After the Gods, it is necessary in the next place to consider the order
of divine souls, who are deified by always participating of the Gods.
This order, Plato in the Parmenides denies of _the one_ as follows:
“Does it appear that _the one_ can be either older or younger, or be
of the same age? What should hinder? If it had in any respect the same
age, either with itself, or with another, it would participate equally
of time and similitude, which we have nevertheless asserted _the one_
does not participate. We have asserted so. And this also we have said,
that it neither participates of dissimilitude nor inequality. Entirely
so. How therefore being such, can it either be older or younger than
any thing, or possess the same age with any thing? It can in no
respect. _The one_ therefore, will neither be younger nor older, nor
will it be of the same age, either with itself or with another. It
does not appear that it will. Will it not therefore, be impossible
that _the one_ should be at all in time, if it be such? Or, is it not
necessary that, if any thing is in time, it should always become older
than itself? It is necessary. But is not that which is older, always
older than the younger? What then? Hence that which is becoming to be
older than itself, is at the same time becoming to be younger than
itself, if it is about to have that through which it may become older.
How do you say? Thus: It is requisite that nothing should subsist
in _becoming_ to be different from another, when it _is_ already
different, but that it should _be_ now different from that which _is_
different, _have been_ from that which _was_, and _will be_ from that
which _is to be hereafter_. But from that which is _becoming to be_
different, it ought neither to _have been_, nor to _be hereafter_,
nor _to be_, but to subsist in _becoming to be_ different, and no
otherwise. It is necessary. But the older differs from the younger,
and no other. Certainly. Hence, that which is _becoming to be_ older
than itself, must necessarily at the same time subsist in _becoming
to be_ younger than itself. It seems so. But likewise it ought not to
subsist in _becoming to be_ in a longer time than itself, nor yet in a
shorter; but in a time equal to itself it should subsist in _becoming
to be_, should _be_, _have been_, and _be hereafter_. For these are
necessary. It is necessary, therefore, as it appears, that such things
as are in time, and participate an affection of this kind, should each
one possess the same age with itself, and should subsist in becoming
to be both older and younger than itself. It seems so. But no one of
these passions belongs to _the one_. None. Neither, therefore, is time
present with it, nor does it subsist in any time. It does not indeed
according to the decisions of reason.”
Plato having proceeded, says Proclus, as far as to the mundane Gods,
always taking away things in a consequent order from _the one_, through
the middle genera, or, to speak more clearly, the negations always
producing things secondary, through such as are proximate to _the one_,
from the exempt cause of wholes, he is now about to separate from
_the one_ the divine essence itself, which first participates of the
Gods, and receives their progression into the world; or, to speak more
accurately, he is now about to produce this essence from the ineffable
fountain of all beings. For, as every thing which has being derives its
subsistence from the monad of beings, both _true being_, and that which
is assimilated to it, which of itself indeed is not, but through its
communion with true being receives an obscure representation of being;
in like manner from the one unity of every deity, the peculiarity of
which, if it be lawful so to speak, is to deify all things according
to a certain exempt and ineffable transcendency, every divine number
subsists, or rather proceeds, and every deified order of things. The
design, therefore, as we have before observed, of what is now said,
is to show that _the one_ is exempt from, and therefore produces this
essence.
And here we may see how Parmenides subverts their hypothesis who
contend that the first cause is soul, or any thing else of this kind,
and this by showing that _the one_ does not participate of time. For
it is impossible that a nature which is exempt from time should be
soul; since every soul participates of time, and uses periods which
are measured by time. _The one_ also is better than, and is beyond
intellect, because every intellect is both moved and permanent;
but it is demonstrated that _the one_ neither stands still, nor is
moved. Hence through these things, the three hypostases which rank
as principles, viz. _the one_, _intellect_, and _soul_, become known
to us. But that _the one_ is perfectly exempt from time, Parmenides
demonstrates by showing in the first place, that it is neither older
nor younger, nor of the same age with itself, nor with any other. For
every thing which participates of time necessarily participates of
these; so that by showing that _the one_ is exempt from these which
happen to every thing that participates of time, he also shows that
_the one_ has no connexion with time. This, however, is incredible to
the many, and appeared so to the physiologists prior to Plato, who
thought that all things were comprehended in time, and that, if there
is any thing perpetual, it is infinite time, but that there is not any
thing which time does not measure. For, as they were of opinion that
all things are in place, in consequence of thinking that all things
are bodies, and that nothing is incorporeal, so they thought that
all things subsist in time, and are in motion, and that nothing is
immoveable; for the conception of bodies introduces with itself place,
but motion time. As, therefore, it was demonstrated that _the one_ is
not in place, because it is not in another, and on this account is
incorporeal,--in like manner through these arguments it is also shown
that neither is it in time, and on this account that it is not soul,
nor any thing else which requires and participates of time, either
according to essence or according to energy.
And here it is well worthy our observation that Parmenides no longer
stops at the dyad as in the former conclusions, but triadically
enumerates the peculiarities of this order, viz. _the older_, _the
younger_, and _the possession of the same age_, though he might have
said dyadically, _of an equal age_, and _of an unequal age_, as there
_the equal_ and _the unequal_. But there indeed having previously
introduced the dyad, he passes from the division of the unequal to the
triadic distribution; but here he begins from the triad. For there
union precedes multitude, and the whole the parts; but in this order of
things multitude is most apparent, and a division into parts, as Timæus
says, whom Parmenides, in what is now said imitating, begins indeed
from the triad, but proceeds as far as to the hexad. For, _the older_
and _the younger_, and _the possession of the same age_, are doubled,
being divided into _itself_ and _relation to another_. That the triad,
indeed, and the hexad are adapted to this order is not immanifest.
For the triple nature of soul, consisting of _essence_, _same_ and
_different_, and its triple power, which receives its completion from
the charioteer and the two horses, as we learn from the Phædrus,[180]
evince its alliance with the triad; and its essence being combined from
both these shows its natural alliance with the hexad.
It is likewise necessary to observe, that as the discourse is about
divine souls who are deified by always participating of the Gods, Time
according to its first subsistence pertains to these souls,--not that
which proceeds into the apparent, but that which is liberated, and
without habitude; and this is the Time which is now denied of _the
one_. All the periods of souls, their harmonious motions about the
intelligible, and their circulations, are measured by this Time. For
it has a supernal origin, imitates eternity, and connects, evolves,
and perfects every motion, whether vital, or pertaining to soul, or
in whatever other manner it may be said to subsist. This Time also is
indeed essentially an intellect, as we have before observed; but it is
the cause to divine souls, of their harmonic and infinite motion about
the intelligible, through which these likewise are led to _the older_
and to _the same age_: and this in a twofold respect. For _the older_
in these _with respect to themselves_ takes place, so far as with their
more excellent powers they enjoy in a greater degree the infinity of
Time, and participate it more abundantly. For they are not filled with
similar perfection from more divine natures, according to all their
powers, but with some more, and with others less. But that is said to
be older which participates more of time. That which is older in these
divine souls _with respect to other things_ is effected, so far as
some of these receive the whole measure of Time, and the whole of its
extension proceeding to souls, but others are measured by more partial
periods. Those therefore are older, whose period is more total, and is
extended to a longer time. They may also be said to be _older and at
the same time younger with respect to themselves_, by becoming _hoary_
as it were above, through extending themselves to the whole power of
Time, but juvenile _beneath_, by enjoying Time more partially. But, _as
with respect to others_, they may be said to be _older and at the same
time younger_ according to a diminution of energy. For that which has
its circulation measured by a less period is younger than that whose
circulation is measured by a more extended period.
Again, among things co-ordinate, that which has the same participation
and the same measure of perfection with others may be said to be of
_the same age with itself and others_. But every divine soul, though
its own period is measured according to one Time, and that of the body
which is suspended from it according to another, yet it has an equal
restitution to the same condition; itself always according to its own
Time, and its body also according to its time. Hence, again, it is of
the same age with itself and its body, according to the analogous. By
thus interpreting what is now said of _the one_, we shall accord with
Plato in the Timæus, who there evinces that Time is the measure of
every transitive life, and who says that soul is the origin of a divine
and wise life through the whole of time. And we shall also accord with
his assertion in the Phædrus, that souls see true being through Time,
because they perceive temporally and not eternally.
Farther still, Plato here demonstrates that _the one_ is neither older
nor younger than itself, or another. For it was necessary to show
that _the one_ is beyond every divine soul, prior to other souls, in
the same manner as it is demonstrated to be prior to true beings, and
to be the cause of all things. Hence, since it is the cause of every
divine soul, so far as these derive their subsistence as well as all
beings from the divine unities, with great propriety is it necessary
to show that _the one_ is beyond the order of deified souls. For these
souls so far as they are intellectual have intellect for their cause;
so far as they are essences they originate from being; and so far as
they have the form of unity, they are derived from _the one_; receiving
their subsistence from this, so far as each is a multitude consisting
of certain unities, and of these as elements.
Again, that which participates of time is twofold, the one proceeding,
as it were, in a right line, and beginning from one thing, and ending
in another; but the other proceeding circularly, and having its motion
from the same to the same, to which both the beginning and the end
are the same, and the motion is unceasing, every thing in it being
both beginning and end. That, therefore, which energizes circularly,
participates of time periodically: and so far as it departs from the
beginning it becomes older, but so far as it approaches to the end it
becomes younger. For becoming nearer the end, it becomes nearer to
its proper beginning. But that which becomes nearer to its beginning
becomes younger. Hence, that which circularly approaches to the end
becomes younger, the same also according to the same becoming older;
for that which approximates to its end proceeds to that which is
older. That to which the beginning therefore is one thing, and the end
another, to this the younger is different from the older; but that to
which the beginning and the end are the same, is in no respect older
than younger, but as Plato says, at the same time becomes younger and
older than itself. Every thing, therefore, which participates of time,
if it becomes both older and younger than itself, is circularly moved.
But divine souls are of this kind: for they participate of time, and
the time of their proper motion is periodical.