exerted great influence in the battle by infusing his own spirit into
the patriot band, cannot be doubted. He acted, however, only as a
volunteer. There is no reliable account which states that he assumed
any command--that he performed any military duty in the army previous
to the battle, or that he gave an order during the engagement. He was
in the redoubt, and Colonel Prescott's letter makes it certain that
here he (Prescott) commanded throughout the action.
Seth Pomeroy was the next officer in rank, as he was the oldest
officer, being one of the first generals elected. He was one of the
intrepid veterans of the French wars, having commanded a company
under Sir William Johnson, when he defeated the army under Baron
Dieskau. He exerted large influence in Hampshire county, and had
a marked character for intrepidity, generosity, frankness and
patriotism. He was a delegate in the first and second provincial
congress from Northampton, and a colleague with the celebrated Major
Hawley. His name often appears on important committees. He was
elected a general officer Oct. 27, 1774, and again Feb. 9, 1775; and
probably preferring military service, was not returned a delegate to
the third provincial congress, which met on the 31st of May, 1775. He
aided in organizing the army that assembled at Cambridge to besiege
the British army, and was in service at the time of the battle. It
is stated that he had not received a commission in the Massachusetts
army, as Ward and Thomas had, but served under "his old commission;"
but the authority for this is not given. I have met with but few
authentic notices of him in connection with the battle. But it is
admitted that he went on to the field as a volunteer, and though he
ranked above Putnam, there is no evidence that he gave him an order.
He is said to have borrowed a horse of General Ward to carry him
on; but on arriving at Charlestown Neck, and seeing the severe fire
that raked it, he refused to risk the borrowed animal, but walked
across. He fought with a musket at the rail fence breastwork. He
behaved bravely during the battle, and in some accounts, figures as
the commander of a brigade. But he appears to have had no special
command. He was elected a brigadier general by the continental
congress, but declined on account of his age.
Israel Putnam, of Connecticut, was the general next in rank stationed
at Cambridge. Not an officer of the army, if Warren be excepted, had
a larger measure of popularity. His daring exploits at home, and on
the Canada frontier, had established his character for bravery, while
his public spirit and efficient political action, on trying occasions
during the ten years controversy from 1764 to 1775, had made him
widely known as a decided and bold patriot. But it is unnecessary to
relate his history. The Connecticut assembly, in April, made him a
brigadier general, and he was second in command of the forces of that
colony. At the time of the battle of Bunker Hill, the greater part of
these forces was stationed at Cambridge--the remainder, under General
Spencer, the senior officer, was at Roxbury. It was not, I think,
until subsequently to the battle, that Patterson's, Sargent's, and
other regiments (Mass.) were placed under his command.
No reliable contemporary account states that the detachment which
was detailed to take possession of Bunker Hill, was placed under
the orders of General Putnam, or gives him by express agreement
the superintendence of the whole expedition, or puts Col. Prescott
under him. On the other hand, the negative evidence is decisive and
conclusive. Scammans writes as though it were well known that there
was no general officer in command; James Thatcher states that though
several general officers came on to the field, no one assumed the
command; William Tudor says there was no authorised general command;
and Judge Prescott says that neither General Putnam nor any other
officer claimed or exercised any command over Prescott. It is also
a singular fact, that the patriot governor of Connecticut, Governor
Trumbull, the head of the committee of war of that colony, under
whose direct orders Spencer and Putnam acted, who speaks in the
most friendly manner of Putnam in his letters, who would be likely
to know the fact if he had commanded, and to claim the honor for
his colony if he justly could, yet in his historical letter (Aug.
31, 1779) names General Warren as the commanding officer. General
Putnam, too, in a letter dated May 22, 1776, speaks of venturing "his
life in the high places of the field," and of "taking possession
of Prospect Hill the very night after the fight on Bunker Hill,
_without having any orders from any person_." This does not indicate
that he was the commander in this fight, or had entrusted to him the
whole direction of the expedition. Nor does the relation that Stiles
has given--already quoted--indicate such a responsibility; but if
it indicates any thing, it is that he was not responsible for the
result. To all this must be added the decisive negative testimony
of the letter of General Ward, which is clearly to the point, that a
Massachusetts officer conducted the battle.
In order to show how decided is the denial that General Putnam
was detached to exercise a general command, or that the original
detachment was put under his orders, or that he gave an order to Col.
Prescott, I now add the following extract of a letter of the late
Judge William Prescott, the son of Colonel Prescott, which has not
before been printed. It is appended to his MS. memoir of the battle.
After remarking on Mr. Swett's history, he says (October 30, 1838)--
"There is one (fact) however, in which I cannot concur with the
statement in the history. This, as I understand it, represents that
General Putnam had the command of all the troops engaged in the
action. I have not the smallest disposition to disparage Gen. P. or
his services, but I believe no authority or reason can be found for
this supposition, other than his rank, and that he was on the heights
during the battle.
The detachment that marched from Cambridge the night before,
including the one hundred and twenty Connecticut men, was placed
under the command of Colonel Prescott, by an order in writing from
the commander-in-chief, with instructions to proceed to Bunker Hill
and fortify it till relieved. Colonel Prescott conferred with his
officers and Colonel Gridley (General Putnam might be present) as to
the place intended for the fortification; but Colonel Prescott took
on himself the responsibility of deciding, as well he might, for on
him it would rest.
I know from evidence that with me is conclusive, that General Putnam
never exercised any authority over this detachment, or any part of
it; and that he never at any time, before, during, or after the
battle, gave an order or command to Colonel Prescott."
These authorities and _facts_ in the case are put together without
the slightest disposition to do injustice to this brave old general.
Still, if there be any authority, _in manuscript or in print_,
between June 1775 and May 1790, which assigns to him the command of
the original detachment, or of the battle of Bunker Hill, let it be
produced.
But General Putnam had been an efficient officer since the rustic
army gathered at Cambridge, was one of the council of war, is
understood to have been in favor of fortifying Bunker Hill, and
was the last to shrink from a perilous enterprise. His patriotic
zeal carried him to the heights during the watches of the memorable
night when the redoubt was built, and also early on the next day,
to give the entrenching party the benefit of his presence and
council; and this carried him also into the heat of the fight,
at the commencement, at the rail fence--at its conclusion, on
the brow of Bunker Hill. The contemporary accounts that name him
in connection with the battle, harmonize as to the nature of his
service. Chester gives the fact that about noon he ordered on all
the Connecticut troops at Cambridge; Martin states that he came on
with a reinforcement; Gordon states that he was employed in aiding
and encouraging the troops here and there, as the case required;
Pitts states that he was employed in collecting the men; and Williams
(secretary of the Connecticut committee of war) states he received it
that he commanded the troops, perhaps not in chief. And thus, while
the negative testimony is against the idea of his being detached
to exercise a general command, that of a positive cast is that as
a general officer he acted the part of an aid, an assistant, a
volunteer.
And in such capacity he did his duty fearlessly, faithfully, well. He
was on horseback, and rode quickly from place to place.[C] His main
service was in connection with the reinforcements. He gave orders to
them, not in the redoubt, not, I think, near the redoubt, but at the
rail fence, and on Bunker Hill, and in the rear of this. He stated
himself--so Stiles says--that there was "a reinforcement within half
a mile" that ought to have gone on to the hill, but the heavy fire at
"the open causeway" deterred it, and that "in the heat of the action
he went away to fetch across _this reinforcement_." Now this service
is consistent with the duty of a patriotic volunteer "collecting
men," but is it consistent with the duty of a responsible commander,
ordering a battle? What would be thought of a general, who, in the
heat of an action, should leave the field, and go half a mile after
a reinforcement, and not get back until a retreat had commenced? Is
it not at considerable hazard to General Putnam's reputation that,
with such contemporary evidence to meet as there is in this case--the
authenticity of which cannot be successfully impugned--the position
is maintained that he was the immediate and responsible commander
of this battle? But to return: General Putnam most probably left
the hill after the first attack. He next is seen braving the balls
at Charlestown Neck, and, in the rear of it, urging on the backward
troops. Thus Samuel Bassett says he came in full gallop to Ploughed
Hill (Mount Benedict) from the neck, (which, probably, was _after_
the first attack) exclaiming, "Up my brave boys, for God's sake!
We drive them;" and Sargent and Cooke say that he was at Prospect
Hill, at an hour and under circumstances, which must have been while
the battle was going on. Here the contemporary evidence (Stiles and
Pitts) and the soldiers' statements (Bassett, Sargent and Cooke)
harmonize. The retreat (Stiles says) had commenced before he got
back. But he must soon have rode to Bunker Hill, for he is found here
by a messenger Col. Scammans sent; and when his regiment got to this
hill he ordered it forward. On the brow of this hill, where there
was hot fighting, he put himself between the retreating throng and
the advancing enemy; and, regardless of personal danger, he urged
the flying troops to stop. "Make a stand here!" he exclaimed, "We
can stop them yet! In God's name form! and give them one shot more!"
There are other circumstances that will harmonize with this detail;
and if it will not furnish a stage on which to act the Major Small
romance--where Putnam saves Small's life--all that need be said is,
that it is time to ignore _some_ of the romance that has accumulated
about the battle of Bunker Hill.
[C] Here I quote an extract from p. 169 of the SIEGE OF
BOSTON. To sustain the statement I have before me several
pages (MS.) in which the notices of General Putnam's movements
to be found in the soldiers' statements, are compared with
such contemporary notices of his conduct as I have been able
to glean. I see no cause to alter a line of it:--"The mass
of matter relative to General Putnam's movements on this day
presents the following account of them as the most probable. On
the evening of June 16, he joined the detachment at Charlestown
Neck; took part in the consultation as to the place to be
fortified; returned in the night to Cambridge; went to the
heights on the firing of the Lively, but immediately returned
to Cambridge; went again to the heights about ten o'clock;
was in Cambridge after the British landed; ordered on the
Connecticut troops, and then went to the heights; was at the
rail fence at the time the action commenced; was in the heat of
the battle, and during its continuance made great efforts to
induce the reinforcements to advance to the lines; urged labor
on works at Bunker Hill; was on the brow of this hill when the
retreat took place; retreated with that part of the army that
went to Prospect Hill, and remained here through the night. He
was on horseback, and in a few minutes' space of time could be
not only in any part of the heights, but even at Cambridge. It
is not, therefore, at all strange, that statements made by the
soldiers as to the time when, and the place where, they saw the
general, amid the confusion of so terrific a scene, cannot be
reconciled; and more especially as these statements were made
after an expiration of forty or fifty years."
In all this, General Putnam acted as a general officer would have
acted. He gave orders, undoubtedly, not only to the Connecticut
officers and troops, over whom he had a specific command, but to
others over whom he had no special command. If it be true that even
in an army of allies the oldest or highest officer ranks, still it
is also true there must be the requisite discipline, regularity and
subordination, to allow this principle to operate, and that the
officer who appears on a field of battle to take the command from
an inferior officer, must be _ordered on by his superior_. Such
in either particular is not the case here. Every thing was in an
irregular, half-organized, transition state, and there is no more
evidence that Ward ordered Putnam on than that he ordered Pomeroy
(his senior) or Warren on. Besides: he was neither the highest nor
oldest allied officer, for Whitcomb, Warren, and Pomeroy ranked him.
Indeed it has been stated, by those defending Putnam, that Ward could
not order him on. Thus Hon. John Lowell remarks: "It is certainly
true that there could not in the nature of the case have been any
authorized commander." General Putnam might give orders, even
accompany them with threats, and yet not be detached to supercede
Prescott. In so trying a scene, an officer so popular on being seen
in the field, would naturally be looked up to for advice and applied
to for orders. A case in point is that of Arnold at Saratoga. He was
only not ordered by Gates on to the field, but was actually under
arrest, yet seeing the necessity of prompt and decisive action, he
galloped about, giving orders, leading on the troops, and was obeyed
as though he were ordered on. So with General Putnam during the
Bunker Hill battle. He rode about from place to place, cheering all
with whom he came in contact, "aiding and encouraging where the case
required." Some of the officers and troops not under his immediate
command respected his authority, while others refused to obey him.
Some of the Connecticut forces whom he ordered to the field, did a
brilliant service, and indeed no service was more brilliant; but some
of the Massachusetts forces, whom he labored hard to get into the
battle, behaved badly. Indeed in the afternoon, during the battle,
and in the rear of Bunker Hill, there was great confusion, as Captain
Chester's excellent and life-like letter (July 12, 1775) firmly
establishes. That Gen. Putnam was not successful in getting these
backward troops into action, in sheer justice, ought to be ascribed
neither to his lack of energy nor of conduct, but to the hesitancy
of inexperienced troops, to the want of spirit in some of their
officers, and to the general lack of discipline and subordination in
the army. General Putnam was not blamed for this at the time, but on
the contrary, his services as an officer throughout the siege are
spoken of in letters in terms of lively approbation. Indeed among
all the documents of the time--I mean those I have seen--in print
or in manuscript, there is not a disparaging remark on his services
this day; and none occur until the unjust comments made by General
Wilkinson in his memoirs, printed in 1816. Still, to represent that
the detachment sent to Bunker Hill was under his command, and that
Colonel Prescott acted under his orders, is to contradict the most
positive evidence and violate the integrity of history.
William Prescott was one of the French war veterans. He served as a
lieutenant of a company under General Winslow at the capture of Cape
Breton, and so decided was the military talent he displayed, that he
attracted the particular notice of the British commander-in-chief,
who urged him to accept a commission of a lieutenancy in the regular
army. This he declined, as he was unwilling to adopt a military
profession and leave his native country. He was born in Groton, but
he lived in that part of it which was set off, and became Pepperell.
Here he took a prominent part in the questions that arose between
the colonies and the mother country, and on the popular side. He
represented Pepperell in the celebrated convention of committees
held in Boston in 1768, in the convention of Middlesex county Aug.
30, 1774, when the boldest measures were determined upon, and in the
provincial congress of October. He is called on the records of this
congress Captain William Prescott. He was not a member at the time of
the battle. He had been also chairman of the Pepperell committee of
safety. He was chosen colonel of the minute men, when they organized
agreeably to the advice of the provincial congress, and it was in
this capacity that, on the "Lexington Alarm," he hastened at the head
of his men to Cambridge, and acted as one of the members of the first
council of war. To him were assigned some of the earliest duties of
the campaign. On the 27th of May he received a colonel's commission
in "the Massachusetts army," being then about fifty years of age.
Among the Massachusetts colonels there was, at that time, no one
more distinguished, both in the civil and military line, than
Colonel Prescott. And when the resolution to occupy Bunker Hill, so
unanimously advised by the Massachusetts committee of safety, was so
suddenly taken by the council of war, the selection of an officer to
perform this service could not have fallen upon a patriot of greater
decision of character, or a soldier of more dauntless resolution. His
established reputation furnishes a sufficient reason for his being
selected for so dangerous and trying a duty. Though in the afternoon
of June 16, his regiment, with Frye's and Bridge's, was required to
parade at six o'clock, yet it was not until evening that he received
orders in writing to take the command of a detachment. He received
them directly from General Ward. They required him to proceed, at
the head of his detachment, to Bunker Hill, and there erect such
fortifications as he and Colonel Gridley--the chief engineer of the
Massachusetts army--should judge proper for its defence; and he was
instructed not to communicate his orders until after he had passed
Charlestown Neck. Thus he was regularly detached for a special
service, and as such marched at the head of his troops. "General
Putnam"--so Judge Prescott expressly states from information from his
father--"did not head the detachment from Cambridge to Bunker Hill,
_nor march with it_." It was under the entire command of Colonel
Prescott.
In all the evidence, it is only twice that Colonel Prescott, up to
about the time of the attack, appears in consultation with general
officers: once in the night, in reference to the place to be
fortified, and once just before the enemy made his first landing, in
reference to the removal of the entrenching tools. It may be well to
look at both these cases.
When Colonel Prescott, in the evening of June 16th, arrived at
Charlestown Neck, he halted, and sent a small party, under Captain
Nutting, to the lower part of the town, to serve as a guard. He
soon marched over to Bunker Hill, and again halted. It was here,
probably, that he communicated his orders to his officers, and held
a consultation as to the place to be fortified. Other officers, who
did not march with the detachment, were present, and took part in
the discussion. Samuel Gray (Letter July 12, 1775,) gives the best
account of what took place. He states that "the engineer and two
generals went on to the hill at night, and reconnoitred the ground;
that one general and the engineer were of opinion we ought not to
entrench on Charlestown Hill (Breed's Hill) till we had thrown up
some works on the north and south ends of Bunker Hill, to cover our
men in their retreat, if that should happen; but on the pressing
importunity of the other general officer it was consented to begin
as was done." One of these generals was General Putnam. There is no
data to determine who the other was, but rather from the estimation
which Gen. Whitcomb's character was held, his recent appointment as
major general, and the fact he was on active duty, than from anything
else, it may be inferred that he was the general. No account states
that Colonel Prescott here received an order; but Judge Prescott does
say that the responsibility of the decision rested with him. When the
troops got to the spot, so Prescott states, "the lines were drawn
by the engineer." After the men were at labor General Putnam, and
probably the other general, returned to Cambridge.
The other instance, which was before the British landed, occurred
between eleven and twelve o'clock in the forenoon. The men had mostly
ceased to labor on the entrenchments, and the entrenching tools had
been piled in the rear of them. General Putnam rode on horseback to
the redoubt, and consulted Colonel Prescott relative to beginning
works on Bunker Hill; he also remarked to the colonel that the
entrenching tools ought to be sent off or they might be lost. General
Heath first relates this circumstance, and he is supported by the
depositions of several soldiers. Col. Prescott replied that if he
(Prescott) sent any of the men away not one of them would return.
To this Putnam replied, "they shall every man return." "A large
party," Heath says, "was then sent off with the tools, and not one
of them returned. In this instance the colonel was the best judge
of human nature." No order was given to Colonel Prescott, and the
collision of opinion was merely as to whether the men would return
to the redoubt. It is probable, by the way, that this affair of the
tools is the kernel of truth there is in the stories told of Putnam's
riding off the field with parcels of "pickaxes," "spades," "tents,"
or "tent-poles," on his horse. As though an officer with his reins
in one hand and his sword in the other, would or could have, in the
thick fight of such a retreat as that of Bunker Hill, such gear about
him. These stories are neither consistent with a general's duty nor
with a coward's fear.