The experiences that I have thus far cited in evidence of the principle
of the conservation of dormant experiences that cannot be voluntarily
recalled have been drawn almost entirely from normal everyday life. We
now come to a series of facts which are very important in that they show
that what is true of the experiences of everyday life is also true of
those of _artificial_ and _pathological_ states of which the normal
personal consciousness has no cognizance. These facts are also vital for
the comprehension of post-hypnotic phenomena, of amnesia, multiple
personality, and allied dissociated states. Let us consider some of the
states from the point of view of conservation.
=Artificial states.=—After a person passes from one _dissociated state_
to another, or from a dissociated state to the full waking state, it is
commonly found that there is amnesia for the previous state. This is a
general principle. The forgetting of dreams is an example from normal
life. For the psychological state of sleep in which dreams occur is one
of normal dissociation of consciousness by which the perception of the
environment, and the great mass of life’s experiences, can no longer be
brought within the content of the dream consciousness. Hence there is a
general tendency to the development of amnesia for dreams after waking
when the normal synthesis of the personality has been established. Yet,
as we have seen, forgotten dreams can generally be recalled in hypnosis
or by some other technical method (e. g., crystal visions and
abstraction). Now _hypnosis_ is an artificially dissociated state. After
passing from one hypnotic state to another,[33] or after waking, it is
very common to find complete amnesia for the whole of the experience
belonging to the previous hypnotic state. By no effort whatsoever can it
be recalled and this inability persists during the remainder of the life
of the subject. And yet those hypnotic experiences may have been very
extensive, particularly if the subject has been hypnotized a great many
times. Nevertheless, it is easy to demonstrate that they are conserved
and therefore, like all conserved experiences, potentially still
existing, subject to recall under favoring conditions; for, as is well
known, if the subject be rehypnotized they are recalled as normal
memories. With the restitution of the hypnotic state the memories which
were dormant become synthesized with the hypnotic personality and
conscious.
The method of producing crystal visions may also be used to demonstrate
the dormant conservation of experiences originating in hypnotic states.
By this method and that of automatic writing, as I have already
explained, the memories may be made to reveal themselves, without
inducing recollection, at the very moment when the subject cannot
voluntarily recall them. The subject, of course, being ignorant of what
happened in hypnosis cannot recognize the visions as pictorial memories.
In illustration of this I would recall the observation in the case of
Miss B. where, in such an artificial vision, she saw herself sitting on
a sofa smoking a cigarette.[34] This vision represented an incident
which occurred during one of the subject’s hypnotic states when she had
smoked a cigarette. Naturally Miss B., in her ignorance of the facts,
denied the truthfulness of the vision. Other examples of a like kind
might be cited if it were necessary.
By automatic writing, also, evidence of the same principle may be
obtained. The conserved memories are _tapped_, so to speak. Thus I
suggest to Mrs. R. in hypnosis that after waking she shall write certain
verses or sentences. After being awakened she reproduces automatically,
as directed, the desired verses or sentences which, of course, belonged
to her hypnotic experiences.[35] In other words, although the personal
consciousness did not remember the hypnotic experience of having
received the command and of having given the promise to write the
verses, etc., the automatic writing by the act of fulfilling the command
showed that all this was conserved; here again was evidence of
conservation, in some form, of an experience at the very moment when the
personal consciousness was unable to voluntarily recall what had taken
place in hypnosis. Such experiments may be varied indefinitely.
The following is an instance of the same phenomenon obtained by tapping
without the use of previous suggestion in hypnosis: subject B. C. A. One
of the hypnotic states, b, was waked up to become B, this change being
followed, as usual, by amnesia. By means of automatic writing an
accurate account was now obtained of the experiences which had taken
place during the previous moments in hypnosis, the subject being unaware
of what the hand wrote. Here were complete memories of the whole period
of which the personal consciousness, B, had no knowledge. One of the
most striking, not to say dramatic, demonstrations of this kind can
sometimes be obtained in cases exhibiting several different hypnotic
states. For instance: “c” and “b” are two different hypnotic phases
belonging to the same individual (B. C. A.). c knows nothing of the
experiences of b, and b nothing of c, each having amnesia for the other.
Now one has only to whisper in the ear of c, asking a question of b, and
at once, by automatic speech, the dormant b phase responds, giving such
information as is sought in proof of the conservation of any given
experience belonging to the tapped b phase. The consciousness of c
apparently continues uninterruptedly during the experiment. The same
evidence could be obtained by automatic writing under the same
conditions. Again in the b phase another state known as “Alpha and
Omega” can be tapped, giving similar evidence of conservation. In the
case of Miss B. the same phenomena could be elicited. In this respect
hypnotic states may show the same behavior as alternating personalities
of which I shall presently speak.
Suggested _post-hypnotic phenomena_ depend, in part, on the conservation
of dormant complexes. In hypnosis I give a suggestion that the subject
on waking shall, at a given moment, take a cigarette and smoke it. There
is thus formed a complex of ideas which becomes dormant and forgotten
after waking. Later, by some mechanism which we need not inquire into
now, the ideas of the dormant complex enter the field of the personal
self; the idea of smoking a cigarette arises therein and the subject
puts the idea into execution. These consequences of the suggestion could
not occur unless the experiences were conserved. Or, we may take an
experiment where the hypnotic experiences are reproduced automatically
by writing. Here the conserved experiences form a secondary system split
off from the personal consciousness. This system reproduces the hypnotic
experiences as memory outside of the personal consciousness.
From a practical point of view this principle of the conservation of the
experiences of the hypnotic state is of the utmost importance. The fact
that a person does not remember them on waking—if such be the case—is of
little consequence in principle, and, practically, this amnesia does not
preclude these experiences from influencing the waking personality. _As
experiences and potential memories they all belong to and are part of
the personality._ The hypnotic experiences being conserved our
personality may still be modified and determined in its judgments,
points of view, and attitudes by them, as by other unrecognized memories
when such modifications have been effected in the hypnotic state. When
the last is the case the hypnotically modified judgments, etc., may
introduce themselves into the content of consciousness in the waking
state by association without being recognized as memories. There may be
no recollection of the source of the new ideas, of the reason for the
modification of a given judgment or attitude of mind, because there is
no recollection of the hypnotic state as a whole; but so far as the new
judgment or attitude is a reproduction of an hypnotic experience it is
memory, although not perfect memory or recollection in the sense of
localizing the experience in the past.
This principle can easily be demonstrated experimentally. It is only
necessary, for instance, to state to a suitably suggestible subject that
the weather, with which previously he was discontented is, after all,
fine; for although it is raining, still, the crops need rain; it will
allay the dust and make motoring pleasant, it will give him an
opportunity to finish his neglected correspondence, etc. The whole
prospect, he is told, is pleasing. He accepts, we assume, the new point
of view. He is then waked up and has complete amnesia for the
experience. Now these ideas, developed in the hypnotic state, are
conserved as potential memories. Though with the change of the
moment-consciousness they cannot be voluntarily recalled, they have
entered into associations to form a new viewpoint. Just speak to him
about the weather and watch the result. His discontent has disappeared
and given place to satisfaction. He expresses himself as quite pleased
with the weather and gives the same reasons for his satisfaction as were
suggested to and accepted by him in hypnosis. He does not recognize his
new views as reproductions, i.e., memories, of previous experiences
because he has no recollection of the hypnotic state. He does not
remember when and how he changed his mind; but these experiences have
determined his views because they have become a part of his conscious
system of thought. The principle applies to a large part of our
judgments not formed in hypnosis. There is nothing very remarkable about
it. The process is similar to that of ordinary thought though it has had
an artificial and different origin. The complex of ideas having been
formed in hypnosis still remains organized and some of its elements
enter the complexes of the personal consciousness, just as in normal
life ideas of buried experiences of which we have no recollection
intrude themselves from time to time and shape our judgments and the
current of our thoughts without our realizing what has determined our
mental processes. We have forgotten the source of our judgments, but
this forgetfulness does not affect the mechanism of the process.
=Pathological states.=—In the _functional amnesias_ of a pathological
character we find the same phenomenon of conservation. Various types of
amnesia are encountered. I will specify only the episodic, epochal, and
the continuous, so commonly observed in hysteria. This field has been
threshed over by many observers and I need refer only to a few instances
as illustrations. In the first two types the experiences which are
forgotten may have occurred during the previous normal condition. In the
episodic the particular episode which is forgotten may have been,
strangely enough, one which from the very important part it played in
the life of the subject and its peculiar impressiveness and significance
we should expect would be necessarily remembered, especially as memory
in other respects is normal. But for the same reasons it is not
surprising to find that the experience has been conserved somehow and
somewhere although it cannot be recalled. The classical cases of
Fräulein O. and Lucy R. reported by Breuer and Freud[36] are typical.
From my own collection of cases I will cite the following episode from
the case of B. C. A. This subject received a mental shock as the result
of an emotional conflict of a distressing character. This experience was
the exciting factor in the development of her psychosis, a dissociation
of personality. In the resulting “neurasthenic” state, although her
memory was normal for all other experiences of her life, this particular
episode with all its manifold details, notwithstanding its great
significance in her life, completely dropped out of her memory.[37]
This incident was a very intimate one and it is not necessary to give
the details. When put to the test all effort to recall the episode
voluntarily is without result, and even suggestions in two hypnotic
states fail to awaken it in those states. Yet when a pencil is put in
her hand these memories are made to manifest themselves by automatic
writing. During the writing the subject remains in a perfectly alert
state but is unaware of what her hand is doing. At a later period after
the subject had been restored to the normal condition she could
voluntarily recall these memories thus, again, showing their
conservation.
One other example of episodic amnesia I will cite, inasmuch as, aside
from the question of conservation, it is of practical importance, being
typical of experiences which lead to obsessions of phobia. The subject,
O. N., had an intense fear of towers such as might contain bells that
might ring. She had no recollection of the first occasion when the fear
occurred or of any experience which might have given rise to it, and, of
course, could give no explanation of the obsession. Neither in
abstraction or hypnosis could any related memories be evoked, but by
automatic writing she “unconsciously” described an emotional and
dramatic scene which was the occasion of the first occurrence of the
fear and which had taken place some twenty-five years previously when
she was a young girl.
With the reason for the amnesia we are not particularly concerned at
present excepting so far as it serves to make clear the distinction
between recollection and conservation, and to throw light on the nature
of the latter. The episodes in both these instances were of a strongly
emotional character. Now we have known for many years from numerous
observations that emotion tends to disrupt the mind and to dissociate
the experiences which give rise to the affective state so that they
cannot be brought back into consciousness. We may particularize further
and, making use of the known impulsive force of emotion, attribute the
dissociation (or inhibition) in many cases to a conflict between certain
ideas belonging to the experience and other opposing ideas which, with
the emotion, they have awakened. The impulsive force of the latter
ideas, being the stronger, dissociates, or, to use the expressive term
introduced by Freud, represses, the former. The principle of
dissociation by conflict has been formulated and elaborated by Freud in
his well-known theory which has been made use of to explain all
functional amnesias. It is not necessary to go as far as that, nor does
the theory as such concern us now. It is sufficient if in certain cases
the amnesia (or dissociation) is a dissociation (repression) induced by
the conative force of conflicting emotion. If so we should expect that
the amnesia would be of a temporary nature and would continue only so
long as the conflict and dissociating force continued. In any favorable
moment when repression ceased or failed to be operative, as in hypnosis
or abstraction, reproduction (recollection) could occur. But this
requires that the registration of the experience should be something
specific that can be dissociated without obliteration. And, further, it
must be something that can be so conserved, somehow and somewhere,
_during dissociation_ that, as in the case of reproduction by automatic
writing, it can escape the influence of the repressing force and express
itself autonomously, i.e., without the expressed memory of the
experience entering the personal consciousness. To this we shall return
later.
In the two examples I have cited, if my interpretation is correct, the
amnesia was due to dissociation by conflict and hence the conservation,
as is the rule in functional dissociation, and the reproduction by
automatic writing. This principle of dissociation by conflict and of
conservation of the dissociated remembrances is of great practical
importance as we shall see in later lectures. It can be best studied
experimentally with cases of multiple personality. In the case of Miss
B. numerous examples of amnesia from conflict were observed. Owing to
the precise organization of the consciousness into two distinct
personalities it was possible to definitely determine beyond question
the antagonistic ideas of one personality which voluntarily induced the
conflict and, by the impulsive force of their emotion, caused the
amnesia in the other personality.[38] The same phenomena were observed
in the case of B. C. A. As memory for the forgotten experiences in these
instances returned as soon as the conflict ceased, conservation of them
necessarily persisted during the amnesia.
Perhaps I may be permitted to digress here slightly to point out that
this same (in principle) phenomenon may be effected experimentally by
suggestion. The suggested idea which has the force of a volition or
unexpressed wish, coming in conflict with the knowledge of previously
familiar facts, inhibits or represses the reproduction in consciousness
of this knowledge as memory. It is easy to prove, however, that this
knowledge is conserved though it cannot be recalled. Thus, I give
appropriate suggestions to B. C. A. in hypnosis that she shall be
unable, when awake, to remember a certain unpleasant episode connected
with a person named “August.” After being awakened she has complete
amnesia, not only for the episode, but even for the name. The
suppression of the memory of the episode carries with it by association
the name of the person. In fact, the name itself has no meaning for her.
When asked to give the names of the calendar months after mentioning
“July” she hesitates, then gives “September” as the next. Even when the
name “August” is mentioned to her it has no meaning and sounds like a
word of a foreign language. The memory of the episode has become dormant
so far as volitional recollection is concerned. It can, however, be
_recalled as a coconscious process_ through automatic writing, as in the
preceding experiment, and then the word in all its meanings and
associations is also awakened in the coconsciousness.
The same phenomenon may be observed clinically in transition types
standing halfway between the amnesia following emotional episodes and
that produced by external suggestion. Auto-suggestion may then be a
factor in the mechanism, as in the following example: In a moment of
discouragement and despair B. C. A., torn by an unsolved problem, said
to herself after going to bed at night, “I shall go to sleep and I shall
forget everything, my name and everything else.” Of course she did not
intend or expect to forget literally her name, but she gave expression
to a petulant despairing conditional wish which if fulfilled would be a
solution to her problem; as much as if she said, “If I should forget who
I am my troubles would be ended.” Nevertheless the auto-suggestion with
its strong feeling tones worked for repression. The next day, when about
to give her name by telephone, she discovered that she had forgotten it.
On testing her later I found that she could not speak, write, or read
her name. She could not even understandingly read the same word when
used with a different signification, i.e., stone [her name, we will
suppose, is Stone], nor the letters of the same. This amnesia persisted
for three days until removed by my suggestion. That the lost knowledge
was all the time conserved is further shown by the fact that during the
amnesia the name was remembered in hypnosis and also reproduced by
automatic writing.
In the epochal type of amnesia a person, perhaps after a shock, suddenly
loses all memory for lost _epochs_, it may be for days and even for
years of his preceding life. In the classical case of Mr. Hanna, studied
by Boris Sidis, the amnesia was for his whole previous life, so that the
subject was like a new-born child. It is easy to show, however, that the
forgotten epoch is normally conserved by making use of the various
methods of reproduction at our disposal. In the case of Hanna, Sidis was
able through “hypnoidization” and suggestion to bring back memory
pictures of the amnesic periods. “While the subject’s attention is thus
distracted, events, names of persons, of places, sentences, phrases,
whole paragraphs of books totally lapsed from memory, and in language
the very words of which sounded bizarre to his ears and the meaning of
which was to him inscrutable—all that flashed lightning-like on the
patient’s mind. So successful was this method that on one occasion the
patient was frightened by the flood of memories that rose suddenly from
the obscure subconscious [unconscious] regions, deluged his mind, and
were expressed aloud, only to be forgotten the next moment. To the
patient himself it appeared as if another being took possession of his
tongue.”[39]
In another class of cases of epochal amnesia known as _fugues_ the
subject, having forgotten his past life and controlled by fancied ideas,
perhaps wanders away not knowing who he is or anything of the previous
associations of his life. The “Lowell Case” of amnesia, which I had an
opportunity to carefully observe and which later was more extensively
studied for me by Dr. Coriat, may be instanced.[40] A woman suddenly
left her home without apparent rhyme or reason. When later found she had
lost all recollection of her name, her personality, her family, and her
surroundings, and her identity was only accidentally discovered through
the publication of her photograph in the newspaper. She then had almost
complete amnesia for her previous life.
Another case, also studied by Dr. Coriat and the writer, was that of a
policeman who suddenly deserted his official duty in Boston and went to
New York, where he wandered about without knowledge of who he was, his
name, his age, his occupation, indeed, as there is reason to believe, of
his past life. When he came to himself three days later he found himself
in a hospital with complete amnesia for the three days’ fugue. When I
examined him some days later this amnesia still persisted but Dr. Coriat
was able to recover memories of his vagrancy in New York showing that
the experiences of this fugue were still conserved. It is hardly
necessary to remind you that, of course, the memories of his normal life
which during the fugue it might have been thought were lost were shown
to have been conserved, as on “coming to himself” they were recovered.
In the “Lowell Case” substantially similar conditions were found.
In _continuous or anterograde_ amnesia the subject forgets every
experience nearly as fast as it happens. The classical case of Mme. D.,
studied by Charcot and later more completely by Janet, is an example.
The conservation of the forgotten experiences was demonstrated by these
authors.
In _multiple personality_ amnesia for large epochs in the subject’s life
is quite generally a prominent feature. In one phase of personality
there is no knowledge whatsoever of existence in another phase. Thus,
for instance, all the experiences of BI and BIV, in the case of Miss B.,
were respectively unknown to the other. When, however, the change took
place from one personality to the other, with accompanying amnesia, all
the great mass of experiences of the one personality still remained
organized and conserved during the cycle of the other’s existence. With
the reversion to the first personality, whichever it might be, the
previously formed experiences of that personality became capable of
manifesting themselves as conscious memories. This conservation could
also be shown, in this case, by the method of tapping the conserved
memories and producing crystal visions or artificial hallucinations.
Those who are familiar with the published account of the case will
remember that BIV was in the habit at one time of acquiring knowledge of
the amnesic periods of BI’s existence by “fixing” her mind and obtaining
a visual picture of the latter’s acts. Likewise, it will be remembered
that by crystal visions I was enabled to bring into consciousness a
vision of the scene at the hospital which, through its emotional
influence, caused the catastrophe of dissociation of personality, and
also of the scene enacted by BI just preceding the awakening of BIV, of
all of which BIV had no knowledge.[41] As with Mr. Hanna sometimes these
memories instead of being complex pictures were scrappy—mere flashes in
the pan. The same condition of conservation of the experiences of one
personality during the existence of another obtained in the case of B.
C. A. and numerous cases recorded in the literature. In this respect the
condition is the same as that which obtains in hypnotic states and which
I mentioned a few moments ago.
We may, in fact, lay it down as a general law that during any
dissociated state, no matter how extensive or how intense the amnesia,
all the experiences that can be recalled in any other state, whether the
normal one or another dissociated state, are conserved and,
theoretically at least, can be made to manifest themselves. And,
likewise and to the same extent, during the normal state the experiences
which belong to a dissociated state are still conserved, notwithstanding
the existing amnesia for those experiences. Furthermore, if we were
dealing with special pathology we would be able to show that many
pathological phenomena are due to the subconscious manifestations of
such conserved and forgotten experiences.
Observation shows that the experiences of _trance states_ and allied
conditions are similarly conserved. Fanny S., as the result of an
emotional shock, due to a distressing piece of news, goes into a
trance-like state of which she has no memory afterwards. Later, a
recollection of this supposedly unconscious state, including the content
of her trance thoughts and the sayings and doings of those about her, is
recovered by a special device. B. C. A. likewise fell into a trance of
which there was no recollection. The whole incident was equally fully
recovered in a crystal vision, and also conscious memory of it brought
back to personal consciousness by a special technic. In the vision she
saw herself apparently unconscious, the various people about her each
performing his part in the episode; the doctor administering a
hypodermic dose of medicine, etc. In hypnosis she remembered in addition
the thoughts of the trance consciousness and the various remarks made by
different people in attendance.
Even _delirious states_ for which there is complete amnesia may be
conserved. I have observed numerous instances of this in the case of
Miss B. For instance, the delirious acts occurring in the course of
pneumonia were reproduced in a crystal vision by Miss B. and the
delirious thoughts as well were remembered by the secondary personality,
Sally.[42] I have records of several examples of conservation of
delirium in this case. Quite interesting was the repetition of the same
delirium due to ether narcosis in succeeding states of narcosis as
frequently happened. A very curious phenomenon of the same order was the
following: After the subject had been etherized a number of times I
adopted the ruse of pretending to etherize one of the secondary
personalities, using the customary inhaler but without ether. The
efficient factor was, of course, suggestion. The subject would, at least
apparently, become unconscious, passing into a state which had all the
superficial appearances of deep etherization. At the end of the
procedure she would slowly return to consciousness, repeat the same
stereotyped expletives and other expressions which she regularly made
use of when ether was actually used, and make the same grimaces and
signs of discomfort, etc. This behavior would seem to indicate that the
mental and physical experiences originally induced by a physical agent
were conserved and later reproduced under imaginary conditions.
Mental experiences formed in states of _alcoholic intoxication_ without
delirium may be conserved as dormant complexes. Dr. Isador Coriat,[43]
in his studies of _alcoholic amnesia_, was able to restore memories of
experiences occurring during the alcoholic state showing that they were
still conserved. The person, during the period for which later there is
amnesia, may or may not be what is ordinarily called drunk, although
under the influence of alcohol. Later, when he comes to himself, he is
found to have forgotten the whole alcoholic period—perhaps several days
or a week—during which he may have acted with apparently ordinary
intelligence, and perhaps have committed criminal acts. By one or
another of several technical methods memory of the forgotten period may
often be recalled. Dr. C. W. Pilgrim[44] also has reported two cases of
this kind in which he succeeded in restoring the memories of the
forgotten alcoholic state. I might also recall here the case, cited by
Ribot, of the Irish porter who, having lost a package while drunk, got
drunk again and remembered where he had left it.
Of course, in order to demonstrate the conservation of forgotten
experiences it is necessary, when abstraction is not sufficient, to
employ subjects in whom more profound dissociation of consciousness can
be produced by one or another of the artificial means described so as to
permit of the reproduction of the hidden (conserved) experiences of
mental life. Such subjects, however, are sufficiently common. Often the
passive state of abstraction after some practice is sufficient.