3. From 91/710 to 93/712: Consolidation of the Arab authority
in the Oxus valley and its extension into _S_ughd;
4. From 94/713 to 96/715: Expeditions into the Jaxartes
provinces.
_The recovery of Lower _T_ukhāristān._
The first task before Qutayba was to crush the revolt of Lower
_T_ukhāristān. In the spring of 86/705 the army was assembled and marched
through Merv Rūdh and _T_ālaqān on Balkh. According to one of _T_abarī’s
narratives the city was surrendered without a blow. A second account,
which, though not explicitly given as Bāhilite, may be regarded as such,
since it centres on Qutayba’s brother and is intended to establish a
Bāhilite claim on the Barmakids, speaks of a revolt amongst some of the
inhabitants. This may perhaps be the more correct version, since we hear
of Balkh being in a ruinous condition four years later (_T_ab. 1206. 1).
The submission of Balkh was followed by that of Tīsh, king of Chaghāniān,
who had probably cooperated with Mufa_dd_al in the attack on Tirmidh the
year before. His action was, it seems, inspired by a feud with the king
of Shūmān and Ākharūn, in the upper valleys of the Surkhan and Penjab
rivers, against whom he hoped to use the Arab troops in return for his
assistance to them. Mufa_dd_al had actually projected an expedition
against Shūmān before his recall, and it was now carried out by Qutayba,
who was perhaps the more ready to undertake it since it assured the
safety of the southern approach to the Iron Gate. After the submission
of the King Ghīslashtān, who was of Turkish blood, according to Yuan
Chwang, Qutayba returned to Merv alone, leaving the army to follow under
his brother Sāli_h_, who carried out a number of minor raids on the way.
It is obvious that, in spite of Balādhurī’s imaginative account, these
raids must be located in the districts neighbouring on the Oxus. The
readings in _T_abarī’s narrative are, however, defective[43]. Having thus
isolated Nēzak in Bādghīs, the heart of the revolt, Qutayba spent the
winter months in negotiating with him through Sulaym “the Counsellor,”
an influential Persian whose skill in conducting the most difficult
negotiations proved more than once of the utmost value to Qutayba. Nēzak
was persuaded to surrender and was conducted to Merv, where peace was
concluded on condition that Qutayba would not enter Bādghīs in person. As
a precautionary measure however the governor arranged that Nēzak should
accompany him in all his expeditions. Thus for the moment at least, the
danger of an outbreak in Khurāsān was averted, in a manner honourable to
both parties, and the son of Pērōz took his way back to China to await a
more favourable opportunity[44].
_The Conquest of Bukhārā._
In the following year, Qutayba, first making sure of the crossings at
Āmul and Zamm, opened his campaigns in Bukhārā with an attack on Paykand.
From the expressions of Narshakhī, on whose history of this period we
may place more reliance since his details as a rule fit in with and
supplement the other histories, it can be gathered that the principality
of Bukhārā was weakened by civil war and invasion. During the minority of
_T_ughshāda and the regency of Khātūn, the ambitious nobles had struggled
between themselves for the chief power; most of the territories,
including Bukhārā itself, had been seized by the prince of Wardāna
and the remaining districts seem to have been brought under the rule
of Khunuk Khudāh, a noble who assumed the title of Bukhār Khudāh[45].
Paykand was thus more or less isolated and, from Narshakhī’s account,
seems to have been left to its fate. The battle with the _S_ughdians
related in _T_abarī is an obvious anticipation from the events of the
following year. After a siege of some two months the city came to terms
with Qutayba, who left it under a small garrison and, according to
_T_abarī’s version, began the return march to Merv. An émeute in Paykand,
however, brought him back at once. It seems reasonable to assume that
the citizens, imagining Qutayba’s attack to have been no more than an
isolated raid, tried to expel the garrison as soon as he retired. The
details given in Narshakhī, that on Qutayba’s advance towards Bukhārā a
certain citizen, enraged by the insulting conduct of the governor, Warqāʾ
b. Nasr al-Bāhili, attempted to murder him, are trivial and unconvincing.
Whatever the cause of the revolt may have been, however, Qutayba took a
terrible revenge. In accordance with mediaeval practice the renegade city
was sacked, its fighting men put to death, and its women and children
enslaved. The booty taken from this, the first of the great trading
cities of Central Asia to be forcibly captured by the Arabs, furnished
inexhaustible material for the exaggerated details of later tradition.
The most important part of the spoil was an arsenal of weapons and
armour, the excellence of which was such that the “forging of _S_ughd”
appears in contemporary verse alongside the traditional “forging of
David” for superlative craftsmanship[46]. With the consent of _H_ajjāj,
these weapons were not included in the division of the booty but used
to re-equip the army. The statement that there were only 350 suits of
armour in the whole army before this is, however, of Bāhilite provenance
and scarcely worthy of credence. The exemplary punishment thus meted
out by Qutayba to Paykand at the beginning of his career was a stern
warning to Nēzak and the Sogdians. Those who accepted Arab dominion would
be humanely treated, but any attempt at rebellion would be inexorably
crushed. Nevertheless the sentence on Paykand was somewhat mitigated in
the sequel, as Narshakhī adds that the captives were ransomed by the
merchants of Paykand on their return from the annual trading expedition
to China, and the city, after lying in ruins for many years, was
eventually rebuilt.
The disaster at Paykand roused the princes and merchants of Transoxania
to the danger of neglecting the invaders. The feud between Wardāna and
Bukhārā was patched up; round Wardān Khudāh, the central figure and
organiser of the struggle for independence, gathered the forces of all
the nearer principalities. Thus when Qutayba, on renewing his expedition
in 88/707, had taken the outlying town of Tūmushkath (not Nūmushkath,
which was the earlier name of Bukhārā) and Rāmīthana (or Rāmtīn), he
found his communications cut by the troops of Wardāna, Bukhārā, and
_S_ughd. It is not, perhaps, impossible that the prince of Farghāna
should have cooperated with the _S_ughdians, as stated in Madāʾinī’s
account. On the other hand the Arabic narratives are far from explicit,
and the _S_ughdians here referred to are much more probably those of
Kish than of Samarqand, a suspicion which is confirmed by the famous
punning order of _H_ajjāj: “Crush Kish, destroy Nasaf, and drive Wardān
back.” Narshakhī and Yaʿqūbī give an account of the negotiations between
_H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, representing Qutayba, and _T_arkhūn king of
_S_ughd, which is certainly to be put, with _T_abarī, after the conquest
of Bukhārā two years later. Throughout all these campaigns there is
manifest a tendency, common to the early chronicles of all nations,
to exaggerate the numbers and composition of the opposing forces. As
usual the Bāhilite account carries this to the point of absurdity by
introducing a Türgesh force of no less than 200,000 men, an obvious
anachronism, influenced by the later Türgesh invasions. The connection
is made clear by the mention of Kūr Maghānūn, whom we find nearly thirty
years later (_T_ab. II. 1602. 2) as “one of the chiefs of the Türgesh.”
The true account would seem to be that Qutayba did not attempt to fight
a pitched battle, but by dilatory tactics wearied out the allies and
gave time for their natural inclination towards disunion to operate,
then evaded them by a rapid march through the Iron Gate and, except for
a rearguard skirmish with the enemy’s cavalry, got his army clear across
the river at Tirmidh. The appointment of ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān ibn Muslim
to command the rearguard gives us the clue, as it was to this brother
that Qutayba regularly entrusted all the most difficult commands. In
the following year Qutayba was still unable to make headway against the
united forces of Wardān Khudāh, Kish and Nasaf, and after protracted
fighting (in spite of the double victory claimed by the Bāhilites)
returned to Merv. For this weakness he was severely reprimanded by
_H_ajjāj, who, with the aid of a map, drew up a plan of attack. The
invasion of 90/709 seems to have taken Wardān Khudāh by surprise, as the
Muslim army was able to advance at once to the siege of Bukhārā. There
is some ground for the conjecture, however, that the death of Wardān
Khudāh had occurred in the interval and that Qutayba was opposed only
by the local forces[47]. This may also explain the hesitation of the
forces of Samarqand to intervene. The battle before the walls of Bukhārā
is described by _T_abarī in a long Tamīmite tradition reminiscent of
the ancient “days,” but the actual capture of the city is left to be
inferred. This siege is transferred to Wardāna by Vámbéry (_cf._ _Heart
of Asia_ p. 52) probably on the authority of the Persian _T_abarī
(Zotenberg IV. 165), but Narshakhī, _T_abarī and all other authorities
quite definitely refer to Bukhārā. Abū ʿUbayda’s tradition (Bal. 420)
of capture by treachery is at best a confusion with the capture of
Samarqand. All the details given in Narshakhī relative to Qutayba’s
organisation of Bukhārā do not refer to this year; most probably the only
immediate measures taken were the imposition of a tribute of 200,000
dirhems and the occupation of the citadel by an Arab garrison.
A diplomatic success followed the victory at Bukhārā. _T_arkhūn, king
of Samarqand, opened negotiations with Qutayba, who was represented by
the commander of his Persian corps, _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, and terms were
agreed upon, probably on the basis of the old treaty made by Salm ibn
Ziyād. _T_arkhūn gave hostages for the payment of tribute and Qutayba
began the march back to Merv.
_Consolidation and Advance._
If the Arabs returned in the autumn of 90/709 elated with their success,
they were soon given fresh cause for anxiety. Nēzak, finally realising
that all hope of recovering independence must be extinguished if Arab
rule was strengthened in Khurāsān, and perhaps putting down to weakness
Qutayba’s willingness to gain his ends if possible by diplomacy,
determined on a last effort to overthrow Muslim sovereignty in Lower
_T_ukhāristān, at the moment when it was least to be expected. Having
obtained permission to revisit his home, he left Qutayba at Āmul and made
for Balkh, but escaped to _T_ukhāristān in order to avoid re-arrest. From
here he corresponded with the rulers of Balkh, Merv Rūdh, _T_ālaqān,
Fāryāb, and Jūzjān, urging them to undertake a concerted rising in the
spring. The king of Chaghāniān seems to have refused to countenance the
conspiracy, but the weak Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān was induced, possibly by
force, to make common cause with Nēzak, who hoped doubtless by this means
to unite all the subject princes in defence of their suzerain.
Qutayba’s army was already disbanded and the winter was setting in.
All that he could do was to despatch the garrison at Merv, some 12,000
men, under ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān, with instructions to winter in Balkh,
where they could counter any immediate move by Nēzak, and advance into
_T_ukhāristān in the spring. This resolute action made Qutayba master
of the situation and so intimidated the rebels that when, in the early
spring, the Arabs marched through the disaffected districts, scarcely a
blow was struck and the princes either submitted or fled. The inhabitants
were granted a complete amnesty except at _T_alāqān, concerning which
the traditions are hopelessly confused. According to one account, a band
of robbers were there executed and crucified, but it is possible that
it was selected for special severity because there alone the revolt had
openly broken out[48]. There was probably also some reorganization of the
administration of Lower _T_ukhāristān, in the direction of conferring
fuller powers on the Arab governors installed in each district, though
the native princes continued to exercise a nominal authority. From
Balkh, Qutayba marched forward and rejoined ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān. With the
assistance of the lesser princes they pursued and captured Nēzak, who was
subsequently executed on direct orders from _H_ajjāj, in violation of
Qutayba’s promise of pardon[49]. How little this action was condemned by
the prevailing spirit of the age, however, is shown by the contemporary
poems quoted by _T_abarī, lauding the “defender of the precincts of
Islam” and comparing his action to the measures formerly adopted against
the Jewish tribes of Madīna. Yet even at this time we find traces of
the new spirit that was to make itself more felt in later years, and
hear voices raised, like Thābit Qu_t_na’s, against the “treachery that
calls itself resolution.” _T_abarī inserts at this point the narrative of
the putting to death of the hostages of Jūzjān, in retaliation for the
murder of the Arab hostage in Jūzjān, a much more excusable incident.
Balādhurī puts it at the beginning of Qutayba’s career, however, as
though it belonged to the first pacification of Lower _T_ukhāristān, so
that its position in _T_abarī may possibly be due to its superficial
similarity with the case of Nēzak. The results of this expedition were
of the greatest importance: not only was Nēzak’s scheme crushed and
Lower _T_ukhāristān henceforth incorporated in the Arab Empire, but also
for the first time Arab authority was extended over the Jabghu and his
immediate vassals in the Oxus basin. The former, exiled to Damascus,
formed a valuable hostage against any attempt to regain independence,
and it seems not improbable that the king of Chaghāniān was made regent
for the young Jabghu (see above, p. 9), ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān was appointed
governor of Balkh, in order to supervise the administration of the new
province.
Qutayba had hardly returned to Merv before he was called to deal
with yet another revolt. The king of Shūmān, taking advantage of the
difficulties of the Arabs, or of their absence in the southern mountains,
had re-asserted his independence in spite of the conciliatory offers of
Sāli_h_ ibn Muslim. The full weight of Qutayba’s power was now employed
to crush him. His stronghold was attacked with siege artillery, the
king himself killed in a sortie and the garrison put to the sword.
From this point Shūmān and Ākharūn gradually drop out of the Arabic
narratives altogether. Qutayba then resumed his march through the Iron
Gate, reduced the districts of Kish and Nasaf, and revisited Bukhārā.
There seems to have been continual friction between the Arab garrison
and the population[50] and it was felt that a drastic re-organisation
was necessary. _T_ughshāda, though still a youth, was restored to the
position of Bukhār-Khudāh, and the leaders of the hostile party (more
probably that of Khunuk Khudāh than Wardān Khudāh) were put to death.
By this means, Qutayba no doubt hoped to secure compliance and docility
in the native administration. _T_ughshāda had been raised to the throne
by the Arabs and it might be expected that he would side with them in
consequence. A more solid guarantee for the permanence of the conquest,
however, was the establishment of a military colony in Bukhārā. Following
the precedent set in the colonization of Merv, Arabs were lodged in the
houses of the inhabitants, and it is said that the latter were encouraged
to attend the Friday prayer and behave as Muslims by the distribution
of a small gratuity. The Kushan merchants left their homes and property
rather than comply with these orders and founded a new city outside the
walls, but it is evident that the Islamization of the city was not yet so
thorough as the traditions assert[51]. The building of the Mosque and the
organization of the Friday services are dated by Narshakhī in 94 A.H.,
which points to a further organization of the city after the capture of
Samarqand. The organization of the new territories proceeded, in fact,
_pari passu_ with the extension and consolidation of the conquests.
So long as the Arab authority was insecure in Cisoxania, it was out
of the question to establish either military colonies or an elaborate
administration beyond the river. Consequently, it was only now that the
failure of Nēzak’s revolt had definitely secured the Arab dominion in the
former Ephthalite lands that it was possible to take the decisive step of
settling an Arab garrison in Bukhārā. The regularity with which each step
followed the last suggests that it was done according to a prearranged
plan, or at least that some attention had been devoted to the question
of the administration of the occupied territories in the event of the
success of the military operations.
Qutayba’s reorganization was not confined to the civil government,
however, but extended to the army as well. Hitherto the jealousy of
the Arabs for their exclusive rights as a warrior caste had strictly
limited the number of Persians in the armies, apart from the clients
and camp followers. Thus we are told (_T_ab. 1290. 20) that the armies
of Khurāsān at this period were composed as follows: from Ba_s_ra-Ahl
al-ʿĀliya, 9,000; Bakr, 7,000; Tamīm, 10,000; ʿAbd al Qays, 4,000; Azd,
10,000: from Kūfa, 7,000: and alongside these 47,000 Arabs only 7,000
Mawālī, commanded by _H_ayyān-an-Naba_t_ī, who is called variously a
Daylamite and a native of Khurāsān. Now, however, Qutayba imposed,
first on Bukhārā, and later on each successive conquest, the obligation
of providing an auxiliary corps of local troops, amounting usually to
some ten or twenty thousand men, to serve with the Arab armies. It is
possible, if the story be true, that this was suggested by the precedent
set by Saʿīd b. ʿOthmān in the conquest of Samarqand, but more probable
that it represents an entirely new departure in the East, though it had
long been a practice in other spheres of the Arab conquests.
We are given no hint of the motives which led to the adoption of the
new system, though it would seem that they must have been of some
force. Possibly it was no more than a desire to keep the native armies
occupied in the service of the Arabs rather than risk a revolt in their
rear. _H_ajjāj and Qutayba perhaps realised too that the Arab forces
by themselves, after taking four years to reduce Bukhārā alone, were
insufficient to ensure success in the greater task of subduing Samarqand.
Under the new system—which recalls Pan-chʿao’s famous aphorism “Use
barbarians to attack barbarians”—each conquest in turn made the next more
easy. The rapidity of Qutayba’s later conquests in contrast with the
early period is thus explained. It is just possible that in this plan
Qutayba had an ulterior motive as well: the formation of a Persian army,
trained on the same lines as the Arab forces, but more devoted to the
person of the governor and able to take his part against the Arabs. How
very nearly this plan succeeded, even in Qutayba’s own case, the sequel
was to show.
The practice of raising native levies, once started, appears to have
become general in Khurāsān. We have no information as to when the local
forces of Khurāsān and Lower _T_ukhāristān were incorporated in the army,
nor in what proportions, but we have frequent evidence of their presence
and increasing prestige in the wars of the next forty years[52]. On the
other hand, though contingents from the towns of Sogdiana were used by
later governors if they were available, as in 106 and 112 A.H., in view
of the weaker hold of the Arabs on Transoxania Sogdian troops never
formed a regular division of the Arab forces up to the end of the Umayyad
period. This distinction between the two subject Iranian groups became,
as will be seen, of some importance when the ʿAbbāsid propaganda began to
tamper with the loyalty of the armies of Khurāsān.
While Qutayba was occupied with the new organization of Bukhārā, a
detached force, sent under ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān from Kish to Samarqand to
exact from _T_arkhūn the tribute agreed upon in the previous year,
successfully accomplished its mission. ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān, after restoring
the hostages to _T_arkhūn, rejoined his brother at Bukhārā, whence they
returned to Merv for the winter.
One important vassal of _T_ukhāristān, who had long been a thorn in the
side of _H_ajjāj, still remained unsubdued. This was Rutbīl or Zunbīl,
the Turkish ruler of Zābulistān[53]. In 91, the viceroy united Sijistān
to the province of Khurāsān, with instructions to Qutayba to undertake a
campaign in person against Rutbīl. In the following year, therefore, the
expeditions into Transoxania were interrupted, and the army again marched
southwards. To Qutayba’s great relief (for he disliked to undertake a
campaign against this formidable foe who had made Sijistān “an ill-omened
frontier”) Rutbīl hastened to tender his submission, and at the same
time sent an embassy to convey his homage to the Emperor of China[54].
Recognition of Arab suzerainty over Zābulistān involved of course only
the payment of a fixed tribute, and no attempt was made at a permanent
occupation.
Meanwhile a serious situation had arisen in _S_ughd. The merchants and
nobles of Samarqand had resented the weakness of their king and the
payment of tribute: in Qutayba’s absence the party for resistance _à
outrance_ gained the upper hand, and _T_arkhūn, deposed on the ground
of incapacity, committed suicide. The choice of the electors fell on
Ghūrak[55], a prince of whom we would gladly have known more. Under
the ever increasing difficulties with which he was confronted during
his twenty-seven years of rule, his consummate handling of the most
confused situations shows him to have been at once statesman and patriot,
and preserved his kingdom from repeated disaster. The action of the
_S_ughdian nobles, however, the Arabic account of which is confirmed by
the Chinese records, constituted a challenge to Arab pretensions which
Qutayba could not be slow in answering. These considerations clearly
disprove the partial tradition of Abū ʿUbayda (Bal. 422), to the effect
that Qutayba treacherously attacked Khwārizm and Samarqand in spite of
the treaties of Saʿīd ibn ʿOthmān, and the argument based upon it by van
Vloten in _La Domination Arabe_, must also, in consequence, be somewhat
modified.
The winter of 93/711, therefore, was spent in preparations for an
expedition against Samarqand, but before the opening of the campaigning
season, Qutayba received a secret mission from the Khwārizm Shāh, who
offered to become tributary if the Arabs would rid him of his rebellious
brother Khurrazādh. Qutayba agreed, and after publicly announcing his
intention of invading _S_ughd, suddenly appeared at Hazārasp. The
followers of the Khwārizm Shāh were persuaded to offer no resistance
for this year, at least, and accepted the terms, which included, in
accordance with the new scheme, the provision of a corps of 10,000
ablebodied men as well as the usual tribute. Qutayba remained at the
capital[56] until the army was collected, while ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān was
employed, according to _T_abarī, in reducing the king of Khāmjird, who
from the parallel account in Balādhurī is to be identified either with
Khurrazādh, or at least with his party. The Persian _T_abarī adds a
long and doubtless legendary narrative of his surrender. Four thousand
prisoners were taken and butchered, probably by order of the Khwārizm
Shāh.
The later history of Khwārizm under Qutayba’s rule is an unhappy one.
His first governor Iyās b. ʿAbdullah, proved too weak for his post,
and on Qutayba’s withdrawal the Khwārizmians rose in revolt and put to
death the king who had betrayed them. Iyās was recalled in disgrace,
together with the Persian _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, who had been associated
with him, and Qutayba’s brother ʿAbdullah (in Balādhurī ʿUbaydullah) was
appointed as temporary regent until, after the capture of Samarqand, a
strong force under al-Mughīra b. ʿAbdullah could be sent to effect a
reconquest. Qutayba’s retribution on this occasion exceeded even the
terror of Paykand and Shūmān. We are told by Al-Bīrūnī that the educated
classes and more cultured elements in Khwārizm were slaughtered almost
to extinction. He refers this by implication to the second expedition of
Qutayba (though it does not appear that the governor led the expedition
in person), which is borne out by what we know of Qutayba’s methods in
similar cases, while there is no instance in his career of such an action
on a first conquest. It was in all probability the educated classes
(including no doubt the hierarchy) who led the revolt against the traitor
king and thus met with the severest punishment. The dynasty, however, was
maintained, and it is not improbable that the Arab colony of which we
hear shortly afterwards was settled in Khwārizm at the same time[57].
The booty from the first expedition into Khwārizm was enough to satisfy
Qutayba’s troops, who demanded to be allowed to return to their homes,
but a sudden thrust at Samarqand promised such success that Qutayba
and his leaders decided to make the attempt. The _S_ughdian army had
apparently been disbanded, and under cover of a false movement of the
advance guard, the Arabs marched directly on Samarqand. The advance guard
under ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān numbered 20,000 men, while the main body included
the new Persian contingents from Khwārizm and Bukhārā. The march occupied
only a few days and the slight resistance encountered did not prevent
the Arabs from proceeding at once to invest the city. Ghūrak conducted
the defence with vigour, however, and appealed to Shāsh and Farghāna for
assistance, reminding them that Samarqand was the bulwark of the Jaxartes
valley. A strong force was despatched from Shāsh with the intention of
making a surprise attack on the Arab camp, but was ambushed at night by a
picked troop of Arabs and almost annihilated. This reverse, together with
the continuous bombardment to which they were subjected, disheartened
the _S_ughdians, but the wall had been breached and an entrance almost
effected by the Arabs, stoutly assisted by their new Iranian divisions,
before Ghūrak sued for peace. Qutayba’s demands were unexpectedly
light—an annual tribute, stated in widely varying amounts, and a strong
corps of _S_ughdians, together with a stipulation that the city should be
cleared of its fighting men while the Arabs built a mosque and celebrated
the ritual prayers. Once within the gates, however, Qutayba refused to
restore the city to Ghūrak: a strong garrison was established in the
citadel, under the command of ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān (so Yaʿqūbī; in _T_abarī
ʿAbdullah) and drastic orders were issued excluding all unbelievers
except under strict surveillance, doubtless with the intention of
avoiding a repetition of the friction that had occurred at Bukhārā.
Ghūrak either could not or would not place himself in the humiliating
position of _T_ughshāda, and with his retinue, accompanied possibly by
the merchants, withdrew from Samarqand altogether and built a new city,
Farankath, some four farsakhs distant in the direction of Ishtīkhan[58].
Qutayba’s double-dealing on this occasion, however, tarnished his
reputation among both Persians and Arabs, far more than his severity to
Paykand and Khwārizm, and left a rankling memory in _S_ughd. In order
to avoid the stigma of treachery attaching to their hero the Bāhilite
tradition relates this expedition in an entirely different version[59].
Qutayba, we are told, after marching down the right bank of the Oxus
and collecting his army at Bukhārā, advanced to Rabinjān where he was
met by the _S_ughdians under Ghūrak, supported by the troops of Shāsh
and Farghāna and the Turks. The enemy retired on Samarqand but engaged
in constant rearguard actions, the city being finally entered by force
after a decisive battle in the suburbs. Though this account is at first
sight borne out to some extent by Ghūrak’s own narrative in his letter
to the Emperor of China, in which he claims an initial success against
the Arabs, but was unable to prevent their advance, both statements must
be regarded as exaggerations in opposite interests. At all events it is
quite certain that none but _S_ughdian troops were involved at first.
A further development of the Bāhilite tradition has given rise to some
controversy. According to this, Ghūrak appealed for help not only to
Shāsh but also to the Khāqān, and the squadron sent from Shāsh appears
as a force of Turks, commanded by a son of the Khāqān. This is, of
course, an obvious exaggeration on the former narrative. In the Turkish
Orkhon inscriptions, however, an expedition under the prince Kül-tegin
into Sogdiana “to organize the Sogdian people” is mentioned, following
on a successful campaign against the Türgesh in 710/711. Marquart
endeavours to prove that this expedition occurred in 712 and is, in
fact, corroborated by the Bāhilite tradition. Professor Houtsma has
raised several objections to this view, the most important being that
the chronology of the inscriptions has to be manipulated to allow of
this date, as the natural date to assume from the context is at latest
711. These, together with the considerations mentioned above, render
Marquart’s hypothesis absolutely untenable.
A second suggestion has been put forward by Professor Barthold, to which,
however, Professor Houtsma’s objections would apply with equal force[60].
In the narrative of the historian Yaʿqūbī (II. 344), there is a brief
notice as follows: “Qutayba appointed his brother ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān ibn
Muslim governor of Samarqand, but the men of Samarqand treacherously
revolted against him, and Khāqān, king of the Turks, attacked him also.
He wrote to Qutayba, but Qutayba waited until the winter cleared, then
marched to join him and routed the army of the Turks.” Professor Barthold
takes the view, therefore, that this is the expedition referred to in the
inscriptions, and attributes the failure of the Turks to the disastrous
effects of a winter campaign in a devastated land, which so severely
disabled them that they could not face the formidable army that took the
field under Qutayba in the spring. It is questionable, however, how far
Yaʿqūbī’s narrative may be trusted. None of the other historians give the
slightest hint of this invasion, nor were the results such as we should
expect after a _S_ughdian revolt. There was no ruthless reconquest, no
stamping out of rebellion in blood. Neither does the general tenor of
Yaʿqūbī’s accounts of Qutayba inspire confidence. They are not only
confused in detail and chronology—the capture of Samarqand, for instance,
is dated 94 A.H.—but in some cases are taken from what we know to be the
Bāhilite tradition, and in others, such as the narrative under discussion
and the account of the conquest of Khwārizm, follow a tradition which
seems irreconcilable with our other information. While it cannot be said
definitely therefore, that Yaʿqūbī’s statements in this case contain no
truth, it is certainly preferable to regard them as a later development
of the narrative, on the lines of the Bāhilite tradition.
If the chronological objections raised by Professor Houtsma are sound,
there remains still a third possible solution, which, however, as there
is no corroborative evidence from either the Arabic or Chinese sources,
must remain nothing but a hypothesis. It is surely quite tenable that
Kül-tegin’s “organization of the Sogdian people” had something to do
with the deposition of _T_arkhūn and appointment of Ghūrak. With Sogdian
trade playing the most important part which we know in the Turkish lands,
it would be well worth while to try to prevent the Arabs from obtaining
control over it. The very unexpectedness of the description given to this
expedition shows clearly that there was some motive for “organization”
and it is difficult to see what other motive there could have been. These
circumstances would render it quite probable that Ghūrak did, in fact,
appeal to the Khāqān for assistance against the Arabs, but it seems that
the growing power of the Türgesh barred the way into Sogdiana against the
Northern Khanate for the remainder of its short existence.
By the conquest of Samarqand Qutayba finally established his position
in Transoxania. It must not be assumed, however, as many of the Arab
historians give the impression of assuming, that the holding of Samarqand
meant the conquest of _S_ughd. All that had been done was to settle an
Arab garrison in a country as yet unfriendly. It was the duty of the
commanders at Samarqand gradually to extend their authority over the
whole district of _S_ughd by expeditions and razzias[61]. There was
thus a radical difference between the conquest of Bukhārā and that of
Samarqand. The former was the result of a series of campaigns in which
the resources of the country had been exhausted and the province annexed
piecemeal. The whole population had become subjects of the Arabs and
were under constant surveillance: _T_ughshāda himself held his rank on
sufferance and was compelled to maintain at least an outward show of
loyalty. But Samarqand had been captured in one swift thrust; _S_ughd
as a whole was still unsubdued and only from policy acknowledged the
suzerainty of the Arabs for the time being. “Ghūrak at Ishtīkhan was
free to turn either to the Arabs or to the Turks”[58]. Nevertheless
in the years that followed there is evidence that friendly relations
were formed between the Arab garrison and many of the local leaders and
inhabitants[62]. The whole country, however, had suffered terribly in the
constant invasions and counter invasions. A contemporary poet gives a
vivid picture of its dissipated wealth, its ruined and desolate lands:
“Daily Qutayba gathers spoil, increasing our wealth with new
wealth: A Bāhilite who has worn the crown till the hair that
was black has whitened. _S_ughd is subdued by his squadrons,
its people left sitting in nakedness.... As oft as he lights in
a land, his horse leave it furrowed and scarred.”
_The Expeditions into the Jaxartes Provinces._
It might perhaps have been expected that Qutayba’s next object after the
capture of Samarqand would be to establish Arab authority in _S_ughd as
firmly as had been done in Bukhārā. It would probably have been better
in the end had he done so, but for the moment the attractions of the
“forward policy” which had already proved so successful were too strong.
Instead of concentrating on the reduction of _S_ughd, it was decided to
push the frontiers of the Empire further into Central Asia, and leave
the former to be carried out at leisure. Qutayba therefore crossed to
Bukhārā, where 20,000 levies from Khwārizm, Bukhārā, Kish, and Nasaf
had been summoned to meet him, and marched into _S_ughd. If there was
a Turkish army wintering in the country, it offered no considerable
resistance to the advance of the Arabs. In _S_ughd Qutayba divided his
forces into two corps. The Persian levies were sent in the direction
of Shāsh, while he himself with the Arabs marched on Khujanda and
Farghāna. Our information is brief and lacking in detail. Of the northern
expedition we are told only that they captured Shāsh and burnt the
greater part of it. Qutayba’s own force had to overcome some resistance
at Khujanda, but eventually reached Kāsān, where it was rejoined by the
other. The geographers refer also to a battle fought by Qutayba at Mīnak
in Ushrūsana, but against whom is not clear[63]. _T_abarī (1440. 7)
preserves a tradition that Qutayba appointed an Arab resident, ʿI_s_ām b.
ʿAbdullah al-Bāhilī, in Farghāna. If this is true, as seems not unlikely,
the appointment was probably made during this year. The details of the
tradition are quite unacceptable, however. No Arab governor would ever
have taken up his residence in a hill-pass in the remotest district
of Farghāna, completely cut off from his fellow-countrymen. One of
Balādhurī’s authorities carries this or a similar tradition further by
crediting Qutayba with the establishment of Arab colonies as far as Shāsh
and Farghāna. Here again at most only temporary military outposts can be
in question. On the other hand, the extraordinary success achieved by the
Arabs on this expedition is apt to be overlooked, and Qutayba might well
have imagined, as he returned to Merv, that the latest conquests were as
permanently annexed to Khurāsān as Samarqand and Khwārizm.
The helplessness of their Turkish suzerain in face of the victorious
Arabs, however, caused a revival in Transoxania of the tradition of
Chinese overlordship. Appeals to the Khāqān were of no avail, and in the
minds of the Sogdian princes, seeking for some counterpoise to the rapid
extension of the Arab conquests, the idea of appealing directly to the
Emperor was slowly maturing. Though no definite steps in this direction
had as yet been taken, some inkling of it may have reached Qutayba. The
Arabs were now familiar with China through the sea-borne trade of the
Persian Gulf and at least after, if not before, their conquest of the
cities which were already becoming the headquarters of Central Asian
commerce, must have become aware of the close commercial relations
which these cities maintained with China. Under these circumstances,
Qutayba (or possibly _H_ajjāj) decided to send a mission overland to
the Chinese court, possibly to prevent their intervention in the West,
but more probably with the intention of promoting trade relations. As
the princes of Sogdiana and _T_ukhāristān were much more alive to the
advantages of preserving their commerce and to the dangers which might
befall it under the new government than the Arabs could have been, it was
probably on their suggestion that the embassy was sent. They would, of
course, have no difficulty in persuading governors of the character of
_H_ajjāj and Qutayba that their own interests also lay in safeguarding
and encouraging the trade which brought such wealth to Transoxania.
If the intervention of the Turks had been caused by their concern for
Sogdian trade, it became doubly important for the Arabs to show their
practical interest in its welfare. Apart from the immediate gain to the
treasury which would accrue, such an action might reasonably be expected
to secure the acquiescence of the Sogdians in Arab rule. The date of the
mission is fixed as 713 by the Chinese records, which add also that in
spite of the refusal of the envoys to perform the customary kow-tow it
was favourably received by the Emperor. Both statements are confirmed by
_T_abarī’s remark that the leader was sent to Walīd on his return, which
must therefore be dated between the death of _H_ajjāj and the end of
714[64]. Unfortunately the Arab records of the mission have been confused
with the legendary exploits of Qutayba two years later, becoming so
disfigured in the process as to be almost worthless. The wisdom of this
step must have been justified by its results, though there are no effects
apparent in our histories and the relentless march of Chinese policy was
not affected. This embassy is mentioned by the Arabic historians as if it
were an isolated incident, but it was, as I have shown elsewhere[65],
only the first of many such sent by the governors of Khurāsān to maintain
friendly relations with the Chinese court. It cannot be doubted that
in the majority of cases at least the object of these missions was
commercial, particularly where joint embassies were sent with one or
other of the Sogdian principalities.
In the following year 95/714 the raids on the Jaxartes provinces were
renewed. It would seem on comparing Balādhurī’s account with _T_abarī
that Qutayba made Shāsh his headquarters and worked northwards as far
as Isbījāb. The prince of Shāsh appealed to China for assistance, but
without effect[66]. Qutayba’s plan therefore was to follow up the
important trade-route which led from Turfan down the Ili valley, along
the northern edge of the Thian-Shan mountains, through Tokmak and Tarāz
into Shāsh and Samarqand. Though the economic importance of controlling
this trade-route may have had its part in this decision, especially in
view of their new patronage of Sogdian trade, it is probable that this
was less in the mind of the Arabs than its strategic value as the road
by which the Central Asian Turks debouched on Transoxania. Towards the
end of the summer, the expeditions were abruptly interrupted by the news
of the death of _H_ajjāj, which had occurred in Shawwāl (June). Deeply
affected by the loss of his patron and not a little uncertain of the
effect on his own fortunes, Qutayba disbanded the army, sending garrisons
to Bukhārā, Kish, and Nasaf, and returned to Merv. Walīd, however,
allayed his fears by an encouraging letter, and made his province
independent of ʿIrāq. But the death of _H_ajjāj had affected Khurāsān too
deeply for such a simple remedy. The Arabs had gained wealth in their
expeditions, they were weary of the constant campaigns and anxious to
enjoy the comforts of peace. Factional feeling was merely slumbering,
and a new element of unrest had been added by a Kūfan corps under Jahm
b. Za_h_r, which had been transferred to Khurāsān from India by _H_ajjāj
in his last year. All parties among the Arabs were alienated from
Qutayba; even Qays had been estranged by his highhanded action in the
first place with the house of Al-Ahtam and again by his feud with Wakīʿ
b. Abī Sūd, the chief of Tamīm[67]; moreover, they were suspicious of his
medizing tendencies. Amongst the Persians he was popular, but _H_ayyān
an-Naba_t_ī, though restored to his position in command of the Persian
troops, had not forgiven Qutayba for his disgrace at Khwārizm. It seems
extraordinary that the general himself should have been blind to any
internal danger and was entirely confident in the loyalty of his army.
On re-opening the campaign in 96/715, therefore, his only precautions
consisted in the removal of his family and personal property from Merv to
Samarqand and the posting of a guard on the Oxus, in view of a possible
restoration to favour of Yazīd b. Muhallab. It is unlikely that Qutayba
could have had in mind the possibility of Walīd’s death; what he feared
was more probably a _rapprochement_ between the Caliph and his heir
Sulaymān, who was his bitter enemy.
The object of this last campaign was probably the complete subjugation
of Farghāna. Having established his authority over the important section
of the Middle Jaxartes and its trade route, it remained now to round off
his conquests by extending it also over the central trade route between
Farghāna and Kashgaria. The account which _T_abarī intends to convey,
however, is that Qutayba marched first into Farghāna and from there led
an expedition against Kashgar, with complete success. In an article
of mine published in the _Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies_
(II. 467 ff.), all our evidence for this expedition has been critically
discussed, and shown to be against the authenticity of the tradition. It
is unnecessary, therefore, to do more than summarise very briefly the
arguments there put forward. (1) None of the historians earlier than or
contemporary with _T_abarī contain any reference to a raid on Kashgar,
and even _T_abarī’s own statement is not borne out by the authorities
on which it professedly rests. Only one of these relates an expedition
to Kashgar, and that under the command of an unknown leader. (2) The
interval between the opening of the campaign and the death of Qutayba
in Farghāna in August or September does not allow time for such an
expedition, especially in view of the mutinous attitude of the army after
the death of the Caliph. (3) The Chinese account of Arab interference
in Farghāna cannot refer, for chronological reasons, to Qutayba’s
expedition, and in any case is silent on any attack on Kashgaria.
That an expedition of this sort should have been attributed to Qutayba
is not surprising, in view of the tradition of the embassy to China, and
of the great renown which attached to his memory. Later tradition[68]
recounted that _H_ajjāj pledged the governorship of China to the first
to reach it of his two governors in the East, Mu_h_ammad b. Qāsim and
Qutayba. “_S_īn” was, of course, not the sharply defined country of
our days, but rather a loose term for the Far East, including even the
Turkish lands in the North-East. Qutayba had probably done little more
than make preparations for his campaign, perhaps to the extent of sending
out minor raiding expeditions, when the news of the death of Walīd
brought everything to a standstill.
The historians give the most contradictory accounts of the events that
followed; according to Balādhurī the new Caliph Sulaymān confirmed
Qutayba in his command but gave permission to the army to disband.
_T_abarī’s narrative, with which Yaʿqūbī’s in general agrees, is fully
discussed by Wellhausen (274 ff.), together with a valuable analysis
of Qutayba’s position. The story of his highhanded negotiations with
Sulaymān is too well known to need repetition. Finding the army
disinclined to follow him, he completely lost his head and roused the
mutiny in which he was killed. The Persian levies, who were inclined to
side with him, were dissuaded by _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, and at the last
only his own family and bodyguard of Sogdian princes remained faithful.
The death of Qutayba marked not merely the end of the Arab conquests in
Central Asia for a quarter of a century, but the beginning of a period
of retrogression. Under Wakīʿ b. Abī Sūd, his successor[69], the armies
melted away. Mukhallad, the son of Yazīd b. Muhallab and his lieutenant
in Transoxania, carried out summer raids on the villages of _S_ughd,
but an isolated attempt on the Jaxartes provinces by ʿOmar’s governor,
Al-Jarrā_h_ b. ʿAbdullah, met with ignominious failure. It is possibly
to this that the tradition, mentioned by Barthold (_Turkestan_ 160),
of the disaster met with by a Muslim army refers. On the other hand an
embassy was sent in the name of the Caliph to renew relations with the
Chinese court, and a third in concert with the kingdoms of _T_ukhāristān
and Samarqand, etc., during the reign of ʿOmar[65]. There is mention also
of an expedition into Khuttal which regained some territory. But it was
Qutayba, with _H_ajjāj at his back, who had held his conquests together,
and when he disappeared there was neither leader nor organisation to take
his place. The history of the next decade clearly shows how loose and
unstable was the authority of the Arabs. It was force that had made the
conquests, and only a settled policy of force or conciliation could hold
them. The first was absent. “Qutayba in chains at the world’s end is more
terrible to us than Yazīd as governor in our very midst” is the graphic
summary put into the mouths of the conquered, while of Rutbīl, king of
Zābulistān, we are told expressly that after the death of _H_ajjāj “he
paid not a cent of tribute to any of the governors of Sijistān on behalf
of the Umayyads nor on behalf of Abū Muslim.”[70].
Nor was ʿOmar’s policy a true policy of conciliation, based as it was not
on the maintenance of the Arab conquests but on the complete evacuation
of Transoxania. His orders to that effect were of course indignantly
rejected by the Arab colonists in Bukhārā and Samarqand, but together
with his appointment of the feeble and ineffective ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b.
Nuʿaym al-Qushayrī as governor, such a policy was naturally construed
by the Sogdians as mere weakness, and an invitation to regain their
independence. In addition to the embassies to China, to be related in
the next chapter, and possibly also some negotiations with the Türgesh,
Ghūrak sought to win back his capital by playing on ʿOmar’s piety.
The Caliph sent envoys to the princes of Sogdiana calling on them to
accept Islām, and Ghūrak, outwardly professing his adherence, sent a
deputation to ʿOmar urging that as “Qutayba dealt with us treacherously
and tyrannically, but God has now caused justice and equity to reign” the
city should be restored to the _S_ughdians. The commonsense of the judge
appointed to try the case on ʿOmar’s instructions by the governor of
Samarqand, Sulaymān b. Abiʾs-Sarī (himself a mawlā), solved the problem
in an eminently practical manner, and we are told that his decision, so
far from being “malicious,” was satisfactory to both the Arabs and the
_S_ughdians, if not perhaps to Ghūrak. Beyond the remission of kharāj, it
is doubtful whether ʿOmar’s administration benefited the subject peoples
in the slightest, and the reaction which followed his brief reign only
aggravated the situation. Already before its close the _S_ughdians had
withdrawn their allegiance[71].
Thus within six years from the death of Qutayba, much of his work was
undone. He had laid the foundations on which the later rule of Islām
was built, and laid them well, though his own superstructure was too
flimsy to withstand the tempests of the years ahead. But the fault was
not entirely, perhaps not even chiefly, the fault of the builder. He was
snatched away before his work was done, even if in his latter years he
tended to neglect everything else for military glory. As we shall see,
there was no peace in Transoxania until other men arose, great and strong
enough to adopt and carry out the best of his plans. The ruthlessness
and ferocity of his conquests, however, have been much exaggerated.
He was always ready to use diplomacy rather than force if it offered
any hope of success, so much so that his lenience was misconstrued on
occasion by both friends and foes. Only in cases of treachery and revolt
his punishment came swift and terrible. That he did not hesitate to take
vengeance on his private enemies is to say no more than that he was an
Arab. It was not without reason that in later days the Muslims of Central
Asia added Qutayba’s name to the roll of martyrs and that his tomb in
Farghāna became a favourite place of pilgrimage[72].
To sum up the position in Central Asia in the years immediately following
Qutayba’s conquests:—
(1) Lower _T_ukhāristān and Chaghāniān formed an integral part
of the Arab Empire.
(2) _T_ukhāristān, now in the decay of its power, was held
as a vassal state, together with the Transoxine provinces of
Khuttal, Kumādh, etc., where, however, the Arab authority was
much weaker.
(3) In Sogdiana, Bukhārā was regarded as a permanent conquest
and gradually colonized; _S_ughd was still hostile territory
held by strong outpost garrisons in Samarqand and Kish,
connected to Bukhārā by minor posts.
(4) Khwārizm as a military power was negligible and was
permanently colonized.
(5) The kingdoms beyond the Jaxartes remained independent,
hostile, and relatively strong, supported by the Turkish power
to the North East and also by the intervention of China.
(6) Ushrūsana, though unsubdued, does not seem to have offered
any obstacle to the passage of Arab armies.
(7) The existing dynastic houses were everywhere maintained, as
the representatives of the conquered peoples and vehicle of the
civil administration. The actual administrative and financial
authority in their territories, however, passed to the Wāli,
or agent of the Arab governor of Khurāsān[73].