At Berlin the opinion that Russia was unable to face a European war
prevailed not only in the official world and in society, but among
all the manufacturers who specialized in the construction of armaments.
M. Krupp, the best qualified among them to express an opinion, announced
on the 28th July, at a table next mine at the Hotel Bristol, that the
Russian artillery was neither good nor complete, while that of the German
army had never been of such superior quality. It would be folly on the
part of Russia, the great maker of guns concluded, to dare to make war
on Germany and Austria in these conditions.[4]
But while the attitude of the German Foreign Office and (as I am inclined
to suppose) of the Kaiser may have been that which I have just suggested,
there were other and more important factors to be considered. It appears
almost certain that at some point in the crisis the control of the
situation was taken out of the hands of the civilians by the military.
The position of the military is not difficult to understand. They believed,
as professional soldiers usually do, in the "inevitability" of war, and
they had, of course, a professional interest in making war. Their attitude
may be illustrated from a statement attributed by M. Bourdon to Prince
Lichnowsky in 1912[5]: "The soldiers think about war. It is their business
and their duty. They tell us that the German army, is in good order, that
the Russian army has not completed its organization, that it would be a
good moment ... but for twenty years they have been saying the same thing,"
The passage is significant. It shows us exactly what it is we have to dread
in "militarism." The danger in a military State is always that when a
crisis comes the soldiers will get control, as they seem to have done on
this occasion. From their point of view there was good reason. They knew
that France and Russia, on a common understanding, were making enormous
military preparations; they knew that these preparations would mature by
the beginning of 1917; they knew that Germany would fight then at a less
advantage; they believed she would then have to fight, and they said,
"Better fight now." The following dispatch of Baron Beyens, dated July
26th, may probably be taken as fairly representing their attitude:--
To justify these conclusions I must remind you of the opinion which
prevails in the German General Staff, that war with France and Russia is
unavoidable and near, an _opinion which the Emperor has been induced to
share_. Such a war, ardently desired by the military and Pangerman party,
might be undertaken to-day, as this party think, in circumstances which
are extremely favourable to Germany, and which probably will not again
present themselves for some time. Germany has finished the strengthening
of her army which was decreed by the law of 1912, and, on the other hand,
she feels that she cannot carry on indefinitely a race in armaments
with Russia and France which would end by her ruin. The Wehrbeitrag
has been a disappointment for the Imperial Government, to whom it has
demonstrated the limits of the national wealth. Russia has made the
mistake of making a display of her strength before having finished her
military reorganization. That strength will not be formidable for several
years: at the present moment it lacks the railway lines necessary for its
deployment. As to France, M. Charles Humbert has revealed her deficiency
in guns of large calibre, but apparently it is this arm that will decide
the fate of battles. For the rest, England, which during the last two
years Germany has been trying, not without some success, to detach from
France and Russia, is paralysed by internal dissensions and her Irish
quarrels.[6]
It will be noticed that Baron Beyens supposes the Kaiser to have been in
the hands of the soldiers as early as July 26th. On the other hand, as
late as August 5th Beyens believed that the German Foreign Office had
been working throughout for peace. Describing an interview he had had
on that day with Herr Zimmermann, he writes:--
From this interview I brought away the impression that Herr Zimmermann
spoke to me with his customary sincerity, and that the Department for
Foreign Affairs since the opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict had been
on the side of a peaceful solution, and that it was not due to it that
its views and counsels had not prevailed... A superior power intervened
to precipitate the march of events. It was the ultimatum from Germany to
Russia, sent to St. Petersburg at the very moment when the Vienna Cabinet
was showing itself more disposed to conciliation, which let loose the
war.[7]
Why was that ultimatum sent? According to the German apologists, it
was sent because Russia had mobilized on the German frontier at the
critical moment, and so made war inevitable. There is, indeed, no doubt
that the tension was enormously increased throughout the critical days by
mobilization and rumours of mobilization. The danger was clearly pointed
out as early as July 26th in a dispatch of the Austrian Ambassador at
Petrograd to his Government:--
As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilization of Russian
troops, Count Pourtalès [German Ambassador at Petrograd] has called the
Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner to the fact that
nowadays measures of mobilization would be a highly dangerous form of
diplomatic pressure. For in that event the purely military consideration
of the question by the General Staffs would find expression, and if that
button were once touched in Germany the situation would get out of
control.[8]
On the other hand, it must be remembered that in 1909 Austria had mobilized
against Serbia and Montenegro,[9] and in 1912-13 Russia and Austria had
mobilized against one another without war ensuing in either case. Moreover,
in view of the slowness of Russian mobilization, it is difficult to believe
that a day or two would make the difference between security and ruin to
Germany. However, it is possible that the Kaiser was so advised by his
soldiers, and genuinely believed the country to be in danger. We do not
definitely know. What we do know is, that it was the German ultimatum that
precipitated the war.
We are informed, however, by Baron Beyens that even at the last moment the
German Foreign Office made one more effort for peace:--
As no reply had been received from St. Petersburg by noon the next day
[after the dispatch of the German ultimatum], MM. de Jagow and Zimmermann
(I have it from the latter) hurried to the Chancellor and the Kaiser to
prevent the issue of the order for general mobilization, and to persuade
his Majesty to wait till the following day. It was the last effort of
their dying pacifism, or the last awakening of their conscience. Their
efforts were broken against the irreducible obstinacy of the Minister of
War and the army chiefs, who represented to the Kaiser the disastrous
consequences of a delay of twenty-four hours.[10]
[Footnote 1: French Yellow Book, No. 6. In "L'Allemagne avant la guerre"
(p. 24) Baron Beyens states that this conversation was held at Potsdam on
November 5th or 6th; the Kaiser said that war between Germany and France
was "inevitable and near." Baron Beyens, presumably, is the authority from
whom M. Cambon derives his information.]
[Footnote 2: Above, p. 25.]
[Footnote 3: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 273.]
[Footnote 4: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 280 seq.]
[Footnote 5: See "L'Enigme Allemande," p. 96.]
[Footnote 6: Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 8.]
[Footnote 7: Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 52.]
[Footnote 8: Austrian Red Book, No. 28.]
[Footnote 9: See Chapter 14.]
[Footnote 10: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 301.]