I turn now to the Balkan question. This is too ancient and too complicated
to be even summarized here. But we must remind ourselves of the main
situation. Primarily, the Balkan question is, or rather was, one between
subject Christian populations and the Turks. But it has been complicated,
not only by the quarrels of the subject populations among themselves, but
by the rival ambitions and claims of Russia and Austria. The interest of
Russia in the Balkans is partly one of racial sympathy, partly one of
territorial ambition, for the road to Constantinople lies through Rumania
and Bulgaria. It is this territorial ambition of Russia that has given
occasion in the past to the intervention of the Western Powers, for until
recently it was a fixed principle, both of French and British policy, to
keep Russia out of the Mediterranean. Hence the Crimean War, and hence
the disastrous intervention of Disraeli after the treaty of San Stefano
in 1878--an intervention which perpetuated for years the Balkan hell.
The interest of Austria in the peninsula depends primarily on the fact
that the Austrian Empire contains a large Slav population desiring its
independence, and that this national ambition of the Austrian Slavs finds
in the independent kingdom of Serbia its natural centre of attraction. The
determination of Austria to retain her Slavs as unwilling citizens of her
Empire brings her also into conflict with Russia, so far as Russia is the
protector of the Slavs. The situation, and the danger with which it is
pregnant, may be realized by an Englishman if he will suppose St. George's
Channel and the Atlantic to be annihilated, and Ireland to touch, by a land
frontier, on the one side Great Britain, on the other the United States.
The friction and even the warfare which might have arisen between these two
great Powers from the plots of American Fenians may readily be imagined.
Something of that kind is the situation of Austria in relation to Serbia
and her protector, Russia. Further, Austria fears the occupation by any
Slav State of any port on the coast line of the Adriatic, and herself
desires a port on the Aegean. Add to this the recent German dream of the
route from Berlin to Bagdad, and the European importance of what would
otherwise be local disputes among the Balkan States becomes apparent.
During the period we are now considering the Balkan factor first came into
prominence with the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
1908. Those provinces, it will be remembered, were handed over to Austrian
protection at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Austria went in and policed
the country, much as England went in and policed Egypt, and, from the
material point of view, with similarly successful results. But, like
England in Egypt, Austria was not sovereign there. Formal sovereignty
still rested with the Turk. In 1909, during the Turkish revolution,
Austria took the opportunity to throw off that nominal suzerainty.
Russia protested, Austria mobilized against Serbia and Montenegro,
and war seemed imminent. But the dramatic intervention of Germany "in
shining armour" on the side of her ally resulted in a diplomatic victory
for the Central Powers. Austria gained her point, and war, for the moment,
was avoided. But such diplomatic victories are dangerous. Russia did not
forget, and the events of 1909 were an operative cause in the catastrophe
of 1914. In acting as she did in this matter Austria-Hungary defied the
public law of Europe, and Germany supported her in doing so.
The motives of Germany in taking this action are thus described, and
probably with truth, by Baron Beyens: "She could not allow the solidity
of the Triple Alliance to be shaken: she had a debt of gratitude to pay
to her ally, who had supported her at the Congress of Algeciras. Finally,
she believed herself to be the object of an attempt at encirclement by
France, England, and Russia, and was anxious to show that the gesture of
putting her hand to the sword was enough to dispel the illusions of her
adversaries."[1] These are the kind of reasons that all Powers consider
adequate where what they conceive to be their interests are involved. From
any higher, more international point of view, they are no reasons at all.
But in such a matter no Power is in a position to throw the first stone.
The whole episode is a classical example for the normal working of the
European anarchy. Austria-Hungary was primarily to blame, but Germany, who
supported her, must take her share. The other Powers of Europe acquiesced
for the sake of peace, and they could probably do no better. There will
never be any guarantee for the public law of Europe until there is a public
tribunal and a public force to see that its decisions are carried out.
The next events of importance in this region were the two Balkan wars.
We need not here go into the causes and results of these, except so far
as to note that, once more, the rivalry of Russia and Austria played a
disastrous part. It was the determination of Austria not to give Serbia
access to the Adriatic that led Serbia to retain territories assigned by
treaty to Bulgaria, and so precipitated the second Balkan war; for that war
was due to the indignation caused in Bulgaria by the breach of faith, and
is said to have been directly prompted by Austria. The bad part played by
Austria throughout this crisis is indisputable. But it must be observed
that, by general admission, Germany throughout worked hand in hand with
Sir Edward Grey to keep the peace of Europe, which, indeed, otherwise
could not have been kept. And nothing illustrates this better than that
episode of 1913 which is sometimes taken to throw discredit upon Germany.
The episode was thus described by the Italian minister, Giolitti: "On the
9th of August, 1913, about a year before the war broke out, I, being then
absent from Rome, received from my colleague, San Giuliano, the following
telegram: 'Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention to
act against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to apply
the _casus foederis_ of the Triple Alliance, which I consider inapplicable.
I intend to join forces with Germany to prevent any such action by Austria,
but it will be necessary to say clearly that we do not consider such
eventual action as defensive, and therefore do not believe that the
_casus foederis_ exists. Please telegraph to Rome if you approve.'
"I replied that, 'if Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is evident that
the _casus foederis_ does not arise. It is an action that she undertakes on
her own account, since there is no question of defence, as no one thinks
of attacking her. It is necessary to make a declaration in this sense to
Austria in the most formal way, and it is to be wished that German action
may dissuade Austria from her most perilous adventure.'"[2]
Now this statement shows upon the face of it two things. One, that Austria
was prepared, by attacking Serbia, to unchain a European war; the other,
that the Italian ministers joined with Germany to dissuade her. They were
successful. Austria abandoned her project, and war was avoided. The episode
is as discreditable as you like to Austria. But, on the face of it, how
does it discredit Germany? More, of course, may lie behind; but no evidence
has been produced, so far as I am aware, to show that the Austrian project
was approved or supported by her ally.
The Treaty of Bucharest, which concluded the second Balkan War, left
all the parties concerned dissatisfied. But, in particular, it left the
situation between Austria and Serbia and between Austria and Russia more
strained than ever. It was this situation that was the proximate cause of
the present war. For, as we have seen, a quarrel between Austria and Russia
over the Balkans must, given the system of alliances, unchain a European
war. For producing that situation Austria-Hungary was mainly responsible.
The part played by Germany was secondary, and throughout the Balkan wars
German diplomacy was certainly working, with England, for peace. "The
diplomacy of the Wilhelmstrasse," says Baron Beyens, "applied itself,
above all, to calm the exasperation and the desire for intervention at
the Ballplatz." "The Cabinet of Berlin did not follow that of Vienna in
its tortuous policy of intrigues at Sofia and Bucharest. As M. Zimmermann
said to me at the time, the Imperial Government contented itself with
maintaining its neutrality in relation to the Balkans, abstaining from
any intervention, beyond advice, in the fury of their quarrels. There is
no reason to doubt the sincerity of this statement."[3]
[Footnote 1: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 240.]
[Footnote 2: It is characteristic of the way history is written in time of
war that M. Yves Guyot, citing Giolitti's statement, omits the references
to Germany. _See_ "Les causes et les consequences de la guerre," p. 101.]
[Footnote 3: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," pp. 248, 262.]