[Footnote 56: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, iii. 115 _sq._

(Tahitians). Wilkin, in _Reports of the Cambridge Expedition to

Torres Straits_, v. 286 (natives of Mabuiag). Kingsley, _West

African Studies_, p. 373. Lang, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverhältnisse_,

p. 238 (Washambala). Desoignies, _ibid._ p. 277 (Msalala).

Rautanen, _ibid._ p. 336 (Ondonga). Dale, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._

xxv. 224. Post, _Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, ii. 199.]

[Footnote 57: See _infra_, on Regard for the Dead.]

[Footnote 58: Dargun, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ v. 99

_sqq._]

[Footnote 59: _Ibid._ p. 102 _sq._]

[Footnote 60: Prescott, in Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the

United States_, ii. 194 _sq._ (Dacotahs). Hale, _U.S. Exploring

Expedition. Vol. VI. Ethnography and Philology_, p. 208 (Salish).

Dalager, _op. cit._ p. 30 _sq._; Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 176

(Greenlanders).]

[Footnote 61: See Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 97 _sqq._]

[Footnote 62: Kloss, _op. cit._ p. 241 (Nicobarese). Wilkin, in

_Rep. Cambridge Anthr. Exped._ v. 285 _sq._ (natives of Mabuiag).

Wilkes, _U.S. Exploring Expedition_, v. 85 (Kingsmill Islanders).

Senfft, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverhältnisse_, p. 441 (Marshall

Islanders). Dawson, _op. cit._ p. 7 (certain tribes of Western

Victoria). Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 14. _Idem_,

_Entwicklungsgeschichte des Familienrechts_, p. 299. _Idem_,

_Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, i. 225.]

[Footnote 63: Sarbah, _Fanti Customary Laws_, p. 87. Post,

_Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 13 _sq._ _Idem_, _Entwicklungsgeschichte

des Familienrechts_, p. 298 _sq._ _Idem_, _Grundriss der ethnol.

Jurisprudenz_, i. 222 _sqq._ Among several uncivilised peoples

landed property descends exclusively (Macpherson, _Memorials of

Service in India_, p. 62 [Kandhs]; Sumner, in _Jour. Anthr.

Inst._ xxxi. 79 [Jakuts]; Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 64;

Johnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 694; Post, _Entwicklungsgeschichte

des Familienrechts_, p. 298 _sq._; _Idem_, _Grundriss der ethnol.

Jurisprudenz_, i. 224) or by preference (Thomson, _Story of New

Zealand_, i. 96; Post, _Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, i.

224 sq.) to men.]

[Footnote 64: Castrén, _Nordiska resor och forskningar_, i. 312

(Ostyaks). Marshall, _A Phrenologist amongst the Todas_, p. 206.

Hodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 122 (Bódo and Dhimáls).

Hislop, _Papers relating to the Aboriginal Tribes of the Central

Provinces_, p. 12, n. [dagger] (Gonds). Soppitt, _Account of the

Kuki-Lushai Tribes_, p. 16; Stewart, 'Notes on Northern Cachar,'

in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxiv. 640 (Kukis). Risley,

_Census of India_, 1901, vol. i. Ethnographic Appendices, pp. 146

(Santals), 156 (Mundas), 209 (most of the Angami Nagas). Fryer,

_Khyeng People of the Sandoway District_, p. 6. Marsden, _op.

cit._ p. 244 (Rejangs). Eyre, _Expeditions of Discovery into

Central Australia_, ii. 297. Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht

der Bogos_, p. 73. Hinde, _Last of the Masai_, p. 105; Johnston,

_Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 828 (Masai). Dale, in _Jour. Anthr.

Inst._ xxv. 224 (Wabondei). Kingsley, _Travels in West Africa_,

p. 485 (some West African tribes). Nassau, _Fetichism in West

Africa_, p. 13 (natives of the Cameroons). Leuschner, in

Steinmetz, _Rechtsverhältnisse_, p. 20 (Bakwiri). Mademba,

_ibid._ p. 81 (pagan Bambara). Lang, _ibid._ p. 238 (Washambala).

Kraft, _ibid._ p. 289 (Wapokomo). Rautanen, _ibid._ p. 335

(Ondonga). Decle, _op. cit._ p. 486 (Wakamba). Campbell, _Travels

in South Africa_, p. 520 (Kafirs). Post, _Afrikanische

Jurisprudenz_, ii. 5. _Idem_, _Entwicklungsgeschichte des

Familienrechts_, p. 296 _sqq._ _Idem_, _Grundriss der ethnol.

Jurisprudenz_, i. 218 _sq._]

[Footnote 65: Hamy, in _Bull. Soc. d'Anthr. Paris_, ser. ii. vol.

xii. (1877), 535 (Penong Piâk of Cambodia). Buchanan, quoted by

Hodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 110 (Kócch). Post, _Grundriss

der ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, i. 213.]

[Footnote 66: Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' in _Ann. Rep.

Bur. Ethn._ xviii. 307. Dawson, _Australian Aborigines_, p. 7

(certain tribes of Western Victoria). Hunt, 'Ethnogr. Notes on

the Murray Islands, Torres Straits,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._

xxviii. 7. Grange, 'Journal of an Expedition into the Naga

Hills,' in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, ix. pt. ii. 964. Mason,

_ibid._ xxxvii. pt. ii. 142 (Karens). Post, _Entwicklungsgeschichte

des Familienrechts_, p. 303 _sqq._]

[Footnote 67: Dalager, _op. cit._ pp. 29, 31; Cranz, _op. cit._

i. 176 (Greenlanders). Risley, _op. cit._ p. 203 (Limbus of

Nepal). Macpherson, _op. cit._ p. 62 (Kandhs). Soppitt, _op.

cit._ p. 16 (Kukis). Fryer, _op. cit._ p. 6 (Khyens). Junghuhn,

_op. cit._ ii. 147 (Bataks). Gill, _Life in the Southern Isles_,

p. 46. Polack, _op. cit._ ii. 69; Colenso, _op. cit._ p. 33

(Maoris). Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos_, pp.

69, 73 _sq._ Paulitschke, _op. cit._ p. 192 (Gallas). Hollis,

_Masai_, p. 309; Hinde, _op. cit._ pp. 51, 105 (Masai). Volkens,

_Der Kilimandscharo_, p. 253 (Wadshagga). Kingsley, _Travels in

West Africa_, p. 485 (some West African tribes). Bosman, _op.

cit._ pp. 173 (natives of the Gold Coast), 322 (natives of the

Slave Coast). Leuschner, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverhältnisse_, p.

20 (Bakwiri). Mademba, _ibid._ p. 81 (pagan Bambara). Desoignies,

_ibid._ p. 276 (Msalala). Marx, _ibid._ p. 355 (Amahlubi),

Chanler, _Through Jungle and Desert_, p. 316 (Rendile), Post,

_Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 12 _sqq._ _Idem_, _Grundriss der

ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, i. 217, 218, 220 _sq._]

[Footnote 68: Proyart, 'History of Loango,' in Pinkerton,

_Collection of Voyages and Travels_, xvi. 571.]

[Footnote 69: Kingsley, _West African Studies_, p. 373 _sq._

(some West African tribes). Sorge, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverhältnisse_,

p. 413 (Nissan Islanders).]

[Footnote 70: Risley, _op. cit._ p. 227 (Lusheis). Avebury,

_Origin of Civilisation_, p. 493 _sqq._ Post, _Grundriss, der

ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, i. 218, 221 _sq._ Liebrecht, _Zur

Volkskunde_, p. 432.]

[Footnote 71: Tickell, 'Memoir on the Hodésum,' in _Jour. Asiatic

Soc. Bengal_, ix. pt. ii. 794, n.*]

[Footnote 72: Risley, _op. cit._ p. 203. _Cf._ Mason, in _Jour.

Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxxvii. pt. ii. 142 (Karens).]

[Footnote 73: Nelson, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xviii. 307.]

[Footnote 74: Dalager, _op. cit._ p. 33.]

[Footnote 75: Denham and Clapperton, quoted in Spencer's

_Descriptive Sociology_, African Races, p. 8.]

[Footnote 76: Stewart, in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxiv. 640.]

[Footnote 77: Hodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 122.]

[Footnote 78: Burton, _Lake Regions of Central Africa_, ii. 23

_sq._ _Cf._ Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 6.]

[Footnote 79: Nicole, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverhältnisse_, pp.

115, 119 (Diakité-Sarracolese). Lang, _ibid._ pp. 238, 242

(Washambala). Kraft, _ibid._ pp. 289, 291 (Wapokomo). Rautanen,

_ibid._ p. 335 (Ondonga). Post, _Grundriss der ethnol.

Jurisprudenz_, i. 383.]

[Footnote 80: Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos_,

p. 73. Steinmetz, _Rechtsverhältnisse_, p. 43 (Banaka and Bapuku).

Mademba, _ibid._ p. 83 (natives of the Sansanding States). Post,

_Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, i. 383.]

At higher stages of civilisation the rules of inheritance present

the same characteristics as among many savages. During historic

times, at least, the nations of culture have reckoned kinship

through the father, and succession has been agnatic.[81] In China

women only inherit in the very last resort, failing all male

relatives.[82] Among the Hebrews, in ancient times, only sons,

not daughters, still less wives, could inherit;[83] but the later

law conferred on daughters the right of heirship in the absence

of sons.[84] The Muhammedan law of inheritance in most cases

awards to a female a share equal to half that of a male of the

same degree of relationship to the deceased;[85] but according to

the old law of Medina women could not inherit at all.[86] Of all

the ancient nations with whose rules of inheritance we are

acquainted, the Romans seem to have been the only one who gave

daughters the same right of inheritance as sons.[87] In India

women had originally no such right at all, but in this, as in

other matters relating to property, their position subsequently

improved.[88] In Attic law sons excluded {48} daughters from

succession,[89] and the same was the case among the Scandinavian

peoples still in the later Middle Ages.[90] In England women are

even to this day postponed to men in the order of succession to

real property.[91] Special privileges in the division of the

father's property were granted to the eldest son by the Hebrews[92]

and Hindus,[93] and traces of primogeniture are met with in ancient

Greek legislation.[94] In the history of English law we find not

only primogeniture, but ultimogeniture as well.[95] As regards the

question of legitimacy, we notice that in China all sons born in the

household have an equal share in the inheritance, whether born of

the principal wife or a concubine or a domestic slave.[96] Among

the Hebrews the sons of concubines had a right of inheritance,[97]

but whether on an equality with the other sons we do not

know.[98] According to Muhammedan law no distinction in point of

inheritance is made between the child of a wife and that borne by

a slave to her master, if the master acknowledge the child to be

his own.[99] In Hindu legislation the legitimate {49} sons have

the nearest right to the inheritance of their father, but a son

begotten by a Sûdra on a female slave may, if permitted by his

father, take a share of it.[100] The Roman law on the subject may

be summed up thus:--With regard to its father a natural child has

no right at all, and differs in no respect from a stranger; with

regard to its mother it has the same right as a legitimate

child.[101] In Teutonic countries the position of illegitimate

children as to succession was much more favourable in earlier

times than later on when Christianity made its influence felt,

depriving them of all title to inheritance.[102] Strangers were

formerly unable both to inherit and to transmit property. For a

long time it was the custom in Europe to confiscate their effects

on their death; and not only persons who were born in a foreign

country were subject to this _droit d'aubaine_, as it was called

in France, but in some countries it was applied even to persons

who removed from one diocese to another, or from the lands of one

baron to another.[103] Indeed, it is only in recent times that

foreigners have been placed on a footing of equality with

citizens with regard to inheritance. In 1790 the French National

Assembly abolished the right of _aubaine_ as being contrary to

the principle of a human brotherhood.[104] Later on, when the

Code Napoléon was drawn up, a backward step was taken by

restricting the abolition of this right to nations who acted with

reciprocity; but this limitation only lasted till 1819, when all

inequalities were finally removed in France.[105] In England it

was not until 1870 that foreigners were authorised to inherit and

bequeath like British subjects.[106]

[Footnote 81: See Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 104.]

[Footnote 82: Alabaster, 'Law of Inheritance,' in _China Review_,

v. 193. 'Inheritance and "Patria Potestas" in China,' _ibid._

v. 406.]

[Footnote 83: _Genesis_, xxxi. 14 _sq._ _Numbers_, xxvii. 4.

Gans, _Das Erbrecht in weltgeschichtlicher Entwickelung_, i. 147.

Benzinger, 'Law and Justice,' in Cheyne and Black, _Encyclopædia

Biblica_, iii. 2728.]

[Footnote 84: _Numbers_, xxvii. 8. Gans, _op. cit._ i. 147.

Benzinger, _loc. cit._ p. 2729. It is only by exceptional favour

that the daughters inherit along with the sons (_Job_, xlii. 15).]

[Footnote 85: _Koran_, iv. 12, 175. Lane, _Manners and Customs of

the Modern Egyptians_, p. 116 _sq._ Kohler, _Rechtsvergleichende

Studien_, p. 102 _sqq._]

[Footnote 86: Robertson Smith, _Kinship and Marriage in Early

Arabia_, pp. 65, 117.]

[Footnote 87: Gans, _op. cit._ ii. 367 _sq._ Gide, _Étude sur la

condition privée de la femme_, p. 102.]

[Footnote 88: Jolly, _loc. cit._ pp. 83, 86. Kohler, 'Indisches

Ehe- und Familienrecht,' in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._

iii. 424 _sqq._ Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus Civile_, ii.

48.]

[Footnote 89: Gans, _op. cit._ i. 338, 341. Gide, _op. cit._ p. 79.]

[Footnote 90: Nordström, _Bidrag till den svenska

samhälls-författningens historia_, ii. 95, 190. Stemann, _Den danske

Retshistorie indtil Christian V.'s Lov_, p. 311 _sq._ Keyser,

_Efterladte Skrifter_, ii. pt. i. 330, 339.]

[Footnote 91: Renton, _Encyclopædia of the Laws of England_, xi. 75.]

[Footnote 92: _Deuteronomy_, xxi. 17. Gans, _op. cit._ i. 148.

Benzinger, in Cheyne and Black, _Encyclopædia Biblica_, iii.

2729. Mr. Jacobs suggests (_Studies in Biblical Archæology_, p.

49 _sqq._) that ultimogeniture was once the rule in early Hebrew

society, and was succeeded by primogeniture only when the

Israelites exchanged their roving life for one in which sons

became more stay-at-home.]

[Footnote 93: _Âpastamba_, ii. 6. 14. 6, 12. _Laws of Manu_, ix.

114. Jolly, _loc. cit._ pp. 77, 82. Maine, _Dissertations on

Early Law and Custom_, p. 89 _sq._ In China, though sons inherit

in equal shares, "it is not uncommon for the brothers to

temporarily yield up their share to the elder brother, either in

whole or in part, for the glory of the House" ('Inheritance and

"Patria Potestas" in China,' in _China Review_, v. 406; _cf._

Doolittle, _Social Life of the Chinese_, ii. 224; Davis, _China_,

i. 343).]

[Footnote 94: Fustel de Coulanges, _op. cit._ p. 99.]

[Footnote 95: Elton, _Origins of English History_, p. 178 _sqq._

Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law till the Time of

Edward I._ ii. 263 _sqq._ The custom of ultimogeniture has also

been traced in Wales, parts of France, Germany, Friesland,

Scandinavia, Russia, and Hungary (Elton, _op. cit._ p. 180

_sqq._; Liebrecht, _op. cit._ p. 431 _sq._).]

[Footnote 96: Parker, 'Comparative Chinese Family Law,' in _China

Review_, viii. 79. 'Inheritance and "Patria Potestas" in China,'

_ibid._ v. 406. Medhurst, 'Marriage, Affinity, and Inheritance in

China,' in _Trans. Roy. Asiatic Soc. China Branch_, iv. 31.

Simcox, _Primitive Civilizations_, ii. 351.]

[Footnote 97: _Genesis_, xxi. 10 _sqq._]

[Footnote 98: Benzinger, in Cheyne and Black, _Encyclopædia

Biblica_, iii. 2729.]

[Footnote 99: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 118.]

[Footnote 100: Jolly, _loc. cit._ p. 85. _Laws of Manu_, ix. 179.]

[Footnote 101: Gide, _op. cit._ p. 567 _sqq._]

[Footnote 102: Nordström, _op. cit._ ii. 67, 200 _sqq._ See also

Alard, _Condition et droits des enfants naturels_, pp. 9, 11;

_supra_, i. 47.]

[Footnote 103: Brussel, _Nouvel examen de l'usage général des

fiefs en France_, ii. 944 _sqq._ de Laurière, _Glossaire du droit

françois_, p. 47 _sq._ Demangeat, _Histoire de la condition

civile des étrangers en France_, p. 107 _sqq._]

[Footnote 104: Demangeat, _op. cit._ p. 239.]

[Footnote 105: _Ibid._ p. 250 _sqq._]

[Footnote 106: _Naturalisation Act_, 1870, § 2.]

Besides acquisition by occupation, possession for a certain

length of time, labour, voluntary transfer, and inheritance,

there are instances in which ownership in a {50} thing directly

follows from ownership in another thing. It is a general rule

that the owner of an object also owns what develops from or is

produced by it.[107] The owner of a cow owns her calf, the owner

of a tree its fruits, the owner of a piece of land anything

growing on it, at least if no labour has been necessary for its

production. Ownership in land also gives a certain right to the

wild animals which are found there. Among the Fantis, for

instance, if anybody kills game on another person's land, its

proprietor is entitled to the shoulder or a quarter of such

game.[108] In this connection we have further to notice the mode

of acquisition which the Roman jurists called _accessio_. When

that which belongs to one person is so intermixed with the

property of another, that either it cannot be separated at all,

or cannot be separated without inflicting damage out of

proportion to the gain, the owner of the principal becomes the

owner of the accessory, though, as a rule, he would have to pay

compensation for it.[109]

[Footnote 107: See Post, _Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz_,

ii. 612; Goos, _Forelæsninger over den almindelige Retslære_,

ii. 159 _sqq._]

[Footnote 108: Sarbah, _op. cit._ p. 48.]

[Footnote 109: Hunter, _Roman Law_, p. 247 _sq._]

All these methods of acquisition apply not only to individual

property, but to common property as well. Occupation may

establish ownership whether there be many occupants or only one;

joint labour may lead to joint ownership in the produce; property

may be transferred to a body of persons as well as to a single

individual. But the custom which prescribes community of goods

may also itself be an independent method of acquisition: by

belonging to an association of people who hold property in common

a person may be part owner of a thing which has been occupied or

produced by some other member of the association. Communism of

one kind or another is undoubtedly a very ancient institution,[110]

though its prevalence at the lower stages of civilisation has

often been exaggerated.[111] But the whole question of {51}

common ownership is too complicated and lies too much apart from

our special subject to admit of a detailed treatment.

[Footnote 110: _Cf._ Kovalewsky, _Tableau des origines et de

l'évolution de la famille et de la propriété_, p. 51 _sqq._]

[Footnote 111: Dr. Dargun (in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._

v. 76, &c.) even goes so far as to say that savages know of no

other property but such as belongs to individuals; but this

statement is hardly justified by facts.]

* * * * *

From the statement of facts we shall now proceed to an

explanation of these facts. First, why do men recognise

proprietary rights at all? Why do the moral feelings of mankind

grant to certain persons a right to the exclusive disposal of

certain things, in other words, why does the disposal of an

object without the consent of the person called its owner give

rise to moral disapproval? The "right of property," it is true,

is generally used as a term for a legal right. But in this, as in

so many other cases, the legal right is essentially a formulated

expression of moral feelings.

As Mr. Spencer observes, the desire to appropriate, and to keep

that which has been appropriated, lies deep not only in human but

in animal nature, being, indeed, a condition of survival.[112]

Sticklebacks show obvious signs of anger when their territory is

invaded by other sticklebacks.[113] Birds defend their nests

against the attacks of intruders.[114] The dog fights for his

kennel or for the prey he has caught. A monkey in the Zoological

Gardens of London, which made use of a stone to open nuts, always

hid it in the straw after using it, and would not allow any other

monkey to touch it.[115] We find the same propensity in man from

his earliest years. At the age of two, Tiedemann's son did not

let his sister sit on his chair or take any of his clothes,

though he had no scruples against appropriating things which

belonged to her.[116] Owing to this tendency to keep an

appropriated object, and to resist its abstraction, it is

dangerous for an individual to try to seize anything held by

another of about equal strength; {52} and in human societies this

naturally led to the habit of leaving each in possession of

whatever he had attained, especially in early times when the

objects possessed were of little value, and there was no great

inequality of wealth.[117] This habit was further strengthened by

various circumstances, all of which tended to make interference

with other persons' possessions the subject of moral censure.

From both prudential and altruistic motives parents taught their

children to abstain from such interference, and this, by itself,

would readily give rise to the notion of theft as a moral wrong.

Society at large also tried to prevent acts of this kind, partly

in order to preserve peace and order, partly out of sympathy with

the possessor. Resentment is felt not only by him who is deprived

of his possession, but by others on his behalf. This is seen even

among some of the lower animals. The Pomeranian dogs of German

carters watch the goods of their masters;[118] Mr. Romanes's

terrier protected meat from other terriers, his offspring, which

lived in the same house with him, and with which he was on the

very best of terms;[119] Captain Gordon Stables's cat, which had

her place on the table at meals, never allowed any unauthorised

interference with the viands.[120] In men such sympathetic

resentment naturally develops into genuine moral disapproval.

[Footnote 112: Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, ii. 644.]

[Footnote 113: _Supra_, i. 22.]

[Footnote 114: Perty, _Das Seelenleben der Thiere_, p. 68.]

[Footnote 115: Darwin, _Descent of Man_, i. 125. See also

Fischer, 'Notes sur l'intelligence des singes,' in _Revue

scientifique_, xxxiii. 618.]

[Footnote 116: Compayré, _L'évolution intellectuelle et morale de

l'enfant_, p. 312.]

[Footnote 117: _Cf._ Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, ii. 634,

644; Dargun, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ v. 79 _sq._;

von Martius, _Beiträge zur Ethnographie Amerika's_, i. 88, 90.]

[Footnote 118: Peschel, _Races of Man_, p. 240.]

[Footnote 119: Romanes, 'Conscience in Animals,' in _Quarterly

Journal of Science_, xiii. 156, n.*]

[Footnote 120: 'Studies in Animal Life,' in _Chambers's Journal_,

1884, p. 824.]

All this applies not only to proprietary rights based on

occupation, but also to the principle of continued possession as

a ground of ownership. Indeed, the longer a person is in

possession of a certain object, the more apt are both he and

other individuals to resent its alienation; whereas the loss or

abandonment of a thing has a tendency to loosen the connection

between the thing and its owner.[121] This is undoubtedly the

chief source of the rule of prescription, {53} though there may be

other circumstances as well which help to justify it. Thus it has

been said that it is necessary to the security of rightful

possessors that they should not be molested by charges of

wrongful acquisition when by the lapse of time witnesses must

have perished or been lost sight of, and the real character of

the transaction can no longer be cleared up;[122] whilst another

argument adduced in favour of prescription is, that long

possession generally implies labour and that labour gives

ownership.[123] The reason why property is gained by labour is

obvious enough. Not only do exertions in producing an object make

the producer desirous to keep it and to have the exclusive

disposal of it, but an encroachment upon the fruit of his labour

arouses sympathetic resentment in outsiders, who feel that an

effort deserves its reward.

[Footnote 121: _Cf._ Hume, _Treatise of Human Nature_, ii. 3

(_Philosophical Works_, ii. 274):--"What has long lain under our

eye, and has often been employed to our advantage, _that_ we are

always the most unwilling to part with."]

[Footnote 122: Mill, _Principles of Political Economy_, i. 272.]

[Footnote 123: Thiers, _op. cit._ p. 103 _sqq._]

As the recognition of ownership thus ultimately springs from a

desire in the owner to keep and dispose of what he has

appropriated or produced, it is evident that, in ordinary

circumstances, there would be no moral disapproval of a voluntary

transfer of property to another person. But the case is different

if such a transfer is injurious to the interests of persons who

have a special claim to consideration. Thus testation is

frequently held to be inconsistent with the duties which parents

owe to their children or other near relatives to one another. The

father, though the lord of the family's possessions, may indeed

be regarded only as the first magistrate of an association, and

in such a case his share in the division naturally devolves on

the member of the family who succeeds to his authority.[124] The

right of inheritance, then, may be intimately connected with the

idea that the heir was, in a manner, joint owner of the deceased

person's property already during his lifetime.[125] But there are

{54} various other facts which account for the existence of this

right. In early civilisation the rule of succession is part of a

comprehensive system of rights and duties which unite persons of

the same kin. Professor Robertson Smith observes that in ancient

Arabia all persons on whom the duty of blood-revenge lay

originally had the right of inheritance;[126] and a similar

connection between inheritance and blood-revenge is found among

other peoples. This system of mutual rights and duties is

generally one-sided, it has reference either to paternal or to

maternal relatives, but not to both at once. Now, whatever be the

reason why the one or the other method of reckoning kinship

prevails among a certain people, it is in the present place

sufficient to point out the influence which the idea of a common

descent exercises upon the right of inheritance owing to its

power of knitting together the persons to whom it refers.

Besides, the duty connected with this right may also be of such a

nature as to require a certain amount of wealth for its

performance; among the Hindus, Greeks, and Romans, the right to

inherit a dead man's property was exactly co-extensive with the

duty of performing his obsequies and offering sacrifices to his

spirit.[127] A further cause of children inheriting their

father's property may be that they, to some extent, have

previously been in joint possession of it; for, as we know,

possession readily leads to ownership. They would have an

additional claim to succeed to his property when it had been

gathered by their labour, as well as his, or when they stood in

need of the support which it had been the father's duty to give

them had he been alive. Moreover, where a person's children are

present on the spot at his death, they are apt to be the first

occupants of his {55} property;[128] and we have noticed the

importance of first occupancy as a means of establishing

proprietary rights. The influence of these latter considerations,

which are independent of the method of tracing descent, is

apparent from the fact that among several peoples inheritance

runs in the male line even though children take the mother's name

and are considered to belong to her clan.[129] It may be added

that a reason which modern writers often have assigned for giving

the property of a person who dies intestate to his children or

other near relatives is the supposition that in so disposing of

it the law is only likely to do what the proprietor himself would

have done, if he had done anything.[130]

[Footnote 124: Plato, _Leges_, xi. 923. Maine, _Ancient Law_, p.

184. Fustel de Coulanges, _op. cit._ p. 85. Leist, _Alt-arisches

Jus Civile_, ii. 48. Mill, _op. cit._ i. 274. Kovalewsky,

_Coutume contemporaine et loi ancienne_, p. 198 (Ossetes).]

[Footnote 125: It is interesting to note that in the Chinese

penal code stealing from a relative is punished less severely

than other cases of theft, and that the mitigation of the

punishment is proportionate to the nearness of the relationship

(_Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cclxxii. p. 287). The reason for this

is that, "according to the Chinese patriarchal system, a theft is

not in this case a violation of an exclusive right, but only of

the qualified interest which each individual has in his share of

the family property" (Staunton, _ibid._ p. 287, n.*).]

[Footnote 126: Robertson Smith, _Kinship and Marriage in Early

Arabia_, pp. 55, 56, 66 _sq._]

[Footnote 127: _Laws of Manu_, ix. 186 _sq._ Isaeus, _Oratio de

Philoctemonis hereditate_, 51. Cicero, _De legibus_, ii. 19 _sq._

Fustel de Coulanges, _op. cit._ p. 84. Maine, _Ancient Law_, p.

191 _sq._]

[Footnote 128: _Cf._ Mill, _op. cit._ i. 274.]

[Footnote 129: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_,

pp. 104, 111.]

[Footnote 130: Hume, _Treatise of Human Nature_, ii. 3

(_Philosophical Works_, ii. 280). Godwin, _Enquiry concerning

Political Justice_, ii. 438. Mill, _op. cit._ i. 275.]

In details the rules of succession are influenced by a variety of

circumstances. Women may be excluded from inheritance or receive

a smaller share than the men because the latter, being the

stronger party, appropriate everything or the larger portion of

the property for themselves;[131] or because the women are less

in need of property, being supported by their male relatives or

husbands;[132] or because they are exempt from the heaviest

duties connected with kinship, as the duty of blood-revenge;[133]

or, as was the case in the feudal system, because a female tenant

is naturally unable to attend the lord in his wars;[134] or for

the purpose of preventing the estate from passing to another

family or tribe.[135] The idea of keeping together the property

of the house also largely is at the bottom of the rule of

primogeniture. {56} Besides, the eldest son is the most respected

among the children, sometimes he is regarded quite as a sacred

being.[136] On the death of the head of the family he is

generally better suited than anybody else to take his place; and

his privileged position with regard to inheritance is justified

by the duties connected with it, especially the duty of looking

after and supporting the other members of the household.[137] In

feudalism, where tenancy implied duties as well as rights, it was

also, from the lord's point of view, the simplest arrangement

that when a tenant died a single person should fill the vacant

place.[138] But there are many other points of view which may

determine the rules of succession. It may be thought just that

each child should have an equal share in the inheritance, and

that something should be given also to the widow, whose

maintenance devolved on the husband and who, whilst he was alive,

had been in joint possession of many of his belongings. Or the

youngest son may be the chief or the exclusive heir, partly

perhaps for the sake of preventing a division of the property, or

because the lord would have but one tenant,[139] but partly also

because he had remained with his father till his death,[140] or

"on the plea of his being less able to help himself on the death

of the parents than his elder brethren, who have had their

father's assistance in settling themselves in the world during

his lifetime."[141] The Wanyamwezi, again, justify the practice

of leaving property {57} to their illegitimate children by slave

girls or concubines, to the exclusion of their legitimate

offspring, "by the fact of the former requiring their assistance

more than the latter, who have friends and relatives to aid

them."[142] Generally there seems to be a close connection

between illegitimate children's right to inheritance and the

legal recognition of polygamous practices. This is indicated by a

comparison between Oriental and Roman legislation on the subject,

and, in Teutonic countries, between ancient custom and the later

law, which was influenced by Christianity's horror of sexual acts

falling outside the monogamous marriage relation. The privileges

which Hindu law grants to the illegitimate children of Sûdras are

due to the notion that the marriage of a member of this caste is

itself considered to be of so low a nature as to be on a par with

irregular connections.[143]

[Footnote 131: _Cf._ Campbell, _Travels in South Africa_, p. 520

(Kafirs).]

[Footnote 132: _Cf._ Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 176 (Greenlanders);

Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 62 (Kandhs);

Hinde, _op. cit._ p. 51 (Masai); 'Inheritance and "Patria

Potestas" in China,' in _China Review_, v. 406; Jolly, _loc.

cit._ p. 83 (ancient Hindus); Post, _Entwicklungsgeschichte des

Familienrechts_, p. 296 _sq._; _Idem_, _Grundriss der ethnol.

Jurisprudenz_, i. 218 _sq._]

[Footnote 133: _Cf._ Robertson Smith, _Kinship and Marriage in

Early Arabia_, p. 65 _sq._; Stemann, _Den danske Retshistorie

indtil Christian V.'s Lov_, p. 311 _sq._]

[Footnote 134: _Cf._ Cleveland, _Woman under the English Law_,

p. 83.]

[Footnote 135: Shortland, _Traditions and Superstitions of the

New Zealanders_, p. 256. Kingsley, _Travels in West Africa_, p.

485. Post, _Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, i. 214. _Cf._

_Numbers_, xxxvi. 1 _sqq._]

[Footnote 136: _Supra_, i. 605, 606, 614. Gill, _Life in the

Southern Isles_, p. 46 _sq._]

[Footnote 137: Dalager, _op. cit._ pp. 29, 31; Cranz, _op. cit._

i. 176 (Greenlanders). Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht der

Bogos_, p. 74. Hinde, _op. cit._ p. 51 (Masai). Of the B[=a]gdis

of Bengal Mr. Risley expressly says (_op. cit._ p. 183) that the

extra share which is given to the eldest son "seems to be

intended to enable him to support the female members of the

family, who remain under his care."]

[Footnote 138: Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 274.]

[Footnote 139: _Ibid._ ii. 280.]

[Footnote 140: Risley, _op. cit._ p. 227 (Lusheis). Among the

Angami Nagas the youngest son nearly always inherits his father's

house, because sons, when marrying, leave the paternal mansion

and build houses of their own (_ibid._ p. 209). It has been

suggested that the custom of ultimogeniture "would naturally

arise during the latter stages of the pastoral period, when the

elder sons would in the ordinary course of events have 'set up

for themselves' by the time of the father's death" (Jacobs,

_Studies in Biblical Archæology_, p. 47; Gomme, quoted _ibid._ p.

47, n. 1; Blackstone, _Commentaries on the Laws of England_,

ii. 70 _sq._).]

[Footnote 141: Tickell, in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, ix. pt.

ii. 794, n.*]

[Footnote 142: Burton, _Lake Regions of Central Africa_,

ii. 23 _sq._]

[Footnote 143: Jolly, _loc. cit._ p. 85.]

Of the incapacity of children, wives, and slaves to acquire

property for themselves little needs to be said, in the present

connection, by way of explanation. Their exclusion from the right

of independent ownership is an incident of their subjection to

their parents, husbands, or masters. But we must remember that,

whilst the latter have a right to dispose of the earnings of

their subordinates, they also have the duty of supporting them,

and that in early civilisation the child and the wife, sometimes

even the slave,[144] are practically, as it were, joint owners of

goods which in theory belong to the head of the family alone.

[Footnote 144: Volkens, _op. cit._ p. 249 (Wadshagga).]

We have still to explain the variations of moral judgments with

regard to different acts of theft. That the condemnation of the

offence varies in degree according to the value of the stolen

goods follows from the fact that theft is disapproved of on

account of the injury done to the owner. But in many cases, when

the injury is very slight, the appropriation of another person's

property is {58} justified by the needs of him who took it. And

frequently, also, the condemnation of the thief is more concerned

with his encroachment upon a neighbour's right than with

measuring the exact amount of harm inflicted. Among the Basutos,

says Casalis, "the idea of theft is expressed by a generic word

which refers to the violation of right, much more than to the

damage caused."[145] Burglary is regarded as an aggravated form

of theft partly because it adds a fresh offence, the illicit

entering into another person's house, to that against property,

partly because it proves great premeditation in the

offender.[146] Robbery is likewise a double offence, implying, as

it does, an act of violence, and may on that account be more

severely censured than ordinary theft; but in other cases the

courage and strength displayed by the robber is looked upon as a

mitigating circumstance, and sometimes substitutes admiration for

disapproval, whereas the secret offender is despised as a coward.

So, too, the secrecy of nocturnal theft may aggravate the crime,

whilst at the same time the difficulty in providing against it

may induce society to increase the punishment. But men are apt to

admire not only bravery and force, but also dexterity and pluck,

hence the appreciation of adroit theft. The same tendency in some

measure accounts for the distinction between manifest and

non-manifest theft; but here we have in the first place to

remember that strong emotions are more easily aroused by the

sight of an act than by the mere knowledge of its commission.[147]

That the moral valuation of theft varies according to the station

of the thief and the person robbed is due to the same causes as

are similar variations with regard to other injuries; and

so is the distinction between offences against the property of a

tribesman or fellow-countryman and offences against the property

of a stranger. The theory of the Roman jurists according to which

the property of an enemy in war belongs to nobody as long as the

hostilities last, and therefore becomes the property of the {59}

captor by the right of occupation,[148] is only a play with words

intended to give a reasonable justification to a practice which

is really due to lack of regard for the feelings of strangers.

When men at an early stage of civilisation respect a stranger's

property the motive is undoubtedly in the main prudential.

Savages may be anxious to prevent theft from a neighbouring tribe

in order to avoid disagreeable consequences.[149] And I venture

to think that the honesty they often display with regard to

objects belonging to strangers who visit them, and especially

with regard to things left in their charge,[150] largely springs

from superstitious fear. We have noticed before that even the

acceptance of gifts is supposed to be connected with supernatural

danger, owing to the baneful magic energy with which the gift is

suspected to be saturated.[151] Would not the same apply to the

illicit appropriation of a stranger's belongings, and especially

to trusts, which naturally call for great precaution on the part

of the owner? This leads us to a subject of considerable

importance in the history of property, namely, the influence

which magic and religious beliefs have exercised on the regard

for proprietary rights.

[Footnote 145: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 304.]

[Footnote 146: _Cf._ Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 878 (ancient Teutons).]

[Footnote 147: _Supra_, i. 294.]

[Footnote 148: Hunter, _Roman Law_, p. 257. Puchta, _op. cit._

ii. 220.]

[Footnote 149: Sproat, _Scenes and Studies of Savage Life_,

p. 159 (Ahts). Scott Robertson, _Káfirs of the Hindu-Kush_, p. 440.]

[Footnote 150: See, besides statements referred to above,

Lumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, i. 420, and ii. 477; Nordenskiöld,

_Vegas färd kring Asien och Europa_, ii. 140 _sq._ (Chukchi);

Worcester, _Philippine Islands_, p. 413 (Mangyans); Colenso, _op.

cit._ p. 43 (Maoris); Macdonald, _Light in Africa_, p. 212

(Bantu); Campbell, _Travels in South Africa_, p. 517, and Leslie,

_Among the Zulus and Amatongas_, p. 201 (Kafirs).]

[Footnote 151: _Supra_, i. 593 _sq._]

Theft is not only punished by men, but is supposed to be avenged

by supernatural powers. The Alfura of Halmahera are said to be

honest only because they fear that they otherwise would be

subject to the punishment of spirits.[152] The natives of Efate,

in the New Hebrides, maintained that theft was condemned by their

gods.[153] In Aneiteum, another island belonging to the same

group, thieves were supposed to be punished after death.[154] In

Netherland Island they {60} were said to go to a prison of

darkness under the earth;[155] according to the beliefs of the

Banks Islanders they were excluded from the true Panoi or

Paradise.[156] On the Gold Coast, "if a man had property stolen

from his house, he might go to the priest of the local deity he

was accustomed to worship, state the loss that had befallen him,

make an offering of a fowl, rum, and eggs, and ask the priest to

supplicate the god to punish the thief."[157] In Southern Guinea

fetishes are inaugurated to detect and punish certain kinds of

theft, and persons who are cognisant of such crimes and do not

give information about them are also liable to be punished by the

fetish.[158] The Bechuanas speak of an unknown being, vaguely

called by the name of Lord and Master of things (Mongalinto), who

punishes theft. One of them said: "When it thunders every one

trembles; if there are several together, one asks the other with

uneasiness, Is there any one amongst us who devours the wealth of

others? All then spit on the ground saying, We do not devour the

wealth of others. If a thunderbolt strikes and kills one of them,

no one complains, no one weeps; instead of being grieved, all

unite in saying that the Lord is delighted (that is to say, he

has done right) with killing that man; we also say that the thief

eats thunderbolts, that is to say, does things which draw down

upon men such judgments."[159]

[Footnote 152: Kükenthal, _Forschungsreise in den Molukken_, p. 188.]

[Footnote 153: Macdonald, _Oceania_, p. 208.]

[Footnote 154: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 326.]

[Footnote 155: _Ibid._ p. 301.]

[Footnote 156: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 274.]

[Footnote 157: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_,

p. 75. See also Cruickshank, _op. cit._ ii. 152, 160, 184;

Schultze, _Der Fetischismus_, p. 91.]

[Footnote 158: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 275.]

[Footnote 159: Arbousset and Daumas, _Exploratory Tour to the

North-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope_, p. 322 _sq._]

According to the Zoroastrian Yasts, Rashnu Razista was "the best

killer, smiter, destroyer of thieves and bandits."[160] In Greece

Zeus [Greek: ktê/sios] was a guardian of the family

property;[161] and according to a Roman tradition the domestic

god repulsed the robber and kept off the enemy.[162] The removing

of landmarks {61} has frequently been regarded as sacrilegious.[163]

It was strictly prohibited by the religious law of the

Hebrews.[164] In Greece boundaries were protected by Zeus [Greek:

o(/rios]. Plato says in his 'Laws':--"Let no one shift the

boundary line either of a fellow-citizen who is a neighbour, or,

if he dwells at the extremity of the land, of any stranger who is

conterminous with him. . . . Every one should be more willing to

move the largest rock which is not a land mark, than the least

stone which is the sworn mark of friendship and hatred between

neighbours; for Zeus, the god of kindred, is the witness of the

citizen, and Zeus, the god of strangers, of the stranger, and

when aroused terrible are the wars which they stir up. He who

obeys the law will never know the fatal consequences of

disobedience, but he who despises the law shall be liable to a

double penalty, the first coming from the Gods, and the second

from the law."[165] The Romans worshipped Terminus or Jupiter

Terminalis as the god of boundaries.[166] According to an old

tradition, Numa directed that every one should mark the bounds of

his landed property by stones consecrated to Jupiter, that yearly

sacrifices should be offered to them at the festival of the

Terminalia, and that, "if any person demolished or displaced

these bound-stones, he should be looked upon as devoted to this

god, to the end that anybody might kill him as a sacrilegious

person with impunity and without being defiled with guilt."[167]

In the higher religions theft of any kind is frequently condemned

as a sin.

[Footnote 160: _Yasts_, xii. 8.]

[Footnote 161: Aeschylus, _Supplices_, 445. Farnell, _Cults of

the Greek States_, i. 55.]

[Footnote 162: Ovid, _Fasti_, v. 141.]

[Footnote 163: Trumbull, _The Threshold Covenant_, p. 166 _sq._]

[Footnote 164: _Deuteronomy_, xix. 14; xxvii. 17. _Proverbs_,

xxii. 28; xxiii. 10 _sq._ _Hosea_, v. 10. _Cf._ _Job_, xxiv. 2.]

[Footnote 165: Plato, _Leges_, viii. 842 _sq._ Demosthenes,

_Oratio de Halonneso_, 39, p. 86. See also Hermann, _Disputatio

de terminis eorumque religione apud Græcos_, _passim_.]

[Footnote 166: Ovid, _Fasti_, ii. 639 _sqq._ Festus, _De verborum

significatione_ 'Termino.' Lactantius, _Divinæ Institutiones_, i.

10 (Migne, _Patrologiæ cursus_, vi. 227 _sqq._). Pauly,

_Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Alterthumswissenschaft_, vi.

pt. ii. 1707 _sqq._ Fowler, _Roman Festivals of the Period of the

Republic_, p. 324 _sqq._]

[Footnote 167: Dionysius of Halicarnassus, _Antiquitates Romanæ_,

ii. 74. Plutarch, _Numa_, xvi. i. Festus, _op. cit._ 'Termino.']

This religious sanction given to ownership is no doubt in some

measure due to the same circumstances as, in certain cases, make

morality in general a matter of divine {62} concern--a subject

which will be dealt with in a future chapter. But there are also

special reasons which account for it. Partly it has its origin in

magic practices, particularly in the curse.

Cursing is a frequent method of punishing criminals who cannot be

reached in any other way.[168] In the Book of Judges we read of

Micah's mother who had pronounced a curse with reference to the

money stolen from her, and afterwards, when her son had confessed

his guilt, hastened to render it ineffective by a blessing.[169]

In early Arabia the owner of stolen property had recourse to

cursing in order to recover what he had lost.[170] In Samoa "the

party from whom anything had been stolen, if he knew not the

thief, would seek satisfaction in sitting down and deliberately

cursing him."[171] The Kamchadales "think they can punish an

undiscovered theft by burning the sinews of the stonebuck in a

publick meeting with great ceremonies of conjuration, believing

that as these sinews are contracted by the fire so the thief will

have all his limbs contracted."[172] Among the Ossetes, if an

object has been secretly stolen, its owner secures the assistance

of a sorcerer. They proceed together to the house of any person

whom they suspect, the sorcerer carrying under his arm a cat,

which is regarded as a particularly enchanted animal. He

exclaims, "If thou hast stolen the article and dost not restore

it to its owner, may this cat torment the souls of thy

ancestors!" And such an imprecation is generally followed by a

speedy restitution of the stolen property. Again, if their

suspicions rest upon no particular individual, they proceed in the

same manner from house to house, and the thief then, knowing that his

turn must come, frequently confesses his guilt at once.[173] A common

mode of detecting the perpetrator of a theft is to compel the

suspected individual to make oath, {63} that is to say, to pronounce

a conditional curse upon himself.[174]

[Footnote 168: See, _e.g._, Mason, in _Jour. Asiatic Soc.

Bengal_, xxxvii. pt. ii. 149 (Karens).]

[Footnote 169: _Judges_, xvii. 2.]

[Footnote 170: Wellhausen, _Reste arabischen Heidentums_, p. 192.]

[Footnote 171: Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 318.]

[Footnote 172: Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, p. 179 _sq._]

[Footnote 173: von Haxthausen, _Transcaucasia_, p. 398 _sq._]

[Footnote 174: von Struve, in _Das Ausland_, 1880, p. 796

(Samoyedes). Worcester, _Philippine Islands_, p. 412 (Mangyans of

Mindoro). Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 292 _sq._

(Samoans). Bosman, _op. cit._ p. 125 (Negroes of the Gold Coast).

Bowdich, _Mission to Ashantee_, p. 267; &c.]

Cursing is resorted to not only for the purpose of punishing

thieves or compelling them to restore what they have stolen, but

also as a means of preventing theft. In the South Sea Islands it

is a common practice to protect property by making it _taboo_,

and the tabooing of an object is, as Dr. Codrington puts it, "a

prohibition with a curse expressed or implied."[175] The curse is

then, in many cases, deposited in some article which is attached

to the thing or place it is intended to protect. The mark of

taboo, in Polynesia called _rahui_ or _raui_, sometimes consists

of a cocoa-nut leaf plaited in a particular way,[176] sometimes

of a wooden image of a man or a carved post stuck in the

ground,[177] sometimes of a bunch of human hair or a piece of an

old mat,[178] and so forth. In Samoa there were various forms of

taboo which formed a powerful check on stealing, especially from

plantations and fruit-trees, and each was known by a special name

indicating the sort of curse which the owner wished would fall on

the thief. Thus, if a man desired that a sea-pike should run into

the body of the person who attempted to steal, say, his

bread-fruits, he would plait some cocoa-nut leaflets in the form

of a sea-pike, and suspend it from one or more of the trees which

he wanted to protect. This was called the "sea-pike taboo"; and

any ordinary thief would be terrified to touch a tree from which

this was suspended, believing that, if he did so, a fish of the

said description would dart up and mortally wound him the next

time he went to the sea. The "white shark taboo" was done by

plaiting a cocoa-nut leaf in the form of a shark, and was

tantamount to an {64} expressed imprecation that the thief might

be devoured by the white shark when he went to fish. The

"cross-stick taboo," again, consisted of a stick suspended

horizontally from the tree, and meant that any thief touching the

tree would have a disease running right across his body and

remaining fixed there till he died.[179] Exactly equivalent to

the taboo of the Pacific Islanders is the _pomali_ of the natives

of Timor; "a few palm leaves stuck outside a garden as a sign of

the _pomali_ will preserve its produce from thieves as

effectually as the threatening notice of man-traps, spring-guns,

or a savage dog, would do with us."[180] Among the Santals,

whenever a person "is desirous of protecting a patch of jungle

from the axes of the villagers, or a patch of grass from being

grazed over, or a newly sown field from being trespassed upon, he

erects a bamboo in his patch of grass or field, to which is

affixed a tuft of straw, or in the case of jungle some prominent

and lofty tree has the same prohibitory mark attached, which mark

is well understood and strictly observed by all parties

interested."[181] So also in Madagascar "on rencontre sur les

chemins, on voit dans les champs de longs bâtons munis à leur

sommet d'un paquet d'herbes et qui sont plantés en terre soit

pour interdire le passage du terrain soit pour indiquer que les

récoltes sont réservées à l'usage d'individus déterminés."[182]

Among the Washambala the owner of a field sometimes puts a stick

wound round with a banana leaf on the road to it, believing that

anybody who without permission enters the field "will be subject

to the curse of this charm."[183] The Wadshagga protect a

doorless hut against burglars by placing a banana leaf over the

threshold, and any maliciously inclined person who dares to step

over it is supposed to get ill or die.[184] The Akka "stick an

arrow in a bunch of bananas still on the stalk to mark it as

their own {65} when ripe," and then not even the owner of the

tree would think of touching the fruit so claimed by others.[185]

Of the Barotse we are told that "when they do not want a thing

touched they spit on straws and stick them all about the

object."[186] When a Balonda has placed a beehive on a tree, he

ties a "piece of medicine" round the trunk, and this will prove

sufficient protection against thieves.[187] Jacob of Edessa tells

us of a Syrian priest who wrote a curse and hung it on a tree,

that nobody might eat the fruit.[188] In the early days of Islam

a masterful man reserved water for his own use by hanging pieces

of fringe of his red blanket on a tree beside it, or by throwing

them into the pool;[189] and in modern Palestine nobody dares to

touch the piles of stones which are placed on the boundaries of

landed property.[190] The old inhabitants of Cumaná on the

Caribbean Sea used to mark off their plantations by a single

cotton thread, in the belief that anybody tampering with these

boundary marks would speedily die.[191] A similar idea seems

still to prevail among the Indians of the Amazon. Among the Jurís

a traveller noticed that in places where the hedge surrounding a

field was broken, it was replaced by a cotton string; and when

Brazilian Indians leave their huts they often wind a piece of the

same material round the latch of the door.[192] Sometimes they

also hang baskets, rags, or flaps of bark on their

landmarks.[193] In these and in various other instances just

referred to it is not expressly stated that the taboo mark

embodies a curse, but their similarity to cases in which it does

so is striking enough to {66} preclude much doubt about their

real meaning. It is true that an object which is sacred by itself

may, on that account, protect everything in its neighbourhood;[194]

in Morocco any article deposited in the _[h.]orm_ of a saint is

safe, and among pagan Africans the same effect is produced by

using fetishes as protectors of fields or houses.[195] But a

thing of inherent holiness may also be chosen for taboo purposes

for the reason that its sanctity is supposed to give particular

efficacy to any curse with which it may be loaded.

[Footnote 175: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 215.]

[Footnote 176: Taylor White, in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._ i. 275.]

[Footnote 177: Hamilton, _Maori Art_, p. 102; Thomson, _Story of

New Zealand_, i. 102; Polack, _op. cit._ ii. 70 (Maoris). Ellis,

_Polynesian Researches_, iii. 116 (Tahitians).]

[Footnote 178: Thomson, _op. cit._ i. 102 (Maoris). See also

Colenso, _op. cit._ p. 34 (Maoris); Ellis, _Polynesian

Researches_, iii. 201 (Tahitians).]

[Footnote 179: Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 294 _sqq._]

[Footnote 180: Wallace, _Malay Archipelago_, p. 149 _sq._]

[Footnote 181: Sherwill, 'Tour through the Rájmahal Hills,' in

_Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xx. 568.]

[Footnote 182: van Gennep, _Tabou et totémisme à Madagascar_,

p. 184 _sqq._]

[Footnote 183: Lang, in Steinmetz, _Rechtverhältnisse_, p. 263.]

[Footnote 184: Volkens, _op. cit._ p. 254.]

[Footnote 185: Junker, _Travels in Africa during the Years

1882-1886_, p. 86.]

[Footnote 186: Decle, _op. cit._ p. 77.]

[Footnote 187: Livingstone, _Missionary Travels_, p. 285.]

[Footnote 188: Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_,

p. 164, n. 1.]

[Footnote 189: _Ibid._ p. 336, n. 1.]

[Footnote 190: Pierotti, _Customs and Traditions of Palestine_,

p. 95 _sq._ According to Roman sources (_Digesta_, xlvii. 11. 9),

there was in the province of Arabia an offence called [Greek:

skopelismo/s], which consisted in laying stones on an enemy's

ground as a threat that if the owner cultivated the land "malo

leto periturus esset insidiis eorum, qui scopulos posuissent";

and so great was the fear of such stones that nobody would go

near a field where they had been put.]

[Footnote 191: Gomara, _Primera parte de la historia general de

las Indias_, ch. 79 (_Biblioteca de autores españoles_, xxii. 206).]

[Footnote 192: von Martius, _Von dem Rechtszustande unter den

Ureinwohnern Brasiliens_, p. 37 _sq._]

[Footnote 193: _Ibid._ p. 34.]

[Footnote 194: _Cf._ van Gennep, _op. cit._ p. 185 (natives of

Madagascar). It was an ancient Roman usage to inter the dead in

the field belonging to the family, and in the works of the elder

Cato there is a formula according to which the Italian labourer

prayed the manes to take good care against thieves (Fustel de

Coulanges, _op. cit._ p. 75). Cicero says (_Pro domo_, 41) that

the house of each citizen was sacred because his household gods

were there.]

[Footnote 195: Rowley, _Africa Unveiled_, p. 174. Bastian,

_Afrikanische Reisen_, p. 78 _sq._ 3 Nassau, _Fetichism in West

Africa_, p. 85. _Cf._ Schneider, _Die Religion der afrikanischen

Naturvölker_, p. 230. If we knew the ceremonies with which

magicians transform ordinary material objects into fetishes,

we might perhaps find that they charge them with curses.

Dr. Nassau says (_op. cit._ p. 85):--"For every human passion

or desire of every part of our nature, for our thousand

necessities or wishes, a fetich can be made, its operation being

directed to the attainment of one specified wish." See also

Schultze, _Der Fetischismus_, p. 109.]

We have previously noticed another method of charging a curse

with magic energy, namely, by giving it the form of an appeal to

a supernatural being.[196] So also spirits or gods are frequently

invoked in curses referring to theft. On the Gold Coast, "when

the owner of land sees that some one has been making a clearing

on his land, he cuts the young inner branches of the palm tree

and hangs them about the place where the trespass has been

committed. As he hangs each leaf he says something to the

following effect: 'The person who did this and did not make it

known to me before he did it, if he comes here to do any other

thing, may fetish Katawere (or Tanor or Fofie or other fetish)

kill him and all his family.'"[197] In Samoa, in the case of a

theft, the suspected persons had to swear before the chiefs, each

one invoking the village god to send swift destruction if he had

committed the crime; and if all had sworn and the culprit was

still undiscovered, the chiefs solemnly made a similar invocation

on behalf of the {67} thief.[198] The Hawaiians seem likewise to

have appealed to an avenging deity in certain cursing ceremonies,

which they performed for the purpose of detecting or punishing

thieves.[199] In ancient Greece it was a custom to dedicate a

lost article to a deity, with a curse for those who kept it.[200]

Of the Melanesian taboo, again, Dr. Codrington observes that the

power at the back of it "is that of the ghost or spirit in whose

name, or in reliance upon whom, it is pronounced."[201] In

Ceylon, "to prevent fruit being stolen, the people hang up

certain grotesque figures around the orchard and dedicate it to

the devils, after which none of the native Ceylonese will dare

even to touch the fruit on any account. Even the owner will not

venture to use it till it be first liberated from the

dedication."[202] On the landmarks of the ancient Babylonians,

generally consisting of stone pillars in the form of a phallus,

imprecations were inscribed with appeals to various deities. One

of these boundary stones contains the following curse directed

against the violator of its sacredness:--"Upon this man may the

great gods Anu, Bêl, Ea, and Nusku, look wrathfully, uproot his

foundation, and destroy his offspring"; and similar invocations

are then made to many other gods.[203]

[Footnote 196: _Supra_, i. 564.]

[Footnote 197: _Jour. African Soc._ 110 xviii. January, 1906, p. 203.]

[Footnote 198: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 19. _Idem_, _Nineteen Years in

Polynesia_, p. 292 _sq._]

[Footnote 199: Jarves, _History of the Hawaiian Islands_, p. 20.]

[Footnote 200: Rouse, _Greek Votive Offerings_, p. 339.]

[Footnote 201: Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 215.]

[Footnote 202: Percival, _Account of the Island of Ceylon_, p. 198.]

[Footnote 203: Trumbull, _The Threshold Covenant_, p. 166 _sq._

Hilprecht, quoted _ibid._ p. 167 _sqq._]

Now we can understand why gods so frequently take notice of

offences against property. They are invoked in curses uttered

against thieves; the invocation in a curse easily develops into a

genuine prayer, and where this is the case the god is supposed to

punish the offender of his own free will. Besides, he may be

induced to do so by offerings. And when often appealed to in

connection with theft, a supernatural being may finally come to

be looked upon as a guardian of property. This, for instance, I

take to be the explanation of the belief prevalent among the

Berbers {68} of [H.]a[h.]a, in Southern Morocco, that some of the

local saints punish thieves who approach their sanctuaries, even

though the theft was committed elsewhere; being constantly

appealed to in oaths taken by persons suspected of theft, they

have become the permanent enemies of thieves. We can, further,

understand why in some cases certain offences against property

have actually assumed the character of a sacrilege, even apart

from such as are committed in the proximity of a supernatural

being. Curses are sometimes personified and elevated to the rank

of divine agents; this, as we have seen, is the origin of the

Erinyes of parents, beggars, and strangers, and of the Roman

_divi parentum_ and _dii hospitales_; and this is also in all

probability the origin of the god Terminus.[204] Or the curse may

be transformed into an attribute of the chief god, not only

because he is frequently appealed to in connection with offences

of a certain kind, but also because such a god has a tendency to

attract supernatural forces which are in harmony with his general

nature. This explains the origin of conceptions such as Zeus

[Greek: o(/rios] and Jupiter Terminalis, as well as the extreme

severity with which Yahweh treated the removal of landmarks. In

all these cases there are indications of a connection between the

god and a curse. Apart from other evidence to be found in Semitic

antiquities, there is the anathema of _Deuteronomy_, "Cursed be

he that removeth his neighbour's landmark."[205] That the

boundary stones dedicated to Zeus [Greek: o(/rios] were

originally charged with imprecations appears from a passage in

Plato's 'Laws' quoted above,[206] as also from inscriptions made

on them.[207] The Etruscans cursed anyone who should touch or

displace a boundary mark:--Such a person shall be condemned by

the gods; his house shall disappear; his race shall be

extinguished; his limbs shall be covered with ulcers and waste

away; his land shall no longer produce {69} fruits; hail, rust,

and the fires of the dog-star shall destroy his harvests.[208]

Considering the important part played by blood as a conductor of

imprecations, it is not improbable that the Roman ceremony of

letting the blood of a sacrificial animal flow into the hole

where the landmark was to be placed[209] was intended to give

efficacy to a curse. In some parts of England a custom of

annually "beating the bounds" of a parish has survived up to the

present time, and this ceremony was formerly accompanied by

religious services, in which a clergyman invoked curses on him

who should transgress the bounds of his neighbour, and blessings

on him who should regard the landmarks.[210]

[Footnote 204: _Cf._ Festus, _op. cit._ 'Termino':--"Numa

Pompilius statuit eum, qui terminum exarasset, et ipsum, et boves

sacros esse."]

[Footnote 205: _Deuteronomy_, xxvii. 17. _Cf._ _Genesis_,

xxxi. 44 _sqq._]

[Footnote 206: Plato, _Leges_, viii. 843: ". . . [Greek: ê)\n smikron

li/thon o(ri/zonta philai/n kai\ e)/chthran e)/norkon

para\ theô=n.]"]

[Footnote 207: Xenophon, _Anabasis_, v. 3. 13. Hermann,

_Disputatio de terminis apud Græcos_, p. 11.]

[Footnote 208: _Rei agrariæ auctores legesque variæ_, edited by

G[oe]sius, p. 258 _sq._]

[Footnote 209: Siculus Flaccus, 'De conditionibus agrorum,' in

_Rei agrariæ auctores_, p. 5.]

[Footnote 210: Dibbs, 'Beating the Bounds,' in _Chambers's

Edinburgh Journal_, N.S. xx. (1853) 49 _sqq._ Trumbull, _The

Threshold Covenant_, p. 174 _sq._]

The practice of cursing a thief may possibly even be at the

bottom of the belief of some savages that such a person will be

punished after death. In a following chapter we shall notice

instances where the efficacy of a curse is supposed to extend

beyond the grave. But we shall also find other reasons for savage

doctrines of retribution in the world to come. In the cases

referred to above it is not expressly said that the _post mortem_

punishment of the thief is inflicted by a god.

* * * * *

I have here only dealt with rules relating to property which have

been recognised by custom or law. But the established principles

of ownership have not always been admitted to be just: in the

civilised countries of the West they have called forth an

opposition which is rapidly gaining in strength. The limited

scope of the present work does not allow me to attempt a detailed

account of this movement, with its variety of arguments and its

multitudinous schemes of reform. The main reasons for complaint

are:--first, that our actual law of property does not ensure to

every labourer the whole produce of his labour; secondly, that it

does not provide for every want {70} a satisfaction proportionate

to the available means. However much the opinions of the

different schools of socialists may vary, every socialist

organisation of property aims either at guaranteeing to the

working-classes the entire product of their industry, or at

reducing to just proportions individual needs and existing means

of satisfaction by recognising the claim of every member of

society to the commodities and services necessary to support

existence, in preference to the satisfaction of the less pressing

wants of others.[211] These aims are greatly hampered by the

present system, in which land and capital are the property of

private individuals freely struggling for increase of wealth, and

especially by the legally recognised existence of unearned

income[212]--the "rent" of the Saint-Simonians, the "surplus

value" (_Mehrwert_) of Thompson and Marx,--for which the favoured

recipient returns no personal equivalent to society, and which he

is able to pocket because the wage labourer receives in

money-wages less than the full value of the produce of his work.

We have here a conflict between different principles of

acquisition. Both the rule that the owner of a thing also owns

what results from it, and the law of inheritance, leading as they

do to unearned income, are intruding upon the principle of labour

as a source of property. They, moreover, interfere with the right

to subsistence, which in some measure, though often insufficiently,

is recognised in all human societies;[213] for, as Marx observed,

the accumulation of wealth at one pole means the accumulation of

misery at the opposite pole.[214] This conflict between different

principles or rights, all of which have deep foundations in human

nature and the conditions of social life, has been brought about

by certain {71} facts inherent in progressive civilisation. In

simple societies the unearned income is small, because no fortunes

exist, and the wants of those who are incapable of earning their

own livelihood are provided for by the system of mutual aid.

Progress in culture, on the other hand, has been accompanied by

a more unequal distribution of wealth, and also by a decrease of

social solidarity as a result of the increase and greater

differentiation of the social unit. The unearned income has grown

larger, the disproportion between the returns on capital and the

reward for labour has in many cases become enormous, and hand in

hand with the opulence of some goes the destitution of others. At

the same time the injustice of prerogatives based on birth or

fortune is keenly felt, the dignity of labour is recognised, and

the working-classes are every day becoming more conscious both of

their power and their rights. All this has resulted in a strong

and wide-spread conviction that the actual law of property

greatly differs from the ideal law. But much struggle will no

doubt be required to bring them in harmony with one another. The

present rights of property are supported not only by personal

interests, but also by a deep-rooted feeling, trained in the

school of tradition, that it would be iniquitous of the State to

interfere with individuals' long-established claims to use at

their pleasure the objects of wealth. The new scheme, on the

other hand, derives strength from the fact that it aims at

rectifying legal rights in accordance with existing needs, and

that it lays stress on a method of acquisition which more than

any other seems to appeal to the natural sense of justice in man.

We are utterly unable to foresee in detail the issue of this

struggle. But that the law of property will sooner or later

undergo a radical change must be obvious to every one who

realises that, though ideas of right and wrong may for some time

outlive the conditions from which they sprang, they cannot do so

for ever.

[Footnote 211: See Menger, _Right to the whole Produce of

Labour_, p. 5 _sqq._, Goos, _op. cit._ ii. 61.]

[Footnote 212: The term "unearned income" (_arbeitsloses

Einkommen_) has been proposed by Menger (_op. cit._ p. 3).]

[Footnote 213: See _supra_, ch. xxiii., vol. i. 526 _sqq._ Among

the Eskimo about Behring Strait (Nelson, in _Ann. Rep. Bur.

Ethn._ xviii. 294) and the Greenlanders (Rink, _Eskimo Tales_, p.

29 _sq._), if a man borrows an article from another and fails to

return it, the owner is not entitled to claim it back, as they

consider that when a person has enough property to enable him to

lend some of it he has more than he needs.]

[Footnote 214: Marx, _Capital_, p. 661.]

CHAPTER XXX

THE REGARD FOR TRUTH AND GOOD FAITH

THE regard for truth implies in the first place that we ought to

abstain from lying, that is, a wilful misrepresentation of facts,

by word or deed, with the intention of producing a false belief.

Closely connected with this duty is that of good faith or

fidelity to promises, which requires that we should make facts

correspond with our emphatic assertions as to our conduct in the

future. Within certain limits these duties seem to be universally

recognised, though the censure passed on the transgressor varies

extremely in degree. But there are also many cases in which

untruthfulness and bad faith are looked upon with indifference,

or even held laudable or obligatory.

Various uncivilised races are conspicuous for their great regard

for truth; of some savages it is said that not even the most

trying circumstances can induce them to tell a lie. Among others,

again, falsehood is found to be a prevailing vice and the

successful lie a matter of popular admiration.

All authorities agree that the Veddahs of Ceylon are models of

veracity. They "are proverbially truthful and honest."[1] They

think it perfectly inconceivable that any person should say

anything which is not true.[2] Mr. Nevill writes, "I never knew a

true Vaedda to tell a lie, and the Sinhalese give them the same

character."[3] Messrs. Sarasin had a similar experience:{73}--"The

genuine Wood-Wedda always speaks the truth; we never heard a lie

from any of them; all their statements are short and true."[4] A

Veddah who had committed murder and was tried for it, instead of

telling a lie in order to escape punishment, said simply nothing.[5]

[Footnote 1: Bailey, 'Wild Tribes of the Veddahs of Ceylon,' in

_Trans. Ethn. Soc._ N.S. ii. 291.]

[Footnote 2: Hartshorne, in _Indian Antiquary_, viii. 320.]

[Footnote 3: Nevill, in _Taprobanian_, i. 193.]

[Footnote 4: Sarasin, _Forschungen auf Ceylon_, iii. 541. _Cf._

_ibid._ iii. 542 _sq._; Schmidt, _Ceylon_, p. 276.]

[Footnote 5: Sarasin, _op. cit._ iii. 543.]

Other instances of extreme truthfulness are provided by various

uncivilised tribes in India. The Saoras of the province of

Madras, "like most of the hill people, . . . are not inclined to

lying. If one Saora kill another he admits it at once and tells

why he killed him."[6] The highlander of Central India is

described as "the most truthful of beings, and rarely denies

either a money obligation or a crime really chargeable against

him."[7] A true Gond "will commit a murder, but he will not tell

a lie."[8] The Kandhs, says Macpherson, "are, I believe, inferior

in veracity to no people in the world. . . . It is in all cases

imperative to tell the truth, except when deception is necessary

to save the life of a guest."[9] And to break a solemn pledge of

friendship is, in their opinion, one of the greatest sins a man

can commit.[10] The Korwás inhabiting the highlands of

Sirgúja--though they show great cruelty in committing robberies,

putting to death the whole of the party attacked, even when

unresisting--"have what one might call the savage virtue of

truthfulness to an extraordinary degree, and, rightly accused,

will at once confess and give you every required detail of the

crime."[11] The Santals are noted for veracity and fidelity to

their word even in the most trying circumstances.[12] A Kurubar

"always speaks the truth."[13] Among the Hos "a reflection on a

man's honesty or veracity may be sufficient to send him to

self-destruction."[14] Among the Angami Nagas simple truth is

highly regarded; it is rare for a statement to be made on oath,

and rarer still for it to be false.[15] In the Chittagong Hills

the Tipperahs are the only people among whom Captain Lewin {74}

has met with meanness and lying;[16] and they, too, have

previously been said to be, "as a rule, truthful and

simple-minded.**"[17] The Karens of Burma have the following

traditional precept:--"Do not speak falsehood. What you do not

know, do not speak. Liars shall have their tongues cut out."[18]

Among the Bannavs of Cambodia "severe penalties, such as slavery

or exile, are imposed for lying."[19]

[Footnote 6: Fawcett, _Saoras_, p. 17.]

[Footnote 7: Forsyth, _Highlands of Central India_, p. 164. _Cf._

_ibid._ p. 361; Sleeman, _Rambles and Recollections of an Indian

Official_, ii. 109; Hislop, _Aboriginal Tribes of the Central

Provinces_, p. 1.]

[Footnote 8: Dalton, _Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 284. _Cf._

Forsyth, _op. cit._ p. 155.]

[Footnote 9: Macpherson, 'Religious Opinions and Observances of

the Khonds,' in _Jour. Roy. Asiatic Soc._ vii. 196.]

[Footnote 10: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 94.]

[Footnote 11: Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 230.]

[Footnote 12: Elliot, 'Characteristics of the Population of

Central and Southern India,' in _Jour. Ethn. Soc. London_, N.S.

i. 106 _sq._]

[Footnote 13: _Ibid._ i. 105.]

[Footnote 14: Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 206. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 204

_sq._; Bradley-Birt, _Chota Nagpore_, p. 103.]

[Footnote 15: Prain, 'Angami Nagas,' in _Revue coloniale

internationale_, v. 490.]

[Footnote 16: Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, p. 191.]

[Footnote 17: Browne, quoted by Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 110.]

[Footnote 18: Smeaton, _Loyal Karens of India_, p. 254.]

[Footnote 19: Comte, quoted by Mouhot, _Travels in Indo-China,

Cambodia, and Laos_, ii. 27. For the truthfulness of the

uncivilised races of India see also Sleeman, _op. cit._ ii. 110

_sqq._; Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 256 (Oraons); Crooke, _Tribes and

Castes of the North-Western Provinces_, ii. 478 (Hâbûra); Fraser,

_Tour through the Him[=a]l[=a] Mountains_, pp. 264 (inhabitants

of Kunawur), 335 (Bhoteas); Iyer, in the Madras Government

Museum's _Bulletin_, iv. 73 (Nay[=a]dis of Malabar); Walhouse,

'Account of a Leaf-wearing Tribe on the Western Coast of India,'

in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ iv. 370 (Koragars).]

The Andaman Islanders call falsehood _y[=u]bda_, that is, sin or

wrong-doing.[20] The natives of Car Nicobar are not only very

honest,[21] but "the accusation of untruthfulness brings them up

in arms immediately."[22] The Dyaks of Borneo are praised for

their honesty and great regard for truth.[23] Mr. Bock states that

if they could not satisfactorily reply to his questions they

hesitated to answer at all, and that if he did not always get the

whole truth he always got at least nothing but the truth from

them.[24] Veracity is a characteristic of the Alfura of

Halmahera[25] and the Bataks of Sumatra, who only in cases of

urgent necessity have recourse to a lie.[26] The Javanese, says

Crawfurd, "are honourably distinguished from all the civilised

nations of Asia by a regard for truth."[27] "In their intercourse

with society," Raffles observes, "they display, in a high degree,

the virtues of honesty, plain dealing, and candour. Their

ingenuousness is such that, as the first Dutch authorities have

acknowledged, prisoners brought to the bar on criminal charges,

if really guilty, nine times out of ten confess, without disguise

or equivocation, the full extent and exact circumstances of their

offences, and communicate, when required, more information on the

matter at issue than all the rest of the evidence."[28] Among the

natives {75} of the Malay Archipelago there are some further

instances of trustworthy and truthful peoples;[29] whereas others

are described as distrustful and regardless of truth.[30] Thus

the natives of Timor-laut lie without compunction when they think

they can escape detection,[31] and of the Niase it is said that

"truth is their bitter enemy."[32]

[Footnote 20: Man, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 112.]

[Footnote 21: Distant, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ iii. 4.]

[Footnote 22: Kloss, _In the Andamans and Nicobars_, p. 227 _sq._]

[Footnote 23: Ling Roth, _Natives of Sarawak_, i. 66-68, 82.

Boyle, _Adventures among the Dyaks of Borneo_, p. 215. Selenka,

_Sonnige Welten_, p. 47.]

[Footnote 24: Bock, _Head-Hunters of Borneo_, p. 209.]

[Footnote 25: Kükenthal, _Forschungsreise in den Molukken_, p. 188.]

[Footnote 26: Junghuhn, _Battaländer auf Sumatra_, ii. 239.]

[Footnote 27: Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_, i. 50.]

[Footnote 28: Raffles, _History of Java_, i. 248.]

[Footnote 29: Riedel, _De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen

Selebes en Papua_, p. 96 (Serangese). St. John, _Life in the

Forests of the Far East_, ii. 322 (Malays of Sarawak).]

[Footnote 30: Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 209 (natives of

the interior of Sumatra). Riedel, _op. cit._ p. 314 (natives of

the Luang-Sermata group). Steller, _De Sangi-Archipel_, p. 23.]

[Footnote 31: Forbes, _A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern

Archipelago_, p. 320.]

[Footnote 32: Modigliani, _Viaggio a Nías_, p. 467.]

Veracity and probity were conspicuous virtues among various

uncivilised peoples belonging to the Russian Empire. Georgi,

whose work dates from the eighteenth century, says of the

Chuvashes that they "content themselves with a simple affirmation

or denial, and always keep their word";[33] of the Barabinzes,

that "lying, duplicity, and fraud, are unknown among them";[34]

of the Tunguses, that they "always appear to be what they really

are," and that "lying seems to them the absurdest thing in the

world, which prevents them being either suspicious or

necessitated to accompany their affirmations by oaths or solemn

protestations";[35] of the Kurilians, that they always speak the

truth "with the most scrupulous fidelity."[36] Castrén states

that the Zyrians, like the Finnish tribes generally, are

trustworthy and honest,[37] and that the Ostyaks have no other

oaths but those of purgation. Among them "witnesses never take

the oath, but their words are unconditionally believed in, and

everybody, with the exception of lunatics, is allowed to give

evidence. Children may witness against their parents, brothers

against brothers, a husband against his wife, and a wife against

her husband."[38]

[Footnote 33: Georgi, _Russia_, i. 110.]

[Footnote 34: _Ibid._ ii. 229.]

[Footnote 35: _Ibid._ iii. 78. _Cf._ _ibid._ iii. 109.]

[Footnote 36: _Ibid._ iii. 192. _Cf._ Krasheninnikoff, _History

of Kamschatka_, p. 236.]

[Footnote 37: Castrén, _Nordiska resor och forskningar_, i. 257.]

[Footnote 38: _Ibid._ i. 309 _sq._]

The Aleuts were highly praised by Father Veniaminof for their

truthfulness:--"These people detest lying, and never spread false

rumours. . . . They are very much offended if any one doubts

their word." They "despise hypocrisy in every respect," and "do

not flatter nor make empty promises, even in order to escape

reproof."[39] The regard in which truth is held by the Eskimo

seems to vary among different tribes. Armstrong blames the

Western Eskimo for being much {76} addicted to falsehood, and for

seldom telling the truth, if there be anything to gain by a

lie.[40] The Point Barrow Eskimo "are in the main truthful,

though a detected lie is hardly considered more than a good joke,

and considerable trickery is practised in trading."[41] Of the

Eskimo at Igloolik, an island near Melville Peninsula, we are

told that "their lies consist only of vilifying each other's

character, with false accusations of theft or ill behaviour. When

asking questions of an individual, it is but rarely that he will

either advance or persist in an untruth. . . . Lying among them

is almost exclusively confined to the ladies."[42] In his

description of the Eskimo on the western side of Davis Strait and

in the region of Frobisher Bay, Mr. Hall says that they despise

and shun one who will _shag-la-voo_, that is, "tell a lie," and

that they are rarely troubled by any of this class.[43] The

Greenlanders are generally truthful towards each other, at least

the men.[44] But if he can help it, a Greenlander will not tell a

truth which he thinks may be unpleasant to the hearer, as he is

anxious to stand on as good a footing as possible with his

fellow-men.[45]

[Footnote 39: Veniaminof, quoted by Dall, _Alaska_, pp. 396, 395.]

[Footnote 40: Armstrong, _Discovery of the North-West Passage_,

p. 196 _sq._]

[Footnote 41: Murdoch, 'Ethnological Results of the Point Barrow

Expedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 41.]

[Footnote 42: Lyon, _Private Journal during the Voyage of

Discovery under Captain Parry_, p. 349.]

[Footnote 43: Hall, _Arctic Researches_, p. 567.]

[Footnote 44: Dalager, _Grønlandske Relationer_, p. 69. Cranz,

_History of Greenland_, i. 171, 175. Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 158.]

[Footnote 45: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 101. _Idem_, _First

Crossing of Greenland_, ii. 334 _sq._]

The Thompson River Indians of British Columbia maintain that it

is bad to lie, that if you do so people will laugh at you and

call you a "liar."[46] Speaking of the Iroquois, Mr. Morgan says

that the love of truth was a marked trait of the Indian

character. "This inborn sentiment flourished in the period of

their highest prosperity, in all the freshness of its primeval

purity. On all occasions and at whatever peril, the Iroquois

spoke the truth without fear and without hesitation.

Dissimulation was not an Indian habit. . . . The Iroquois prided

themselves upon their sacred regard for the public faith, and

punished the want of it with severity when an occasion presented

itself."[47] Loskiel likewise states that they considered lying

and cheating heinous and scandalous offences.[48] Among the

Chippewas there were a few persons addicted to lying, but these

{77} were held in disrepute.[49] The Shoshones, a tribe of the

Snake Indians, were frank and communicative in their intercourse

with strangers, and perfectly fair in their dealings.[50] The

Seminole Indians of Florida are commended for their

truthfulness.[51] With special reference to the Navahos, Mr.

Matthews observes, "As the result of over thirty years'

experience among Indians, I must say that I have not found them

less truthful than the average of our own race."[52] Among the

Dacotahs lying "is considered very bad"; yet in this respect

"every one sees the mote in his brother's eye, but does not

discover the beam that is in his own,"[53] want of truthfulness

and habitual dishonesty in little things being prevalent traits

in their character.[54] So, also, the Thlinkets admit that

falsehood is criminal, although they have recourse to it without

hesitation whenever it suits their purpose.[55] Of the

Chippewyans, again, it is said that they carry the habit of lying

to such an extent, even among themselves, that they can scarcely

be said to esteem truth a virtue.[56] The Crees are "not very

strict in their adherence to truth, being great boasters."[57]

Heriot[58] and Adair[59] speak of the treacherous or deceitful

disposition of the North American Indians; but the latter adds

that, though "privately dishonest," they are "very faithful

indeed to their own tribe."

[Footnote 46: Teit, 'Thompson Indians of British Columbia,' in

_Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History_,

Anthropology, i. 366.]

[Footnote 47: Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, pp. 335, 338.]

[Footnote 48: Loskiel, _History of the Mission of the United

Brethren among the Indians in North America_, i. 16.]

[Footnote 49: Keating, _Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's

River_, ii. 168.]

[Footnote 50: Lewis and Clarke, _Travels to the Source of the

Missouri River_, p. 306.]

[Footnote 51: Maccauley, 'Seminole Indians of Florida,' in _Ann.

Rep. Bur. Ethn._ v. 491.]

[Footnote 52: Matthews, 'Study of Ethics among the Lower Races,'

in _Jour. of American Folk-Lore_, xii. 5.]

[Footnote 53: Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United States_,

ii. 196.]

[Footnote 54: Eastman, _Dacotah_, p. xvii.]

[Footnote 55: Douglas, quoted by Petroff, _Report on Alaska_,

p. 177.]

[Footnote 56: Richardson, _Arctic Searching Expedition_, ii. 18.

_Cf._ _ibid._ ii. 19.]

[Footnote 57: Richardson, in Franklin, _Journey to the Shores of

the Polar Sea_, p. 63.]

[Footnote 58: Heriot, _Travels through the Canadas_, p. 319.]

[Footnote 59: Adair, _History of the American Indians_, p. 4.]

Of the regard in which truth is held by the Indians of South

America the authorities I have consulted have little to say. The

Coroados are not deceitful.[60] The Tehuelches of Patagonia

nearly always lie in minor affairs, and will invent stories for

sheer amusement. "In anything of importance, however, such as

guaranteeing the safety of a person, they were very truthful, as

long as faith was kept with them. After a time," Lieutenant

Musters adds, "when they ascertained that I invariably avoided

deviating in any way from the truth, they left off lying to me

even in minor matters. This will serve to show that they are not

of the treacherous nature assigned to {78} them by some ignorant

writers."[61] Among the Fuegians, according to Mr. Bridge, no one

can trust another, lying tales of slander are very common, great

exaggeration is used, and it is not even considered wrong to tell

a lie.[62] Snow, however, speaks of "the honesty they undoubtedly

evince in many of their transactions";[63] and Darwin states that

the Fuegian boy on board the Beagle "showed, by going into the

most violent passion, that he quite understood the reproach of

being called a liar, which in truth he was."[64]

[Footnote 60: von Spix and von Martius, _Travels in Brazil_,

ii. 242.]

[Footnote 61: Musters, _At Home with the Patagonians_, p. 195 _sq._]

[Footnote 62: Bridges, in _A Voice for South America_, xiii. 202

_sq._ _Cf._ Hyades and Deniker, _Mission scientifique du Cap

Horn_, vii. 242; King and Fitzroy, _Voyages of the "Adventure"

and "Beagle,"_ ii. 188.]

[Footnote 63: Snow, _Two Years Cruise off Tierra del Fuego_, i. 347.]

[Footnote 64: Darwin, _Journal of Researches_, p. 227.]

Of the Australian aborigines we are told that some tribes and

families display on nearly all occasions honesty and

truthfulness, whereas others "seem almost destitute of the better

qualities."[65] According to Mr. Mathew, they are not wantonly

untruthful, although one can rely on them being faithful to a

trust only on condition that they are exempt from strong

temptation.[66] Mr. Curr admits that under some circumstances

they are treacherous, and that it costs them little pain to lie;

but from his own observations he has no doubt that the black

feels, in the commencement of his career at least, that lying is

wrong.[67] Mr. Howitt has found the South Australian Kurnai "to

compare not unfavourably with our own people in their narration

of occurrences, or as witnesses in courts of justice as to facts.

Among them a person known to disregard truth is branded as a liar

(_jet-bolan_)."[68] Among the aborigines of New South Wales

people who cause strife by lying are punished, and "liars are

much disliked"; Dr. Fraser was assured by a person who had had

much intercourse with them for thirty years that he never knew

them to tell a lie.[69] Among the tribes of Western Victoria

described by Mr. Dawson liars are detested; should any man,

through lying, get others into trouble, he is punished with the

boomerang, whilst women and young people, for the same fault, are

beaten with a stick.[70] In his description of his expeditions

into Central Australia Eyre writes, "In their intercourse with

each other I {79} have generally found the natives to speak the

truth and act with honesty, and they will usually do the same

with Europeans if on friendly terms with them."[71] With regard

to West Australian tribes Mr. Chauncy states that they are

certainly not remarkable for their treachery, and that he has

very seldom known any of them accused of it. He adds that they

are "habitually honest among themselves, if not truthful," and

that, during his many years' acquaintance with them, he does not

remember ever hearing a native utter a falsehood with a definite

idea of gaining anything by it. "If questioned on any subject, he

would form his reply rather with the view of pleasing the

enquirer than of its being true; but this was attributable to his

politeness."[72] According to a late Advocate-General of West

Australia, "when a native is accused of any crime, he often

acknowledges his share in the transaction with perfect

candour."[73] Very different from these accounts is Mr. Gason's

statement concerning the Dieyerie in South Australia. "A more

treacherous race," he says, "I do not believe exists. They imbibe

treachery in infancy, and practise it until death, and have no

sense of wrong in it. . . . They seem to take a delight in lying,

especially if they think it will please you. Should you ask them

any question, be prepared for a falsehood, as a matter of course.

They not only lie to the white man, but to each other, and do not

appear to see any wrong in it."[74] The natives of Botany Bay and

Port Jackson in New South Wales are by older writers described as

no strangers to falsehood.[75] And speaking of a tribe in North

Queensland, Mr. Lumholtz observed that "an Australian native can

betray anybody," and that "there is not one among them who will

not lie if it is to his advantage."[76]

[Footnote 65: Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of Victoria_, i. 25.]

[Footnote 66: Mathew, 'Australian Aborigines,' in _Jour. and

Proceed. Roy. Soc. N.S. Wales_, xxiii. 387.]

[Footnote 67: Curr, _Australian Race_, i. 43, 100.]

[Footnote 68: Fison and Howitt, _Kamilaroi and Kurnai_, p. 256.]

[Footnote 69: Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, pp. 41, 90.]

[Footnote 70: Dawson, _Australian Aborigines_, p. 76.]

[Footnote 71: Eyre, _Expeditions of Discovery into Central

Australia_, ii. 385.]

[Footnote 72: Chauncy, quoted by Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ ii.

275, 281. _Cf._ Oldfield, 'Aborigines of Australia,' in _Trans.

Ethn. Soc._ N.S. iii. 255.]

[Footnote 73: Moore, quoted by Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ ii. 278.]

[Footnote 74: Gason, 'Dieyerie Tribe of Australian Aborigines,'

in Woods, _Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 257 _sq._]

[Footnote 75: Collins, _English Colony in New South Wales_, i.

600. Barrington, _History of New South Wales_, p. 22.]

[Footnote 76: Lumholtz, _Among Cannibals_, p. 100.]

According to Mr. Hale, the Polynesians are not naturally

treacherous, by no means from a horror of deception, but

apparently from a mere inaptitude at dissembling; and it is said

that the word of a Micronesian may generally be relied upon.[77]

To the Tonga Islanders a false accusation appeared more horrible

than deliberate murder does to us, and they also put this {80}

principle into practice.[78] We are told by Polack that among the

Maoris of New Zealand lying is universally practised by all

classes, and that an accomplished liar is accounted a man of

consummate ability.[79] But Dieffenbach found that, if treated

with honesty, they were always ready to reciprocate such

treatment;[80] and, according to another authority, they believed

in an evil spirit whom they said was "a liar and the father of

lies."[81] The broad statement made by von Jhering, that among

the South Sea Islanders lying is regarded as a harmless and

innocent play of the imagination,[82] is certainly not correct.

The treacherous disposition attributed to the Caroline

Islanders[83] and the natives of New Britain[84] does not imply

so much as that. The New Caledonians are, comparatively speaking,

"not naturally dishonest."[85] The Solomon Islanders are praised

as faithful and reliable workmen and servants,[86] though

cheating in trade is nowadays very common among some of them.[87]

Of the people of Erromanga, in the New Hebrides, the Rev. H. A.

Robertson states that "truth, in heathenism, was told only when

it suited best, but," he adds, "it is not that natives are always

reckless about the truth so much as that they seem utterly

incapable of stating anything definitely, or stating a thing just

as it really occurred."[88] In the opinion of some authorities,

the Fijians are very untruthful and regard adroit lying as an

accomplishment.[89] Their propensity to lie, says the missionary

Williams, "is so strong that they seem to have no wish to deny

its existence, or very little shame when convicted of a

falsehood." The universal prevalence of the habit of lying is so

thoroughly taken for granted, "that it is common to hear, after

the most ordinary statement, the rejoinder, 'That's a lie,' or

something to the same effect, at which the accused person does

not think of taking offence." But the same writer adds:--"Natives

have often told me lies, manifestly without any ill-will, and

when it would have been far more to their advantage to have

spoken the truth. The Fijians hail as agreeable companions those

who are {81} skilful in making tales, but, under some

circumstances, strongly condemn the practice of falsehood. . . .

On matters most lied about by civilised people, the native is the

readiest to speak the truth. Thus, when convicted of some

offence, he rarely attempts to deny it, but will generally

confess all to any one he esteems. . . . The following incident

shows that lying _per se_ is condemned and considered

disreputable. A white man, notorious for falsehood, had

displeased a powerful chief, and wrote asking me to intercede for

him. I did so; when the chief dismissed the case briefly, saying,

'Tell--that no one hates a foreigner; but tell him that every one

hates a liar!'"[90] Other writers even deny that the Fijians were

habitual liars;[91] and Erskine found that those chiefs with whom

he had to deal were so open to appeals to their good faith as to

convince him "that they had a due appreciation of the virtue of

truth."[92]

[Footnote 77: Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition, Vol. VI.

Ethnography and Philology_, pp. 16, 73.]

[Footnote 78: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 163

_sq._]

[Footnote 79: Polack, _Manners and Customs of the New

Zealanders_, ii. 102 _sq._ See also Colenso, _Maori Races of New

Zealand_, pp. 44, 46.]

[Footnote 80: Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii. 109.]

[Footnote 81: Yate, _Account of New Zealand_, p. 145.]

[Footnote 82: von Jhering, _Der Zweck im Recht_, ii. 606.]

[Footnote 83: Angas, _Polynesia_, p. 386.]

[Footnote 84: Powell, _Wanderings in a Wild Country_, p. 262.]

[Footnote 85: Anderson, _Travel in Fiji and New Caledonia_, p. 233.]

[Footnote 86: Parkinson, _Zur Ethnographie der nordwestlichen

Salomo Inseln_, p. 4.]

[Footnote 87: Sommerville, 'Ethnogr. Notes in New Georgia,' in

_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxvi. 393.]

[Footnote 88: Robertson, _Erromanga_, p. 384 _sq._]

[Footnote 89: Wilkes, _U.S. Exploring Expedition_, iii. 76.]

[Footnote 90: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 107 _sq._]

[Footnote 91: Erskine, _Cruise among the Islands of the Western

Pacific_, p. 264. Anderson, _Travel in Fiji and New Caledonia_,

p. 130.]

[Footnote 92: Erskine, _op. cit._ p. 264.]

Nowhere in the savage world is truth held in less estimation than

among many of the African races. The Negroes are described as

cunning and liars by nature.[93] They "tell a lie more readily

than they tell the truth," and falsehood "is not recognised

amongst them as a fault."[94] They lie not only for the sake of

gaining some advantage by it, or in order to please or amuse, but

their lies are often said to be absolutely without purpose.[95]

Of the natives of the Gold Coast the old traveller Bosman says,

"The Negroes are all, without exception, crafty, villainous and

fraudulent, and very seldom to be trusted, being sure to slip no

opportunity of cheating an European, nor indeed one another."[96]

Among all the Bakalai tribes "lying is thought an enviable

accomplishment."[97] The Bakongo, in their answers, "will

generally try and tell the questioner what they think will please

him most, quite ignoring the truthfulness we consider it

necessary to observe in our replies."[98] Miss Kingsley's

experience of West African natives is likewise that they "will

say 'Yes' to any mortal thing, if they think you want them

to."[99] The Wakamba are described as great liars.[100] {82}

Among the Waganda "truth is held in very low estimation, and it

is never considered wrong to tell lies; indeed, a successful liar

is considered a smart, clever fellow, and rather admired."[101]

Untruthfulness is said to be "a national characteristic" of the

tribes inhabiting the region of Lake Nyassa.[102] From his

experience of the Eastern Central Africans, the Rev. D. Macdonald

writes: "'Telling lies' is much practised and is seldom

considered a fault. . . . The negro often thinks that he is

flattered by being accused of falsehood. So, when natives wish to

pay a high compliment to a European who has told them an

interesting story, they look into his face and say, 'O father,

you are a great liar.'"[103] To the Wanika, says Mr. New, lying

is "almost as the very breath of their nostrils, and all classes,

young and old, male and female, indulge in it. A great deal of

their lying is without cause or object; it is lying for lying's

sake. You ask a man his name, his tribe, where he lives, or any

other simple question of like nature, and the answer he gives you

will, as a rule, be the very opposite to the truth; yet he has

nothing to evade or gain by so doing. Lying seems to be more

natural to him than speaking the truth. He lies when detection is

evident, and laughs at it as though he thought it a good joke. He

hears himself called a _mulongo_ (liar) a score of times a day,

but he notices it not, for there is no opprobrium in the term to

him. To hide a fault he lies with the most barefaced audacity and

blindest obstinacy. . . . When his object is gain, he will invent

falsehoods wholesale. . . . He boasts that _ulongo_ (lying) is

his _pesa_ (piece, ha'pence), and holds bare truth to be the most

unprofitable commodity in the world. But while he lies

causelessly, objectlessly, recklessly in self-defence or for

self-interest, he is not a malicious liar. He does not lie with

express intent to do others harm; this he would consider immoral,

and he has sufficient goodness of heart to avoid indulging

therein. . . . I have often been struck with the manner in which

he has controlled his tongue when the character and interest of

others have been at stake."[104] If a Bantu of South-Eastern

Africa "undertakes the charge of any form of property, he

accounts for it with as great fidelity as if he were the Keeper

of the Great Seal. But, on the other hand, there are many

circumstances in which falsehood is not reckoned even a disgrace,

and if a man could {83} extricate himself from difficulties by

lying and did not do so, he would be simply thought a fool."[105]

Andersson speaks of the "lying habits" of the Herero.[106] Of the

Bachapins, a Bechuana tribe, Burchell observes that among their

vices a universal disregard for truth and a want of honourable

adherence to their promise stand high above the rest, the

consequence of this habitual practice of lying being "the absence

of shame, even on being detected."[107] Among the Kafirs

"deception is a practised art from early childhood; even the

children will not answer a plain question."[108] It is considered

a smart thing to deceive so long as a person is not found out,

but it is awkward to be detected; hence a native father will

enjoy seeing his children deceive people cleverly.[109] "In

trading with them, you may make up your mind that all they tell

you is untrue, and act accordingly. . . . Your own natives, on

the other hand, if they like you, will lie for your benefit as

strongly as the opposite party against you; and both sides think

it all fair trade."[110] And in a Kafir lawsuit "defendant,

plaintiff, and witnesses are allowed to tell as many lies as they

like, in order to make the best of their case."[111] But we also

hear that Kafirs do not tell lies to their chiefs, and that there

are many among them who would never deceive a white man whom they

are fond of or respect.[112] Among the Bushmans veracity is said

to be too often, yet not always, disregarded, "and the neglect of

it considered a mere venial offence."[113] "The first version of

what a Bushman or any native has to say can never be relied on;

whatever you ask him about, he invariably says first, 'I don't

know,' and then promises to tell you all he does know. Ask him

for news, and he says, 'No; we have got no news,' and shortly

afterwards he will tell you news of perhaps great interest."[114]

In Madagascar there was no stigma attached to deceit or fraud;

they "were rather admired as proofs of superior cunning, as

things to be imitated, so far at least as they would not bring

the offender within the penalties of the native laws."[115] Ellis

says that "the best sign of genius in children is esteemed a

quickness to deceive, {84} overreach and cheat. The people

delight in fabulous tales, but in none so much or universally as

in those that relate instances of successful deceit or fraud. . . .

Their constant aim is, in business to swindle, in professed

friendship to extort, and in mere conversation to exaggerate and

fabricate."[116] These statements refer to the Hovas; but among

the Betsileo, inhabiting the same island, lying and cheating are

equally rife, and "neither appears to have been thought a sin, so

long as it remained undiscovered."[117] At the same time many of

the Madagascar proverbs are designed to put down lying, and to

show that truth is always best.[118]

[Footnote 93: Baker, _Albert N'yanza_, i. 289. Burton, _Mission

to Gelele_, ii. 199.]

[Footnote 94: Reade, _Savage Africa_, p. 580.]

[Footnote 95: Hübbe-Schleiden, _Ethiopien, Studien über

West-Afrika_, p. 186 _sq._]

[Footnote 96: Bosman, _New Description of the Coast of Guinea_,

p. 100.]

[Footnote 97: Du Chaillu, _Explorations and Adventures in

Equatorial Africa_, p. 390. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 331.]

[Footnote 98: Ward, _Five Years with the Congo Cannibals_, p. 47.]

[Footnote 99: Kingsley, _Travels in West Africa_, p. 525.]

[Footnote 100: Krapf, _Travels in Eastern Africa_, p. 355.]

[Footnote 101: Wilson and Felkin, _Uganda_, i. 224. _Cf._ Felkin,

'Notes on the Waganda Tribe,' in _Proceed. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh_,

xiii. 722; Ashe, _Two Kings of Uganda_, p. 295.]

[Footnote 102: Macdonald, 'East Central African Customs,' in

_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxii. 119.]

[Footnote 103: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 262 _sq._]

[Footnote 104: New, _Life, Wanderings, and Labours in Eastern

Africa_, p. 96 _sqq._]

[Footnote 105: Macdonald, _Light in Africa_, p. 211.]

[Footnote 106: Andersson, _Lake Ngami_, p. 217. _Cf._ _ibid._

p. 499 (Bayeye).]

[Footnote 107: Burchell, _Travels in the Interior of Southern

Africa_, ii. 553 _sq._]

[Footnote 108: Holden, _The Past and Future of the Kaffir Races_,

p. 179.]

[Footnote 109: Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 285.]

[Footnote 110: Leslie, _Among the Zulus and Amatongas_, p. 199.

_Cf._ _ibid._ p. 202.]

[Footnote 111: Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs_,

p. 58.]

[Footnote 112: Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 286.]

[Footnote 113: Burchell, _op. cit._ ii. 54.]

[Footnote 114: Chapman, _Travels in the Interior of South

Africa_, i. 76 _sq._]

[Footnote 115: Sibree, _The Great African Island_, p. 338.]

[Footnote 116: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 143 _sq._]

[Footnote 117: Sibree, _op. cit._ p. 125. Shaw, 'Betsileo,' in

_Antananarivo Annual_, iii. 79.]

[Footnote 118: Clemes, 'Malagasy Proverbs,' _ibid._ iv. 29.]

But in Africa, also, there are many peoples who have been

described as regardful of truth and hostile to falsehood. Early

travellers speak very highly of the sincerity of the Hottentots.

Father Tachart says that they have more honesty than is almost

anywhere found among Christians;[119] and Kolben agrees with him,

asserting that the word of a Hottentot is sacred, and that there

is hardly anything upon earth which he looks upon as a fouler

crime than breach of engagement.[120] According to Barrow, the

Hottentots are perfectly honest and faithful, and, "if accused of

crimes of which they have been guilty, they generally divulge the

truth."[121] Of the Manansas Dr. Holub states that, so far as his

experience goes, they are beyond the average for honesty and

fidelity, and are consequently laughed at by the more powerful

tribes as "the simpletons of the North."[122] The Bahima in the

Uganda Protectorate are usually very honest and truthful, and

most of the Nandi think it very wicked to tell a lie.[123] Among

the For tribe of Central Africa "lying is held to be a great

crime; even the youngest children are severely beaten for it, and

any one over fifteen or sixteen who is an habitual liar suffers

the loss of one lip as a penalty."[124] Speaking of the natives

of Sierra Leone, Winterbottom remarks that, in proportion as we

advance into the interior of the country, the people are found to

be more devoid of art and more free from suspicion.[125] "Those

who have dealings with the Fán universally {85} prefer them in

point of honesty and manliness to the Mpongwe and Coast races,"

and it is an insult to call one of them a liar or coward.[126]

Monrad, who wrote in the beginning of the nineteenth century,

asserts that among the Negroes of Accra lying is by no means

common and that they are as a rule honest towards their own

people.[127] According to an early authority, the people of Great

Benin were very straightforward and did not cheat each

other.[128] Mr. and Mrs. Hinde write that the Masai are as a race

truthful, and that a grown-up person among them will not lie; "he

may refuse to answer a question, but, once given, his word can be

depended on."[129] Dr. Baumann, on the other hand, says that they

often lie, but that they regard lying as a great fault.[130] The

Guanches of the Canary Islands are stated to have been "slaves to

their word."[131] Of the Berbers of Morocco Leo Africanus

writes:--"Most honest people they are, and destitute of all fraud

and guile. . . . They keep their couenant most faithfully;

insomuch that they had rather die than breake promise."[132] M.

Dyveyrier found the same virtue among the Touareg, another Berber

people:--"La fidélité aux promesses, aux traités, est poussée si

loin par les Touareg, qu il est difficile d'obtenir d'eux des

engagements. . . . Il est de maxime chez les Touâreg, en matière

de contrat, de ne s'engager que pour la moitié de ce qu'on peut

tenir, afin de ne pas s'exposer au reproche d'infidélité. . . .

Le mensonge, le vol domestique et l'abus de confiance sont

inconnus des Touâreg."[133] As regards the truthfulness of the

African Arabs opinions vary. Parkyns asks, "Who is more

trustworthy than the desert Arab?"[134] According to Rohlfs and

Chavanne, on the other hand, the Arabs of the Sahara are much

addicted to lying;[135] and of the Arabs of Egypt Mr. St. John

observes:--"There is no general appreciation of a man's word. . . .

'Liar' is a playful appellative scarcely reproachful; and 'I

have told a lie' a confession that may be made without a

blush."[136] Herodotus' statement that "the Arabs observe pledges

as religiously as any people,"[137] is true of the Bedouins of

Arabia in the {86} present day. "No vice or crime is more

deservedly stigmatised as infamous among Bedouins than treachery.

An individual in the great Arabian Desert will be forgiven if he

should kill a stranger on the road, but eternal disgrace would be

attached to his name, if it were known that he had robbed his

companion, or his protected guest, even of a handkerchief."[138]

Wallin affirms that you may put perfect trust in the promise of a

Bedouin, as soon as you have eaten salt and bread with him.[139]

But whilst faithfulness to a tacit or express promise is thus

regarded by him as a sacred duty, lying and cheating are as

prevalent in the desert as in the market-towns of Syria.[140]

Speaking of the Bedouins of the Euphrates, Mr. Blunt

observes:--"Truth, in ordinary matters, is not regarded as a

virtue by the Bedouins, nor is lying held shameful. Every man,

they say, has a right to conceal his own thought. In matters of

importance, the simple affirmation is confirmed by an oath, and

then the fact stated may be relied on. There is only one

exception to the general rule of lying among them. The Bedouin,

if questioned on the breed of his mare, will not give a false

answer. He may refuse to say, or he may answer that he does not

know; but he will not name another breed than that to which she

really belongs. . . . The rule, however, does not hold good on

any other point of horse dealing. The age, the qualities, and the

ownership of the horse may be all falsely stated."[141]

[Footnote 119: Tachart, quoted by Kolben, _Present State of the

Cape of Good Hope_, i. 167.]

[Footnote 120: _Ibid._ i. 59.]

[Footnote 121: Barrow, _Travels into the Interior of Southern

Africa_, i. 151 _sq._]

[Footnote 122: Holub, _Seven Years in South Africa_, ii. 209.]

[Footnote 123: Johnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 630, 879.]

[Footnote 124: Felkin, in _Proceed. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh_,

xiii. 232.]

[Footnote 125: Winterbottom, _Account of the Native Africans in

the Neighbourhood of Sierra Leone_, i. 206 _sq._]

[Footnote 126: Burton, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 225 _sq._]

[Footnote 127: Monrad, _Guinea-Kysten og dens Indbyggere_, p. 6.]

[Footnote 128: Quoted by Ling Roth, _Great Benin_, p. 45.]

[Footnote 129: Hinde, _The Last of the Masai_, p. 34.]

[Footnote 130: Baumann, _Durch Massailand_, p. 165.]

[Footnote 131: Bory de St. Vincent, _Essais sur les Isles

Fortunées_, p. 70.]

[Footnote 132: Leo Africanus, _History and Description of

Africa_, i. 183.]

[Footnote 133: Dyveyrier, _Exploration du Sahara_, p. 384 _sq._]

[Footnote 134: Parkyns, _Life in Abyssinia_, ii. 182.]

[Footnote 135: Chavanne, _Die Sahara_, p. 392.]

[Footnote 136: St. John, _Adventures in the Lybian Desert_, p. 31.]

[Footnote 137: Herodotus, iii. 8.]

[Footnote 138: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys_,

p. 190 _sq._]

[Footnote 139: Wallin, _Reseanteckningar från Orienten_, iii. 116.]

[Footnote 140: Burckhardt, _op. cit._ p. 104 _sq._ _Cf._ Wallin,

_op. cit._ iv. 89 _sq._; Doughty, _Arabia Deserta_, i. 241.]

[Footnote 141: Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 203

_sq._ _Cf._ Niebuhr, _Travels through Arabia_, ii. 302:--"There

is no instance of false testimony given in respect to the descent

of a horse. Every Arabian is persuaded that himself and his whole

family would be ruined, if he should prevaricate in giving his

oath in an affair of such consequence."]

Various statements of travellers thus directly contradict the

common opinion that want of truthfulness is mostly a

characteristic of uncivilised races.[142] And we have much reason

to assume that a foreigner visiting a savage tribe is apt rather

to underrate than to overestimate its veracity. Mr. Savage Landor

gives us a curious insight into an explorer's method of testing

it. "If you were to say to an Ainu, 'You are old, are you not?'

he would answer {87}'Yes'; but if you asked the same man, 'You

are not old, are you?' he would equally answer 'Yes.'" And then

comes the conclusion:--"Knowingly speaking the truth is not one

of their characteristics; indeed, they do not know the difference

between falsehood and truth."[143] It is hardly surprising to

hear from other authorities that the Ainu are remarkably honest,

and regard veracity as one of the most imperative duties.[144]

Speaking of the Uaupés and other Brazilian tribes, Mr. Wallace

observes:--"In my communications and inquiries among the Indians

on various matters, I have always found the greatest caution

necessary, to prevent one's arriving at wrong conclusions. They

are always apt to affirm that which they see you wish to believe,

and, when they do not at all comprehend your question, will

unhesitatingly answer, 'Yes.'"[145] Savages who are inclined to

give inaccurate answers to questions made by strangers, may

nevertheless be truthful towards each other. As the regard for

life and property, so the regard for truth varies according as

the person concerned is a foreigner or a tribesman. "Perfidy and

faithlessness," says Crawfurd, "are vices of the Indian

islanders, and those vices of which they have been most

frequently accused by strangers. This sentence against them must,

however, be understood with some allowances. In their domestic

and social intercourse, they are far from being a deceitful

people, but in reality possess more integrity than it is

reasonable to look for with so much misgovernment and barbarity.

It is in their intercourse with strangers and with enemies that,

like other barbarians, the treachery of their character is

displayed."[146] The natives of the interior of Sumatra are

"dishonest in their dealings with strangers, which they esteem no

moral defect."[147] Dalager states that the same Greenlanders

who, among themselves, in the sale of an object {88} which, the

buyer had not seen, would depreciate it rather than overpraise

it--even though the seller was anxious to get rid of it--told

frightful lies in their transactions with Danish traders.[148]

The Touareg, whilst scrupulously faithful to a promise given to

one of their own people, do not regard as binding a promise given

to a Christian;[149] and their Arab neighbours say that their

word, "like water fallen on the sand, is never to be found

again."[150] The Masai, according to Herr Merker, hold any kind

of deceit to be allowable in their relations with persons of

another race.[151] The Hovas of Madagascar even considered it a

duty for anyone speaking with foreigners on political matters to

state the exact opposite to the truth, and punished him who did

otherwise.[152]

[Footnote 142: Burton, _City of the Saints_, p. 130. Vierkandt,

_Naturvölker und Kulturvölker_, p. 273. von Jhering, _Der Zweck

im Recht_, ii. 606.]

[Footnote 143: Landor, _Alone with the Hairy Ainu_, p. 283.]

[Footnote 144: Holland, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ iii. 237. von

Siebold, _Aino auf der Insel Yesso_, p. 25.]

[Footnote 145: Wallace, _Travels on the Amazon_, p. 494 _sq._]

[Footnote 146: Crawfurd, _op. cit._ i. 71 _sq._ _Cf._ Christian,

_Caroline Islands_, p. 71 _sq._]

[Footnote 147: Marsden, _op. cit._ p. 208.]

[Footnote 148: Dalager, _op. cit._ p. 60 _sq._]

[Footnote 149: von Bary, quoted by Chavanne, _Die Sahara_, p. 186.]

[Footnote 150: Dubois, _Timbuctoo_, p. 231.]

[Footnote 151: Merker, _Die Masai_, p. 115.]

[Footnote 152: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 144. Professor

Stanley Hall observes ('Children's Lies,' in _American Journal of

Psychology_, iii. 62) that "truth for our friends and lies for

our enemies is a practical, though not distinctly conscious rule

widely current with children."]

In point of truthfulness savages are in many cases superior to

nations more advanced in culture. "A Chinese," says Mr. Wells

Williams, "requires but little motive to falsify, and he is

constantly sharpening his wits to cozen his customer--wheedle him

by promises and cheat him in goods or work."[153] His ordinary

speech is said to be so full of insincerity that it is very

difficult to learn the truth in almost any case.[154] He feels no

shame at being detected in a lie, nor does he fear any punishment

from his gods for it;[155] if you call him a liar, "you arouse in

him no sense of outrage, no sentiment of degradation."[156] Yet

the moral teachings of the Chinese inculcate truthfulness as a

stringent duty. One of their injunctions is, "Let children always

be taught to speak the simple truth."[157] Many sayings may be

quoted from Confucius in which sincerity is celebrated as highly

and demanded as urgently as it ever was by any {89} Christian

moralist. Faithfulness and sincerity, he said, should be held as

first principles. Sincerity is the way of Heaven, the end and

beginning of things, without which there would be nothing. It is

as necessary to truly virtuous conduct as a boat is to a man

wishing to cross a river, or as oars are to a boat. The superior

man ought to feel shame when his conduct is not in accord with

his words.[158] But there are instances in which sincerity has to

yield to family duties: a father should conceal the misconduct of

his son, and a son that of his father.[159] Moreover, the great

moralists themselves did not always act up to their lofty

principles. Confucius and Mencius sometimes did not hesitate to

tell a lie for the sake of convenience.[160] The former could

excuse himself from seeing an unwelcome visitor on the ground

that he was sick, when there was nothing the matter with

him;[161] and he deliberately broke an oath which he had sworn,

because it had been forced from him.[162] In Japan, Burma, and

Siam, truth is more respected than in China. "In love of truth,"

says Professor Rein, "the Japanese, so far as my experience goes,

are not inferior to us Europeans." [163] The Burmese, though

partial to much exaggeration, are generally truthful.[164] And

"the mendacity so characteristic of Orientals is not a national

defect among the Siamese. Lying, no doubt, is often resorted to

as a protection against injustice and oppression, but the chances

are greatly in favour of truth when evidence is sought."[165]

[Footnote 153: Wells Williams, _The Middle Kingdom_, i. 834.]

[Footnote 154: Smith, _Chinese Characteristics_, p. 271.]

[Footnote 155: Cooke, _China_, p. 414. Edkins, _Religion in

China_, p. 122. Bowring, _Siam_, i. 106. Wells Williams, _op.

cit._ i. 834.]

[Footnote 156: Smith, _Chinese Characteristics_, p. 271.]

[Footnote 157: Wells Williams, _op. cit._ i. 522.]

[Footnote 158: _Lun Yü_, i. 8. 2; vii. 24; ix. 24; xii. 10. 1;

xv. 5. 2. _Chung Yung_, xx. 18. Douglas, _Confucianism and

Taouism_, pp. 103, 114, 146. Legge, _Chinese Classics_, i. 100.]

[Footnote 159: _Lun Yü_, xiii. 18. 2.]

[Footnote 160: Legge, _Chinese Classics_, i. 100. Smith, _Chinese

Characteristics_, p. 267.]

[Footnote 161: _Lun Yü_, vi. 13.]

[Footnote 162: _Lun Yü_, xvii. 20.]

[Footnote 163: Rein, _Japan_, p. 393.]

[Footnote 164: MacMahon, _Far Cathay and Farther India_, p. 62.

Forbes, _British Burma_, p. 45. Fytche, _Burma Past and Present_,

ii. 67.]

[Footnote 165: Bowring, _Siam_, i. 105.]

Lying has been called the national vice of the Hindus.[166] "It

is not too much to assert that the mass of Bengalis have no

notion of truth and falsehood."[167] A gentleman {90} who has

been brought into the closest intimacy with natives of all

classes, declares "that when a question is asked, the full

bearing of which on themselves or those connected with them they

cannot see, you may rely upon it that the first answer you

receive is false; but that, when they see that the truth cannot

injure themselves or any one they care for, they will speak the

truth."[168] The testimony of a Hindu is not generally regarded

as evidence.[169] Forgery is frequently resorted to, cheating is

rife. "In almost all business transactions of the smallest kind a

written agreement must be made on both sides, and this must be

stamped and registered, because it is believed that a man's word

is not binding."[170] Nor is a lie held disreputable, especially

if not found out.[171] But in India, as elsewhere, the question

whether truth or falsehood is to be spoken depends on the

relationship between the speaker and the party addressed. In

their relations with each other, says Sir W. H. Sleeman, members

of a village community spoke as much truth as those of any other

community in the world, but in their relations with the

government they told as many lies; "if a man had told a lie to

_cheat_ his neighbour, he would have become an object of hatred

and contempt--if he had told a lie to _save_ his neighbour's

fields from an increase of rent or tax, he would have become an

object of esteem and respect."[172] Of the Sûdra inhabitants of

Central India Sir John Malcolm likewise observes that "they may

be said, in their intercourse with strangers and with officers of

government, to evade the truth, and often to assert positive

falsehoods"; whereas, "in their intercourse with each other,

falsehood is not common, and many (particularly some of the

cultivators) are distinguished by their adherence to truth."[173]

The ancient Hindus were praised for their veracity and good

faith; {91} in his History of India, written in the second

century of the Christian era, Arrian states that no Indian was

ever known to tell an untruth.[174] In the sacred books of India

truthfulness is highly celebrated. "If veracity and a thousand

horse-sacrifices are weighed against each other, it is found that

truth ranks even higher than a thousand horse-sacrifices."[175]

"Verily the gods are the truth, and man is the untruth."[176]

"There is one law which the gods do keep, namely, the truth. It

is through this that their conquest, their glory is unassailable:

and so, forsooth, is his conquest, his glory unassailable

whosoever, knowing this, speaks the truth."[177] Attendance on,

or the worship of, the sacred fire means speaking the

truth:--"Whosoever speaks the truth, acts as if he sprinkled that

lighted fire with ghee; for even so does he enkindle it: and ever

the more increases his own vital energy, and day by day does he

become better. And whosoever speaks the untruth, acts as if he

sprinkled that lighted fire with water; for even so does he

enfeeble it: and ever the less becomes his own vital energy, and

day by day does he become more wicked. Let him, therefore, speak

nothing but the truth."[178] Fearful denunciations are

particularly pronounced against those who deliver false testimony

in a court of justice.[179] By giving false evidence concerning

small cattle, a witness commits the sin of killing ten men; by

false evidence concerning cows, horses, and men, he commits the

sin of killing a hundred, a thousand, and ten thousand men

respectively; but by false evidence concerning land, he commits

the sin of killing the whole human race.[180] The sin of

falsehood thus admits of different degrees according to the

magnitude of the injury inflicted by it. Indeed, "in some cases a

man who, though knowing the facts to be different, gives such

false evidence from a pious motive, does not lose heaven; such

evidence they call the speech of the gods."[181] {92} Moreover,

"whenever the death of a Sûdra, of a Vaisya, of a Kshatriya, or

of a Brâhmana would be caused by a declaration of the truth, a

falsehood may be spoken; for such falsehood is preferable to the

truth."[182] According to Buddhist conceptions of lying, "the

magnitude of the crime increases in proportion to the value of

the article, or the importance of the matter, about which the lie

is told."[183] And it is a lesser wrong to lie in self-defence

than to lie with a view to procuring an advantage by injuring

one's neighbour. Thus, to deny the possession of any article, in

order to retain it, is not a lie of a heinous description,

whereas to bear false witness in order that the proper owner may

be deprived of that which he possesses, is a lie to which a

greater degree of culpability is attached.[184] The Buddhist

precept of truthfulness is more restricted than that laid down by

Brahmanism:--"It is said by the Brahmans that it is not a crime

to tell a lie on behalf of the guru, or on account of cattle, or

to save the person's own life, or to gain the victory in any

contest; but this is contrary to the precept."[185] One of the

conditions that make a Buddha is, never, under the influence of

desire and other passions, to utter a conscious lie, for the sake

of wealth or any other advantage.[186] From the time that Gautama

became a Bodhisattva, or claimant for the Buddhaship, through all

his births until the attainment of the Buddhaship, he never told

a lie; and "it were easier for the sakwala [or system of worlds]

to be blown away than for a supreme Buddha to utter an

untruth."[187] His followers are not equally scrupulous. The

Buddhists of Ceylon, we are told, lie without compunction, and

are not ashamed to be detected in a lie.[188] And religious

Mongols "do not hesitate to tell lies even when saying their

prayers."[189]

[Footnote 166: Caldwell, _Tinnevelly Shanars_, p. 38. _Cf._

Kearns, _Tribes of South India_, pp. 64 (Reddies and Hindus

generally), 68 (Reddies and Naickers); Burton, _Sindh_, pp. 197,

284; _Idem_, _Sind Revisited_, i. 314.]

[Footnote 167: Trevelyan, quoted by Wilkins, _Modern Hinduism_,

p. 401.]

[Footnote 168: Wilkins, _Modern Hinduism_, p. 399 _sq._]

[Footnote 169: Percival, _Land of the Veda_, p. 288.]

[Footnote 170: Wilkins, _op. cit._ p. 407 _sq._]

[Footnote 171: _Ibid._ p. 400. Caldwell, _op. cit._ p. 40.]

[Footnote 172: Sleeman, _op. cit._ ii. 123. _Cf._ _ibid._ ii.

118, 129 _sq._; Crooke, _Tribes and Castes of the North-Western

Provinces and Oudh_, ii. 478 (Hâbûra).]

[Footnote 173: Malcolm, _Memoir of Central India_, ii. 171. _Cf._

Hislop, _op. cit._ p. 1.]

[Footnote 174: Arrian, _Historia Indica_, xii. 5.]

[Footnote 175: _Institutes of Vishnu_, viii. 36.]

[Footnote 176: _Satapatha-Brâhmana_, i. 1. 1. 4; iii. 3. 2. 2.]

[Footnote 177: _Ibid._ iii. 4. 2. 8. _Cf._ _ibid._ i. 1. 1. 5.]

[Footnote 178: _Ibid._ ii. 2. 2. 19.]

[Footnote 179: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 82.]

[Footnote 180: _Gautama_, xiii. 14 _sqq._]

[Footnote 181: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 103.]

[Footnote 182: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 104.]

[Footnote 183: Hardy, _Manual of Budhism_, p. 486.]

[Footnote 184: _Ibid._ p. 485.]

[Footnote 185: _Ibid._ p. 486.]

[Footnote 186: _Jâtaka Tales_, p. 23.]

[Footnote 187: Hardy, _op. cit._ p. 486.]

[Footnote 188: Knox, quoted by Schmidt, _Ceylon_, p. 239.]

[Footnote 189: Gilmour, _Among the Mongols_, p. 259.]