THE ADVANCE TO FINAL VICTORY (I): SEPTEMBER 28TH TO OCTOBER 17TH, 1918
The attack of the II. Corps was to be carried out with the 29th
Division on the right and the 9th on the left. The left flank of
the latter Division lay on the Zonnebeke Road at Mill Cott. On its
left was the 8th Belgian Division. The Belgians did not desire to
attack without preliminary bombardment, and for three hours before
Zero their artillery shelled the German positions and battery areas.
The artillery on the II. Corps front fired for five minutes only
before Zero, which was at 5-30 a.m. on the 28th of September. The
preliminary attack was to be carried out under a creeping barrage,
with a large proportion of smoke-shell. In density this was far less
than the "creepers" of 1917, there being a gun to upwards of fifty
yards. The German defences, however, owing to the drain caused by
reverses elsewhere, were no longer manned in the strength of those
days, nor was the resistance likely to be of a quality so high. The
task, however, was formidable enough, the ground being only less
difficult than during the Battles of Ypres, 1917.
The attack, launched in heavy rain, was a complete success. The
German infantry was left in the lurch by its artillery, and, save at
isolated points, made no serious resistance. The attacking troops,
Belgians and British, went forward with the greatest dash and
determination. The Belgian infantry, which had not been involved in
the great reverses of the British and French, was by this time of
excellent quality, its ranks filled by young men of good physique.
Neither wire nor shell-pocked waste could check the assault. The
Frezenberg Ridge, that had resisted so many attacks of old, was in
the hands of the 9th Division a little more than an hour after the
beginning of the advance. By night the 29th Division had Gheluvelt,
with its heroic memories of the 2nd Worcesters' charge on the 31st
of October, 1914, and was astride the Menin Road a mile east of
it. The Belgians had Zonnebeke, and were in touch with the 9th
Division on the Broodseinde Ridge. But it was the 9th which had most
accomplished. Passing its third Brigade through in early afternoon,
it had seized the village of Becelaere. At its greatest point the
day's advance exceeded six thousand yards. Verily were times changed
in these regions.
By an early hour it had been apparent that affairs were marching
swiftly, and at eleven in the morning the II. Corps ordered the 36th
Division to move forward, with its Infantry Brigades in echelon.
The 109th was ordered to entrain first, and was carried by light
railway to Potijze, where it detrained at 3 p.m. It then received
orders to march to the neighbourhood of the Bellewaarde Lake. The
108th Brigade was moved east of Ypres at noon; the 107th to Potijze
later in the afternoon. So fast had been the advance that the 107th
Brigade's first orders were to move no further than Vlamertinghe,
but on arrival the men were told to keep their places in the trucks,
which bore them forward another three miles before dusk. Headquarters
of the Division were established in the old dug-outs of the Ypres
Ramparts at 2 p.m.
The plan for the 29th of September was that one Brigade of the
36th--the 109th--was to come into line between the 29th and 9th
Divisions. The 109th Brigade was to be supported by the 153rd Brigade
R.F.A., hitherto under the orders of the 9th Division, if its
batteries could be got into action in time. As a matter of fact,
owing to the shocking state of the roads, they were not able to fire
a shot till the next day. The 109th Brigade was to pass through the
27th Brigade in Becelaere, the latter Brigade then following in
rear of the assaulting Brigade of its own Division. The objective
of the 109th was Terhand, but, if this were easily attained, the
intention was to exploit the success. It was attacking with the 2nd
Inniskillings on the right, the 9th on the left, and the 1st in
support. A dawn assault would have been desirable, but, owing to the
difficulty the 109th Brigade experienced in advancing by night across
broken country on roads so damaged and thronged, it was postponed
till 9-30 a.m. The Brigade's difficulties were increased by heavy
bombing of the approaches to the line by enemy aircraft during the
hours of darkness.
The rain continued all night, accompanied by great cold, and in
this blasted area there was no shelter for the troops. By a stroke
of fortune, however, the weather improved in the morning, the sun
appearing just about the hour of Zero. The advance was at first very
rapid. If the 109th had no artillery support, it had small opposition
from that arm. Its difficulties were caused by machine-guns, singly
or in nests of from two to five, cleverly disposed in depth behind
hedges or in buildings. For hedges there were now, and, though the
ground had been heavily shelled, it was no longer the sea of mud and
shell-holes of the old Salient battle-ground.
These German machine-guns were attacked with greatest _élan_. Often
the leading infantry put them out of action by rifle-fire before
the Lewis guns, a serious burden on such ground, could be brought
into action against them. Still, there is no reason to doubt that
the rate of advance could have been swifter had artillery support
been available. The left battalion, the 9th Inniskillings, aided
by the magnificent rush of the 9th Division to north of it, found
matters considerably easier than did the 2nd Inniskillings on the
right. From two o'clock onwards the latter was held up by machine-gun
fire from Terhand, while the former pressed forward north of the
village. Terhand fell at last at a quarter to four. By this time
the 9th Inniskillings was on the southern outskirts of Dadizeele,
which was captured by the 9th Division a few minutes later. Then, at
six o'clock, the 9th Inniskillings forced its way into Vijfwegen, a
road-side hamlet a mile south of Dadizeele.
The day's advance had been once more remarkable, but much more so on
the left of the II. Corps than on its right flank. The 9th Division,
from Becelaere to Dadizeele, had gained well-nigh three miles of
ground. From Vijfwegen, however, the line ran almost west--that is to
say, it faced south--to Terhand, and thence to south of Becelaere,
where the 29th Division had been held up.
At 4 a.m. the 108th Brigade had moved off in support to the 109th,
being upon the high ground west of Becelaere by 7 p.m. It was ordered
to move forward again, pass through the 109th at dawn, and advance
with as objective the great Menin-Roulers highway from Kezelberg
northward. The 29th Division, meanwhile, was to make a great effort
to force its way up into line on the right. "D" Company of the
Machine-Gun Battalion was attached to the 108th Brigade, together
with its own Stokes Mortar Battery.
The position to be attacked had few artificial defences--the German
wired line defending Menin and Roulers was just west of Dadizeele and
Vijfwegen, and had already been pierced--but it was naturally strong.
The embankment of the huge main road formed good protection to the
enemy. But the key to the position was a hillock half-way between
the road and Vijfwegen--Hill 41. Sixty feet above the surrounding
country, crowned with several farms and their outbuildings, which had
been strengthened with concrete, it was at once invaluable to the
enemy and an excellent defensive position in fighting of this nature,
when very little artillery was available to shake its machine-gun
detachments prior to the infantry assault. With plenty, even of field
artillery, it would not have been a very formidable obstacle, while a
concentration of heavy artillery would have blown the defenders off
its crest. But the big guns were still far behind.
At 7-30 a.m. the 108th Brigade passed through the troops of the
109th. The 9th Irish Fusiliers was on the right, the 12th Rifles on
the left, and the 1st Irish Fusiliers in reserve, eight hundred yards
behind the leading battalions. Each had one section of machine-guns
and one Stokes mortar attached. The advance encountered considerable
machine-gun fire from Hill 41 and the Menin-Roulers Road. Despite
this, north of the hill it went forward in splendid fashion. The
men of the 12th Rifles fought their way through the Zuidhoek Copse,
and reached the Menin-Roulers Road by 10-30 a.m. Touch being gained
here with the 9th Division, the 12th Rifles, according to previous
agreement, took over from its troops as far north as Klephoek
Cross Roads. On the right the 9th Irish Fusiliers reached the
Gheluwe-Vijfwegen Road, and pressed on south of the latter village
and past the southern flank of Hill 41. But upon the hill itself the
German machine-gunners resisted all attacks. On the right of the
9th Irish Fusiliers the 29th Division made great strides, despite
machine-guns distributed in depth all along its front. Though it did
not take Gheluwe, and was unable to do so all day, its left flank
reached the Gheluwe-Vijfwegen Road in touch with the 108th Brigade.
At last the 9th Irish Fusiliers also reached the Menin-Roulers Road,
at Kezelberg, and attempted to work up it and obtain touch with
its comrades of the 12th Rifles, a thousand yards further north,
thus surrounding Hill 41. One strongly held farm-house, with twelve
prisoners, was taken at 12-30, but thereafter fire from the hill
prevented any move northward.
The capture of Hill 41 evidently required a serious effort. General
Coffin arranged with the 9th Division that its 50th Brigade R.F.A.
should support an attack with a barrage of smoke and high explosive.
Behind this one company of the 12th Rifles was to advance at 4 p.m.
The Riflemen, in face of heavy fire, went forward most gallantly.
The German resistance was equally determined. For every hedge there
was a battle, the bayonet being frequently used. Thirty-one prisoners
were taken, and about the same number of dead Germans counted after
the attack. The crest, however, could not be reached, a line being
established just short of it. But the strength of the German defence
had been under-estimated. The story of Mœuvres was repeated with
regard to this battalion. Before reinforcements could move up a heavy
German bombardment came as prelude to a counter-attack, estimated at
three hundred strong. Atop the hill it was held by the fire of Lewis
guns, but, with their superiority of numbers, the Germans pushed
round on either flank, rendering the position untenable. At six
o'clock the company was compelled to fall back. Its casualties had
not been heavy considering the fierce nature of the fighting.
The 107th Brigade had reached the line of Becelaere by the morning,
and had been ordered to push up a battalion on the right of the 108th
Brigade in the afternoon. The 2nd Rifles had attempted to advance
upon Klythoek, on the Menin-Roulers Road, but had been held up by
heavy machine-gun fire. Another attempt to advance was planned for
the morning of October the 1st. This time there was more effective
artillery support, two batteries of 6-inch howitzers being able to
shell Hill 41 at long range. To attack the hill, two companies of
the reserve battalion, the 1st Rifles, were brought up. The 12th
Rifles was to co-operate on the left, and the 2nd Rifles of the 107th
Brigade on the right. The 9th Division was to endeavour to cross
the Menin-Roulers Road and capture Ledeghem, on the Menin-Roulers
Railway. The new attack was launched at 6-15 a.m. in heavy mist. On
the right the leading companies of the 2nd Rifles lost direction.
The commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel Bridcott, was killed while
attempting to reorganise them. On the left also the attack failed.
On Hill 41, however, the companies of the 1st Irish Fusiliers,
fighting their way desperately forward in face of heavy resistance,
reached Twigg Farm, just short of the crest, and captured that
place with twenty-two prisoners. Further they were unable to go in
face of the machine-gun fire. The fire from the eastern slope of
the hill was also causing serious trouble to the troops of the 9th
Division, now approaching the Menin-Roulers Railway. After capturing
Ledeghem the Lowland Brigade made an attempt to turn Hill 41 from the
north, to aid the 36th Division, but was beaten off in turn by the
irrepressible machine-guns.
One more attempt finally to clear the obstinate hill was made that
day by the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers of the 109th Brigade, swinging
in from the north. It was unsuccessful in its object, but it achieved
another not less important. The Germans were about to launch a heavy
counter-attack on the exposed right flank of the 9th Division, when
this diversion checked them. The affair is thus reported in the
_History of the 9th (Scottish) Division_:
"Lieut.-Colonel Smyth saw the Germans collecting troops for a great
counter-stroke, and the K.O.S.B. were bracing themselves for a
desperate resistance at Manhattan Farm, when the timely arrival of
the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, who made a most heroic attack on Hill
41 from the north, scared the enemy and turned his efforts solely to
defence. Though the Inniskillings failed to capture the hill, their
plucky effort probably saved the K.O.S.B., and so great was the
admiration of the latter and the troops of the Ninth Division who
witnessed the attack, that the G.O.C. at their request wrote at once
to the Thirty-sixth Division expressing the admiration and thanks of
the officers and men of the Ninth."
Local counter-attacks did come against Twigg Farm, to be beaten off
with loss by the company of the 1st Irish Fusiliers which held it.
That night the 109th Brigade relieved the 108th.
The action of this day and of those following cannot be understood
without a brief survey of the general situation. The British advance
of the first two days, at its greatest point, from east of Ypres to
the Menin-Roulers Road, had been eight miles. The Germans had been
broken and thrown into confusion. But the very rapidity of the
Allied advance, over such roads as those which crossed the welter
of the old Ypres Salient, had created new difficulties. It was hard
enough, as has been related, to bring guns forward. But that was by
no means the main difficulty, even where the artillery was concerned.
Batteries in an advance go forward only. The limbers which feed them,
the lorries which feed the limbers from the train, must go forward
and backward. Therein lay the real trouble. The roads were choked.
The only tolerable among them, because, bad though they were, the
remains of the old _pavé_ held them together, were the Menin and
Zonnebeke Roads. Upon each was a solid mass of transport, which often
for hours at a time remained immobile. A few days after the events
already recorded, wagons of the 107th Brigade took thirty-six hours
to proceed from Potijze Château to Terhand. Captain Walker thus
describes the Zonnebeke Road on the night of the 30th of September:
"I had never previously realized the number and variety of vehicles
which move in support of three Divisions; indeed, I think this
road fed only the 9th and 36th Divisions.[61] There were limbers
by scores with rations; there were G.S. wagons with forage for the
battalion transports forward; there were R.E. wagons, mess-carts,
guns and ammunition; there were lorries stuck in shell-holes in the
road, and the cause of most of the trouble. On every odd bit of
ground bordering the road were French cavalrymen. The surface and
the language were equally bad, and there was mud everywhere. I had
to wind my way through these troubles for several miles. During my
journey there was practically no movement of the traffic. It had
taken 'C' Company's transport fourteen hours to do the six miles
from Ypres to the Ridge, and the Company bivouacked on the road for
a night. A Gotha flew down that road at midnight, dropping bombs
at regular intervals. I'm glad I missed that. There must have been
many casualties, for that road was a mass of animals and men. Why
only one Gotha was out that night beats me. 'D' Company, which
was supposed to be with the advancing infantry, was held up with
everybody else. Major Wood, the O.C., was panic-stricken, having the
General's orders to be in action at a stated time and place, and,
putting eight guns on pack mules, set off across the desolation.
I believe about four guns did eventually come into action, but a
couple of mules got into shell-holes from which they could not be
extricated, and had to be despatched."
On the one hand, then, the Germans, now driven back to the fringe of
civilized and unbroken country, with roads and railways behind them,
were enabled to make some hasty attempts at reorganization; on the
other, the Allies, having overrun their supplies, were yet under the
necessity of keeping up steady pressure, to prevent the enemy from
improving and settling down upon those positions. Doubtless the enemy
had expected to be driven back and eventually to form up upon the
line of the Lys, but he had been driven back much more quickly than
he had anticipated, and was now anxious lest his troops should fall
back piecemeal upon the river, and its line be prematurely forced,
as the British line of the Somme had been forced in March. He was
therefore bringing up fresh troops, and, above all, artillery, with
the support of which a complete change had appeared in the fighting
quality of his infantry. The next fortnight was to be marked by a
constant see-saw, by desperate, if minor, stroke and counter-stroke.
Little more ground was to be won by the Allies till they had mastered
the difficulties behind them, pushed forward adequate artillery and
ammunition for a new "full-dress" attack to provide the initial
momentum for a great new advance.
On October the 2nd, the day after its relief of the 108th Brigade,
the 109th experienced the strength of the enemy's artillery and his
determination. At 5 p.m. a heavy barrage of artillery of all calibres
fell upon the front line, upon Dadizeele, and all approaches. Half
an hour later the German infantry advanced to the attack. The force
of the barrage had caused a withdrawal from some forward positions.
These the enemy penetrated, but was quickly driven out with the
bayonet. By night the line was completely restored.
It was during this attack that Captain G. J. Bruce, D.S.O., M.C.,
Brigade Major, 109th Brigade, making his way forward through the
barrage to ascertain the position, was killed. Captain Bruce was
one of the Division's original officers, and his total service with
it now amounted to over four years, except for a few months in
1917, when he had been Brigade Major of the 47th Infantry Brigade,
16th Division. His quickness and cleverness, and his wonderful eye
for country, which filled many a good professional soldier with
envy, made him a very fine example of the "civilian" staff officer.
His personal bravery was quite proverbial among all ranks of the
Division. He was one of those rare and fortunate men who do not seem
to require a mental effort, a summoning of resolution, to face great
danger. He walked into it as naturally and as unconcernedly as he
walked into his office. By all who knew him well George Bruce will
long be remembered as a sagacious soldier and a fine spirit.
The next three days passed without further attempt at progress on the
front of the 36th Division. All along the line, indeed, the advance
was held up, and preparations were in train for an important new
attack. For this it was necessary that the troops should have some
preliminary rest. On the night of the 4th the 108th Brigade again
relieved the 109th, while the 107th was relieved by troops of the
35th Division. On the 7th the 109th Brigade moved back across the
devastation to a camp between Ypres and Poperinghe, where baths and
clean clothes could be provided, and training for the new battle
carried out. The 107th Brigade had not such good fortune, as it was
retired as far only as Polygon Wood, and accommodated in canvas
trench shelters.
Meanwhile artillery had moved up in force. By October the 7th there
was in position covering the 36th Division's frontage its own
Divisional Artillery, the 113th Army Brigade, and three batteries of
the 4th French Cavalry Division. Medium trench mortars, including the
6-inch Stokes, had also been brought forward in face of extraordinary
difficulties. The enemy's artillery was very active, and the shelling
in its intensity now recalled the days of the big battles of trench
warfare.
On October the 11th, after an intense artillery preparation, in which
the trench mortars took part, two platoons of the 9th Irish Fusiliers
captured Goldflake Farm, with fourteen prisoners and three light
machine-guns. This very strong "pill-box," on the southern slope
of Hill 41, had defied all previous attempts. It did not on this
occasion remain long in our hands. At evening, after a tremendous
bombardment, the enemy launched an attack on the hill. Not only was
Goldflake Farm retaken, but from Twigg and Mansard Farms, on the
crest, our men were driven out. An immediate counter-attack caused
Twigg Farm to change hands for the third time. Next morning before
it was light a patrol got back Mansard Farm, with another prisoner
and another machine-gun. That was the last of the local fighting. All
things were now prepared for attack upon a very different scale.
The 35th Division, it has been recorded, had come into line on the
right of the 36th. At the same time the 29th, its old right-hand
neighbour, had been moved up to its left flank, from Klephoek
northward, and now separated it from the 9th Division. The Second
Army and the Belgians were now to attack with the objective of the
Lys. This operation, if successful, would almost certainly cause the
enemy to evacuate the great industrial cities of Lille, Roubaix, and
Tourcoing.
The first general objective of the II. Corps was the
Courtrai-Ingelmunster Railway. Upon this the 36th Division was
directed, from the Lys on the right to the northern skirts of the
town of Heule. It had also upon its front two other small towns,
Moorseele and Gulleghem. The three were in a straight line from west
to east; Moorseele being about two and a half miles from the present
position, Gulleghem four and a half, and Heule six. The attack was
to be carried out by the 107th Brigade on the right, and the 109th
on the left. To the former was attached the 121st, and to the latter
the 150th Field Company, while each had a company of the Machine-Gun
Battalion. A section of each Field Company was in readiness to bridge
the Heulebeek if necessary. The Divisional Reserve consisted of the
108th Brigade, the 36th Machine-Gun Battalion (less two companies),
the 16th Rifles (Pioneers), the 122nd Field Company, two platoons
of VIII. Corps Cyclists, and a company of the 104th Machine-Gun
Battalion. Each Brigade was to attack with one battalion in line, one
in support, and one in reserve. The Division's frontage was about a
thousand yards, though on the objective of the Courtrai-Ingelmunster
Railway it grew to fifteen hundred.
With the artillery now at the disposal of the Division, and the
considerable heavy artillery at that of the II. Corps, the barrage
was to be something like the barrage of old days. There was, in fact,
one field gun or howitzer to a little more than twenty yards. There
was to be no preliminary bombardment. The barrage was to come down
two hundred yards in front of the forming-up line of the infantry
three minutes before Zero, and to begin to creep forward at that
hour. It was to move at a rate that would have seemed incredible a
year ago, one hundred yards in two minutes, with a pause of fifteen
minutes every fifteen hundred yards. East of Moorseele the field
artillery barrage was to halt from Zero plus 115 minutes to Zero plus
132 minutes, then to cease. Upon this line the infantry was to remain
an hour, to allow the support battalions to pass through the leaders,
and batteries of field artillery to move up west of the town and aid
the next advance.
At two o'clock on the morning of October the 14th the attacking
troops were formed up east of the Vijfwegen-Zuidhoek Road, in
trenches hastily dug by the Pioneers and 122nd Field Company. At the
same hour the 108th Brigade began a quiet withdrawal, leaving its
outposts on Hill 41 in position. The batteries of the field artillery
were in position close up to the front line. Even then their final
barrage east of Moorseele would be at almost extreme range for the
18-pounders.
At 5-32, on a morning most fortunately fine, but foggy, the thunder
of the barrage broke out all along the line. Three minutes later it
began to move forward, followed by the infantry. The mist made the
keeping of direction difficult, and the attackers eventually fell
behind the barrage. It had served its purpose, however, in keeping
down fire from the German front-line "pill-boxes," which had been
the cause of so much trouble in the last fortnight. Behind it the
infantrymen swept in with the bayonet, and the struggle that had so
long endured was ended in a few fierce moments.
East of the Menin-Roulers Railway the enemy had ample opportunity to
stop the advance, had he been the grim-fighting German of old. But
this he certainly was not, though the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division,
opposed to the 36th, was one of his best. By eight o'clock the 15th
Rifles, the leading battalion of the 107th Brigade, were upon the
outskirts of Moorseele. Their neighbours, the 1st Inniskillings, were
slightly ahead, having reached the Rolleghem-Cappelle Road north
of the village. Here they were held up by machine-gun fire from
the town, till the latter was captured by the 15th Rifles. Then a
line was swiftly consolidated east of Moorseele, while the support
battalions, the 1st Rifles on the right and 2nd Inniskillings on
the left, made ready to pass through, and the batteries were rushed
forward into action close to the western outskirts of the town. This
operation was splendidly accomplished. The first action of Major R.
R. Sharp, D.S.O., M.C., commanding A/173, on reaching Moorseele, now
being heavily bombarded, was to ascend the church steeple. From there
he saw a German 77-mm. battery doing great damage. Fire opened by his
battery, under his observation, killed the detachment and horses of
this battery and blew up its ammunition, dumped beside the guns. The
latter were captured in the subsequent advance.
All had gone excellently so far. Casualties had been light, and
strong positions had been taken with surprising ease. Prisoners
numbered over a hundred and fifty, while ten field guns and five
horses had also been taken. As for light machine-guns, with which the
whole German front had bristled, they were now tossed in heaps, too
large to be counted for the time being. It was a fine achievement to
have accomplished between half-past five and ten o'clock. But it was
the beginning only of the day's work.
At 10-35 the advance was resumed, in weather still misty. Once more
all went well. There had been no trouble with the Heulebeek, the
bridges across which had not been destroyed by the enemy. For over a
mile the two battalions went forward almost unchecked, driving in or
capturing the machine-gun groups that disputed their passage. Then,
a thousand yards west of Gulleghem, came resistance more severe. The
machine-gun fire had greatly increased, and the town was defended by
three lines of wire. Attempts were made to outflank the town from
north and south. They were partially successful, some of the wire
being negotiated, but not all. By midnight a line three hundred yards
west of Gulleghem was being consolidated, and arrangements were in
train for an attack at nine the following day with a fresh barrage.
On the right the troops of the 36th Division were in touch with
those of the 35th Division; on the left with those of the 29th, held
up in front of the village of Salines. To the north the attack had
been equally successful, and the whole line ran almost due north and
south, the Belgians, who had fought magnificently, having their heads
slightly in front. It had been a splendid day's work; for the Allies
one of the great days of the war. With casualties comparatively
light, they had driven back the enemy four miles upon a wide front,
capturing ten thousand prisoners and over a hundred guns.
The barrage for the 15th, in view of the events of the preceding day,
was slowed down slightly, to a hundred yards in three minutes. East
of Gulleghem there was to be a halt of three-quarters of an hour, to
allow the third battalion of each Brigade to pass through and advance
upon Heule.
With the first onrush resistance was swept aside. Twenty minutes
after Zero the 1st Rifles was across the Gulleghem-Wevelghem Road. A
few minutes later the 2nd Inniskillings had the whole of Gulleghem
in its area, save a few "pockets" of machine-guns which could be
cleared at leisure. On the left the 87th Brigade took Salines
about the same time. The 1st Rifles, destined to pass through its
sister battalion on the front of the 107th Brigade, did not move
up quite swiftly enough, and, as a consequence, lost the barrage.
The 9th Inniskillings, on the left, with the advantage of a good
main road in its area, pushed ahead north of the Heulebeek. By two
o'clock its troops were through Heule, and upon the objective of the
Courtrai-Ingelmunster Railway, east of the town. It had advanced a
mile and a half in two and a half hours.
The 1st Rifles, meanwhile, without artillery support, had been
brought to a halt by machine-gun fire from farms and hedges. A new
barrage was arranged, to commence at 4 p.m. Under its cover the
1st Rifles quickly overran the enemy machine-guns. By 7 p.m. the
battalion was on the railway embankment, in touch with the 9th
Inniskillings. On the left the 29th Division had likewise reached the
railway, while further north the 9th Division and the Belgians, who
had made one of the greatest advances of a day in face of opposition,
were miles east of it, in possession of Cuerne and Bavichove. The
left flank of the 35th Division, on the other hand, was a thousand
yards in rear of the right of the 107th Brigade.
The original intention had been to pass the troops of the 108th
Brigade, the head of which was on Moorseele at the time the morning's
attack was launched, through those of the other Brigades that
afternoon, to advance upon the Lys at Courtrai. The slight delay
above recorded caused a change in this arrangement. The 108th Brigade
was now ordered to pass through at dawn on the 16th, and establish
itself upon the Lys. During the night the 107th Brigade was ordered
to send out a patrol to discover whether the Germans were going to
make a stand west of the great canalized river.
By a curious coincidence there happened to be in the 2nd Rifles
an officer, Lieutenant F. Adams, who was a native of the city of
Courtrai. He was naturally chosen to make the reconnaissance, but
his intimate knowledge of Courtrai may not have been altogether an
advantage, for he made an investigation so thorough that he was not
back till the following morning, when the barrage for the advance of
the 108th Brigade had commenced. He had discovered that the Germans
had evacuated all the quarter of the city north-west of the river,
and blown up the five bridges which spanned the latter. When this
news, and also the information that the troops of the 29th Division
were on the Lys, north of the city, was received, the barrage was
instantly stopped and the 12th Rifles, with no other protection than
that of advanced and flank guards, marched down the road from Heule
into Courtrai.
There were scenes of great enthusiasm among the citizens, who came
forth into the streets from their cellars to greet the troops. But
the Germans were not far off. As the first British troops appeared
on the quays of the Lys, here eighty feet wide, heavy machine-gun
fire burst out all along the opposite bank. Anything more difficult
than to force a crossing, in the heart of a city full of friendly
civilians, to whom and to whose property it was desired to do as
little damage as might be, against German troops of the old mettle,
could not well be imagined. But the Germans opposite were not of the
old mettle, and General Vaughan decided to attempt to throw a bridge
across in broad daylight. The 122nd Field Company with its pontoons
had moved forward in readiness.
At 2 p.m. a smoke-screen was put down. Five minutes later, under
its cover, the first boat-load was across. The men leapt ashore
exultingly and drove the Germans from the bank. They had had scarce
a casualty. Another boat-load followed, and in an incredibly
short time the bridge was practicable for infantry. But the German
artillery soon had its range. The men of the 122nd Field Company, who
displayed the greatest gallantry, suffered heavy loss, and eventually
the bridge was destroyed. The party on the other shore, however, held
its ground without difficulty. The machine-gunners of "C" Company,
attached to the Brigade, distinguished themselves particularly in
this day's operations.
The obvious course now was to await darkness, throw another bridge
across, clear the city of Germans, and be ready to advance eastward
at peep of day. But news arrived meanwhile which altered these plans.
The Allies were not going to batter Courtrai. They were going to
force the Lys to northward, swing half-right, and drive down upon
the Scheldt, or Escaut, as this portion of the river is called by
French-speaking people, thus turning all the great industrial towns.
As a fact, the evacuation of Lille, the western-most, was proceeding
at this very moment. The 36th Division was required for the new
thrust, and was to be relieved at once by the 123rd Brigade of the
41st Division.
In these circumstances, as the bridgehead--without a bridge--was
useless to the relieving Brigade, the bridgehead party was quietly
and skilfully withdrawn at dusk and ferried across, together with
six captured Germans. The relief was complete by eight o'clock, and
the 108th Brigade marched back through new-won Heule and Gulleghem,
to the village of Drei Masten, north of the latter town. The other
Brigades had begun to move back earlier in the afternoon.
If the troops had been cheerful before, they were jubilant now. They
knew themselves infinitely better men than the enemy, who, still
supported by huge masses of artillery and by machine-gun fire which
General Jacob later described as "the heaviest ever experienced in
this war," never awaited their onslaught long. It was evident to all
now that the war would be over by Christmas. A little longer and the
German Army would be beaten to its knees.
The worst danger, the greatest obstacle to the launching of the
death-thrust, was now, in fact, behind, not in front. It lay in
those terrible roads of the devastated area far behind, with which
the troops, now upon the untouched soil of the richest agricultural
land in Europe, might feel they had no connection, but across which
every mouthful of food they ate and every bullet they fired had to
come. The strain upon the mechanism of the lorries was tremendous,
and they were constantly breaking down. The strain upon their drivers
was no less, and at this period they were less easy to replace than
their wagons. The loss of horses, too, from bombing, in the Artillery
and the Supply Services, had been very serious and could not be
replaced at the moment. To add to the difficulties of communication,
rations had to be brought up for the Belgian civilians, many of
whom had been left stripped bare and in danger of starvation by the
Germans, who took horses, carts, cattle, fowls, and all stores they
could lay hand upon, in their retreat. In the hardest work they were
ever called on to perform, the A.S.C., both mechanical and horsed
services, scored a triumph. The success they achieved was due in part
to good organization and industry. But it was due, above all, to the
grit and determination of the junior officers and drivers in the
performance of their tasks. The lorry-driver, who stuck for fifteen
hours at his wheel amid the ruts and turmoil of the Menin Road, as
many of them did, with bombs crashing down at night; the section of
the Divisional Train bringing up its wagons through valleys wreathed
and stinking with gas, these men in truth deserved well of the
infantrymen facing the bullets further forward, and were in truth
their companions-in-arms.
FOOTNOTE:
[61] This supposition is correct. The 29th Division used the Menin
Road.