After spending the 4th of June in a manner worthy of the day, we took
leave of Merida for the last time, at one o'clock in the morning of the
5th, and marched to Almendralejo. Intelligence having been received
a few days after, that Marshal Soult intended paying us a visit, Sir
Rowland Hill deeming it prudent to concentrate his little army at a
more advanced point, the whole of the infantry moved forward to Zafra,
Los Santos, and Sancho Perez, on the 12th and 13th.
On the 11th of June, a severe, gallant, but unfortunate action was
fought near Llera, between the French cavalry under General L'Allemand,
and our heavy dragoons commanded by General Slade. In the early part
of the conflict our troops were completely victorious, but from some
unfortunate cause, they were ultimately beaten back with great loss to
themselves, besides the loss of all the prisoners they had previously
taken from the enemy. To whom the heavy cavalry brigade were indebted
for this drubbing, I shall not affirm, but it was reported that Sir
Rowland Hill was highly displeased with the issue of the affair.
This disastrous affair cast a deep gloom over every battalion in the
division; but fortunately it was of short duration, for Sir Rowland
Hill having received intelligence, on the 12th, that the men General
Slade had lost on the preceding day, were then in the village of
Meguila, under a slender guard, instantly despatched fifty of the heavy
brigade of cavalry, under Lieutenant Strenuwitz, to recapture them.
This was exactly the kind of thing for Strenuwitz, for as he frequently
told us, "he was so fond of _de fight_," that he was sure to be killed
some day or other. Away the whole party went in high spirits. In their
principal object, however, they were unsuccessful; but having fallen
in with a detachment of French cavalry consisting of eighty men, the
British, notwithstanding the great disparity of numbers, instantly
attacked them, and after a tight little brush, defeated them with the
loss of many killed and wounded, and twenty prisoners, and completely
established the superiority of our heavy cavalry over that of the enemy.
The enemy's cavalry in front of Llerena having been reinforced, and
their every movement indicating an intention of attacking us, the
allied cavalry were withdrawn from Llerena on the 14th June. The latter
continuing to fall back, and the French to advance, the 50th and 92nd
regiments retired from Sancho Perez to Los Santos on the 16th, and at
sun-set, on the following evening, the whole corps retired towards
Santa Martha, behind which we halted at sun-rise on the 18th. Resuming
our retrograde movement on the 19th, we marched to a wood a mile and
a-half in front of the position of Albuera, and encamped on the right
bank of the little river of that name, where, on the 20th, we were
joined by the 5th, 17th and 22nd Portuguese regiments of the line, and
one battalion of caçadores, which raised our force to upwards of 21,000
men.
Fully convinced that Soult intended to attack him, Sir Rowland Hill
lost not a moment after going into camp, in making such preparations as
he considered necessary to give the Marshal a warm reception, on the
same ground from which Marshal Beresford so unceremoniously drove him
on the 16th of May 1811.
The ground denominated the position of Albuera, is a ridge covered
with heath, the left or lower part of which is washed by the small
river Albuera. From the river, it runs in a southerly direction
about three-quarters of a mile, and all the way rises with a gentle
acclivity, till it terminates abruptly at a deep ravine, which
separates the position from a high range of mountains farther to the
right. The slope on each side of the ridge is long, but not steep. The
village of Albuera stands on the lower part of the ridge, at a short
distance from the river; and the high-road from Zafra to Badajoz runs
through the centre of it. The extreme right being considerably higher
than the other parts of the ridge, must be considered as the key to the
position.
As this part of the ground, therefore, was likely to become the grand
bone of contention, an engineer and strong working parties were
instantly ordered to the spot, to increase its natural strength by
all the artificial means in their power. Accordingly, by dint of hard
working, day and night, a most respectable looking redoubt crowned the
summit of the ridge in course of a few days. Another redoubt was raised
on an eminence a little lower down, and a third one begun still farther
to the left. The parapet of the bridge over the Albuera, a little
in front of the village, was thrown down; the road broken up; the
streets were barricaded; many of the houses loop-holed; and numerous
breast-works graced the slope of the ridge. An officer from each
regiment proceeded to the position, under the Quarter-Master General,
who pointed out to them the ground which their respective battalions
were to occupy, in case of an attack, as well as the particular fords
of the river, where each corps was to cross on its way from the
encampment to the position. Cavalry piquets were posted in front of the
wood where the infantry were encamped. These were supported by some
companies of infantry, placed within an abattis, and the first brigade,
50th, 71st, and 92nd regiments, were ordered to be in readiness to
proceed to the front of the wood, on the first appearance of the
enemy, and to retard their progress till the other brigades had taken
up their ground. Such were the precautionary measures adopted by Sir
Rowland Hill at Albuera in June 1812,--measures which every individual
present characterized as the offspring of caution, prudence, and a very
considerable portion of military talent.
On taking possession of the ridge of Albuera, we were a good deal
astonished to find a trench, forty yards in length, nearly half filled
with human skeletons, without so much as one handful of mould sprinkled
over them, to screen them from the eye of the eagle, the vulture,
or carrion crow. "_Look_," cried the men, one to another, on first
beholding the horrifying spectacle, "_behold our reward!_" In order to
quiet their minds, we threw out a hint that the skeletons were those
of the French soldiers who had fallen in battle the previous year.
But our oratory produced very little effect;--and no wonder, for that
circumstance formed any thing but a good apology for the conduct of
those to whom Marshal Beresford had entrusted the duty of burying the
dead. That the dead were ordered to be buried, we require no other
proof than the existence of the trench;--for had no order been given,
that tomb of many warriors would never have been made. Now, as an
order to bury the dead is all that can be expected from a general
commanding an army, no blame can possibly be attached to the general
who commanded the allied army at Albuera, in May 1811. To suppose for
a moment that he gave no orders to bury the dead, would be a foul
aspersion on his military character; for every general whose breast,
like his, glows with humanity, will, after completing the rout of an
enemy, invariably endeavour to enhance his victory, by extending mercy
to all those who are in his power, and consigning to the tomb, with
becoming solemnity, all those, whether friends or foes, who may have
fallen in battle.
"Did you ever hear a good reason given why Marshal Beresford did not
either destroy, or capture the remains of the French army after the
battle of Albuera?" is a question which has been privately put to me
more than a hundred times, and to which I shall now endeavour thus
publicly to return a satisfactory answer.
In the height of their patriotic frenzy, the inhabitants of these
realms are but too apt to anticipate from their naval and military
armaments, a degree of success far beyond what they can possibly
achieve. In forming these extravagant notions of success, it often
happens that the sanguine people lose sight of a great many facts,
which, if kept in view, would assist them materially in forming a
correct estimate of the advantages which may be expected from any
particular body of troops. On the occasion alluded to, the querists
must unquestionably have forgotten, that when an army is composed
of troops drawn from various nations, it is almost impossible for a
general to infuse into the breasts of all his followers the same daring
spirit, the same ardour, and the same praise-worthy disposition, to
emulate in deeds of valour, those who have gone before them in the path
of danger, of honour, and of glory. Let him do his utmost, he will not
succeed; for so long as the troops of each nation possess, as they now
do, a separate and distinct species of courage from the others, there
will, there must be a secret enemy at work in the shape of jealousy
and envy, which will prevent the soldiers of different nations from
co-operating so heartily, and so effectually with each other, as the
different corps of an army composed entirely of native troops do.
Even in a native army, trivial causes have frequently been known to
produce jealousy, hatred, and envy. It often happens that a particular
battalion, brigade, or division is engaged in many and successive
combats, while others have no opportunity of displaying their prowess,
and all without any premeditated arrangement of the general commanding.
This succession of partial combats, seldom fails to draw down upon
the general, a charge of partiality, and upon the troops engaged in
them, the envy and hatred of their less fortunate companions. This
again produces ill-will between the different battalions, brigades,
and divisions, which, in the end, tends to destroy confidence, and of
consequence, unity and strength in an army.
That the victory would have been more complete, had the general placed
the key of his position in the keeping of the British troops, instead
of those of Spain, there can be but one opinion; for the great loss of
the former did not arise from defending their own portion of ground,
but in _retaking that_ which the _Spaniards_ had _too tamely_ yielded
up to the enemy. That the original plan of operations on that day was
forced on the general, I believe there cannot be a doubt. But whatever
may have been his reasons for agreeing to the arrangements, the issue
shews us, that to place implicit confidence in foreign troops, is, to
say the least of it, a bad and dangerous policy. Let us, therefore,
hope that the fate of the _key_ of the position of Albuera, on the
16th May 1811, will for ever operate as a warning to every British
general or officer in command of a mixed force, never to place a post
of importance in the keeping of foreign troops, but on all occasions
to give the preference to the troops of that nation, whose army he
commands.
A troop of one of our light cavalry regiments being on out-post duty
one morning during our stay at Albuera, one of the horses bestrode by
an honest Hibernian became so restive, that the rider was ordered to
fall out to the rear, and make it quiet. Pat being more anxious for a
trip in another direction, requested permission to take the horse to
the front. Leave being granted, Pat, on leaving the ranks, said to his
comrades, "Now, by J----, lads, I will shew you something you never saw
before." Every eye was instantly fixed upon the son of Erin, while he
belaboured the head and sides of the poor horse in the most unmerciful
manner. Neither the smart reproofs of his officers, nor the coarse
jokes of his comrades, had any effect in lessening the punishment of
the animal. In defiance of every thing, Pat kept whipping, spurring,
and swearing, till he had gained a hundred yards from the troop, when,
conceiving himself out of danger, he turned the head of his horse
towards the enemy, gave him the reins, and the spurs at the same time,
and at full speed gained the French lines, before any of his companions
could overtake him.
For ten days the enemy gave us very little trouble, but in the morning
of the 30th, a body of their cavalry approached our advanced posts,
apparently with an intention to give us a meeting. Our brigade being
busily employed in preparing their breakfast when the alarm was given,
the camp-kettles were instantly emptied, and away we went to dispute
with the enemy the passage through the forest. After waiting two hours
for them, we were informed they had retired, and at the same time
received permission to follow their example.
On returning to our camp, we put our culinary articles again in
requisition, but most unfortunately, just as the kettles were about
being removed from the fire, a second alarm called us again to the
front, when as before, we were forced to leave our dinners behind
us--the soup to fertilize the soil, and the beef to feed the carrion
crow. This movement was equally unproductive of incident as the former,
as far as we were concerned. The Spanish cavalry were less fortunate
however, for in addition to the loss of breakfast and dinner, not
a few of them lost their lives in an engagement with a body of the
enemy's dragoons. In the early part of the action, the Spaniards were
successful, but having advanced farther than prudence warranted, they
at length fell into an ambuscade, and suffered severely. On this
occasion the Conde-de-Penne-Villamur and his cavalry, fought in very
good style.
Finding that the enemy were only amusing him until he could draw off
the main body of his army, Sir Rowland Hill abandoned the defensive
and assumed the offensive on the 1st of July. Moving in one column,
we arrived in the afternoon at Santa Martha, and encamped. On the
following day, the corps advanced in two columns. The left, consisting
of General Long's brigade of British, and Colonel Campbell's brigade
of Portuguese cavalry, one brigade of artillery, the first brigade
of British, and Brigadier-General Campbell's brigade of Portuguese
infantry, was placed under the orders of Sir William Erskine, and moved
against the enemy at Villa-Alba. The remaining brigades of artillery,
cavalry, and infantry, advanced along the high road to Zafra, under the
command of Lieutenant-General Tilson Chowne.
The whole moved from Santa Martha, about nine o'clock, A.M. The German
hussars, who led the advance to Villa-Alba, hearing that the French
were quite unprepared for a visit, dashed into the village, cut down
a number of them before they mounted their chargers, and would have
taken or destroyed the greater part of them, had the Portuguese cavalry
behaved equally well. But unfortunately, neither the threats nor
promises of Colonel Campbell and his officers, could induce their men
to take part in the fray, till the favourable moment had for ever fled.
Attacked at length by a superior force, the hussars were compelled
to retire, until the light dragoons advanced to their assistance,
when they once more became the assailants, and drove the enemy from
the village to a height a short distance from it, where the whole
skirmished very beautifully for some time after our brigade arrived at
Villa-Alba. When the enemy finally retired, we crossed the Guadacia,
moved a few miles up its right bank, then re-crossed the river, and
lay down under arms. Towards evening, we were moving from the banks of
the Guadacia to encamp, when the enemy brought forward a few pieces of
artillery, and cannonaded us from an opposite height. Our artillery
returned the fire of the enemy from a rising ground, close to the
river, across which the 71st light infantry were thrown, to take
possession of a height half-way between us and our opponents. After a
mutual interchange of civilities, the affair was brought to a close by
the French withdrawing their artillery, and leaving us to bind up the
wounds of a few of our artillerymen, and some Portuguese infantry, in
peace and quietness.
In the engagement at Villa-Alba, one of the second German hussars was
assaulted by a powerful French dragoon. Both being dexterous swordsmen,
it was sometime before either could claim an advantage. Another
Frenchman conceiving his friend in danger, flew to his aid, but when
he arrived, his companion was heaving his last convulsive throe at the
feet of his conqueror. The fatal result of this rencounter did not
however deter the second antagonist from making an attempt to revenge
the fall of his friend. To it they went gallantly. Cut succeeded cut,
and thrust succeeded thrust, till both were considerably weakened.
At length a third opponent approached the scene of action, and in
seconding his friend, buried his sword in the body of the German hero,
just as the sabre of the latter had performed a similar favour to his
antagonist.
In the afternoon of the 3rd of July, we quitted the banks of the
Guadacia, marched two leagues through a close country, and bivouacked
on the left of the road from Santa Martha to Zafra. Next morning we
advanced to Los Santos and bivouacked, and at sun-set the same day
resumed our march, and at sun-rise on the 5th, entered Benveneida.
Quitting the latter on the 6th, we marched into Llerena the same
afternoon. As we passed the windows of a convent in the suburbs of
the city, the fair inmates cheered us through the gratings of their
miserable cells, and continued to wave their white handkerchiefs, till
every red-coat was lost in the distance. The joy of the nuns may have
been sincere, but if the tittle-tattle of the neighbouring towns could
be credited, the inhabitants of Llerena had very little regard for us.