Let us turn now to the other storm-centre, Morocco. The salient features
here were, first, the treaty of 1880, to which all the Great Powers,
including, of course, Germany, were parties, and which guaranteed to
the signatories most-favoured-nation treatment; secondly, the interest of
Great Britain to prevent a strong Power from establishing itself opposite
Gibraltar and threatening British control over the Straits; thirdly, the
interest of France to annex Morocco and knit it up with the North African
Empire; fourthly, the new colonial and trading interests of Germany, which,
as she had formally announced, could not leave her indifferent to any new
dispositions of influence or territory in undeveloped countries. For many
years French ambitions in Morocco had been held in check by the British
desire to maintain the _status quo_. But the Anglo-French Entente of 1904
gave France a free hand there in return for the abandonment of French
opposition to the British position in Egypt. The Anglo-French treaty of
1904 affirmed, in the clauses made public, the independence and integrity
of Morocco; but there were secret clauses looking to its partition. By
these the British interest in the Straits was guaranteed by an arrangement
which gave to Spain the reversion of the coast opposite Gibraltar and a
strip on the north-west coast, while leaving the rest of the country to
fall to France. Germany was not consulted while these arrangements were
being made, and the secret clauses of the treaty were, of course, not
communicated to her. But it seems reasonable to suppose that they became
known to, or at least were suspected by, the German Government shortly
after they were adopted.[1] And probably it was this that led to the
dramatic intervention of the Kaiser at Tangier,[2] when he announced
that the independence of Morocco was under German protection. The result
was the Conference of Algeciras, at which the independence and integrity of
Morocco was once more affirmed (the clauses looking to its partition being
still kept secret by the three Powers privy to them), and equal commercial
facilities were guaranteed to all the Powers. Germany thereby obtained what
she most wanted, what she had a right to by the treaty of 1880, and what
otherwise might have been threatened by French occupation--the maintenance
of the open door. But the French enterprise was not abandoned. Disputes
with the natives such as always occur, or are manufactured, in these cases,
led to fresh military intervention. At the same time, it was difficult to
secure the practical application of the principle of equal commercial
opportunity. An agreement of 1909 between France and Germany, whereby
both Powers were to share equally in contracts for public works, was
found in practice not to work. The Germans pressed for its application
to the new railways projected in Morocco. The French delayed, temporized,
and postponed decision.[3] Meantime they were strengthening their position
in Morocco. The matter was brought to a head by the expedition to Fez.
Initiated on the plea of danger to the European residents at the capital
(a plea which was disputed by the Germans and by many Frenchmen), it
clearly heralded a definite final occupation of the country. The patience
of the Germans was exhausted, and the Kaiser made the coup of Agadir.
There followed the Mansion House speech of Mr. Lloyd George and the
Franco-German agreement of November 1911, whereby Germany recognized a
French protectorate in Morocco in return for concessions of territory
in the French Congo. These are the bare facts of the Moroccan episode.
Much, of course, is still unrevealed, particularly as to the motives and
intentions of the Powers concerned. Did Germany, for instance, intend to
seize a share of Morocco when she sent the _Panther_ to Agadir? And was
that the reason of the vigour of the British intervention? Possibly, but
by no means certainly; the evidence accessible is conflicting. If Germany
had that intention, she was frustrated by the solidarity shown between
France and England, and the result was the final and definite absorption
of Morocco in the French Empire, with the approval and active support of
Great Britain, Germany being compensated by the cession of part of the
French Congo. Once more a difficult question had been settled by diplomacy,
but only after it had twice brought Europe to the verge of war, and in such
a way as to leave behind the bitterest feelings of anger and mistrust in
all the parties concerned.
The facts thus briefly summarized here may be studied more at length,
with the relevant documents, in Mr. Morel's book "Morocco in Diplomacy."
The reader will form his own opinion on the part played by the various
Powers. But I do not believe that any instructed and impartial student
will accept what appears to be the current English view, that the action
of Germany in this episode was a piece of sheer aggression without excuse,
and that the other Powers were acting throughout justly, honestly, and
straightforwardly.
The Morocco crisis, as we have already seen, produced in Germany a painful
impression, and strengthened there the elements making for war. Thus Baron
Beyens writes:--
The Moroccan conflicts made many Germans hitherto pacific regard another
war as a necessary evil.[4]