In the next place, let us direct our attention to Plato’s theological
conceptions of Nature, Fate, and Fortune. From the Timæus, therefore,
it appears that Plato does not consider either matter, or material
form, or body, or natural powers, as worthy to be called Nature, though
it has been thus denominated by others. Nor does he think proper
to call Nature soul; but establishing its essence between soul and
corporeal powers, he considers it as inferior to the former through
its being divided about bodies, and its incapacity of conversion to
itself, but as surpassing the latter through containing the productive
principles, and generating and vivifying every part of the visible
world. For Nature verges towards bodies, and is inseparable from their
fluctuating empire. But soul is separate from body, is established in
herself, and subsists both from herself and another; from another, that
is, from intellect through participation; and from herself, on account
of not verging to body, but abiding in her own essence, and at the
same time illuminating the obscure nature of matter with a secondary
life. Nature, therefore, is the last of the causes which fabricate this
corporeal and sensible world; bounds the progressions of incorporeal
essences; and is full of reasons and powers through which she governs
mundane affairs. And she is a Goddess indeed considered as deified,
and not according to the primary signification of the word; for divine
bodies also are called Gods, as being the statues or images of the
Gods. But she governs the whole world by her powers; by her summit
comprehending the heavens; but through heaven governing generation. And
she every where weaves partial natures in amicable conjunction with
wholes.
Nature, however, thus subsisting, she proceeds from the vivific Goddess
Rhea; (for “immense Nature, says the Chaldean oracle, is suspended from
the shoulders of the Goddess;”) from whom all life is derived, both
that which is intellectual, and that which is inseparable from the
subjects of its government. But Nature being from thence suspended,
she pervades through and inspires all things without impediment.
Hence, the most inanimate beings participate of a certain soul, and
corruptible natures remain perpetually in the world, being connected
and comprehended by the causes of forms which she contains. And those
indeed who call Nature demiurgic art, if they mean by this the Nature
which abides in the demiurgus himself, they do not speak rightly;
but if they mean that which proceeds from him, their conception
is accurate. For art must be considered as having a three-fold
subsistence; one, that which does not proceed out of the artist; the
second, that which proceeds indeed, but is converted to him; and
the third, that which has now proceeded, and has its subsistence in
something else. The art, therefore, which is in the demiurgus, abides
indeed in him; but the intellectual soul is art, yet at the same time
both abiding and proceeding. And Nature is art, alone proceeding into
something different from herself. Hence, she is said to be the organ of
the Gods, not deprived of life, nor alter-motive alone, but having in a
certain respect, a self-motive power, in consequence of energizing from
herself. For the organs of the Gods are essentialized in efficacious
powers, are vital, and concur with their energies. And thus much
concerning Nature according to the conceptions of Plato, as unfolded by
Proclus.
In the next place with respect to Fate, in the fable in the Politicus,
Plato says, that “Fate and connate desire convolve the world, when it
is considered by itself as a corporeal nature, without the intellectual
Gods.” And in the Timæus he represents the demiurgus exhibiting to
souls the nature of the universe, and announcing to them the laws of
Fate. On which Proclus admirably comments as follows: It must not be
said, that Fate is a partial nature, as some of the Peripatetics assert
it is; as for instance, Alexander; for such a nature is imbecil and not
perpetual. For from common conceptions, we pre-assume that the power of
Fate is something very great and stable. Nor must it be said, that it
is the order of the mundane periods, as Aristotle asserts it to be, who
denominates the increase which is contrary to order _preterfatal_,
as if order and Fate were the same. For the cause of order is one
thing, but order itself is another. Nor is it soul subsisting in
habitude, as Theodorus says; for such a form of life in wholes is not
a principle. Nor is it simply Nature, as Porphyry says it is. For many
things which are supernatural, and out of the dominion of Nature are
produced by Fate, such as nobility, renown, and wealth. For where is
it seen that physical motions become the cause of these? Nor is it the
intellect of the universe, as again Aristotle says in a certain place,
if the treatise On the World was written by him. For intellect produces
every thing which it produces at once, and is not at all in want of
an administration which proceeds according to a certain period, and a
continued and well-ordered series of things. But the chain, the order,
the periodic production of many causes constitute the peculiarity of
Fate.
If, however, it be requisite to comprehend the whole form of it
concisely, we must say, that the subject matter as it were of it is
Nature herself, but considered as deified, and filled with divine,
intellectual, and psychical illuminations. For the order of Gods called
the presidents of destiny, (των μοιρηγετων καλουμενων) and the genera
that are more excellent than man terminate in Nature. For these impart
powers from themselves to the one life of Nature; and the demiurgus of
wholes collects and unites all these gifts, and demonstrates them to
be one power. For if visible bodies [i.e. the celestial bodies], are
filled with divine[171] powers, Nature, is by a much greater priority
divine. And if the whole visible world is one, much more is the whole
essence of Fate one, and derives from many causes the completion of
its composition. For being suspended from the providence of the Gods,
and from demiurgic goodness, it is united and governed by it, being
a productive principle subsisting from productive principles, one
multiform power, a divine life, and an order of things that have a
prior arrangement. Hence, the ancients looking to this its various
and multiform nature, were led to form different opinions concerning
it. And some indeed said that it is a Goddess, on account of that
which is divine in it; others, that it is a dæmon, on account of the
efficacious and at the same time multiform nature of its production;
others, that it is intellect, because a certain participation of
intellect reaches it; but others, that it is order, so that every
thing which has an arrangement is invisibly comprehended by it. Plato,
however, alone surveyed the essence of it, asserting indeed that it
is Nature, but Nature suspended from the demiurgus. For how could the
demiurgus exhibit Nature to souls, otherwise than by containing the
principle of it in himself? And how could he announce to them the laws
of Fate, after exhibiting to them the Nature of the universe, except by
constituting Nature as the one power that comprehends these laws?
Farther still, in the Politicus, Plato more clearly suspends the second
life of the universe from Fate, after the departure of the one dæmon
that governed it, and the many dæmons that were the followers of that
one. Hence, he separates all the providential care of these powers
from the universe, and alone leaves it the government according to
Fate; the world, indeed, always possessing both these, but the fable
separating the first from the second. For he says, “that Fate and
connate desire convolve the world,” just as the Chaldæan oracles say,
“that unwearied Nature rules over the worlds and works, and draws
downward in order that the heavens may run an eternal course; and
that the other periods of the sun, the moon, the seasons, night and
day may be accomplished.” Thus, therefore, Plato also says, that the
second period of the world is convolved by Fate, and not the first and
intellectual period, all but clearly asserting that Fate is the power
which proximately moves the sensible world, and is suspended from
the invisible providence of the Gods. For establishing Necessity the
mother of the Fates prior to these, he represents her in the Republic
convolving[172] the world on her knees. And if it be requisite to give
my opinion, Plato arranges these three causes of order successive
to each other, viz. Adrastia, Necessity, and Fate; the first being
intellectual, the second supermundane, and the third mundane. For
the demiurgus as Orpheus says, was nourished indeed by Adrastia,
but associated with Necessity, and generated Fate. And as Adrastia
was comprehensive of divine institutions,[173] and the collector of
all-various laws, thus also Fate is comprehensive of all the mundane
laws, which the demiurgus now inscribes in souls, that he may lead
them in conjunction with wholes, and may define what is adapted to
them according to the different elections of lives. Hence, a vicious
life tends to that which is dark and atheistical, but a pious life
leads the soul to the heavens to which she is also conducted by wholes;
because each of these lives is full of the laws of Fate; and souls
lead themselves, as Plotinus says, thither where the law that is in
them announces. For this is the peculiarity of the providence of the
Gods, to conduct inwardly the subjects for which it provides. And
why is it wonderful that this should be the case, since Nature also
inserting material and corporeal-formed powers in bodies, moves them
through these powers; earth indeed through gravity, but fire through
levity. In a much greater degree, therefore, do the Gods move souls
through the powers which they disseminate in them. Hence, if they
lead souls according to the laws of Fate, these laws also subsist in
souls. And they pre-exist indeed intellectually in the demiurgus;
for the divine law is established with him. But they exist in divine
souls; for according to these laws they govern the universe. And they
are participated by partial souls; for through these they conduct
themselves to an appropriate place, themselves moving themselves.
And through deliberate choice, indeed, they act erroneously and with
rectitude; but through law they distribute to themselves an order
adapted to their former conduct.
in the last place with respect to Fortune, it is necessary to observe
that Plato does not assert as the Stoics do, that the worthy man has
no need of the assistance of this divinity; but he is of opinion that
the energies of our reasoning power, since according to their external
progression they are complicated with corporeal energies, require the
inspiration of good Fortune, in order that they may be prosperous and
benefit others. Hence in the Timæus and the Parmenides, the persons of
the dialogues are represented as meeting together through a certain
good Fortune. And in the Laws he says, that God, and after God,
Fortune and Time govern all human affairs. “Fortune, therefore,” says
Proclus,[174] “and her gifts, are not things destitute of design and
indefinite; but she is a power collective of many dispersed causes, and
which adorns things disordered, and gives completion to the allotments
assigned to every thing from the universe.” According to Sallust in his
elegant treatise On the Gods and the World, “Fortune must be considered
as a power of the Gods, disposing things differing from each other, and
happening contrary to expectation, to beneficent purposes.” He adds,
“On this account it is proper that cities should celebrate this Goddess
in common; since every city is composed of different particulars. But
this Goddess holds her dominion in sublunary concerns, since every
thing fortuitous is excluded from the regions above the moon.”
In conformity to this, Simplicius also, in his Commentary On the
Physics of Aristotle,[175] admirably observes concerning Fortune as
follows: “The power of Fortune particularly disposes in an orderly
manner the sublunary part of the universe, in which contingencies
subsist, and which being essentially disordered, Fortune, in
conjunction with other primary causes, directs, places in order, and
governs. Hence she is represented guiding a rudder, because she governs
things sailing on the sea of generation. Her rudder too is fixed on
a globe, because she directs that which is unstable in generation.
In her other hand, she holds the horn of Amalthea, which is full of
fruits, because she is the cause of obtaining all divine fruits. And
on this account, we venerate the fortunes of cities and houses, and
of each individual; because being very remote from divine union, we
are in danger of being deprived of its participation, and require in
order to obtain it the assistance of the Goddess Fortune, and of those
natures[176] superior to the human who possess the characteristic of
this divinity. Indeed, every fortune is good; for every attainment
respects something good, nor does any thing evil subsist from divinity.
But of things that are good, some are precedaneous, and others are of a
punishing or revenging characteristic, which we are accustomed to call
evils. Hence we speak of two Fortunes, one of which we denominate GOOD,
and which is the cause of our obtaining precedaneous goods, but the
other EVIL, which prepares us to receive punishment or revenge.” And
thus much concerning Fortune.