Prop.I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged
and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or
the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and
associated in the body.
Proof.- The order and connection of ideas is the same (II:vii.) as the order
and connection of things, and vice versa the order and connection of things
is the same (II:vi.Coroll. and II:vii.) as the order and connection of
ideas. Wherefore, even as the order and connection of ideas in the mind
takes place according to the order and association of modifications of the
body (II:xviii.), so vice versa (III:ii.) the order and connection of
modifications of the body takes place in accordance with the manner, in
which thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the
mind. Q.E.D.
PROP.II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion,
from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other
thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external cause,
and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these
emotions, be destroyed.
Proof.- That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred, is pleasure
or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. of the
Emotions:vi.,&vii.); wherefore, when this cause is removed, the reality of
love or hatred is removed with it; therefore these emotions and those
which arise therefrom are destroyed. Q.E.D.
Prop.III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a
passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.
Proof.- An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by the general
Def. of the Emotions). If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of a
given emotion, that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion, in so
far as it is referred to the mind only, by reason (II:xxi.,&Note); therefore
(III:iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D.
Corollary.- An emotion therefore becomes more under our control, and the
mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as it is more known to
us.
Prop.IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we
cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
Proof.- Properties which are common to all things can only be conceived
adequately (II:xxxviii.); therefore (II:xii.and Lemma. ii. after II:xiii.)
there is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and
distinct conception. Q.E.D.
Corollary.- Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof we cannot
form some clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is the idea of a
modification of the body (by the general Def. of the Emotions), and must
therefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve some clear and distinct
conception.
Note.- Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by an effect
(I:xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly understand whatever
follows from an idea, which in us is adequate (II:xl.), it follows that
everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and
his emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of
bringing it about, that he should become less subject to them. To attain
this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, as
far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion, in order
that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those
things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully
acquiesces: and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the
thought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts;
whence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be
destroyed (V:ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to
arise from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive (IV:lxi.).
For it must be especially remarked, that the appetite through which a man is
said to be active, and that through which he is said to be passive is one
and the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so
constituted, that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own
fashion (III:xxxi.Note); in a man, who is not guided by reason, this
appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ
from pride; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an
activity or virtue which is called piety (IV:xxxvii.Note.i. and second
proof). In like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far
as they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are accredited to
virtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all
desires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much
from adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV:lix.). Than this remedy for the
emotions (to return to the point from which I started), which consists in a
true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within our power, can
be devised. For the mind has no other power save that of thinking and of
forming, adequate ideas, as we have shown above (III:iii.).
Prop.V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive
simply, and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is,
other conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.
Proof.- An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, is greater
than one towards what we conceive to be necessary (III:xlix.), and,
consequently, still greater than one towards what we conceive as possible,
or contingent (IV:xi.). But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else
than to conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby
it has been determined to action (II:xxxv.Note); therefore, an emotion
towards a thing which we conceive simply is, other conditions being equal,
greater than one, which we feel towards what is necessary, possible, or
contingent, and, consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D.
Prop.VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is
less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as
necessary.
Proof.- The mind understands all things to be necessary (I:xxix.) and to be
determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes;
therefore (by the foregoing Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that
it is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III:xlviii.)
feels less emotion towards the things themselves. Q.E.D.
Note.- The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is applied to
particular things, which we conceive more distinctly and vividly, the
greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, as experience also
testifies. For we see, that the pain arising from the loss of any good is
mitigated, as soon as the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not
by any means have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an
infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly, because it
passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness. Whereas, if most
people were born full-grown and only one here and there as an infant,
everyone would pity the infants; because infancy would not then be looked on
as a state natural and necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature;
and we may note several other instances of the same sort.
Prop.VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if
we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are
attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.
Proof.- We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the emotion
wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body, being affected by
another emotion excluding the existence of the said thing (II:xvii.).
Wherefore, the emotion, which is referred to the thing which we regard as
absent, is not of a nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and
power (IV:vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort
controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its external
cause (IV:ix.). But an emotion which springs from reason is necessarily
referred to the common properties of things (see the def. of reason in
II:xl.Note.ii.), which we always regard as present (for there can be nothing
to exclude their present existence), and which we always conceive in the
same manner (II:xxxviii.). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always remains
the same; and consequently (V:Ax.i.) emotions, which are contrary thereto
and are not kept going by their external causes, will be obliged to adapt
themselves to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary to it; to
this extent the emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.
Prop.VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of
simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.
Proof.- Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few (III:vii.):
therefore (IV:v.), in proportion to the increased number of simultaneous
causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion becomes stronger. Q.E.D.
Note.- This proposition is also evident from V:Ax.ii.
Prop.IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse
causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion
itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less
affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different and
equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a
single cause.
Proof-. An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders the mind
from being able to think (IV:xxvi., IV:xxvii.); therefore, an emotion,
whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of several things at
once, is less hurtful than another equally powerful emotion, which so
engrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a few objects or of one,
that it is unable to think of anything else; this was our first point.
Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III:vii.), consists
solely in thought (II:xi.), the mind is less passive in respect to an
emotion, which causes it to think of several things at once, than in regard
to an equally strong emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation
of a few or of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this
emotion (III:xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to several causes, is
less powerful in regard to each of them. Q.E.D.
Prop.X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to
our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the
modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.
Proof.- The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that is (IV:xxx.),
which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding
(IV:xxvii.). So long, therefore, as we are not assailed by emotions contrary
to our nature, the mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things
(IV:xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear and
distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II:xl.Note.ii. and
II:xlvii.Note); consequently we have in such cases the power of arranging
and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual
order. Q.E.D.
Note.- By this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily
modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evil
emotions. For (V:vii.) a greater force is needed for controlling the
emotions, when they are arranged and associated according to the
intellectual order, than when they, are uncertain and unsettled. The best we
can do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our
emotions, is to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical
precepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith to the
particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so that our
imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that it may be always
ready to our hand. For instance, we have laid down among the rules of life
(IV:xlvi., & Note), that hatred should be overcome with love or high-
mindedness, and not required with hatred in return. Now, that this precept
of reason may be always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often
think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and in
what manner and way they may be best warded off by high-mindedness: we shall
thus associate the idea of wrong with the idea of this precept, which
accordingly will always be ready for use when a wrong is done to us
(II:xviii.). If we keep also in readiness the notion of our true
advantage, and of the good which follows from mutual friendships, and common
fellowships; further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the
result of the right way of life (IV:lii.), and that men, no less than
everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such case I say
the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises therefrom, will engross a
very small part of our imagination and will be easily overcome; or, if the
anger which springs from a grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will
nevertheless be overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far
sooner than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As is
indeed evident from V:vi.,V:vii.,V:viii. We should, in the same way, reflect
on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers of life
should frequently be brought to mind and imagined, together with the means
whereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind we can avoid and
overcome them. But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and
conceptions we should always bear in mind that which is good in every
individual thing (IV:lxiii.Coroll. and III:lix.), in order that we may
always be determined to action by an emotion of pleasure. For instance, if
a man sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of honour, let him think over
its right use, the end for which it should be pursued, and the means whereby
he may attain it. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and
the fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except
through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do the
most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of gaining the
distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving vent to their anger would
fain appear wise. Wherefore it is certain that those, who cry out the
loudest against the misuse of honour and the vanity of the world, are those
who most greedily covet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is
common to all who are ill-used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit.
For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the misuse of
wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely torments himself, and
shows the world that he is intolerant, not only of his own poverty, but also
of other people's riches. So, again, those who have been ill received by a
woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other
stock faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion,
directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart. Thus he who
would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the love of freedom
strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of the virtues and their
causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy which arises from the true
knowledge of them: he will in no wise desire to dwell on men's faults, or to
carp at his fellows, or to revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will
diligently observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not
difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for the most
part, to direct his actions according to the commandments of reason.
Prop.XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to more
objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and occupies
the mind more.
Proof.- In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is referred to more
objects, so are there more causes whereby it can be aroused and fostered,
all of which (by hypothesis) the mind contemplates simultaneously in
association with the given emotion; therefore the emotion is more frequent,
or is more often in full vigour, and (V:viii.) occupies the mind more.
Q.E.D.
Prop.XII. The mental images of things are more easily
associated with the images referred to things which we clearly
and distinctly understand, than with others.
Proof.- Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand, are either the
common properties of things or deductions therefrom (see definition of
Reason, II:.xl.Note ii.), and are consequently (by the last Prop.) more
often aroused in us. Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should
contemplate other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with
something else, and consequently (II:xviii.) that the images of the said
things should be more often associated with the images of these than with
the images of something else. Q.E.D.
Prop. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion
as it is associated with a greater number of other images.
Proof.- In proportion as an image is associated with a greater number of
other images, so (II:xviii.) are there more causes whereby it can be
aroused. Q.E.D.
Prop. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily
modifications or images of things may be referred to the
idea of God.
Proof.- There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind may not form
some clear and distinct conception (V:iv.); wherefore it can bring it about,
that they should all be referred to the idea of God (I:xv.). Q.E.D.
Prop. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself
and his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion
as he more understands himself and his emotions.
Proof.- He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions
feels pleasure (III:liii.), and this pleasure is (by the last Prop.)
accompanied by the idea of God; therefore (Def. of the Emotions:vi.) such an
one loves God, and (for the same reason) so much the more in proportion as
he more understands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D.
Prop. XVI. This love towards God must
hold the chief place in the mind.
Proof.- For this love is associated with all the modifications of the body
(V:xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V:v.); therefore (V:xi.), it must hold
the chief place in the mind. Q.E.D.
Prop. XVII. God is without passions,
neither is he affected by
any emotion of pleasure or pain.
Proof.- All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true
(II:xxxii.), that is (II:Def.iv.) adequate; and therefore (by the general
Def. of the Emotions) God is without passions. Again, God cannot pass either
to a greater or to a lesser perfection (I:xx.Coroll.ii.); therefore
(by Def. of the Emotions:ii., &iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of
pleasure or pain.
Corollary. Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For God (by
the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain,
consequently (Def. of the Emotions:vi., &vii.) he does not love or hate
anyone.
Prop.XVIII. No one can hate God.
Proof.- The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (II:xlvi.,
II:xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God, we are active
(III:iii.) ; consequently (III:lix.) there can be no pain accompanied by the
idea of God, in other words (Def. of the Emotions:vii.), no one can hate
God. Q.E.D.
Corollary.- Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.
Note.- It may be objected that, as we understand God as the cause of all
things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of pain. But I make
answer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it to that
extent (V:iii.) ceases to be a passion, that is, it ceases to be pain
(III:lix.); therefore, in so far as we understand God to be the cause of
pain, we to that extent feel pleasure.
Prop. XIX. He, who loves God,
cannot endeavour that God
should love him in return.
Proof.- For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V:xvii.Coroll.)
that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and consequently he would desire
to feel pain (III:xix.); which is absurd (III:xxviii.). Therefore, he who
loves God, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the
emotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered,
in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be
joined to God by the same bond of love.
Proof.- This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for
under the guidance of reason (IV:xxviii.), it is common to all men
(IV:xxxvi),and we desire that all should rejoice therein (IV:xxxvii.);
therefore (Def. of the Emotions:xxiii), it cannot be stained by the
emotion envy nor by, the emotion of jealousy, (V:xviii. see definition of
Jealousy, (III:xxxv. Note); but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more
fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice
therein. Q.E.D.
Note.- We can in the same way, show, that there is no emotion directly
contrary to this love, whereby this love can be destroyed; therefore we may
conclude, that this love towards God is the most constant of all the
emotions, and that, in so far as it is referred to the body, it cannot be
destroyed, unless the body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far as
it is referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.
I have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions, or all
that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them. Whence it
appears that the mind's power over the emotions consists:-