PREFACE
At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is concerned
with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore treat therein of the
power of the reason, showing how far the reason can control the emotions,
and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be
able to see, how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant.
It is no part of my design to point out the method and means whereby the
understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the body may
be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of its functions. The
latter question lies in the province of Medicine, the former in the province
of Logic. Here, therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the
mind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its
dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation. That we do
not possess absolute dominion over them, I have already shown. Yet the
Stoics have thought, that the emotions depended absolutely on our will, and
that we could absolutely govern them. But these philosophers were compelled,
by the protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess,
that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them:
and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the example (if I remember
rightly) of two dogs, the one a house-dog and the other a hunting-dog. For
by long training it could be brought about, that the house-dog should become
accustomed to hunt, and the hunting-dog to cease from running after hares.
To this opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that the
soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely,
to that part called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is
enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and also
external objects, and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in
motion in various ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the
midst of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of the
animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the midst of the
brain in as many different manners, as the animal spirits can impinge
thereon; and, again, that as many different marks are impressed on the said
gland, as there are different external objects which impel the animal
spirits towards it; whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends
the gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once before
by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the gland in its turn
reacts on the said spirits, driving and determining them to the condition
wherein they were, when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland.
He further asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature
to a certain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever anyone
desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition causes the pupil of
the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in question had only thought of
the dilatation of the pupil, the mere wish to dilate it would not have
brought about the result, inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves
to impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would
dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with the wish to
dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to look at remote or very
near objects. Lastly, he maintained that, although every motion of the
aforesaid gland seems to have been united by nature to one particular
thought out of the whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of
our life, yet it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with
other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de l'ame, I. 50.
He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it cannot, under
proper direction, acquire absolute power over its passions. For passions as
defined by him are "perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul,
which are referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression)
are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement of the
spirits." (Passion del l'ame,I.27.) But, seeing that we can join any motion
of the gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any volition, the
determination of the will depends entirely on our own powers; if, therefore,
we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which
we wish our actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which
we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an absolute
dominion over our passions. Such is the doctrine of this illustrious
philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his own words); it is one
which, had it been less ingenious, I could hardly believe to have proceeded
from so great a man. Indeed, I am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who
had stoutly asserted, that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow
from self-evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not
clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task the
scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities,
could maintain a hypothesis, beside which occult qualities are commonplace.
What does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What
clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union
with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like him to
explain this union through its proximate cause. What clear and distinct
conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain
particle of extended matter? What clear and distinct conception has he got
of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended
matter? But he had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from
body, that he could not assign any particular cause of the union between the
two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse to the cause of
the whole universe, that is to God. Further, I should much like to know,
what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with
what force can it hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this
gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the
animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we have
closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom by
physical causes; in which case it would follow that, although the mind
firmly intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision the
motions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become
suspended in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything
except running away. In truth, as there is no common standard of volition
and motion, so is there no comparison possible between the powers of the
mind and the power or strength of the body; consequently the strength of one
cannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other. We may also
add, that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so
placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also
that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain.
Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes concerning the will and its
freedom, inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that his premisses are false.
Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by
the understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the
mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all have had
experience of, but do not accurately observe or distinctly see, and from the
same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions, which have regard to the
mind's blessedness.
AXIOMS.
I. If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a change must
necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of the two, and continue
until they cease to be contrary.
II. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, in so far
as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause. (This
axiom is evident from III.vii.)