In the next place, the demiurgus says: “Every thing, therefore, which
is bound is dissoluble, but to be willing to dissolve that which is
beautifully harmonized and well composed, is the province of an evil
nature.” It is requisite then to consider how the dissoluble and
indissoluble are asserted of the Gods, and to conjoin proper modes of
solution with appropriate bonds. For every thing is not bound after
a similar manner, nor is that which is bound in one way, dissolved
in different ways. But that which is in a certain respect bound, has
also its dissolution according to this mode. That which is in every
respect bound, is likewise in every respect dissolved. And that which
is bound by itself is also by itself dissolved. But that which is bound
by something different from itself, has also on that its dissolution
depending. That likewise which is bound in time, is also dissolved
according to time. But that which is allotted a perpetual bond, must
also be said to be perpetually dissolved. For in short, dissolution
is conjoined with every bond. For a bond is not union without
multitude; since _the one_ does not require a bond. Nor is it an
assemblage of many and different things, no longer preserving their
characteristic peculiarities. For a thing of this kind is confusion;
and that which results from them is one thing, consisting of things
corrupted together, but does not become bound. For it is necessary
that things that are bound should remain as they are, but not be bound
when corrupted. Hence a bond then alone takes place, when there are
many things, and which are preserved, having one power connective and
collective of them, whether this power be corporeal or incorporeal. If
this, however, be the case, things that are bound are united through
the bond, and separated, because each preserves its own proper nature.
Every where, therefore, as we have said, a bond has also dissolution
connected with it. Bonds, however, and their dissolutions differ in
subsisting in a certain respect, and simply, from themselves, and
from others, according to time, and perpetually. For in these their
differences consist. We must not, therefore, wonder if the same thing
is both dissoluble and indissoluble; and if it is in a certain respect
indissoluble, and in a certain respect dissoluble. So that the works
of the father, if they are indeed indissoluble, are so, as not to
be dissolved according to time. But they are dissoluble, as having
together with a bond, a separation of the simple things of which they
consist, according to the definite causes of things that are bound,
existing in him that binds. For as that which is self-subsistent is
said to be so in a twofold respect, one, as supplying all things from
itself alone, but another, as subsisting indeed from itself, and also
from another which is the cause of it, thus also the indissoluble is
so, from another,[75] and from itself; just as that which is moved is
twofold, and subsists in a similar manner.
To these two modes, however, two modes of dissolution are also opposed;
viz. that which is dissoluble from another and from itself is opposed
to that which is indissoluble from another and from itself. And this,
indeed, is dissoluble in itself, as consisting of things that are
separate. But in consequence of having in something else prior to
itself the causes of its subsistence, by this cause, and according to
this mode alone it becomes dissoluble. Again, that which is simply
dissoluble in a twofold respect, and which contains in itself the cause
of its dissolution, and also receives it from another, is opposed to
that which is simply indissoluble in a twofold respect, from itself and
from another. These, therefore, are four in number, viz. that which
is simply indissoluble from another and from itself. And again, that
which is indissoluble after a certain manner in a twofold respect; that
which is dissoluble after a certain manner in a twofold respect; and
that which is dissoluble simply from itself, and from another.[76] Of
these four, however, the first pertains to intelligibles; for they are
indissoluble, as being entirely simple, and receiving no composition
or dissolution whatever. But the fourth belongs to mortal natures,
which are dissoluble from themselves and from others, as consisting of
many things, and being composed by their causes in such a way, as to
be at a certain time dissolved. And the middles pertain to the mundane
Gods; for the second and the third of these four concur with them.
For after a certain manner, these as being the works of the father
are indissoluble; and they are saved from themselves and through his
will. And again, they are in a certain respect dissoluble, because they
are bound by him; and he contains the productive principle of those
simple natures from which they are composed. Every thing, therefore,
which is bound is dissoluble; and this is also the case with the works
of the father. For these are, all bodies, the composition of animals,
and the number of participated souls. But intellects which ride as
it were in souls as in a vehicle, cannot be called the works of the
father; for they were not generated, but were unfolded into light in
an unbegotten manner, as if fashioned within the adyta of his essence,
and not proceeding out of them. For there are no paradigms of these,
but of middle and last natures; since soul is the first of images. But
the wholes such as animals, the participants of soul and intellect,
and generated natures, derive their subsistence from intellectual
paradigms, of which animal itself is the comprehending cause.
Bodies, therefore, are bound through analogy; for this is the most
beautiful bond of them. But animals are bound with animated bonds.
And souls which contain something of a partible nature are bound by
media, [viz. by geometrical, arithmetical and harmonical ratios;] for
Plato calls these and all the productive principles of which the soul
consists, bonds. Hence the indissoluble in the mundane Gods subsists
according to nature; for each of them is generated indissoluble; such
being the works of the father through the power, which he contains.
They are also indissoluble from the demiurgic will, since they are of a
composite nature, and possess the indissoluble with a bond. But there
is likewise in a certain respect a dissolution of them, so far as they
consist of things of a simple nature, of which the father contains in
himself the definite causes. At one and the same time, therefore, they
are indissoluble and dissoluble. They are not, however, so indissoluble
as the intelligible; for that is indissoluble through transcendency
of simplicity. But these are at the same time indissoluble and
dissoluble, as consisting of simple natures, and as being perpetually
bound. For all the natures that are bound being dissoluble, such as
are perpetual, possessing through the whole of time, beauty from the
intelligible, divine union, and demiurgic harmony, are indissoluble.
But mortal natures are dissoluble alone, because they are connected
with the deformity and inaptitude of matter. And the former indeed are
beautifully harmonized through the union inserted in them by their
harmonizing cause; but this is not the case with the latter, on account
of the multitude of causes which no longer insert in them a similar
union;[77] for their union is dissipated through the multitude which is
mingled in their composition: so that they are very properly allotted a
remitted[78] harmony.
Hence, every thing which is bound is dissoluble. But one thing is
thus dissoluble and indissoluble, and another is dissoluble only,
just as the intelligible is alone indissoluble. Why, therefore, is
that which is primarily bound at one and the same time dissoluble
and indissoluble? Because it is _beautifully_ harmonized, and is
_well_ composed. For from being _well_ composed it obtains union;
since _goodness_ is unific. But from the intelligible it obtains the
_beautifully_; for from thence beauty is derived. And from fabricating
power it obtains _harmony_; for this is the cause of the Muses, and
is the source of harmonical arrangement to mundane natures. Hence
we again have the three causes, the final through the _well_, the
paradigmatic through the _beautifully_; and the demiurgic through the
_harmonized_.[79] But it is necessary that a composition of this kind,
harmonized by the one fabricating power, filled with divine beauty, and
obtaining a boniform union, should be indissoluble; for the demiurgus
says, that to dissolve it is the province of an evil nature.
Moreover, prior to this Plato had said, that the universe is
indissoluble except by him by whom it was bound. If, however, it is
entirely impossible for the universe to be dissolved by any other,
but the father alone is able to dissolve it, and it is impossible for
him to effect this, for it is the province of an evil nature,--it
is impossible for the universe to be dissolved. For either he must
dissolve it, or some other. But if some other, who is it that is
able to offer violence to the demiurgus? For it is impossible that
a dissolution of it should be effected, except by him that bound it.
But if he dissolves it, how being good, can he dissolve that which is
beautifully harmonized and well composed. For that which is subversive
of these, is productive of evil; just as that which is subversive
of evil is allotted a beneficent nature. Hence, there is an equal
necessity that the demiurgus should be depraved, if it be lawful so
to speak, or that this world should be dissolved, [viz. each of these
is equally impossible.] Such, therefore, is the necessity which Plato
assigns to the incorruptibility of the universe. Hence, that Plato
gives the indissoluble to the composition of the mundane Gods, he
clearly manifests when he orders them to bind mortal natures, not with
those indissoluble bonds with which they are connected. For if the
connective bonds of these Gods are indissoluble, they themselves must
be essentially indissoluble. Here, however, he says that they are not
in every respect indissoluble. It is evident, therefore, from both
these assertions, that they are indissoluble, and at the same time
dissoluble,[80] and that they are not in every respect indissoluble,
in consequence of their being appropriately bound. But if these things
are true, there is every necessity that the dissolution of them
should be very different from that which we call corruption. For that
which is dissoluble after such a manner as the corruptible, not being
indissoluble, is so far from being not in every respect indissoluble,
that it is in every respect dissoluble. Hence it is not proper to
say that the mundane Gods are of themselves corruptible, but remain
incorruptible through the will of the father; but we ought to say that
they are in their own nature[81] incorruptible.