Lord Wellington having finally resolved upon the siege of Badajoz, the
advanced guard approached our cantonments on the 2nd of March. Next
day we moved forward to Alegreta, and on the 4th to Albuquerque. Here
we remained until every preparation was made which our Generalissimo
considered necessary to ensure the success of the enterprise.
On the 16th of March we bade a final adieu to Albuquerque, and with the
exception of one Portuguese brigade, the whole of Sir Rowland Hill's
corps moved upon Merida. That evening we bivouacked near Zagala, next
afternoon at La Nava, and on the 17th we entered Merida.
Sir Rowland Hill finding Merida in possession of a few of the enemy's
dragoons, and that the latter were supported by a battalion of
infantry, encamped about a mile from the town, on the opposite bank of
the Guadiana, gave orders to General Long to cross the river a little
below the bridge, with his brigade of cavalry, in order to capture
those of the enemy in Merida, and keep the infantry from retreating too
quickly, till we could get up to them. On the first alarm, however,
the French cavalry fled from Merida, some by the bridge, others by a
ford a little above it. The former, by discharging their carabines on
the bridge, gave their friends in the wood intimation of their danger.
As no time was now to be lost, the 1st brigade, 50th, 71st, and 92nd
regiments, moved towards the town at a trot. In a few minutes we were
on the bridge, and a few more carried us across it. Here we halted
a minute, and then renewed the pursuit with renovated strength; but
notwithstanding all our efforts, and those of our mounted friends, to
bring them to action, the enemy retreated at such a goodly pace, that
fast as our brigade ran, the fugitives always continued to run faster.
Success at length appearing hopeless, and our men being completely
blown, we gave over the pursuit, and retraced our steps to Merida,
carrying with us a few prisoners, whose joints being less supple than
their more fortunate friends, were obliged to fall behind, and were
consequently taken.
Sir Thomas Graham crossed the Guadiana on the 16th, at the head of the
right wing of the covering army, consisting of the greater part of the
cavalry, the 1st, 6th, and 7th divisions of infantry, and then directed
his march upon Santa Martha, Zafra, and Llerena. On Sir Thomas' arrival
at the latter, the right wing of the covering army rested on the
heights on the south of Llerena, and the left on the Guadiana at Don
Boneto.
Lord Wellington also crossed the Guadiana on the 16th, invested
Badajoz the same evening, and broke ground before the fortress on "_St
Patrick's day_."
At day-break on the 18th, Sir Rowland Hill's corps crossed the Guadiana
at Merida, advanced to Almendralejo, and retraced their steps on
the 21st. In the afternoon of the 26th, we again crossed the river,
moved up its left bank to La Zarza, and next morning still farther
to Quarena. On the 28th, the cavalry, one brigade of artillery, and
the 1st brigade of infantry, advanced to Medellin and Don Beneto.
On the march the detachment was formed into two columns, the left
consisting of the 92nd regiment, and two pieces of artillery, moved
against Medellin; and the right column, commanded by General Howard,
and composed of the cavalry, 50th and 71st regiments, one company 60th
rifle corps, and remaining pieces of artillery, against Don Beneto.
Medellin was occupied about sun-set without opposition. Informed that
the enemy had retired from Don Beneto, General Howard, on arriving
close to the village, dispatched Captain Blacier with his rifles into
the town, to see that none of the enemy lurked in it, and to obtain an
interview with the chief magistrate regarding quarters. The gallant
Captain was plodding his way through the streets, thinking on the
good things of this world, when all at once his thoughts were rivetted
on the things of the world to come. Unconscious of their contiguity
to the British, a French cavalry patrol had entered the village on a
reconnoitring excursion, and like my friend the Captain, were thinking
of every thing but what was before them. Each party was therefore
moving along in conscious security, when, on turning the corner of a
street, they unexpectedly met. With eyes looking amazement, they gazed
at each other for a few moments, and then proceeded in the usual manner
to extricate themselves from the dilemma into which false intelligence
had led both parties. A pretty little skirmish ensued, in which the
balls of the rifles made a suitable return for the favours showered
upon their heads by the Gallic sabres. After a few mortal wounds had
been given and received, the enemy, suspecting they had got into the
wrong-box, wheeled to the right-about, retired rather precipitately,
and left the gallant Captain in possession of the well-won honours of
the street.
Medellin is built along the base of a _lonely_ hill, on the left bank
of, and close to the Guadiana. On the summit of the little conical
mount, stands a castle, better calculated to repel the assault of a
pop-gun, than a twenty-four pounder. On our arrival, we threw a strong
piquet into it, which was followed by the whole battalion two hours
before day-break next morning. On ascending the eminence, the air was
disagreeably cold, but the scene which opened to our view at sun-rise,
soon banished past miseries into the shades of forgetfulness.
Twelve miles to the west lay before us the memorable plains and
surrounding hills of Arroyo-del-Molinos, where hundreds of Gerard's
followers breathed their farewell sigh on the 28th of October 1811.
From the ramparts of Badajoz, the continual rolling of Phillipon's
thunder, reminded us every minute that the work of mutual destruction
was proceeding with unabated violence. A few miles to the east we had a
most commanding and beautiful view of the memorable field of Medellin,
where Victor and Cuesta contended for victory in 1810, and where,
before the close of that memorable day, victory perched on the standard
of Victor, which on that fatal evening soared over the inanimate forms
of thousands of warriors, who ever since have soundly slept on the
plains of Medellin.
There shall they rest--ambition's honour'd fools,
Yes, honour decks the turf that wraps their clay.
Vain sophistry! in these behold the tools--
The broken tools that Tyrants cast away
By myriads, when they dare to pave their way
With human hearts--to what? a dream alone.
Can despots compass aught that hails their sway?
Or call with truth one span of earth their own,
Save that wherein at last they crumble bone by bone.
The troops in Medellin rejoined their friends in Don Benito on the
29th, and on the 31st, the whole retreated to Quarena. On the 1st of
April, we retraced our steps to La Zarza, and next morning to Merida.
Sir Thomas Graham being under the necessity of withdrawing his troops
from Llerena, retired slowly towards Albuera, where it was generally
understood the covering army was to assemble. On the afternoon of the
5th, we again crossed the Guadiana, marched to St Servan, and on the
6th, to a small eminence near the village of Lobon.
Aware that the capture of Badajoz was to be attempted that night, the
most intense anxiety pervaded our encampment, for the issue of the
terrific conflict. Throughout every corner of our gloomy bivouac, the
opinion of almost every individual seemed to be, that our friends would
_not_ be able to surmount the numerous obstacles which the besieged had
provided to obstruct the passage of the besiegers into the place by the
practicable breaches. It was therefore with feelings which I shall not
attempt to describe, that we waited the commencement of the struggle
in which our companions were about to engage, in order to rescue a
suffering people from the iron grasp of a hateful and grinding tyranny.
On the signal being given, the various columns moved forward to
the points of attack with extraordinary spirit, but the whole were
ultimately beat back with considerable loss. Again they attempted to
force a passage into the body of the place, but with no better success.
Again and again the intrepid assailants mounted the breaches--renewed
the sanguinary conflict with renovated courage, and at these points,
maintained the murderous conflict, till the ditches were literally
filled with dead, dying and wounded, piled above each other in one
undistinguished mass. The scene at length became one of horror; numbers
every moment breathed their last, while the heart-rending cries of the
wounded in the ditches, intimated to their more fortunate companions,
that if they were not soon removed from their dreadful situation, death
by suffocation would be their inevitable fate. Appalling as this state
of affairs was, yet none seemed inclined to yield till victory should
entitle them to decorate their brows with the wreath of the conqueror.
All therefore being alike determined to perish rather than yield, it
was with no small reluctance that they ultimately obeyed an order of
recal to prepare for another and final effort to wrest the place from
the enemy. This effort, however, was not required, for General Picton
having rather unexpectedly obtained a footing within the castle,
General Philippon, the governor, on perceiving the fruits of his own
folly, in leaving this part of the fortress without a sufficient
body of troops to defend it, retired into Fort St Christoval, and at
day-break on the 7th, surrendered himself and garrison prisoners of
war.
The loss of the enemy during the siege, was 1200 killed and wounded,
and 4000 prisoners; ours amounted to 3860 British, and 1010 Portuguese
killed and wounded.
Early on the 7th, Sir Rowland Hill moved from Lobon, to a field on
the left bank of the Albuera, a short distance from Talavera-la-Real.
Marshal Marmont having dispatched a small body of infantry to the
assistance of his friend Soult, Lord Wellington gave orders for two
arches of the beautiful bridge of Merida to be destroyed, that their
junction with the army of Soult might be retarded to the latest
possible period.
Marshal Soult who had arrived in the vicinity of Zafra, Los-Santos,
&c. on his way to the relief of Badajoz, became perfectly frantic
when he received the first intelligence of the fall of that important
fortress. Being seated at breakfast when the unlooked for and unwelcome
intelligence reached him, the gallant Marshal raised his foot, and
after wishing all the "_Leopards_ at the bottom of the sea," dispatched
the breakfast table to the opposite side of the apartment, and made the
china, under which it groaned, fly into a thousand pieces.
As soon as this unseemly fit of passion had subsided, Soult gave orders
for his followers to wheel to the right-about, and retrace their
steps into Andalusia. On being informed of the Marshal's intentions,
Sir Stapleton Cotton was ordered to harass the enemy's rear with the
allied cavalry. Coming up with a strong body of their dragoons near
Villa-Garcia, a sharp conflict ensued, which terminated in the defeat
of the French, with a loss of 300 killed, wounded, and prisoners.
On the 10th, the Northern army set out on its return to the banks
of the Agueda, to keep Marshal Marmont in order; and we advanced to
Almendralejo, to look after Druet,--the Count D'Erlon.
Strolling at a short distance from our bivouac, in company with two
friends, on the 6th of April, we perceived a Spanish peasant reposing
under the cooling shade of a large tree. After a few preliminary
questions, we inquired whence he came, and his business in the vicinity
of our camp. To these interrogatories he unhesitatingly replied, that
he was an inhabitant of a mountain village, twenty miles distant,
and that his only object was to kill as many Frenchmen as he could,
_after_, not _in_, the great battle which he imagined had become
inevitable, from the proximity of the army of Soult to ours. And to
prove that such was his intention, he pulled a tremendous knife from
his side-pocket, with which he assured us, he sent _eleven Frenchmen_
to sleep with their fathers on the morning subsequent to the battle of
Albuera. On upbraiding him for his cruelty, and inquiring how he could
perpetrate such cold-blooded atrocities, he very coolly replied, that
it was the duty of every loyal Spaniard like himself, to send as many
Frenchmen into another world as they could, wherever they might find
them, whether in the field of battle, or in a private retreat--whether
armed or unarmed--or whether they might be in the enjoyment of health,
or writhing under the effects of severe wounds. From this doctrine,
we not only most decidedly dissented, but endeavoured to convince him
that conduct such as his was highly derogatory to his character as a
man; for either revenge or inhumanity towards an enemy, when he can no
longer offer resistance, was no less an insult to human nature, than
it was contrary to the laws and usages of war. Finding, however, that
we could not bring him to coincide with us in opinion, we bade the
Albuerian assassin adieu, in the fervent hope that we might never again
find ourselves near his polluted person.
Having formerly alluded to the battle of Medellin, I now proceed to
make a few remarks on the conduct of the Spanish General Cuesta, on
that occasion, conceiving that a great proportion of those reverses
which subsequently befel the Spanish arms, are to be traced to the
unfortunate issue of that engagement.
On retiring behind the Guadiana, Cuesta took up an excellent position
between Medellin, and Don Benito, with his right resting on the
Guadiana, and his left on an almost inaccessible mountain. In fact, it
was so well chosen, that Victor was compelled to use stratagem, before
he could with prudence make any attempt to drive his opponent from his
stronghold.
Anxious, therefore, to bring Cuesta to action, but yet afraid to do so
in his position, Victor, in order to rouse the pride of the haughty
Don, detached one party after another, close up to his front line, with
instructions to use every effort in their power to draw their opponents
into the plain. For some time, the Spaniards bore all the insults and
degrading epithets gratuitously bestowed on them by the French, with
considerable humour, but the same species of abuse and insult being
continued day after day, and hour after hour, Cuesta's wrath at length
waxed so hot, that he was induced to depart from the defensive system
which he had hitherto adopted, and to risk the fate of his army, I may
add, his country, on the issue of a general engagement.
Were we called upon to estimate the character of Cuesta as a military
leader, by the talents displayed by him on this occasion, I fear that
the utmost praise, I should feel myself warranted in bestowing on him,
would amount only to this, that had the fate of the day depended on the
personal courage of the Spanish chief, _perhaps_ the result might have
been less disastrous for his country. But unfortunately for Spain, the
fortune of the day did not depend on the personal courage of either
of the military chiefs, but on courage, aided by military talent and
experience, tempered with prudence, and guided by a clear and sound
judgement, none of which military qualifications Cuesta possessed.
Had the Spanish Generalissimo taken a proper view of the duties which
of necessity devolve upon the commander-in-chief of an army, he never
could have permitted this important truth to escape his recollection,
that a general who is appointed to command the armies of his country
in times of peril, is entrusted not only with the lives and honour
of those under his immediate command, but with the lives, honour,
liberties, and property of all his fellow-countrymen. Had Cuesta not
lost sight of this fact, he never would, for the sake of a little
ephemeral praise, have placed in jeopardy the lives of his followers,
and the best interests of his country, by attempting to accomplish that
which ages yet unborn will look upon as a rash, hazardous, and totally
uncalled for military enterprise; for had the attack been delayed but
a few days longer, the French soldiery, who frequently can brook no
delay, would have compelled their leader to attack his opponent, when
Victor's defeat must have been as inevitable as Cuesta's appeared to
be on that fatal morning, to almost every person but himself. Situated
as Cuesta was, one of two things appears to me quite evident--he must
either have been totally incapable of commanding-in-chief on such an
occasion; or he must have grossly betrayed the trust reposed in him by
his country, otherwise he never would have yielded up the many and
important advantages he possessed, and unnecessarily placed himself on
a footing of equality in point of ground with his antagonist--a piece
of infatuation not only without a parallel in the history of Spain, but
one which might have shaken the pillars of his country to their very
foundation. O Spain! Spain! how many thousands of your bravest sons
were in those times offered up as sacrifices to the pride, ambition,
ignorance, or hateful personal feelings of your generals.
In the early ages of the world, a victory obtained by stratagem,
did not confer much honour on the victor, for every thing then was
attempted and achieved by force alone. But as men improved in military
science, they perceived that there were occasions, when, by sacrificing
the lives of a few of their followers, a less bloody and more complete
victory was obtained, than when they exposed to hazard the lives of
every man under their command. They became convinced, that by using
stratagem, much time was saved, and many an advantage gained, which
open force would never have accomplished. So satisfied were the
Spartans of this, that, in order to make their officers endeavour to
achieve every thing by stratagem, they ordered that every general who
obtained an advantage by stratagem, was to be permitted to sacrifice
an ox, but those who succeeded by open force, a cock only. This shews
us how much that gallant people preferred the wiles of war, to open
force, and I trust may induce my military friends to follow their
example, being of opinion, that as the performances of the mind are
preferable and superior to those of the body, so in exact proportion is
stratagem to be preferred to open force.