In the next place let us attend to the meaning of the following part
of the speech of the demiurgus to the mundane Gods, as beautifully
unfolded by Proclus: “Hence so far as you are generated, you are not
immortal, nor in every respect indissoluble, yet you shall never be
dissolved, nor become subject to the fatality of death; my will being
a much greater and more excellent bond than the vital connectives
with which you were bound at the commencement of your generation.”
Since all the mundane Gods to whom these words are addressed consist
of divine souls, and animals suspended from them, or in other words,
since they are participated souls, and since the demiurgus denominates
them indissoluble and at the same time dissoluble, in the way above
explained, he now wishes to collect in one point of view, and into one
truth, all that he had said separately about them. For at one and the
same time he takes away from them the immortal and the indissoluble,
and again confers these on them through a subversion of their
opposites. For media are allotted this nature, not receiving the nature
of the extremes, and appearing to comprehend the whole of both. Just
as if some one should call the soul impartible and at the same time
partible, as consisting of both, and neither impartible, nor partible,
as being different from the extremes. For see how a middle of this kind
may be surveyed in the mundane Gods.
That is principally and primarily called immortal, which supplies
itself with immortality; since that also is primarily being which
is being from itself; intellect which is intellect from itself; and
one which is from itself one. For every where that which primarily
possesses any thing is such from itself; since if it were not so
from itself but from another, that other would be primarily, either
intellect, or life, or _the one_, or something else; and either
this would be primarily so, or if there is nothing primarily, the
ascent will be to infinity. Thus therefore, that is truly immortal,
which is immortal from itself, and which imparts to itself immortality.
But that which is neither vital according to the whole of itself,
nor self-subsistent, nor possesses immortality from itself, is not
primarily immortal. Hence as that which is secondarily being is not
being, so that which is secondarily immortal is not immortal, yet it
is not mortal; for this is entirely a defection or departure from the
immortal, neither possessing a connascent life, nor infinite power. For
these three are in a successive order: That which possesses from itself
infinite life; that which receives infinite life from another; and that
which neither from itself nor another exhibits the infinity of life.
And the first indeed, is immortal; the second is not immortal; the
third is mortal; and the mean is adapted to the mundane Gods. For they
neither have the immortal from themselves, so far as they derive it
from that which is truly and primarily immortal, and so far as bodies
are suspended from them; nor have they a finite life; but they are
filled indeed from the eternal Gods, and produce mortal natures. For
the second fabrication is connected with the first, proceeds about it,
is governed by it, and refers to it the production of the mortal genera.
Again, with respect to the indissoluble, that which is principally and
primarily so is simple and free from all composition. For where there
is no composition what representation can there be of dissolution? But
that is secondarily indissoluble, which is indissoluble with a bond;
which is at the same time dissoluble in consequence of proceeding
from divided causes. For it is not simply dissoluble, but dissoluble
by its cause. For that which is bound prior to all time, is alone
bound according to cause; but that which is alone causally bound, is
alone causally dissolved. And the third from that which is properly
indissoluble, is that which was indissoluble for a certain time;
because the first indeed, is properly indissoluble in conjunction
with simplicity; but the second is subordinately so, together with
composition: and the third, falling off from both, is in its own nature
dissoluble.
Neither therefore, are the mundane Gods entirely indissoluble; for this
pertains to the most simple natures. Nor are they dissoluble according
to time; for the composition of them proceeds from the demiurgic
union. As therefore in the cause union precedes things of a simple
nature, after the same manner here also, a bond precedes dissolution;
for it is more excellent, and the resemblance of a more divine power.
And this is seen in souls; for there were bonds and media in them,
as has been before observed in the generation of the soul. It is
also seen in bodies; for analogy is a bond. And likewise in animals;
for being bound with animated bonds they became animals. Hence, the
immortal and the indissoluble, do not entirely pertain to the mundane
Gods; yet at the same time they do pertain to them. And because they
are not in every respect present with them nor in such a manner as
in intelligibles, immortality must be taken from them. For in the
Banquet also, Plato does not think fit to call Love immortal, yet he
does not denominate it mortal; but asserts it to be something between
both these. For there is a great extent of the mortal and immortal,
and they are bound together by many media. It appears likewise, with
respect to the immortal, that one kind of it is common to all the
beings that differ from a mortal nature,[82] and which consists in not
being deprived of the life which it possesses. According to this sense
of the word, Plato says that the demiurgus is the cause of immortal
natures, but the junior Gods, of such as are mortal. But another kind
of the immortal is the peculiarity of intelligibles, being eternally
so. And another belongs to the mundane Gods, which is an immortality
perpetually rising into existence, and having its subsistence in always
becoming to be. Hence, it may be said that the immortal and mortal are
oppositely divided without a medium, if the common signification of
the immortal is assumed; and that they are not opposed to each other
without a medium, if that which is primarily immortal is considered;
and this is that which _is_ always immortal. For the medium between
this and the mortal, is that which is always _becoming to be_ immortal.
But that which is properly immortal possesses the whole of its life in
eternity. That however which has its life evolved through the whole
of time, and has not always one and the same indivisible life, this
possesses an immortality co-extended with the flux of generation, but
is not immortal according to the stability of being. And again, the
medium between the immortality of the mundane Gods and that of partial
souls, is that which has a life always rising into existence, and
which ascends and descends in intellectual energy, so as to be nearer
to mortal natures, leaving indeed a more excellent intellection, but
transferring itself into one that is subordinate, and again recurring
to its pristine condition without oblivion. And of these, the former
indeed, is the peculiarity of the mundane Gods; but the latter, of
dæmons the attendants on these Gods. But if the nature which remains
is filled with oblivion in descending, becomes most proximate to
mortals, entirely destroys the true life which it contains, and alone
possesses the essential life,--such an immortality as this belongs to
partial souls. Hence, the demiurgus in his speech calls the immortality
in these homonymous to that of the immortals. If however, there is
any nature after these which casts aside its essential life, this is
alone[83] mortal. Hence, the primarily immortal and the mortal are the
extremes. But the immortality of the mundane Gods, and that of partial
souls, are the sub-extremes. And the immortality which is truly the
medium between these, is that of dæmons. Hence too, dæmons are in
reality entirely of a middle nature.