Sir Rowland Hill having received an order early in the morning of the
12th of January, to retrace his steps to Portalegre, we marched from
Merida at nine o'clock, A.M. and in the afternoon bivouacked behind
La-Nava. Next evening we reposed on the bank of a little river, under
the castle of Zagala, and on the 14th returned to Albuquerque. We
retired to Alegreta on the 16th, and to Portalegre on the 17th. On
the succeeding day, the men were busily employed in renewing their
stock of clean linen; and on the 19th, we moved to Alpalhao, on our
way to the North, to tender Lord Wellington our assistance, should
his lordship require it. We reached Niza on the 20th, where, on
the following morning, we received the glad tidings of the fall of
Ciudad-Rodrigo. As Marmont, however, still shewed a disposition to give
battle, we advanced from Niza to the Tagus on the 25th, crossed that
river by a bridge of boats at Villa-Velha, and then moved two leagues
farther, and occupied a few miserable villages. Next day we entered
Castello-Branco, where we had the pleasure of meeting with the French
garrison of Ciudad-Rodrigo, on their way to British transports.
Marmont having withdrawn his army to Salamanca, to wait an opportunity
of resuming the offensive, when his chances of success should appear
more inviting, we bade adieu to Castello-Branco on the 1st of February,
and retraced our steps as far as Villa-Velha, where we bivouacked. On
the 2nd, we occupied Niza, the 3rd Alpalhao, and re-entered Portalegre
the following morning.
The siege of Ciudad-Rodrigo, forms one of the most glorious
achievements of the late Peninsular war, and marks in an eminent degree
the consummate military talent of the General who brought it to a
successful conclusion.
The Marshals Marmont, Soult, and Suchet, viewing the inactivity of the
allied army in the latter months of 1811, as something tantamount to
an acknowledgment on the part of the British chief, that he was not in
a condition to undertake any offensive movement of importance, formed
a triple league, by which Marmont appears to have agreed to favour his
brother Marshals with a few of his brigades during the winter months,
on condition of receiving a _similar_ favour from them in the following
summer. Marmont's reinforcements quitted the banks of the Tormes and
Tagus in the end of November and beginning of December 1811, and moved
towards the seat of war in the east and south of Spain. On the approach
of their friends, Soult laid siege to Tariffa, and Suchet to Valencia.
Having instantly discovered the deep game which his powerful opponents
were playing, Lord Wellington took measures to render it a losing
one. With the eye of the eagle, he watched their every movement, but
never attempted to derange their plans, or arrest the progress of the
brigades, till the latter had arrived at a point so distant, that
they could not return to the banks of the Agweda in time to prevent
his Lordship carrying into execution his designs upon Ciudad-Rodrigo.
But on Marmont's troops arriving at that point, instructions were
immediately transmitted to Sir Rowland Hill, to carry into execution
the first part of those admirably planned operations, which terminated
in the capture of that important military post.
No better proof can be adduced of the ability with which the whole of
these operations were planned and executed, than the signal advantages
which resulted from them to the common cause. Sir Rowland Hill's grand
object in marching upon Merida, being to draw the attention of the
enemy to a point far distant from that to be assailed, his movement
was attended with all the success which could have been anticipated,
The Count D'Erlon no sooner heard of our arrival on the banks of the
Guadiana, than he withdrew precipitately from Almendralejo, and for
a day or two after, dispatched a courier to Soult every two hours,
soliciting immediate assistance, otherwise he would be inevitably
devoured by the "_Arroyo-del-Molinos devils_," who were in close
pursuit of him. Being totally ignorant as to the number of "devils"
that were following his friend D'Erlon, Soult, on receiving a few of
these applications for succour, transmitted instructions to General
Laval, commanding before Tariffa, to raise the siege of that place, and
at the expence of all his battering-train, &c. fly with all possible
celerity to the Count's relief, which instructions were implicitly
obeyed. From these proceedings of the enemy in Andalusia, and the
subsequent tardy movements of Marmont on the side of Ciudad-Rodrigo, it
appears quite evident that the eyes of the two were rivetted too long
upon our movements, for before they recovered from the panic which our
march created amongst them, they thus allowed the British flag proudly
to wave over the turrets of Ciudad-Rodrigo.
With all deference to the experience and high military characters of
the three Marshals, it seems evident that their plan of operations was
based on a capital military error,--that of under-rating the strength
of their opponent. By adopting this view of Lord Wellington's forces,
Marmont denuded himself of the means of affording the necessary
protection to that portion of the Spanish territory which his Imperial
Master had placed under his charge, and as a natural consequence of
such conduct, lost possession of Ciudad-Rodrigo. Soult, on the other
hand, committed another error, little inferior in magnitude to the one
just mentioned, that of over-rating the force under General Hill. By
doing so, Soult not only raised the siege of Tariffa in a disgraceful
manner, but allowed his attention to be completely abstracted from that
point towards which the eyes of every Frenchman in the Peninsula should
have been directed. These facts, I conceive, shew us the folly of any
general either under-rating or over-rating the numbers, courage, or
discipline of an opponent's forces. For although I most readily admit
that it may be a little difficult at times for a general to banish from
his breast the timidity of a Druet, who exaggerated the danger that
threatened him, or the temerity of a Marmont, who as much underrated
them; yet I am quite satisfied, that unless a general's experience and
knowledge of his duties are such as will enable him to steer clear of
timidity on the one hand, and temerity on the other, he should be held
incapable of conducting any field operation, if the result is expected
to have any influence on the issue of the campaign.
On passing a church one morning during our residence in Portalegre,
a melancholy sound struck my ear,--it was a funeral dirge. In a few
minutes the mournful procession entered the portal of the church, and
being anxious to observe the ceremony, I followed. Around the bier
stood an assemblage of priests and friars, who for a considerable
time chaunted hymns for the soul of the deceased. At the conclusion
of the service I stepped forward to view the coffin, and the piece
of inanimate clay it contained. The coffin being open, I beheld a
female figure laid out in the usual manner, with her face uncovered,
and decorated in a rich muslin dress. The countenance, though then in
ruins, exhibited marks of beauty. The junior priests having removed the
corpse to a grave dug for its reception in the body of the church, the
bottom of the coffin was withdrawn, when the body descended into its
place of repose, in a manner the most revolting I ever witnessed. But
distressing to the feelings as was this disgusting mode of depositing
the body of a fellow-creature in the silent tomb, the subsequent
operations of the sexton was ten times more so. The latter, after
sprinkling a little mould over the body, instantly began to pound it
with a log of wood, resembling a paviour's mallet, and continued to do
so, after every additional layer of earth, till the whole of the latter
had been so far replaced in its original position, as to permit the
flag which surmounted the grave to be laid on a level with those around
it. During the latter part of the ceremony I remained close to the
grave, gazing in silent astonishment at the scene before me. At length,
however, I was roused from my reverie, by a most offensive effluvia
proceeding from the depository of the deceased. I did not, however, for
some time, desert the post which I had assigned to myself; but being at
length completely overcome, I made the best of my way towards the door,
lest the exertions of the grave-digger might impose on his superiors
the disagreeable duty of bearing me to my lodgings.
There being no places of public amusement in Portalegre, time, long
before the end of February, had become such a drug on our hands, that
the collective wisdom of the garrison was frequently reduced to its
last shift to devise a rational mode of employing it. Our walks being
few, and miserably bad, and having no books "save the devil's," by
scanning the pages of which we could hope to spend a few hours each day
with pleasure and advantage, not a few of the idlers paid more visits
to a place denominated _hell_, than were at all profitable either for
their purses or their morals. When officers are once induced to give
up their time to play, and employ all the powers of their mind to
gratify the low, grovelling ambition of acquiring wealth at the expense
of those whom they consider their friends and brothers;--when the
love of play leads officers to prefer the amusements of the card and
billiard-tables, and the rattling of dice, to the faithful discharge of
their public and private duties; when they become so wedded to their
favourite pursuits, as to consider it a punishment to eat, drink, and
sleep, they must be held as totally useless to the service,--to be
worthless members of society,--the slaves of vice,--and of that low
cunning and chicanery which borders upon villany.
Accursed game! thy blight is every-where,
Thy lawless fingers pilfer every purse;
The smart mechanic, and the pamper'd peer,
Endure alike the pressure of thy curse.
When hopeless ruin hath dissolv'd thy snare,
The _pistol_ or the _bowl_ are things of course;
And few can from thy gripping fangs depart
Without a _blighted name_ or _broken heart_.