We have reached, then, the year 1913, and the end of the Balkan wars,
without discovering in German policy any clear signs of a determination
to produce a European war. We have found all the Powers, Germany included,
contending for territory and trade at the risk of the peace of Europe; we
have found Germany successfully developing her interests in Turkey; we have
found England annexing the South African republics, France Morocco, Italy
Tripoli; we have found all the Powers stealing in China, and in all these
transactions we have found them continually on the point of being at one
another's throats. Nevertheless, some last instinct of self-preservation
has enabled them, so far, to pull up in time. The crises had been overcome
without a war. Yet they had, of course, produced their effects. Some
statesmen probably, like Sir Edward Grey, had had their passion for
peace confirmed by the dangers encountered. In others, no doubt, an
opposite effect had been produced, and very likely by 1913 there were
prominent men in Europe convinced that war must come, and manoeuvring
only that it should come at the time and occasion most favourable to
their country. That, according to M. Cambon, was now the attitude of
the German Emperor. M. Cambon bases this view on an alleged conversation
between the Kaiser and the King of the Belgians.[1] The conversation has
been denied by the German official organ, but that, of course, is no
proof that it did not take place, and there is nothing improbable in
what M. Cambon narrates.
The conversation is supposed to have occurred in November 1913, at a
time when, as we have seen,[2] there was a distinct outburst in France
of anti-German chauvinism, and when the arming and counter-arming of that
year had exasperated opinion to an extreme degree. The Kaiser is reported
to have said that war between Germany and France was inevitable. If he did,
it is clear from the context that he said it in the belief that French
chauvinism would produce war. For the King of the Belgians, in replying,
is stated to have said that it was "a travesty, of the French Government
to interpret it in that sense, and to let oneself be misled as to the
sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible
spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators." It should be observed
also that this supposed attitude on the part of the Kaiser is noted as a
change, and that he is credited with having previously stood for peace
against the designs of the German Jingoes. His personal influence, says
the dispatch, "had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of
peace." The fact of a change of mind in the Kaiser is accepted also by
Baron Beyens.
Whatever may be the truth in this matter, neither the German nor the French
nor our own Government can then have abandoned the effort at peaceable
settlement. For, in fact, by the summer of 1914, agreements had been made
between the Great Powers which settled for the time being the questions
immediately outstanding. It is understood that a new partition of African
territory had been arranged to meet the claims and interests of Germany,
France, and England alike. The question of the Bagdad railway had been
settled, and everything seemed to favour the maintenance of peace, when,
suddenly, the murder of the Archduke sprang upon a dismayed Europe the
crisis that was at last to prove fatal. The events that followed, so far
as they can be ascertained from published documents, have been so fully
discussed that it would be superfluous for me to go over the ground again
in all its detail. But I will indicate briefly what appear to me to be the
main points of importance in fixing the responsibility for what occurred.
First, the German view, that England is responsible for the war because she
did not prevent Russia from entering upon it, I regard as childish, if it
is not simply sophistical. The German Powers deliberately take an action
which the whole past history of Europe shows must almost certainly lead to
a European war, and they then turn round upon Sir Edward Grey and put the
blame on him because he did not succeed in preventing the consequences of
their own action. "He might have kept Russia out." Who knows whether he
might? What we do know is that it was Austria and Germany who brought her
in. The German view is really only intelligible upon the assumption that
Germany has a right to do what she pleases and that the Powers that stand
in her way are by definition peacebreakers. It is this extraordinary
attitude that has been one of the factors for making war in Europe.
Secondly, I am not, and have not been, one of the critics of Sir Edward
Grey. It is, indeed, possible, as it is always possible after the event, to
suggest that some other course might have been more successful in avoiding
war. But that is conjecture, I, at any rate, am convinced, as I believe
every one outside Germany is convinced, that Sir Edward Grey throughout the
negotiations had one object only--to avoid, if he could, the catastrophe of
war.
Thirdly, the part of Austria-Hungary is perfectly clear. She was determined
now, as in 1913, to have out her quarrel with Serbia, at the risk of a
European war. Her guilt is clear and definite, and it is only the fact that
we are not directly fighting her with British troops that has prevented
British opinion from fastening upon it as the main occasion of the war.
But this time, quite clearly, Austria was backed by Germany. Why this
change in German policy? So far as the Kaiser himself is concerned,
there can be little doubt that a main cause was the horror he felt
at the assassination of the Archduke. The absurd system of autocracy
gives to the emotional reactions of an individual a preposterous weight
in determining world-policy; and the almost insane feeling of the Kaiser
about the sanctity of crowned heads was no doubt a main reason why Germany
backed Austria in sending her ultimatum to Serbia. According to Baron
Beyens, on hearing the news of the murder of the Archduke the Kaiser
changed colour, and exclaimed: "All the effort of my life for twenty-five
years must be begun over again!"[3] A tragic cry which indicates, what I
personally believe to be the case, that it has been the constant effort of
the Kaiser to keep the peace in Europe, and that he foresaw now that he
would no longer be able to resist war.
So far, however, it would only be the war between Austria and Serbia
that the Kaiser would be prepared to sanction. He might hope to avoid
the European war. And, in fact, there is good reason to suppose that
both he and the German Foreign Office did cherish that hope or delusion.
They had bluffed Russia off in 1908. They had the dangerous idea that
they might bluff her off again. In this connection Baron Beyens records
a conversation with his colleague, M. Bollati, the Italian Ambassador
at Berlin, in which the latter took the view that
at Vienna as at Berlin they were persuaded that Russia, in spite of
the official assurances exchanged quite recently between the Tsar and
M. Poincaré, as to the complete preparations of the armies of the two
allies, was not in a position to sustain a European war and would not
dare to plunge into so perilous an adventure.