CHAPTER XV

THE ADVANCE TO FINAL VICTORY (II): OCTOBER 18TH TO NOVEMBER 11TH, 1918

In the forcing of the Lys the 36th Division was to have the honour

of the "left of the line," a real honour, because in an attack only

a good Division was employed on the flank of an Allied Army. The

reputation of the 9th Division, which had hitherto occupied that

position, is too high to stand in need of glorification. But the

36th Division was not only to move on the flank of the British Army;

it was to be its left flank-guard across the Lys, which was to be

crossed by it first of any British Division, and considerably before

its Allies on the left.

On the afternoon of the 18th of October General Coffin's headquarters

were established in Lendelede, a town of upwards of four thousand

inhabitants. Here the Germans had left behind perhaps the most

valuable gift they could at this juncture have bestowed--excellent

baths, where three hundred men could be bathed within an hour.

Accommodation generally was now very good in a country so thickly

populated, but there were still some unpleasant surprises. One

such was the discovery by one unit, that in an excellent stable,

recommended to it by a civilian, there was in each of ten stalls

a dead horse, killed a week earlier by a single burst of Belgian

shrapnel. That evening the relief of the 3rd Belgian Division, along

the left bank of the Lys, from Bavichove to the point of junction

between the river and the Canal de Roulers à la Lys, was carried out

by the 109th Brigade. Heavy bombing of the roads by enemy aeroplanes

made it an affair of great difficulty. A French Division, the 164th,

was coming in on the left of the 36th, but there was no prospect of

its being ready to cross till the night of the 20th. As every moment

was of importance, the 36th Division had orders to effect a passage

more than twenty-four hours earlier.

General Coffin's scheme was in itself a scathing commentary upon

the decadence of German moral. It was one which would not have been

contemplated in the heroic age of the German infantry. In those days

an isolated battalion, pushed across to form a bridgehead, would have

been flung back into the river almost before it had had time to draw

breath. But times had changed, and methods changed with them. Extreme

boldness now paid as it had never paid in the previous course of the

war. With adequate artillery support great risks could be taken, for

the German machine-gunners frequently left their positions under

heavy shell-fire. Moreover, there were no more "pill-boxes."

The Germans, it must be explained, appeared to be holding the

opposite bank of the Lys in some strength. At several points they

had put up wire fences to defend it. Opposite Oyghem, near the 36th

Division's left flank, was one very large moated farm, round which

they had dug a trench. The plan was that one battalion of the 109th

Brigade should be ferried across at dusk on the 19th, should push

forward to the main Courtrai-Ghent Road, from east of Beveren to

Dries, on a front of a thousand yards. That accomplished, a second

battalion was to cross, to form flank from the Oyghem-Desselghem

Road to the left of the leading battalion. Two machine-gun companies

were allotted to the operation, "B" to fire a barrage, "C" with

its sections attached to the battalions of the 109th Brigade. The

original intention had been for the 121st and 150th Field Companies

to effect crossings for the infantry opposite both Oyghem and

Beveren. A daring daylight reconnaissance of the river-bank by

Lieutenant W. Brunyate, of the latter company, caused the Oyghem

crossing to be abandoned, and the construction of a bridge at that

point postponed till the first part of the programme was complete.

The bank here was very steep, was heavily wired, and commanded by

machine-guns. The farm of which mention has been made would have been

in itself a formidable obstacle. Three bridging wagons with full

bridging equipment had been brought up the previous night and hidden

in farm buildings beside the river bank, north-west of Beveren, by

the 121st Field Company. The pontoons of the 150th Field Company were

hidden slightly further north.

At dusk two pontoons were launched, and at 7-25 p.m. the passage of

the 9th Inniskillings began. Two trips were actually made before

the enemy fired a shot; then machine-gun fire burst out, followed a

little later by that of artillery. Nevertheless, by 8 p.m. the whole

battalion and its attached section of machine-guns[62] were across,

with one casualty only. Hastily in the darkness the battalion formed

up. Then the British barrage dropped, and it began its advance over

open country. The night was cloud-veiled, but the full moon was of

great assistance to subsequent operations. Capturing such machine-gun

detachments as did not fly, the 9th Inniskillings worked its way

steadily forward, and crossed the Beveren-Dries Road, four hundred

yards short of its objective, the main road from Courtrai to Ghent.

Almost immediately afterwards, however, it was held up by heavy

machine-gun fire. It had not accomplished quite all that had been

hoped, but it had done enough. The still more complicated task of

bringing across a second battalion to guard the left flank remained.

Directly the 9th was over, the 121st Field Company set about throwing

across a "half-pontoon" bridge. It was found, however, that the river

was here actually over a hundred feet wide, considerably more than

was anticipated from the information in our possession, and that

two pontoons in halves would not reach across. Since pontoons were

infinitely precious--some having been sunk at Courtrai--as many as

possible being required for a subsequent heavy bridge, an attempt was

made to assemble a trestle-bridge instead. But under the very heavy

shell-fire now falling upon the river this had to be abandoned for

want of time, and eventually a pontoon was borrowed from the 150th

Field Company to complete the bridge. It was ready at ten o'clock,

just as the leading platoon of the 1st Inniskillings appeared on the

bank. The battalion had four hours for its crossing and assembly on

the further bank.

On the left flank of the attack were four villages, Desselghem,

Spriete, Straete, and Dries. Of these the first was considerable, the

others tiny hamlets which were really part of it.[63] Desselghem and

Spriete were to be attacked by the two leading companies; Straete

and Dries by the supporting companies, which were to pass through

them. The operation of bringing the battalion across, forming it up

and attacking north-eastward, at right angles to the line of attack

of the 9th Inniskillings, of supporting the new attack by barrage

fire, would have been considered of the greatest difficulty in the

mimic warfare of manœuvres, and would almost certainly have been

characterized as impossible by the umpires. In this case the whole

programme, owing to good staff work, intelligent local leadership,

and the dash of the private soldier, was carried through without

a hitch. Spriete and Desselghem were cleared; then the supporting

companies went through. Their task was a sterner one, since the

Germans had had time to make some preparation for resistance.

Straete was captured after fierce close fighting, the Inniskillings

frequently using the bayonet. On the right the other company reached

the outskirts of Dries, but was unable to make further headway, and

there consolidated its position. Here again, though not quite all

was won, elbow-room sufficient had been gained. Eighty prisoners had

been taken, and passed back over the pontoon bridge.

[Illustration: (Map of battle area)]

It was now the turn of the 107th Brigade. The sappers passed a busy

and disturbed night. The shelling of the Lys continued, and there was

a direct hit on the bridge, a pontoon being damaged and a length of

the superstructure destroyed. By desperately hard work all repairs

were completed for the leading battalion of the 107th Brigade, the

15th Rifles, to cross at 2 a.m. This battalion, followed by the 1st,

moved forward, the former forming up west of the Courtrai-Ghent

Road, in relief of the 9th Inniskillings, which withdrew through its

ranks. Troops of the 9th Division had crossed about midnight, but, as

may easily be imagined, it was not without considerable difficulty

that touch was obtained with them. This, however, was at last

accomplished, but the line at the point of junction was perilously

close to the river, owing to the fact that German machine-gunners

still held out in Beveren.

At 6 a.m. on the 20th the new attack began. Beveren was quickly

taken, with some aid from the Scots Fusiliers of the 9th Division.

Machine-gun fire was very heavy, and the 15th Rifles had considerable

casualties. The commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel B. Y. Jones,

D.S.O., was killed. But the advance continued at a great pace. The

main Courtrai-Ghent-Antwerp Railway was crossed before eight o'clock.

An hour later the line was astride the road from Deerlyck--already in

the hands of the 9th Division--to Waereghem. A mill on that road gave

considerable trouble, but was eventually taken by a platoon of the

1st Rifles. Further progress for the time being was found impossible.

The advance had reached a point two and a half miles from the Lys,

and could no longer be supported by artillery fire. At 12-30 p.m. the

1st Inniskillings made another attempt to clear Dries, and reached

the centre of the hamlet. Resistance was now quite determined, and it

was decided to await the crossing of the French before attempting any

move on the left flank. About two hundred prisoners had been captured

in the day's operations.

The Engineers had continued their good work. By evening a pontoon

bridge for first-line transport had been thrown across by the 150th

Field Company. The 121st had completed a good permanent foot-bridge,

and, returning to the abandoned trestle, for which all materials

had been collected locally, had finished that also. At night the

108th Brigade and a French regiment on the left made the crossing.

Artillery, however, could not cross yet awhile. The 108th Brigade was

to relieve the 109th, and the advance was to be continued for another

twenty-four hours without it.

The advance of the 21st was timed for 7-30 a.m. It was to be carried

out by the 1st Rifles of the 107th Brigade, and the 1st Irish

Fusiliers of the 108th. It was, however, important to be rid of the

hornet's nest in Dries upon the flank, and this village was cleared

by a company of the 12th Rifles before the attack began. Without

artillery this attack was of the greatest difficulty. There were no

hedges, and it was the custom in this part of the country to lop the

lower branches off the trees. Consequently, the attacking force was

constantly exposed to long-range machine-gun fire. Moreover, the

133rd French Regiment, since it had to fight its way from the river

bank, was always in rear. In all the circumstances the advance of the

day, which found the right of the 107th Brigade at Knock, north of

Vichte, and the left of the 108th at Spitael, on the Ghent Railway,

was highly creditable to the troops concerned. The advance of the

107th Brigade, with the 9th Division on its right, was to be resumed

on the morrow, but it was decided that the 108th Brigade should not

move till the French had come up into line.

By the morning of the 22nd the Lys was crossed by bridge after bridge

in the area of the 36th Division; there being, besides numerous

foot-bridges, three medium bridges for first-line transport, and a

trestle which was subsequently used by French motor-lorries. On the

night of the 21st the four batteries of the 153rd Brigade R.F.A.

crossed the river, to fire a barrage in support of the 107th Brigade

next day. On the right, upwards of half the distance between the

parallel rivers, the Lys and the Escaut, had now been covered. From

the Gaverbeek onwards the advance was now faced by rising ground,

which culminated in a general ridge before the drop down, over some

two miles, to the valley of the latter river. The various little

crests of this chain afforded excellent positions to the enemy, and

it was evident that, if so disposed, he could make a very effective

stand before falling back across the Escaut. The first of them had

to be attacked on this morning. It was taken by the 2nd Rifles. The

barrage, small though it would have been reckoned in old days,

and as it was in comparison with the German barrage which had to

be faced, nevertheless made a wonderful difference to the attack.

The little rise, about a mile north-east of Vichte and topped by

a windmill, was carried. But there followed the most resolute

counter-attack experienced for a long time by the 36th Division. It

was made by a Prussian Assault Battalion, and succeeded in driving

our men off the crest and back for almost eight hundred yards.

Colonel Becher, commanding the 2nd Rifles, organized a new attack

by two companies, which, going forward with the greatest gallantry,

once more drove the Germans off the crest and re-established the

position. The left flank swung sharply back, the junction with the

108th Brigade being on the Deerlyck-Waereghem Road. On the left of

the 108th Brigade the French, after heavy fighting, were established

in Spitael.

On the 23rd, as the enemy appeared to be withdrawing, the advance was

continued all along the line behind a screen of scouts. A squadron of

French dragoons, attached to the Division, made a spirited dash for

the Escaut crossing at Berchen, but came under heavy machine-gun fire

from the second line of hills, which it was evident the enemy held in

force. He had, in fact, withdrawn a mile or so during the previous

night. On the extreme left a company of the 1st Irish Fusiliers,

entering Heirweg, was vigorously counter-attacked and driven out

with the loss of several prisoners. Eventually a liaison post was

established by British and French at the station, just west of the

hamlet. On the right the 1st Rifles had captured Vossenhoek and

Hutteghem. The advance had been well maintained. The men of the 107th

Brigade were now, however, weary, and the battalions very weak. It

was decided to relieve the Brigade that night by the 109th. This was

carried out without event.

The following day was given to reorganization. Two batteries of the

173rd Brigade had crossed the river on the 22nd, the remainder were

now brought over in readiness to support an attack upon the ridge.

This took place at 9 a.m. on the 25th. The 109th Brigade on the right

had two battalions, the 1st and 2nd Inniskillings, in line; the

108th one only, the 12th Rifles. The advance was covered by a barrage

moving at the rate of a hundred yards in three minutes. On the right

not much progress was made, in face of heavy machine-gun fire. Loss

of direction, due to fog and the smoke-screen of the enemy barrage,

caused considerable difficulty. Eventually a line east of Hutsbosch

was consolidated. On the left the 12th Rifles made an advance of

half a mile, in face of the most determined opposition encountered

since the fighting at Hill 41. Every house was held, and the Germans

fought their machine-guns desperately. No less than ten were counted

in ten separate houses at the day's end. The advance would have been

greater had the French supported it on the left, but their line had

not moved beyond Heirweg. The work of the 12th Rifles on this day was

probably the best performed by that battalion, amid much good work

accomplished since the beginning of offensive operations. Repeatedly

the men had charged in upon houses defended by machine-guns, and

bayoneted the detachments.

The 9th Division had captured the twin crests of Ingoyghem and

Ooteghem, and it was determined that the 109th Brigade should, the

same afternoon, assault that of Kleineberg, to their north-east,

which would have brought the right of the Division, its left drawn

back through circumstances beyond its control, into the van of the

advance. A new barrage, starting at 5 p.m., was hastily planned

and admirably carried out. Unfortunately, however, orders did not

reach the battalions soon enough, and, at the appointed hour, three

companies only, two of the 1st Inniskillings and one of the 2nd, went

forward to the attack. And it must be remembered that companies were

now never more than fifty strong. The crest was actually reached, but

the advance had been on a frontage so narrow that it was impossible

to maintain the position. A farm-house at the foot of the slope was,

however, held and consolidated.

The 26th was a day of calm, broken when night fell by tremendous

shelling, above all with gas, which seemed almost to have superseded

high explosive and shrapnel in the enemy's armoury. Nor was a further

advance contemplated on the 27th, owing to the complete exhaustion

of the troops. A wounded prisoner had, however, reported that it was

the enemy's intention to withdraw at once to the Escaut, and our

outposts were on the _qui vive_ for signs of such a movement. About

2 p.m. that afternoon they were rewarded. Small bodies of the enemy

were seen retiring from the Kleineberg Ridge. Instantly patrols of

the 109th Brigade were pushed forward and occupied it. And so this

last goal of the 36th Division, after three years' campaigning,

was reached without a shot fired. The 108th Brigade, in attempting

to follow suit, met with a certain resistance, but the 9th Irish

Fusiliers had the railway "halt" west of Anseghem before dusk.

Attempts were made to push onward to the river, but it was found that

the Germans still held Bergstraat with machine-guns, and no further

progress could be made. It was quite evident that they were not

going to fall back on the Escaut till forced to do so. Their policy,

directed with great skill--for never did the work of their divisional

and regimental commanders shine more brightly than in these days--was

to give up what could not be held, and no more, thus husbanding till

the last the declining moral of their infantrymen, and delaying the

advance as long as might be. A resistance more rigid, with the German

soldier in his present temper, would inevitably have led to a break

through, somewhere or other, and a consequent rout.

The bolt of the 36th Division was now shot. Weary flesh was at last

proclaiming itself master over spirit unwearied. The only thing that

had kept the men so long on their legs in this winter warfare was the

excellence of the accommodation behind the line. Such a campaign in

devastated country would have been unthinkable. Even as it was, they

had been subjected to great hardship and exposure, while the constant

gas shelling had had some effect on many hundreds who had not left

the ranks. The casualties since the beginning of offensive operations

numbered over three thousand. Of these, six-sevenths were wounded,

and a very large proportion, most fortunately, suffering from light

wounds from machine-gun bullets, or a temporarily disabling whiff of

gas. But not more than a tenth of these casualties, or of a certain

sick wastage, had been replaced by reinforcements. As a consequence

battalions in action had seldom more than two hundred or two hundred

and fifty bayonets. Other arms had suffered in less, but still in

high proportion, while the loss of transport animals was becoming

serious. All preparations were made for a renewal of the attack, but

on the afternoon of the 27th came a wire from the X. Corps to the

effect that the Division would be relieved by the 34th, and would

come under its orders the following day, being withdrawn for rest

and reorganization. Soon after dusk on the 27th the 101st Brigade of

the 34th Division relieved the two weak Brigades of the 36th in the

line, which began their march back to the area about Courtrai. Though

little they knew it, their part in the war was finished.

The Artillery and Medium Trench Mortar Batteries had further work to

perform, when the 34th Division, having pushed up to the banks of

the Escaut, forced its crossing in the first week of November. The

107th, 108th, and 109th Light Trench Mortar Batteries were also lent

to the 34th Division on that occasion. The distinction of having

fired the last shot of any unit of the 36th Division is claimed

by both artillerymen and Stokes gunners of the 108th Light Trench

Mortar Battery, in action after the other two had expended all their

ammunition. Let both divide the crown. No other unit would begrudge

it to either.

In the late operations the 36th Division had inscribed, on these its

final pages, one of the brightest chapters of its career. It had been

a period marked by a brilliant co-operation of every arm, combatant

and non-combatant. Amid many great achievements, perhaps the most

satisfactory of all had been that of the Engineers. For once their

work, always so hard, but generally so obscure and thankless, had

stood out in the foreground. Upon it had hinged the whole attack

across the Lys. They had carried out, with supreme skill, devotion,

and success, what is perhaps the sapper's first task in warfare, of

which he is popularly supposed to dream, that of putting the infantry

across a great river, to be launched to victory from the further

bank. General Jacob's message, a few days before the Division was

finally withdrawn, is the best testimonial to what the troops and

their leaders had accomplished. It ran as follows:

"Major-General C. COFFIN, V.C., D.S.O.,

Commanding 36th Division.

"The 36th (Ulster) Division has been fighting continuously since

the 28th September in the operations in Flanders. The spirit, dash,

and initiative shown by all ranks have been splendid, and beyond

all praise. The leadership displayed by yourself and your Brigade

and other Commanders could not have been bettered. The conditions

under which the men have had to fight have been, and are still, very

trying, but nothing seems to stop your gallant Division.

"I have also been much struck with the good staff work of the

Division, and it is very creditable to all concerned.

"Will you kindly express to the Commanders, Staffs, and all ranks of

the Division my heartiest congratulations and thanks for their work.

"When the history is written of what the Division has done in

Flanders during the past month, it will prove to be a record of

magnificent fighting and wonderful progress; for, during this period,

an advance has been made of about twenty-five miles over the worst

of country, and under the heaviest machine-gun fire ever experienced

in this war. This advance has entailed constant fighting, but the

36th Division has overcome every obstacle, and has proved itself one

of the best fighting Divisions in the Army, well commanded and well

staffed.

"My best wishes to you all.

"C. N. JACOB, Lieutenant-General,

Commanding II. Corps."

On November the 2nd, Divisional Headquarters and the 107th Brigade

moved to Mouscron, practically a suburb of Tourcoing, but on the

other side of the frontier, in Belgium. Training and reorganization

were carried out. Ranks filled up, and the troops, in splendid

billets, speedily threw off their fatigue. Another turn in the

line was still expected. But that was not required. If the 36th

Division was not actually "in at the death," it had afterwards the

satisfaction of knowing that the war was really won when it left

the firing-line. The very day after, October the 28th, the German

_communiqué_ was signed by the "Chief of the General Staff of the

Field Army"--Hindenburg--instead of the "First Quarter-Master

General"--Ludendorff. The meaning of that was instantly grasped.

Ludendorff, the great gambler, whose final throws had brought him so

near success, had resigned. A day later, and it was announced that

Austria had thrown up the sponge. On the 7th of November the German

_parlementaires_ passed through the French lines at Guise, on their

way to interview Marshal Foch. Then came the news of the Armistice.

It was celebrated by the troops in France without that wild hilarity,

wild almost to hysteria, that greeted it in London. Perhaps the man

who had been trudging forward, week by week, facing the machine-guns,

if in front, sniffing for gas, and, by night, listening anxiously for

the purr of the Gotha, if in rear, hardly realized that it was all

over. The men were, none the less, intensely happy. Everywhere they

were _fêted_ and acclaimed by the civilians whom they had freed from

four long years of bondage. Best of all, after years of discomfort

and exposure, they slept softly, undisturbed by the crash of bombs.

And so, as Lord Fisher afterwards put it, "at the eleventh hour of

the eleventh day of the eleventh month," the war came to its end.

[Illustration: Map VII.

The Final Advances, 1918.]

This History contains few of those Special Orders of the Day which,

long after the events that gave them birth, are inclined to appear

heavy, and sometimes fail to accord with present sentiment. That

of General Jacob has been quoted because it was under his fine

leadership that the men of the 36th Division marched to final

victory. It would not be fitting to conclude this chapter without

recalling that issued at the end of hostilities to all the Allied

Armies by the Marshal in supreme command, who inherits from his

teacher, the greatest soldier his country and the modern world ever

produced, the gift of making a few words majestic and ever-memorable.

Amidst our present discontents some of the glory of these words of

Marshal Foch may appear tarnished, but, like the words of Napoleon

to his troops in Egypt, they will endure, when immediate sorrows and

disappointments are forgotten, perhaps when the very causes for which

men laid down their lives by millions have become obscure.

"Officiers, sous-officiers, soldats des Armées Alliées.

"Après avoir résolument arrêté l'ennemi, vous l'avez, pendant des

mois, avec une foi et une énergie inlassables, attaqué sans répit.

"Vous avez gagné la plus grande bataille de l'Histoire et sauvé la

cause la plus sacrée: la Liberté du Monde.

"Soyez fiers!

"D'une gloire immortelle vous aves paré vos drapeaux.

"La Postérité vous garde sa reconnaissance.

"Le Maréchal de France,

Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées,

F. FOCH."

FOOTNOTES:

[62] _i.e._, three guns. By this time none of the Machine-Gun

Companies had men enough to man more than twelve guns.

[63] This country is, in reality, one vast garden city. Groups of a

dozen houses have their names. It has not been found possible to show

them all on the small-scale map illustrating this chapter.

The History of the 36th (Ulster) Division · 第 15 / 17 章