindalo_ (that is, the disembodied spirit of some man who
already in his lifetime was supposed to be endowed with
supernatural power), or by the ghostly frigate-bird, or by the
ghostly shark.[76] When an ancient Egyptian wished to give
assurance of his honesty and good faith, he called Thoth to
witness, the advocate in the heavenly court of justice, without
whose justification no soul could stand in the day of judgment.[77]
The Eranians swore by Mithra,[78] the Greeks by Zeus,[79] the {122}
Romans by Jupiter and Dius Fidius.[80] A god is more able than
ordinary mortals to master the processes of nature, and he may
also better know whether the sworn word be true or false.[81]
It is undoubtedly on account of their superior knowledge that
sun or moon or light gods are so frequently appealed to in oaths.
The Egyptian god Ra is a solar,[82] and Thoth a lunar[83] deity.
The Zoroastrian Mithra, who "has a thousand senses, and sees
every man that tells a lie,"[84] is closely connected with the
sun;[85] and Rashnu Razista, according to M. Darmesteter, is an
offshoot either of Mithra or Ahura Mazda himself.[86] Dius Fidius
seems originally to have been a spirit of the heaven, and a wielder
of the lightning, closely allied to the great Jupiter.[87] Zeus is
all-seeing, the infallible spy of both gods and men.[88] Now,
even though the oath has the form of an appeal to a god, it may
nevertheless be of a chiefly magic character, being an
imprecation rather than a prayer. The oaths which the Moors swear
by Allah are otherwise exactly similar in nature to those in
which he is not mentioned at all. But the more the belief in
magic was shaken, the more the spoken word was divested of that
mysterious power which had been attributed to it by minds too apt
to confound words with facts, the more prominent became the
religious element in the oath. The fulfilment of the
self-imprecation was made dependent upon the free will of the
deity appealed to, and was regarded as the punishment for an
offence committed by the perjurer against the god himself.[89]
[Footnote 68: Neighbors, in Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the
United States_, i. 132.]
[Footnote 69: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 183.]
[Footnote 70: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 85 _sq._]
[Footnote 71: Hollis, _Masai_, p. 345.]
[Footnote 72: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_,
p. 196.]
[Footnote 73: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 392.]
[Footnote 74: Schultze, _Der Fetischismus_, p. 111.]
[Footnote 75: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 334.]
[Footnote 76: Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 217.]
[Footnote 77: Tiele, _History of the Egyptian Religion_, p. 229.
Amélineau, _op. cit._ p. 251.]
[Footnote 78: _Yasts_, x.]
[Footnote 79: _Iliad_, iii. 276 _sqq._ Farnell, _Cults of the
Greek States_, i. 70.]
[Footnote 80: von Lasaulx, _Der Eid bei den Römern_, p. 9.]
[Footnote 81: _Cf._ James, _Expedition from Pittsburg to the
Rocky Mountains_, i. 267 (Omahas); Tylor, _Primitive Culture_,
ii. 231 (Ostyaks).]
[Footnote 82: Maspero, _Dawn of Civilization_, p. 87 _sq._
Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_, p. 14. Erman,
_Handbook of Egyptian Religion_, p. 10.]
[Footnote 83: Maspero, _op. cit._ p. 145. Erman, _op. cit._ p. 11.]
[Footnote 84: _Yasts_, x. 107.]
[Footnote 85: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, xxiii.
122, n. 4. Meyer, _Geschichte des Alterthums_, i. 541 _sq._
Geiger, _op. cit._ i. p. lvi.]
[Footnote 86: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, xxiii. 168.]
[Footnote 87: Fowler, _Roman Festivals_, p. 141.]
[Footnote 88: _Cf._ _Iliad_, iii. 277; Ovid, _Metamorphoses_, iv.
172; Darmesteter, _Essais orientaux_, p. 107; Usener,
_Götternamen_, p. 177 _sqq._]
[Footnote 89: Grotius says (_De jure belli et pacis_, ii. 13. 12)
that even he who swears by false gods is bound, "because, though
under false notions, he refers to the general idea of Godhead,
and therefore the true God will interpret it as a wrong to
himself if perjury be committed."]
{123} Owing to its invocation of supernatural sanction, perjury
is considered the most heinous of all acts of falsehood.[90] But
it has a tendency to make even the ordinary lie or breach of
faith a matter of religious concern. If a god is frequently
appealed to in oaths, a general hatred of lying and
unfaithfulness may become one of his attributes, as is suggested
by various facts quoted above. There is every reason to believe
that a god is not, in the first place, appealed to because he is
looked upon as a guardian of veracity and good faith, but that he
has come to be looked upon as a guardian of these duties because
he has been frequently appealed to in connection with them.
[Footnote 90: Among various peoples perjury is punished even by
custom or law. Thus among the Gaika tribe of the Kafirs a person
may be fined for taking a false oath in a law case (Brownlee, in
Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs_, p. 124). In
Abyssinia a man convicted of perjury "would not only lose his
reputation, and be for ever incapacitated from being witness even
on the most trivial question, but he would likewise in all
probability be bound and severely fined, and might indeed think
himself fortunate if he got off with all his limbs in their
proper places, or without his hide being scored" (Parkyns, _Life
in Abyssinia_, ii. 258 _sq._). The laws of the Malays punish
perjury (Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_, iii. 90).
In India, according to the Laws of Manu (viii. 219 _sq._), he who
broke an agreement after swearing to it was to be banished,
imprisoned, and fined. Mediæval law-books punished perjurers with
the loss of the right hand, by which the oath was sworn (Wilda,
_Das Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 983 _sq._; Pollock and
Maitland, _History of English Law before the Time of Edward I._
ii. 541). In a Danish law of 1537 it is said that the perjurer
shall lose the two offending fingers so as to appease the wrath
of God (Stemann, _Den danske Retshistorie indtil Christian V.'s
Lov_, p. 645). In other cases, again, no civil punishment is
affixed to a false oath--for instance, among the Rejangs
(Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 240) and Bataks of Sumatra
(_Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 86), the Ossetes
(Kovalewsky, _Coutume contemporaine_, p. 324), Persians (Polak,
_Persien_, ii. 83), and, as it seems, the ancient Hebrews (Keil,
_Manual of Biblical Archæology_, ii. 348; Greenstone, 'Perjury,'
in _Jewish Encyclopedia_, ix. 640), Greeks (Rohde, _Psyche_, p.
245, note), and Teutons in early times (Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 982;
Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 681). Cicero says (_De
legibus_, ii. 9) that "the divine punishment of perjury is
destruction, the human punishment infamy"; but though perjury
_per se_ was not punished in Rome, the law appears from very
early times to have contained provisions for punishing false
testimony (Hunter, _Roman Law_, p. 1063; see also Mommsen,
_Römisches Strafrecht_, p. 681). However, the fact that perjury
is not treated as a crime by no means implies that it is not
regarded as a sin. The punishment of it is left to the offended
deity (Marsden, _op. cit._ p. 219; _Glimpses of the Eastern
Archipelago_, p. 86; Crawfurd, _op. cit._ iii. 90 [Javanese]).]
It seems that sometimes the habit of oath-taking has, in another
respect also, made it prudential for men to speak the simple
truth in all circumstances. Sir W. H. Sleeman {124} observes that
among the woods and hills of India the cotton and other trees are
supposed by the natives to be occupied by deities who are vested
with a local superintendence over the affairs of a district, or
perhaps of a single village. "These," he says, "are always in the
view of the people, and every man knows that he is every moment
liable to be taken to their court, and to be made to invoke their
vengeance upon himself or those dear to him, if he has told a
falsehood in what he has stated, or tells one in what he is about
to state. Men so situated adhere habitually, and I may say
religiously, to the truth; and I have had before me hundreds of
cases in which a man's property, liberty, or life, has depended
upon his telling a lie, and he has refused to tell it to save
either."[91] On the other hand, there are peoples among whom a
person's word can hardly be trusted unless confirmed by an
oath.[92] And one of the arguments adduced by the Quakers against
the taking of oaths is that, if on any particular occasion a man
swear in addition to his yea or nay, in order to make it more
obligatory or convincing, its force becomes comparatively weak at
other times when it receives no such confirmation.[93]
[Footnote 91: Sleeman, _op. cit._ ii. 111 _sq._]
[Footnote 92: See, besides _supra_, Kingsley, _West African
Studies_, p. 414; Chanler, _Through Jungle and Desert_, p. 186
_sq._ (Wamsara).]
[Footnote 93: Gurney, _Views and Practices of the Society of
Friends_, p. 327.]
Modes of conduct which are recommended by prudence tend on that
account in various ways to be regarded as morally compulsory or
praiseworthy. This subject will be discussed in connection with
duties and virtues which are called "self-regarding," but in the
present place it is necessary to remind ourselves of the share
which early education has in making prudence a matter of moral
consideration. Few duties owe so much to the training of parents
and teachers as does veracity. Children easily resort to
falsehood, in self-defence or otherwise, and truthfulness is
therefore enjoined on them with particular emphasis.[94]
[Footnote 94: _Cf._ Priestley, in 'Essay III.' introductory to
Hartley's _Theory of the Human Mind_, p. xlix. _sq._]
{125} The moral ideas referring to truthfulness are, finally,
much influenced by the force of habit. Where lying is frequent it
is, other things being equal, less strenuously condemned, if
condemned at all, than in communities which are strictly
truthful. It is natural to speak the truth. Von Jhering's
suggestion that man was originally a liar, and that veracity is
the result of human progress,[95] is not consistent with facts.
Language was not invented to disguise the truth, but to express
it. As Hutcheson remarked long ago, "truth is the natural
production of the mind when it gets the capacity of communicating
it, dissimulation and disguise are plainly artificial effects of
design and reflection."[96] It may be doubted whether there are
any other mendacious creatures in the world than men.[97] It is
said that "lies are told, if not in speech yet in acts, by
dogs";[98] but the instances reported of canine deceitfulness[99]
are hardly conclusive. As a cautious writer observes, the
question is not whether there may be "objective deceitfulness" in
the dog's conduct, but whether the motive is deceit: and "the
deceitful intent is a piece, not of the observed fact, but of the
observer's inference."[100] Nor is the child, strictly speaking,
a born liar. M. Compayré even goes so far as to say that, if the
child has not been subjected to bad influences, or if a
discipline of repression and constraint has not driven him to
seek a refuge in dissimulation, he is usually frankness and
sincerity itself.[101] Montaigne remarked that the falsehood of a
child grows with its growth.[102] According to M. Perez, useful
dissimulations are practised by children already at the age of
two years, but generally it is only after they are three or four
years old that fear of being scolded or punished will lead {126}
them into falsehood.[103] We are even told that certain savages
are too stupid or too ignorant to tell lies. A Hindu gentleman of
the plains, in the valley of the Nerbudda, when asked what made
the uncultured people of the woods to the north and south so
truthful, replied, "They have not yet learned the value of a
lie."[104] But as we know how readily truthful savages become
liars when their social conditions change, we may conclude that
their veracity was due rather to absence of temptation than to
lack of intelligence. In a small community of savages living by
themselves, there is no need for lying, nor much opportunity to
practise it. There is little scope for those motives which most
commonly induce people to practise falsehood--fear and love of
gain, combined with a hope of success.[105] Harmony and sympathy
generally prevail between the members of the group, and deception
is hardly possible since secrets do not exist.
[Footnote 95: von Jhering, _Zweck im Recht_, ii. 606.]
[Footnote 96: Hutcheson, _System of Moral Philosophy_, ii. 28.
_Cf._ Reid, _op. cit._ vi. 24, p. 428 _sqq._; Dugald Stewart,
_op. cit._ ii. 333.]
[Footnote 97: _Cf._ Schopenhauer, _Essays_, p. 145.]
[Footnote 98: Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 405.]
[Footnote 99: Romanes, _Animal Intelligence_, pp. 443, 444, 451.]
[Footnote 100: Lloyd Morgan, _Animal Life and Intelligence_,
p. 400.]
[Footnote 101: Compayré, _L'évolution intellectuelle et morale de
l'enfant_, p. 309. See also Sully, _Studies of Childhood_, p. 263
_sq._]
[Footnote 102: Montaigne, _Essais_, i. 9 (_[OE]uvres_, p. 16).]
[Footnote 103: Perez, _First Three Years of Childhood_, pp. 87, 89.]
[Footnote 104: Sleeman, _op. cit._ ii. 110.]
[Footnote 105: _Cf._ Sarasin, _Forschungen auf Ceylon_, iii. 543
(Veddahs).]
The case is different when savages come into frequent contact
with foreigners. To deceive a stranger is easy, and no scruple is
made of doing so. On the contrary, as we have seen, he is
regarded as a proper object of deception, and this opinion is
only too often justified by his own behaviour. But when commonly
practised in relation to strangers, falsehood easily becomes a
habit which affects the general conduct of the man. Hamzé, the
teacher of the Druses, said, "When a man once gets into the way
of speaking falsely, it is to be apprehended that, in spite of
himself, and by the mere force of habit, he will get to speak
falsely towards the brethren"; hence it is advisable to speak the
truth at all times and before all men.[106] There is indeed
abundant evidence that intercourse with strangers, and especially
with people of a different race, has had a destructive influence
on savage veracity.
[Footnote 106: Churchill, _Mount Lebanon_, iii. 225 _sq._]
This has been noticed among many of the uncivilised tribes of
India. "Formerly," says Mr. Man, "a Sonthal, as a rule, {127}
disdained to tell a falsehood, but the influences of
civilisation, transfused through the contagious ethics of his
Bengali neighbours, have somewhat impaired his truthfulness. In
the last four or five years a great change for the worse has
become evident, although even now, as a people, they are glorious
exceptions to the prevailing idiosyncrasy of the lower class of
natives in Bengal. With the latter, speaking the truth has been
always an accident; with the Sonthal it was a characteristic
principle."[107] Indeed, the Santals in Singbhúm, who live much
to themselves, are still described by Colonel Dalton as "a very
simple-minded people, almost incapable of deception."[108] The
Tipperah, "where he is brought into contact with, or under the
influence of the Bengallee, easily acquires their worst vices and
superstitions, losing at the same time the leading characteristic
of the primitive man--the love of truth."[109] Other tribes, like
the Garos and Bhúmij, have likewise been partly contaminated by
their intercourse with Bengalis, and acquired from them a
propensity to lie, which, in former days, was altogether foreign
to them.[110] The Kakhyens are at the present time lazy,
thievish, and untrustworthy, "whether their character has been
deteriorated by knavish injustice on the part of Chinese traders,
or high-handed extortion and wrong on the part of Burmese."[111]
The Ladakhis are, in general, "frank, honest, and moral when not
corrupted by communication with the dissolute Kashmiris."[112] Of
the Pahárias, who according to an earlier authority would sooner
die than lie,[113] it is now reported that "those who have most
to do with them say they cannot rely on their word, and that they
not only lie without scruple, but are scarcely annoyed at being
detected."[114] The Todas, whilst they call falsehood one of the
worst vices and have a temple dedicated to Truth, seem nowadays
only too often to forget both the temple and its object;[115] and
we are told that the dissimulation they practise in their
dealings with Europeans has been brought about by the habit of
paying them for every insignificant item of information.[116]
According to an {128} Indian civil servant quoted by Mr. Spencer,
various other hill tribes, originally distinguished by their
veracity, have afterwards been rendered less veracious by contact
with the whites.[117]
[Footnote 107: Man, _Sonthalia_, p. 14. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 20.]
[Footnote 108: Dalton, _Ethnology of Bengal_, _op. cit._ p. 217.]
[Footnote 109: Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, p. 216.]
[Footnote 110: Dalton, _op. cit._ pp. 68, 177.]
[Footnote 111: Anderson, _Mandalay to Momien_, p. 151.]
[Footnote 112: Moorcroft and Trebeck, _Travels in the Himalayan
Provinces of Hindustan_, i. 321.]
[Footnote 113: Shaw, quoted by Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 274.]
[Footnote 114: Cumming, _In the Himalayas_, p. 404 _sq._]
[Footnote 115: Harkness, _A Singular Aboriginal Race inhabiting
the Neilgherry Hills_, p. 18.]
[Footnote 116: Metz, _Tribes inhabiting the Neilgherry Hills_,
p. 13.]
[Footnote 117: Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, ii. 234. See
also Hodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 152. (Bódo and Dhimáls);
Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 206 (Múndas).]
Of the Andaman Islanders Mr. Man observes:--"It has been remarked
with regret by all interested in the race, that intercourse with
the alien population has, generally speaking, prejudicially
affected their morals; and that the candour, veracity, and
self-reliance they manifest in their savage and untutored state
are, when they become associated with foreigners, to a great
extent lost, and habits of untruthfulness, dependence, and sloth
engendered."[118] Riedel makes a similar remark with reference to
the natives of Ambon and Uliase.[119] Mr. Sommerville believes
that the natives of New Georgia, in the Solomon Islands, learned
their practice of cheating from European traders.[120]
[Footnote 118: Man, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 92.]
[Footnote 119: Riedel, _De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen
Selebes en Papua_, p. 41.]
[Footnote 120: Sommerville, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxvi. 394.]
Among the Ostyaks increasing civilisation has proved injurious to
their ancient honesty, and those who live in the neighbourhood of
towns or large villages have become even more deceitful than the
colonists.[121] A similar change has taken place with other
tribes belonging to the Russian Empire, for instance the
Tunguses[122] and Kamchadales.[123]
[Footnote 121: Castrén, _op. cit._ ii. 121.]
[Footnote 122: Dall, _Alaska_, p. 518.]
[Footnote 123: Steller, _Beschreibung von dem Lande Kamtschatka_,
p. 285. Sarytchew, 'Voyage of Discovery to the North-East of
Siberia,' in _Collection of Modern and Contemporary Voyages_, v. 67.]
We hear the same story from America.[124] Among the Omahas
"formerly only two or three were notorious liars; but now, there
are about twenty who do not lie."[125] The old men of the Ojibwas
all agree in saying that before the white man came and resided
among them there was less lying than there is now.[126] The
Indians of Mexico, Lumholtz writes, "do not tell the truth unless
it suits them."[127] But with reference to some of them, the
Tarahumares, he adds that, where they have had little or nothing
to do with the whites, they are trustworthy, and profit is no
inducement to them, as they believe {129} that their gods would
be angry with them for charging an undue price.[128]
[Footnote 124: Domenech, _Seven Years Residence in the Great
Deserts of North America_, ii. 69. _Cf._ Hearne, _Journey to the
Northern Ocean_, pp. 307, 308, 310 (Chippewyans); Morgan, _League
of the Iroquois_, p. 335 _sq._]
[Footnote 125: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.
Ethn._ iii. 370.]
[Footnote 126: Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United States_,
ii. 139.]
[Footnote 127: Lumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, ii. 477.]
[Footnote 128: Lumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, i. 244, 418.]
The deceitfulness of many African peoples is undoubtedly in some
degree a result of their intercourse with foreigners. In Sierra
Leone, says Winterbottom, the natives on the sea coast, who are
chiefly engaged in commerce, "are in general shrewd and artful,
sometimes malevolent and perfidious. Their long connection with
European slave traders has tutored them in the arts of
deceit."[129] The Yorubas, according to Burton, are eminently
dishonest only "in and around the cities."[130] Among the Kalunda
those who live near the great caravan roads and have had much to
do with foreign traders are suspicious and false.[131] And the
Hottentots, of whose truthfulness earlier writers spoke very
highly, are nowadays said to be addicted to lying.[132]
[Footnote 129: Winterbottom, _Native Africans in the
Neighbourhood of Sierra Leone_, i. 206.]
[Footnote 130: Burton, _Abeokuta_, i. 303.]
[Footnote 131: Pogge, _Im Reiche des Muata Jamwo_, p. 236.]
[Footnote 132: Fritsch, _Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrika's_,
p. 307 _sq._]
It has also been noticed that mendacity is favoured among
children by much intercourse with strangers, when "first
impressions" are consciously made, as also by frequent change of
environment, or of school or residence, as such changes give rise
to a feeling that "new leaves" can be easily turned.[133]
[Footnote 133: Stanley Hall, in _American Journal of Psychology_,
iii. 70.]
When a social unit is composed of loosely connected sub-groups,
the intercourse between members of different sub-groups resembles
in many respects that between foreigners. Social incoherence is
thus apt to lead to deceitful habits, as was the case in the
Middle Ages. The same phenomenon is to be observed in the East;
perhaps also among the Desert Arabs and the Fuegians, who live in
small parties which only occasionally meet and soon again separate.
Another factor which has favoured deception is social
differentiation. The different classes of society have often
little sympathy for each other, their interests are not
infrequently conflicting, deceit is a means of procuring
advantages, and, for the inferior classes especially, a means of
self-protection. As Euripides observes, slaves are in {130} the
habit of concealing the truth.[134] In Eastern Africa, says
Livingstone, falsehood is a vice prevailing among the free, but
still more among the slaves; "one can scarcely induce a slave to
translate anything truly: he is so intent on thinking of what
will please."[135]
[Footnote 134: Euripides, _Ph[oe]nissæ_, 392. _Cf._ Burton,
_Arabian Nights_, i. 176, n. 1.]
[Footnote 135: Livingstone, _Expedition to the Zambesi_, p. 309.
See also Polack, _Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders_,
ii. 59.]
Hardly anything has been a greater inducement to falsehood than
oppression. Whilst the old Makololo were truthful, this is not
the case with their sons, "who, having been brought up among the
subjected tribes, have acquired some of the vices peculiar to a
menial and degraded race."[136] The Wanyoro, who are described as
"splendid liars," exercised deception chiefly to evade the
intolerable exactions of their own chiefs, whereas they are
fairly truthful in contact with Europeans who attempt to treat
them justly.[137] The duplicity and cunning of the Malagasy are
"the natural result of centuries of superstition, ignorance, and
submission to the rule of tyrannical despots, with whom the spy
system has always been a necessity."[138] In Morocco the
independent Jbâla, or mountaineers of the North, are more to be
trusted than the Arabs of the plains, who have long been
suffering from the extortions of rapacious officials. The
duplicity of Orientals is very largely due to their despotic form
of government.[139] In India, Mr. Percival observes, "despotism
in one form or other that has so long prevailed, and the
consequent oppression attendant thereon, must have rendered it
difficult to make way without fraud. Deception and arts of
cunning, under such circumstances, being the only means at the
command of the inferior portions of the community for gaining
their ends, and securing the plainest rights, they would resort
to them as the only way of avoiding certain ruin."[140] The
Chinese habit of lying has {131} been attributed partly to the
truckling fear of officers.[141] In China and many other parts of
the East, says Sir J. Bowring, "there is a fear of truth _as_
truth, lest its discovery should lead to consequences of which
the inquirer never dreams, but which are present to the mind of
the person under interrogation."[142]
[Footnote 136: Livingstone, _Expedition to the Zambesi_, p. 283.]
[Footnote 137: Johnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 591.]
[Footnote 138: Little, _Madagascar_, p. 72.]
[Footnote 139: Vámbéry, _Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert_,
p. 231.]
[Footnote 140: Percival, _Land of the Veda_, p. 288. _Cf._
Malcolm, _Memoir of Central India_, ii. 171; Hodgson,
_Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 152.]
[Footnote 141: Wells Williams, _The Middle Kingdom_, i. 835.]
[Footnote 142: Bowring, _Siam_, i. 105 _sq._]
* * * * *
The regard for truth displays itself not only in the condemnation
of falsehood, but in the idea that, under certain circumstances,
it is a person's duty to inform others of the truth, although
there is no deception in withholding it. This duty is limited by
utilitarian considerations, and it is less insisted on than the
duty of refraining from falsehood; positive commandments, as we
have seen, are generally less stringent than the corresponding
negative commandments.[143] But to disclose the truth for the
benefit of others, when it is attended with injurious
consequences for the person who discloses it, can hardly fail to
evoke moral approval, and may be deemed a merit of the highest
order.
[Footnote 143: _Supra_, i. 303 _sqq._]
The regard for truth goes a step further still. It may be
obligatory or praiseworthy not only to spread the knowledge of
truth, but to seek for it. The possession of knowledge, of some
kind or other, is universally respected. A Wolof proverb says,
"Not to know is bad, not to wish to know is worse."[144] In the
moral and religious systems of the East knowledge is one of the
chief pursuits of man. Confucius described virtue as consisting
of knowledge, magnanimity, and valour.[145] The ancients, he
says, "wishing to rectify their hearts, . . . first desired to be
sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their
thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such
extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things."[146]
Knowledge is to be pursued not for theoretical, but for {132}
moral purposes; the Master said, "It is not easy to find a man
who has learned for three years without coming to be good."[147]
The Hindus maintain that ignorance is the greatest of evils, and
that the sole and ultimate object of life should be to give and
receive instruction.[148] It is said in the Laws of Manu, "A man
is not therefore considered venerable because his head is gray;
him who, though young, has learned the Veda, the gods consider to
be venerable."[149] According to the Mahabharata, it is by
knowledge that a creature is liberated, by knowledge that he
becomes the Eternal, Imperceptible, and Undecaying.[150] Buddhism
regards sin as folly and delusion as the cause of crime;[151]
"the unwise man cannot discover the difference between that which
is evil and that which is good, as a child knows not the value of
a coin that is placed before him."[152] And the highest of all
gifts, the source of abiding salvation, is the knowledge of the
identity between the individual and God, in whom and by whom the
individual lives, and moves, and has his being.[153] According to
one of the Pahlavi texts, wisdom is better than wealth of any
kind;[154] through the power of wisdom it is possible to do every
duty and good work;[155] the religion of the Mazda-worshippers is
apprehended more fully by means of the most perfect wisdom, and
"even the struggle and warfare of Irân with foreigners, and the
smiting of Aharman and the demons it is possible to effect
through the power of wisdom."[156] A strong dash of
intellectualism is a prominent feature in the Rabbinic religion.
The highest virtue lies not only in the fulfilment but in the
study of the law. There is a special merit bound up in it that
will assist man both in this world and in the world to come; and
it is said that even a bastard who is learned in {133} the law is
more honoured than a high-priest who is not.[157] Among
Muhammedans, also, great respect is shown to men of
learning.[158] Knowledge, the Prophet said, "lights the way to
Heaven"--"He dies not who gives life to learning"--"With
knowledge the servant of God rises to the heights of goodness and
to a noble position"--"The ink of the scholar is more holy than
the blood of the martyr."[159]
[Footnote 144: Burton, _Wit and Wisdom from West Africa_, p. 6.]
[Footnote 145: _Chung Yung_, xx. 8. Douglas, _Confucianism and
Taouism_, p. 105.]
[Footnote 146: _Tâ Hsio_, 4.]
[Footnote 147: _Lun Yü_, viii. 12. _Cf._ Faber, _Digest of the
Doctrines of Confucius_, p. 60; de Lanessan, _La morale des
philosophes chinois_, p. 27.]
[Footnote 148: Percival, _Land of the Veda_, p. 263.]
[Footnote 149: _Laws of Manu_, ii. 156.]
[Footnote 150: Muir, _Original Sanskrit Texts_, v. 327.]
[Footnote 151: Rhys Davids, _Hibbert Lectures on the History of
Buddhism_, p. 208.]
[Footnote 152: Hardy, _Manual of Budhism_, p. 505.]
[Footnote 153: Rhys Davids, _op. cit._ p. 209.]
[Footnote 154: _Dinâ-î Maînôg-î Khirad_, xlvii. 6.]
[Footnote 155: _Ibid._ i. 54.]
[Footnote 156: _Ibid._ lvii. 15 _sq._]
[Footnote 157: Montefiore, _Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of
the Ancient Hebrews_, p. 495. Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 35.]
[Footnote 158: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern
Egyptians_, p. 301 _sq._]
[Footnote 159: Ameer Ali, _Ethics of Islâm_, pp. 47, 49.]
In Christianity the knowledge of truth became a necessary
requirement of salvation. But here, as in the East, the truth
which alone was valued was religious truth. All knowledge that
was not useful to salvation was, indeed, despised, and science
was regarded not only as valueless, but as sinful.[160] "The
wisdom of this world is foolishness with God."[161] If it
happened that any one gave himself to letters, or lifted up his
mind to the contemplation of the heavenly bodies, he passed
instantly for a magician or a heretic.[162] So also every mental
disposition which is essential to scientific research was for
centuries stigmatised as offensive to the Almighty; it was a sin
to doubt the opinions which had been instilled in childhood
before they had been examined, to notice any objection to those
opinions, to resolve to follow the light of evidence wherever it
might lead.[163] Yet we are told, even by highly respectable
writers, that the modern world owes its scientific spirit to the
extreme importance which Christianity {134} assigned to the
possession of truth, of _the_ truth.[164] According to M.
Réville, "it was the orthodox intolerance of the Church in the
Middle Ages which impressed on Christian society this disposition
to seek truth at any price, of which the modern scientific spirit
is only the application. The more importance the Church attached
to the profession of the truth--to the extent even of considering
involuntary error as in the highest degree a damnable crime--so
much the more the sentiment of the immense value of this truth
arose in the general persuasion, along with a resolve to conquer
it wherever it was felt not to be possessed. How otherwise," M.
Réville asks, "can we explain that science was not developed and
has not been pursued with constancy, except in the midst of
Christian societies?"[165] This statement is characteristic of
the common tendency to attribute to the influence of the
Christian religion almost anything good which may be found among
Christian nations. But, surely, the patient and impartial search
after hidden truth, for the sake of truth, which constitutes the
essence of scientific research, is not congenial to, but the very
opposite of, that ready acceptance of a revealed truth for the
sake of eternal salvation, which was insisted upon by the Church.
And what about that singular love of abstract knowledge which
flourished in ancient Athens, where Aristotle declared it a
sacred duty to prefer truth to everything else,[166] and Socrates
sacrificed his life on its altar? It seems that the modern
scientific spirit is only a revival and development of a mental
disposition which was for ages suppressed by the persecuting
tendencies of the Church and the extreme contempt for learning
displayed by the barbarian invaders and their descendants. Even
when they had settled in the countries which they had conquered,
the {135} Teutons would not permit their children to be
instructed in any science, for fear lest they should become
effeminate and averse from war;[167] and long afterwards it was
held that a nobleman ought not to know letters, and that to write
and read was a shame to gentry.[168]
[Footnote 160: Gibbon, _Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire_,
ii. 185. von Eicken, _Geschichte der mittelalterlichen
Weltanschauung_, pp. 128-130, 589 _sqq._]
[Footnote 161: _1 Corinthians_, iii. 19. _Cf._ Lactantius,
_Divines Institutiones_, iii. 3 (Migne, _Patrologiæ cursus_, vi.
354 _sqq._); St. Augustine, _De Civitate Dei_, viii. 10 (Migne,
xli. 234).]
[Footnote 162: Chapelain, _De la lecture des vieux romans_, p.
20. As late as the middle of the seventeenth century a powerful
party was rising in England who said that all learning was
unfavourable to religion, and that it was sufficient for everyone
to be acquainted with his mother-tongue alone (Twells, _Life of
Pocock_, p. 176). The Duke de Saint Simon, who in 1721 and 1722
was the French ambassador in Madrid, states (_Mémoires_, xxxv.
209) that in Spain science was a crime, and ignorance and
stupidity the chief virtues.]
[Footnote 163: Lecky, _Rationalism in Europe_, ii. 87 _sq._]
[Footnote 164: Ritchie, _Natural Rights_, p. 172. _Cf._ Kuenen,
_Hibbert Lectures on National Religions and Universal Religions_,
p. 290.]
[Footnote 165: Réville, _Prolegomena of the History of
Religions_, p. 226.]
[Footnote 166: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, i. 6. 1. Prof.
Ritchie argues (_op. cit._ p. 172 _sq._) that a devotion to truth
as such was in the ancient world known only to a few
philosophers. Prof. Fowler is probably more correct in saying
(_Principles of Morals_, ii. 45, 220 _sq._; _Progressive
Morality_, p. 114) that it was more common amongst the Greeks
than amongst ourselves.]
[Footnote 167: Procopius, _De bello Gothorum_, i. 2. Robertson,
_History of the Reign of Charles V._ i. 234. Millingen, _op.
cit._ i. 22 _sq._ n. [dagger]]
[Footnote 168: Alain Chartier, quoted by Sainte-Palaye, _op.
cit._ ii. 104. See also De la Nouë, _Discours politiques et
militaires_, p. 238; Lyttleton, _Life of Henry II._ ii. 246 _sq._
The ignorance of the mediæval clergy has been somewhat
exaggerated by Robertson (_op. cit._ pp. 21, 22, 278 _sq._). Even
in the dark ages it was not a very uncommon thing for the clergy
to be able to read and write (Maitland, _The Dark Ages_, p. 16
_sqq._).]
The regard for knowledge springs in the first instance from the
love of it. As Aristotle said, "all men are by nature desirous of
knowledge."[169] But this feeling is not equally strong, nor
equally deep, in all. The curiosity of savages, however great it
often may be,[170] has chiefly reference to objects or events
which immediately concern their welfare or appear to them
alarming, or to trifles which attract attention on account of
their novelty. If their curiosity were more penetrating, they
would no longer remain savages; an extended desire of knowledge
leads to civilisation. But curiosity or love of knowledge,
whether in savage or civilised men, is not resolvable merely into
views of utility; as Dr. Brown observed, we feel it without
reflecting on the pleasure which we are to enjoy or the pain
which we are to suffer.[171] When highly developed, it drives men
to scientific investigations even though no practical benefits
are expected from the results. This devotion to truth for its own
sake, pure and disinterested as it is, has a singular tendency to
excite regard and admiration in everyone who has come under its
influence. From the utilitarian point of view it has been
defended on {136} the ground that, on the whole, every truth is
in the long run useful and every error harmful, and that we can
never exactly tell in advance what benefits may accrue even from
a knowledge which is apparently fruitless. But it seems that our
love of truth is somewhat apt to mislead our moral judgment. When
duly reflecting on the matter, we cannot help making a moral
distinction between him who pursues his studies merely from an
instinctive craving for knowledge, and him who devotes his life
to the search of truth from a conviction that he may thereby
promote human welfare.
[Footnote 169: Aristotle, _Metaphysica_, i. 1. 1, p. 980. _Cf._
Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 4.]
[Footnote 170: Murdoch, 'Ethnological Results of the Point Barrow
Expedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 42 (Eskimo).
Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, p. 177. Anderson,
_Mandalay to Momien_, p. 151 (Kakhyens). Foreman, _Philippine
Islands_, p. 188 (Tagálog natives of the North). Bock, _Head
Hunters of Borneo_, p. 209 (Dyaks). Forbes, _A Naturalist's
Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 320 (natives of
Timor-laut). Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii. 108.]
[Footnote 171: Dugald Stewart, _op. cit._ ii. 336. Brown,
_Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind_, lec. 67, p. 451.]
CHAPTER XXXII
THE RESPECT FOR OTHER MEN'S HONOUR AND SELF-REGARDING
PRIDE--POLITENESS
THERE are many acts, forbearances, and omissions, the
offensiveness of which mainly or exclusively springs from men's
desire to be respected by their fellow-men and their dislike of
being looked down upon. Foremost among these are attacks upon
people's honour and good name. A man's honour may be defined as
the moral worth he possesses in the eyes of the society of which
he is a member, and it behoves other persons to acknowledge this
worth and, especially, not to detract from it by imputing to him,
on insufficient grounds, such behaviour as is generally
considered degrading.
The censure to which he is subject or the contempt in which he
is held may no doubt affect his welfare in various ways, but it
is chiefly painful as a violation of his personal dignity. Hence
the duty of respecting a man's honour is on the whole contained
in the more comprehensive obligation of showing deference, in
words and deeds, for his feeling of self-regarding pride.
This feeling, or at least the germ of it, is found already in
some of the lower animals. Among "high-life" dogs, says Professor
Romanes, "wounded sensibilities and loss of esteem are capable of
producing much keener suffering than is mere physical pain." A
reproachful word or look from any of his friends made a {138}
Skye terrier miserable for a whole day; and another terrier, who
when in good humour used to perform various tricks, was never so
pleased as when his joke was duly appreciated, whereas "nothing
displeased him so much as being laughed at when he did not intend
to be ridiculous."[1] Monkeys also, according to Dr. Brehm, are
"very sensitive to every kind of treatment they may receive, to
love and dislike, to encouraging praise and chilling blame, to
pleasant flattery and wounding ridicule, to caresses and
chastisement."[2]
[Footnote 1: Romanes, _Animal Intelligence_, pp. 439, 444.]
[Footnote 2: Brehm, _From North Pole to Equator_, p. 299. _Cf._
_ibid._ pp. 304-306, Brehm, _Thierleben_, i. 75, 157; Schultze,
_Vergleichende Seelenkunde_, i. pt. i. 110; Perty, _Das
Seelenleben der Thiere_, p. 66.]
Among the savage races of men, as among civilised peoples,
self-regarding pride is universal, and in many of them it is a
very conspicuous trait of character.[3] The Veddah of Ceylon,
says Mr. Nevill, "is proud in the extreme, and considers himself
no man's inferior. Hence he is keenly sensitive to ridicule,
contempt, and even patronage. There is nothing he dreads more
than being laughed at as a savage, because he dislikes clothes
and cultivation."[4] Australian aborigines are described as
"extravagantly proud,"[5] as "vain and fond of approbation."[6]
In Fiji "anything like a slight deeply offends a native, and is
not soon forgotten."[7] The Negroes of Sierra Leone "possess a
great share of pride, and are easily affected by an insult: they
cannot hear even a harsh expression, or a raised tone of voice,
without shewing that {139} they feel it."[8] The Araucanians,
inhabiting parts of Chili, "are naturally fond of honourable
distinction, and there is nothing they can endure with less
patience than contempt or inattention."[9] The North American
Indians, says Perrot, "ont généralement touts beaucoup de vaine
gloire dans leurs actions bonnes ou mauvaises. . . . L'ambition
est en un mot une des plus fortes passions qui les anime."[10]
The Indian of British Columbia, for instance, "watches that he
may receive his proper share of honour at festivals; he cannot
endure to be ridiculed for even the slightest mistake; he
carefully guards all his actions, and looks for due honour to be
paid to him by friends, strangers, and subordinates. This
peculiarity appears most clearly in great festivals."[11] Thus,
in numerous instances, "persons who have been hoarding up
property for ten, fifteen, or twenty years (at the same time
almost starving themselves for want of clothing), have given it
all away to make a show for a few hours, and to be thought of
consequence."[12] Speaking of the Eskimo about Behring Strait,
Mr. Nelson observes, "As with all savages, the Eskimo are
extremely sensitive to ridicule and are very quick to take
offence at real or seeming slights."[13] Among the Atkha Aleuts
it has happened that men have committed suicide from
disappointment at the failure of an undertaking, fearing that
they would become the laughing-stock of the village.[14] Among
many other savages shame or wounded pride is not uncommonly a
cause of suicide.[15] The Hos of Chota Nagpore have a saying that
for a wife who has been reproved by her husband {140}"nothing
remains but the water at the bottom of the well";[16] and in New
Zealand native women sometimes killed themselves because they had
been rebuked for negligence in cooking or for want of care
towards a child.[17]
[Footnote 3: Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii. 107;
Colenso, _Maori Races of New Zealand_, p. 56. Crawfurd, _History
of the Indian Archipelago_, i. 54. Raffles, _History of Java_, i.
249. St. John, _Life in the Forests of the Far East_, ii. 323
(Malays of Sarawak). Man, 'Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman
Islands,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 94. Stewart, 'Notes on
Northern Cachar,' in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxiv. 609
(Nagas). Bergmann, _Nomadische Streifereien unter den Kalmüken_,
ii. 290, 295, 296, 312. Högström, _Beskrifning öfver de til
Sveriges Krona lydande Lapmarker_, p. 152 (Lapps). Dall,
_Alaska_, p. 392 _sq._ (Aleuts). Brett, _Indian Tribes of
Guiana_, p. 103.]
[Footnote 4: Nevill, 'Vaeddas of Ceylon,' in _Taprobanian_, i.
192. _Cf._ Sarasin, _Ergebnisse naturwissenschaftlicher
Forschungen auf Ceylon_, iii. 537.]
[Footnote 5: Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI.
Ethnography and Philology_, p. 109.]
[Footnote 6: Mathew, in Curr, _The Australian Race_, iii. 155.]
[Footnote 7: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 105. _Cf._ _ibid._
p. 103 _sq._]
[Footnote 8: Winterbottom, _Native Africans in the Neighbourhood
of Sierra Leone_, i. 211.]
[Footnote 9: Molina, _History of Chili_, ii. 113.]
[Footnote 10: Perrot, _Memoire sur les m[oe]urs, coustumes et
relligion des sauvages de l'Amerique septentrionale_, p. 76.
_Cf._ Buchanan, _Sketches of the History, Manners, and Customs of
the North American Indians_, p. 165; Matthews, _Ethnography and
Philology of the Hidatsa Indians_, p. 41.]
[Footnote 11: Boas, in _Fifth Report on the North-Western Tribes
of Canada_, p. 19.]
[Footnote 12: Duncan, quoted by Mayne, _Four Years in British
Columbia_, p. 295.]
[Footnote 13: Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' in _Ann. Rep.
Bur. Ethn._ xviii. 300.]
[Footnote 14: Yakof, quoted by Petroff, _Report on Alaska_,
p. 158. _Cf._ Dall, _op. cit._ p. 391 (Aleuts).]
[Footnote 15: See _infra_, on Suicide; Lasch, 'Besitzen die
Naturvölker ein persönliches Ehrgefühl?' in _Zeitschr. f.
Socialwissenschaft_, iii. 837 _sqq._]
[Footnote 16: Bradley-Birt, _Chota Nagpore_, p. 104. _Cf._
Dalton, _Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 206.]
[Footnote 17: Colenso, _op. cit._ p. 57.]
Like other injuries, an insult not only affects the feelings of
the victim, but arouses sympathetic resentment in outsiders, and
is consequently disapproved of as wrong. Among the Maoris, if
anybody wantonly tried to hurt another's feelings, it was
immediately repressed, and "such a person was spoken of as having
had no parents, or, as having been born (laid) by a bird."[18] In
the Malay Archipelago, "among some of the tribes, abusive
language cannot with impunity be used even to a slave. Blows are
still more intolerable, and considered such grievous affronts,
that, by law, the person who receives them is considered
justified in putting the offender to death."[19] The natives of
the Tonga Islands hold no bad moral habit to be more "ridiculous,
depraved, and unjust, than publishing the faults of one's
acquaintances and friends . . . . ; and as to downright calumny
or false accusation, it appears to them more horrible than
deliberate murder does to us: for it is better, they think, to
assassinate a man's person than to attack his reputation."[20]
According to the customary laws of the Fantis in West Africa,
"where a person has been found guilty of using slanderous words,
he is bound to retract his words publicly, in addition to paying
a small fine by way of compensation to the aggrieved party. Words
imputing witchcraft, adultery, immoral conduct, crime, and all
words which sound to the disreputation of a person of whom they
are spoken are actionable."[21]
[Footnote 18: _Ibid._ p. 53.]
[Footnote 19: Crawfurd, _op. cit._ iii. 119 _sq._]
[Footnote 20: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 163 _sq._]
[Footnote 21: Sarbah, _Fanti Customary Laws_, p. 94.]
Among the Aztecs of ancient Mexico he who wilfully calumniated
another, thereby seriously injuring his {141} reputation, was
condemned to have his lips cut off, and sometimes his ears also;
whilst in Tezcuco the slanderer suffered death.[22] In the
Chinese penal code a special book is provided for the prevention
and punishment of opprobrious and insulting language, as "having
naturally a tendency to produce quarrels and affrays."[23] Among
Arabs all insulting expressions have their respective fines
ascertained in the _[k.]ady_'s court.[24] It is said in the
Talmud:--"Let the honour of thy neighbour be to thee like thine
own. Rather be thrown into a fiery furnace than bring any one to
public shame."[25]
[Footnote 22: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_,
ii. 463.]
[Footnote 23: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, p. 354 n.*]
[Footnote 24: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys_,
p. 70 _sq._]
[Footnote 25: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 57.]
The Roman Law of the Twelve Tables contained provisions against
libellers,[26] and throughout the whole history of Roman law an
attack upon honour or reputation was deemed a serious crime.[27]
As for wrongful prosecution, which may be regarded as an
aggravated form of defamation, the law of the later Empire
required that any one bringing a criminal charge should bind
himself to suffer in case of failure the penalty that he had
endeavoured to call down upon his adversary.[28] Among Teutonic
peoples defamatory words and libelling were already at an early
date punished with a fine.[29] The Salic Law decrees that a
person who calls a freeborn man a "fox" or a "hare" or a "dirty
fellow," or says that he has thrown away his shield, must pay him
three solidi;[30] whilst, according to one text of the same law,
it cost 188 solidi (or nearly as much as was paid for the murder
of a Frankish freeman)[31] to call a freeborn woman a witch or a
harlot, in case the truth of the charge could not be proved.[32]
{142} The oldest English laws exacted _bót_ and _wíte_ from
persons who attacked others with abusive words.[33] In the
thirteenth century, in almost every action before an English
local court, the plaintiff claimed compensation not only for the
"damage," but also for the "shame" which had been done him.[34]
We further find that regular actions for defamation were common
in the local courts; whereas in later days the ecclesiastical
procedure against defamatory speech seems to have been regarded
as the usual, if not the only, engine which could be brought to
bear upon cases of libel and slander.[35] In England, as in Rome,
there was a strong feeling that men should not make charges which
they could not prove: before the Conquest a person might lose his
tongue, or have to redeem it with his full _wer_, if he brought a
false and scandalous accusation; and under Edward I. a statute
decreed that if the appellee was acquitted his accuser should lie
in prison for a year and pay damages by way of recompense for the
imprisonment and infamy which he had brought upon the innocent.[36]
[Footnote 26: _Lex Duodecim Tabularum_, viii. 1.]
[Footnote 27: _Digesta_, xlvii. 10. 15. 25. _Codex Justinianus_,
ix. 36. Hunter, _Exposition of Roman Law_, p. 1069 _sq._ Mommsen,
_Römisches Strafrecht_, p. 794 _sq._]
[Footnote 28: Günther, _Die Idee der Wiedervergeltung_, i. 141
_sqq._ Mommsen, _op. cit._ p. 496 _sq._]
[Footnote 29: Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 776 _sqq._
Nordström, _Bidrag till den svenska samhälls-författningens
historia_, ii. 293 _sqq._ Stemann, _Den danske Retshistorie
indtil Christian V.'s Lov_, p. 686 _sq._ Brunner, _Deutsche
Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 672 _sqq._]
[Footnote 30: _Lex Salica_, xxx. 4, 5, 2; Hessel's edition, col.
181 _sqq._]
[Footnote 31: _Ibid._ xv. col. 91 _sqq._]
[Footnote 32: _Ibid._ lxvii. 2, col. 403.]
[Footnote 33: _Laws of Hlothhaere and Eadric_, 11.]
[Footnote 34: Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law till
the Time of Edward I._ ii. 537.]
[Footnote 35: _Ibid._ ii. 538. Stephen, _History of the Criminal
Law of England_, ii. 409.]
[Footnote 36: Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 539.]
The condemnation of an insult is greatly influenced by the
_status_ of, or the relations between, the parties concerned.
Among the Goajiro Indians of Colombia a poor man may be insulted
with impunity, when the same treatment to a rich man would cause
certain bloodshed.[37] In Nias an affront is punished with a
fine, which varies according to the rank of the parties.[38] The
Chinese penal code lays down that a person who is guilty of
addressing abusive language to his or her father or mother, or
father's parents, or a wife who rails at her husband's parents or
grandparents, shall be strangled;[39] and the same punishment is
prescribed for a slave who abuses his master.[40] {143} According
to the Laws of Manu, a Kshatriya shall be fined one hundred
_panas_ for defaming a Brâhmana, a Vaisya shall be fined one
hundred and fifty or two hundred _panas_, and a Sûdra shall
suffer corporal punishment; whereas a Brâhmana shall pay only
fifty _panas_ for defaming a Kshatriya, twenty-five for defaming
a Vaisya, and twelve for defaming a Sûdra.[41] In ancient
Teutonic law the fines for insulting behaviour were graduated
according to the rank of the person offended.[42] The
starting-point of the Roman law was that an _injuria_--which was
pre-eminently an affront to the dignity of the person--could not
be done to a slave as such, only to the master through the medium
of his slave;[43] and even in later times, in the case of
trifling injuries, such as mere verbal insults, the master had no
action, unless by leave of the Praetor, or unless the insult were
meant for the master himself.[44] These and similar variations
spring from the same causes as do corresponding variations in the
case of other injuries dealt with above. But there are also
special reasons why social superiority or inferiority influences
moral opinions concerning offences against persons self-regarding
pride. The respect due to a man is closely connected with his
station, and in the case of defamation the injury suffered by the
loss of honour or reputation is naturally proportionate to the
esteem in which the offended party is held. At the same time the
harmfulness of an insult also depends upon the reputation of the
person who offers it. According to the Gotlands Lag, one of the
ancient provincial laws of Sweden, a slave can not only be
insulted with impunity, but has himself to pay no fine for
insulting another person[45]--obviously because he was too
degraded a being to be able to detract from anybody's honour or
good name.
[Footnote 37: Simons, 'Exploration of the Goajira Peninsula,' in
_Proceed. Roy. Geo. Soc._ N.S. vii. 786.]
[Footnote 38: von Rosenberg, _Der malayische Archipel_, p. 167.]
[Footnote 39: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cccxxix. p. 357.]
[Footnote 40: _Ibid._ sec. cccxxvii. p. 356.]
[Footnote 41: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 267 _sq._ _Cf._ _Gautama_,
xii. 8 _sqq._ It is also said that "a once-born man (a Sûdra),
who insults a twice-born man with gross invective, shall have his
tongue cut out; for he is of low origin" (_ibid._ viii. 270. See
also _Institutes of Vishnu_, v. 23; _Gautama_, xii. 1;
_Âpastamba_, ii. 10. 27. 14).]
[Footnote 42: Keyser, _Efterladte Skrifter_, ii. pt. i. 295.]
[Footnote 43: Hunter, _Exposition of Roman Law_, p. 164. Mommsen,
_Römisches Strafrecht_, p. 786, n. 3.]
[Footnote 44: _Digesta_, xlvii. 10. 15. 35. Hunter, _op. cit._
p. 165.]
[Footnote 45: _Gotlands-Lagen_, i. 19. 37.]
{144} The condemnation of such conduct as is offensive to other
persons' self-regarding pride includes condemnation of pride
itself, when displayed in an excessive degree; whereas the
opposite disposition--modesty--which implies regard for other
people's "self-feeling," is praised as a virtue. The Fijians say
of a boasting person, "You are like the _kaka_ (parrot); you only
speak to shout your own name."[46] On the other hand, among the
Tonga Islanders "a modest opinion of oneself is esteemed a great
virtue, and is also put in practice."[47] Confucius taught that
humility belongs to the characteristics of a superior man.[48]
Such a man, he said, is modest in his speech, though he exceeds
in his actions;[49] he has dignified ease without pride, whereas
the mean man has pride without a dignified ease;[50] he prefers
the concealment of his virtue, when it daily becomes more
illustrious, whereas the mean man seeks notoriety when he daily
goes more and more to ruin.[51] So also humility has a
distinguished place in the teachings of Lao-tsze:--"I have three
precious things which I hold fast and prize, namely, compassion,
economy, and humility"; "He who knows the glory, and at the same
time keeps to shame, will be the whole world's valley . . . ,
eternal virtue will fill him, and he will return home to
Taou."[52] In the Book of the Dead the soul of the ancient
Egyptian pleads, "I am not swollen with pride."[53] According to
Zoroastrianism, the sin of pride has been created by Ahriman.[54]
Overbearingness was censured in ancient Scandinavia,[55]
Greece,[56] and Rome. During our prosperity, says Cicero, "we
ought with great care to {145} avoid pride and arrogance."[57]
The Hebrew prophets condemned not only pride but eminence,
because an eminent man is apt to be proud.[58] We read in the
Talmud:--"He who humiliates himself will be lifted up; he who
raises himself up will be humiliated. Whosoever runs after
greatness, greatness runs away from him; he who runs from
greatness, greatness follows him."[59] Christianity enjoined
humility as a cardinal duty in every man.[60] In the Koran it is
said, "God loves not him who is proud, and boastful."[61] Pride
has thus come to be stigmatised not only as a vice, but as a sin
of great magnitude. One reason for this is that it is regarded as
even more offensive to the "self-feeling" of a great god or the
Supreme Being than it is to that of a man. But pride must also
appear as irreligious arrogance to those who maintain that man is
by nature altogether corrupt, and that everything good in him is
a gift of God.[62]
[Footnote 46: Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p. 107.]
[Footnote 47: Mariner, _op. cit._ ii. 164.]
[Footnote 48: _Lun Yü_, v. 15. _Chung Yung_, xxvii. 7.]
[Footnote 49: _Lun Yü_, xiv. 29.]
[Footnote 50: _Ibid._ xiii. 26. _Cf._ _ibid._ xx. 2. 1.]
[Footnote 51: _Chung Yung_, xxxiii. 1.]
[Footnote 52: Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 194 _sq._
_Tâo Teh King_, xxviii. 1.]