_The Conquest of Lower _T_ukhāristān._
Arab legend relates that the Muslim forces, pursuing Yazdigird from the
field of Nihāwand in 21/642, had already come in contact with the “Turks”
of _T_ukhāristān before the death of ʿOmar. But the final destruction
of the Sāsānid power and first imposition of Arab rule on Khurāsān only
followed ten years later, by the troops of ʿAbdullah ibn ʿĀmir, ʿOthmān’s
governor in Ba_s_ra. The Ephthalites of Herāt and Bādghīs submitted
without a blow, and the first serious check to their advance was met in
the Murghāb valley, when al-A_h_naf b. Qays with an army of 4,000 Arabs
and 1,000 Persians found himself opposed by the organised forces of
Lower _T_ukhāristān and was compelled to retire on Merv-Rūdh. A second
expedition under al-Aqraʿ b. _H_ābis, however, defeated a weaker force in
Jūzjān, and subsequently occupied Jūzjān, Fāryāb, _T_ālaqān, and Balkh.
Small divisions made plundering raids into the neighbouring territories,
_e.g._, to Siminjān (a town within the frontiers of _T_ukhāristān proper,
governed by a Turkish prince, the Ruʿb Khān), and to Khwārizm, not always
with success; on the other hand, a successful raid was made on Māyamurgh
in Sogdiana in 33/654, which is mentioned by Abū ʿUbayda alone of the
Arabic authorities[21]. A general insurrection which broke out shortly
afterwards, headed by a certain Qārin, apparently a member of the noble
Persian family bearing that name, seems to have been instrumental in
causing the Arabs to evacuate Khurāsān for a time[22], though several
raids are recorded of ʿAlī’s governors between 35 and 38 A.H. These
earliest “conquests,” in fact, were little more than plundering raids on
a large scale, the effect of that movement of expansion whose momentum
was carrying forward the Arabs irresistibly. According to the Chinese
records, which, however, require to be used with caution at this
point, the retreat of the Arabs in 655 was followed up by the army of
_T_ukhāristān who reinstated Pērōz, the son of Yazdigird, as titular king
of Persia[23].
When peace was restored to Islām by the recognition of Muʿāwiya in
41/661, Ibn ʿĀmir was again entrusted with the conquest of Khurāsān. The
same rough and ready methods were adopted as before; there appears to
have been no definite plan of invasion, and even the order of governors
is uncertain. Not only are traditions relating to A.H. 32 and 42 confused
by the different authorities, but a vast amount of the whole is affected
by tribal legends. Hints of fierce resistance are given from time to
time. Qays b. al-Haytham, the governor’s first legate, was faced with a
fresh revolt in Bādghīs, Herāt, and Balkh. He recaptured the latter and
in retaliation destroyed the famous shrine of Nawbahār, but left the
Ephthalites to be dealt with by his successor, ʿAbdullah ibn Khāzim.
It is clear that there was no ordered progress of the Arab arms until
Khurāsān was brought under the administration of Ziyād b. Abīhi. After
an experimental division of the province under tribal leaders, a policy
obviously dangerous and quickly abandoned, Ziyād, realising the danger of
allowing Persian nationalism a free hand in the East, backed up by the
resources of _T_ukhāristān, centralised the administration at Merv, and
organised a preventive campaign. In 47/667 his lieutenant, al-_H_akam b.
ʿAmr al-Ghifārī, opened a series of campaigns directed to the conquest of
Lower _T_ukhāristān and Gharjistān, in the course of which he crossed the
Oxus and carried his arms into Chaghāniān, and drove Pērōz back to China
in discomfiture. On his death, three years later, the conquered provinces
rose in revolt, but the new governor, Rabīʿ b. Ziyād al-_H_ārithī, the
first conqueror of Sijistān, after reducing Balkh, pursued the Ephthalite
army into Quhistān and dispersed it with great slaughter. Again an
expedition was sent across the Oxus into Chaghāniān (clearly indicating
the connection between Chaghāniān and Lower _T_ukhāristān), while another
directed down the left bank of the river secured Zamm and Āmul, the two
chief ferry points for Sogdiana. Mention is also made of a conquest of
Khwārizm. All these expeditions seem to point to a methodical plan of
conquest, arranged between Ziyād and his governors; the Arab power was
thus firmly established, for the moment at least, in the Cisoxanian
lands, and the way prepared for the invasion of Sogdiana. A further
important step was the colonisation of Khurāsān by fifty thousand
families from Ba_s_ra and Kūfa[24], settled according to Arab practice
in five garrison towns, for the double purpose of securing the conquests
already made, and providing the forces for their further extension.
_The First Invasion of Bukhārā and _S_ughd._
Although at this junction Ziyād himself died, his policy was carried on
by his sons, in particular by ʿUbaydullah. Scarcely any governor, not
even _H_ajjāj, has suffered so much at the hands of the traditionists
as the “Murderer of _H_usayn,” though his ability and devotion to the
Umayyads are beyond question. It is not surprising therefore that his
earlier military successes should be so briefly related, in spite of
their importance. Yet as he was no more than 25 years of age when
appointed by Muʿāwiya to the province of Khurāsān on probation, and only
two years later was selected to fill his father’s position in ʿIrāq, his
administration must have been markedly successful. The policy of Ziyād
had now firmly secured Khurāsān and made it feasible to use it as a base
for the extension of the conquests into the rich lands across the river.
On his arrival at Merv, therefore, in the autumn of 53/673, the new
governor began preparations for an invasion of Bukhārā.
The Shao-wu principality of Bukhārā was at this time second in importance
only to Samarqand. It included not only the greater part of the oasis
(“al-Bukhārīya”) then much more thickly populated than now, but also
the great emporium of Paykand, which controlled the trade route across
the Oxus at Āmul. Of its early history we have two accounts, both
confused, inaccurate in detail, and often conflicting. From these it
may be gathered that the prince, who held the high Turkish title of
Shād[25], resided at Paykand, the citadel of Bukhārā being either founded
or restored by the Bukhār Khudāh Bidūn, probably in consequence of the
Arab invasions. This prince at his death left a son only a few months
old on whose behalf the regency was exercised by the Queen-Mother. This
princess, known under the title of Khātūn (a Turkish form of the Sogdian
word for “lady”) became the central figure in the local traditions,
which represent the Arab invasions as occurring precisely during the
period of her regency. This version is the one accepted by Balādhurī,
Yaʿqūbī, and Narshakhī, but though not altogether devoid of historical
value, it is certainly misplaced, and the true account of the early
conquests must, for cogent reasons, be sought in the brief and widely
divergent narratives of _T_abarī. In the first place the Khātūn-legend,
like all such legends, has grown by natural elaboration of detail,
as in the account given by Narshakhī of Khātūn’s administration of
justice and by continual accretions from other streams of tradition, as
seen, on comparing the narratives of Balādhurī and Narshakhī, in the
introduction of episodes of Ibn Khāzim and Muhallab. Critical examination
also reveals alternative traditions and chronological inconsistencies,
as, for example, the birth of _T_ughshāda after the invasion of Saʿīd
b. ʿOthmān, Khātūn’s reign of 15 years, and others mentioned below.
There is clear evidence of the late compilation of the tradition in the
frequent references to “_T_arkhūn, King of _S_ughd,” though his reign
did not begin until considerably after 696[26]. It may be noticed that
in the variant account of the conquests prefixed to the Persian edition
of Narshakhī and ascribed to An-Naysābūrī there is no reference at all
to Khātūn. Moreover there are indications that _T_abarī was aware of the
local tradition and completely rejected it; this, at least, would account
for the unusual practice of specifying Qabaj-Khātūn as “the wife of the
king” in 54 A.H. Even Balādhurī rejects the more fantastic developments
of the legend. _T_abarī’s narratives, however, require to be collated
with the additional material in Balādhurī, who has not relied entirely
on the local tradition. The germ of the native version is probably to be
found in a confusion of the Arab conquests with the later war between
Bukhārā and Wardāna[27], whose echoes are heard in Qutayba’s invasions
thirty years after.
In the spring of 54/674 ʿUbaydullah b. Ziyād crossed the river and
marched directly on Paykand. After a partial success, he led his forces
forward towards Bukhārā and severely defeated the army of the Bukhār
Khudāh. From _T_abarī’s narrative, which relates only that two thousand
men of Bukhārā, skilful archers, were taken by ʿUbaydullah to Ba_s_ra,
where they formed his personal guard, it is left to be inferred that a
treaty was concluded under which the Bukhār Khudāh became tributary. The
local tradition magnifies the expedition by adding a siege of Bukhārā
(during the winter) and bringing in an army of Turks to assist Khātūn,
but confirms the success of the Arabs. ʿUbaydullah’s practice on this
occasion of forming a bodyguard or retinue of captives appears to have
been a common one. ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān ibn Samura had previously brought
captives from Sijistān to Ba_s_ra, where they built him a mosque, and
later governors of Khurāsān continued the practice, as will be seen. In
this may be recognised perhaps the germ of the Turkish guards recruited
by the later ʿAbbāsid Caliphs.
ʿUbaydullah’s successor, Aslam b. Zurʿa, remained inactive, but in
56/676 Saʿīd b. ʿOthmān, who had obtained the governorship of Khurāsān
by importuning Muʿāwiya, carried the Arab arms more deeply into
Transoxania, defeated the _S_ughdians in the open field and reduced
their city. Taking fifty young nobles as hostages, he retired from
_S_ughd and subsequently occupied Tirmidh, an important fortress on the
Oxus controlling the main North and South trade route, having presumably
marched through the Iron Gate. The conquest of _S_ughd was thus
definitely co-ordinated with that of Chaghāniān. _T_abarī’s narrative is
strangely vague and abrupt; it contains no mention of Bukhārā nor any
definite reference to Samarqand, except for the statement that it was the
objective of Saʿīd’s expedition. Using this narrative alone, one would be
inclined to suspect that the city captured by Saʿīd was not Samarqand but
Kish (since it has been established by Marquart that Kish was formerly
called _S_ughd), and that the reference to Samarqand was due to a later
misunderstanding of the name[28]. On the other hand, both the local
tradition and Abū ʿUbayda speak of a siege of Samarqand by Saʿīd, though
their narratives are far from being in agreement in detail, and there
are other indications of confusion between Saʿīd and Salm b. Ziyād. All
accounts except Narshakhī’s, however, agree that the hostages who were
carried by Saʿīd to Madīna and there murdered him were _S_ughdians[29].
Balādhurī’s tradition of Saʿīd’s expedition is as follows. On his
crossing the river, Khātūn at first renewed her allegiance, only to
withdraw it again on the approach of an army of Turks, _S_ughdians,
and men of Kish and Nasaf, 120,000 strong. Saʿīd, however, completely
defeated the enemy and after a triumphal entry into Bukhārā, marched on
Samarqand, his forces swelled by Khātūn’s army, besieged it for three
days and made it tributary. On his return he captured Tirmidh and while
there received the tribute due from Khātūn and the allegiance of Khuttal.
Narshakhī’s account is the same in essentials, adding only a number of
imaginative details.
Saʿīd was unable to retain his position in Khurāsān, and for five
years the conquests were stayed (except for summer raids) under the
indolent Aslam b. Zurʿa and the avaricious ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. Ziyād.
In 61/680-681 Yazīd I appointed Salm, another son of Ziyād, to Khurāsān
and Sijistān. Eager to emulate his brother, Salm, even before leaving
Ba_s_ra, announced his intention of renewing the expeditions into
Transoxania and enlisted a picked force on the spot, including such
tried leaders as Muhallab b. Abī _S_ufra and ʿAbdullah b. Khāzim. From
a poem preserved in the _H_amāsa of Abū Tammām[30] it would appear
that somewhat unwilling levies for this expedition were raised even in
Mesopotamia. Towards the close of the winter a surprise attack was made
on Khwārizm, with some success. _T_abarī gives two versions of this
expedition, the first of which is a highly embroidered one from the
Muhallabite tradition. During the same year, Salm marched into _S_ughd
and occupied Samarqand, where he appears to have made his headquarters
over the winter. Balādhurī mentions a subsidiary raid on Khujanda under
Aʿshā Hamdān, in which, however, the Muslims were defeated, and a
_S_ughdian revolt which was crushed with the loss of its leader, here
called Bandūn. The name is almost certainly to be read as that of the
Bukhār-Khudāh, Bīdūn[31], and in view of the silence of _T_abarī raises
rather a difficult problem. It may be conjectured that what Balādhurī
intended was a revolt of the Bukhariots, combined with _S_ughdian forces.
The origin of this statement may perhaps be sought for in the Bukhārā
tradition, which Balādhurī does not follow in his general account of the
expeditions of Salm, but which he may have tried to work in with the
other. On the other hand he nowhere refers to Bīdūn as the Bukhār Khudāh.
As related by Narshakhī and Yaʿqūbī Salm’s expedition is directed solely
against Bukhārā. Khātūn, on promising her hand to _T_arkhūn, receives a
reinforcement of 120,000 men from _S_ughd, and Bīdūn (here still alive)
recruits an army in “Turkistān,” including the “Prince of Khotan.” After
severe fighting, the Muslim forces, numbering 6,000, kill Bīdūn and rout
the unbelievers, taking so much booty that the share of each horseman
amounts to 2,400 dirhems. Khātūn, thoroughly humbled by this decisive
proof of Arab invincibility, sues for peace and pays a heavy tribute.
Beyond the fantastic exaggerations and incoherencies of the legend, there
is nothing inherently improbable in a Bukhariot revolt. In support of
this view, it may be remarked that the death of Bīdūn at this point would
agree with the slender data we have for the internal wars which probably
formed the original basis of the Khātūn-legend, and would also provide
a foothold for the later developments of the tradition. Without fuller
evidence, however, we can get no further than reasonable conjecture.
After the conquests made by Salm, which probably occupied the years 682
and 683, it seemed as though the Arabs were on the verge of imposing
their rule on Transoxania when civil war broke out in the heart of the
Empire. Even allowing for the fact that these expeditions were little
more than raids, the comparative ease with which the Arabs held to ransom
the richest cities in the country is astonishing. The explanation can
lie only in their mutual exclusiveness. There is not a hint of united
action in the field in _T_abarī’s accounts[32]. A factor which may have
exercised some influence was that Sogdiana was completely isolated during
these years and unable to look for support from without. The power of
the Western Turks was broken by the Chinese armies between 645 and 658;
Chinese forces are said to have reached as far west as Kish, and the
Emperor Kao-Tsung had officially annexed all the territories formerly
included in the Turkish dominions. In the latter year the provinces of
Sogdiana and the Jaxartes were organized in sixteen districts, including
a “Government of Persia” under the Pērōz already mentioned, situated
apparently in Sijistān, possibly even in Eastern Khurāsān[33]. The
immediate practical effect of this change of status was of little moment,
but her nominal annexation gave China a prestige which was destined to
exercise immense influence in determining the attitude of the peoples
of Sogdiana to the Arabs. From 670 to 692, however, the new power of
Tibet held the Chinese armies in check in the Tarim basin and cut off
all possibility of Chinese intervention in the West. The Sogdian princes
were thus thrown on their own resources, and, ignorant as yet of the
danger behind the Arab raids, they seem to have bowed to the storm. It
must not be forgotten that the cities had never before met such an enemy
as the Arabs. They had been accustomed to plundering raids by Turks, who
disappeared as quickly as they came, and who, disliking to undertake
a lengthy siege, were easily appeased by a ransom. Familiar with such
nominal annexations, they would naturally adopt the same tactics against
the new invaders. Had the Arabs maintained their pressure, there was thus
every prospect that Transoxania would have been colonised with a tithe of
the expense and loss incurred in its reconquest and would have become as
integral a part of the Muslim dominions as Khurāsān. But the opportunity
was lost in the fratricidal struggles of the factions, and when the Arabs
recommenced their encroachments, the determined resistance offered to
their advance showed that the lessons of the first invasion had not been
lost on the native princes.
_The Withdrawal of the Arabs._
The tribal feuds which occupied the Arabs of Khurāsān left the princes of
Transoxania free to regain their independence. It would seem even that
Lower _T_ukhāristān was not only in part lost to the Arabs but that local
forces took the offensive and raided Khurāsān. On the gradual restoration
of order under Umayya, however, Lower _T_ukhāristān again recognised,
at least in name, the Arab suzerainty[34]. Meanwhile, a strange episode
had occurred in Chaghāniān. Mūsā, the son of ʿAbdullah ibn Khāzim, sent
by his father to secure a safe place of retreat, had captured the strong
fortress of Tirmidh, from which he continually raided the neighbouring
districts. His exploits were worked up in popular story into an epic
of adventure, in which legend has almost overlaid historical fact. The
most fantastic exaggerations were devised in order to provide a suitable
background for the incredible deeds of valour indulged in by the hero.
But in truth his actual exploits were sufficiently amazing, and all
the efforts of the forces of the local rulers (magnified in the legend
to huge armies of “Turks and Hay_t_al and Tibetans”), although aided
on one occasion by a force of Khuzāʿites, were unable to dislodge him.
For fifteen years he remained in secure possession of his stronghold, a
refuge for the disaffected from all sides, and a standing example of the
helplessness of the rulers across the river.
In 77/696 Umayya re-opened the campaigns into Transoxania. An expedition
to Khwārizm was successful[35], another across the Oxus narrowly escaped
destruction. Balādhurī mentions, with doubtful accuracy, a successful
raid on Khuttal, which may, however, only be a variant on this. An
expedition directed against Bukhārā, which is said to have had Tirmidh
as a second objective, was hurriedly abandoned on the fresh outbreak of
revolt under Bukayr b. Wishā_h_ in Khurāsān. Though the revolt failed
in its immediate object, a most serious situation had been created.
Bukayr had endeavoured to rally the Persians to his side by promising
all converts remission of Kharāj. The opportunity was undoubtedly seized
by large numbers, and the pacification occasioned some negotiations
between Umayya and Thābit b. Qu_t_ba, an influential noble who acted as
spokesman for the mawālī of Eastern Khurāsān. Umayya’s reimposition of
Kharāj, however, caused widespread unrest[36] and made prompt action
necessary. ʿAbdul-Malik at once recalled his hapless kinsman (in 78) and
made Khurāsān a dependency of ʿIrāq under the government of _H_ajjāj.
This far-sighted governor had already dealt with a desperate situation
of the same sort in ʿIrāq and reduced it to outward tranquillity. The
same extreme measures that had been adopted there were not necessary in
Khurāsān; its troubles were due less to insurgent mawālī than to the
factions of Qays. _H_ajjāj was himself a strong Qaysite, but he was
not the man to put party before the interests of the State. The first
necessity was to appoint a governor who could be trusted to repress both
forms of anarchy and in Muhallab such a man was available. His tribe of
Azd was not yet strong enough in Khurāsān to cause the risk of opening a
new channel for factional strife, and his military reputation fitted him
for carrying out _H_ajjāj’s policy of active campaigning as an antidote
to internal dissension. It is possible that _H_ajjāj had in mind from the
first a definite conquest of Transoxania, but for a few years nothing
more than sporadic raids took place.
Muhallab’s first care, however, was to encourage the settlement of Azd
in Khurāsān, until he was supported by a division equal in size to any
other. After securing the crossing at Zamm in 80/699 he marched into the
district of Kish and there established his headquarters for two years,
besieging the city and sending out minor expeditions under his sons
in various directions[37]. Yazīd was sent with a force into Khuttal,
nominally to co-operate with a pretender to the throne, but met with
little success; _H_abīb, sent against Rabinjān, found himself countered
by the forces of Bukhārā. Balādhurī’s account of Muhallab’s campaigns is
ludicrously exaggerated; _T_abarī quotes Muhallab himself as discouraging
any attempts at effecting a conquest. On the death of his son al-Mughīra
in Rajab 82, he came to terms with Kish and abandoned his expeditions,
but died in the following Dhuʾl-_H_ijja (Jan. 702) near Merv Rūdh, and
was succeeded by his son Yazīd.
The Muhallabite tradition which represents the appointment as distasteful
to _H_ajjāj but popular in Khurāsān is almost certainly influenced
by the later hostility between Yazīd and _H_ajjāj. It is probable,
however, that _H_ajjāj, whose policy was to keep his governors dependent
on himself, viewed with suspicion the concentration of authority in
the hands of the leader of a powerful hostile clan, but he was content
to wait for the meantime and give Yazīd sufficient rope to hang
himself. Except for an attempted raid on Khwārizm Yazīd carried out no
expeditions, while under his government the precarious internal balance
of Khurāsān was soon upset. The quarrels of Qays had been composed by
Muhallab, but they were in no mood to bear with the leadership of the
parvenu Azd; already before the death of Muhallab, in spite of the
Tamīmite eulogy quoted by _T_abarī, there was a moment when the feud
threatened to break out. The pronounced factional leanings of Yazīd
strained the situation still further. Even more serious was the attitude
of the mawālī. _H_urayth, the brother of Thābit ibn Qu_t_ba, had been
left behind at Kish by Muhallab to collect the tribute, but on his return
was scourged for disobedience. The disgrace cut _H_urayth deeply; too
late Muhallab realised the gravity of his act, but _H_urayth spurned his
overtures and with Thābit fled to Mūsā at Tirmidh. Yazīd retaliated with
foolish severity by maltreating their families, which only inflamed the
general resentment. _H_urayth and Thābit used their influence to stir
up an insurrection to act in concert with Mūsā; the king of Chaghāniān
and his Ephthalite confederates headed by Nēzak, prince of Bādghīs,
readily responded, while Persian interest was excited by the return to
_T_ukhāristān of the son of Pērōz, the heir of the Sāsānids. It seems
probable that even some of Qays were a party to the scheme[38]. Seizing
an opportunity when Yazīd was occupied with the rebel forces of Ibn
al-Ashath on the borders of Khurāsān the revolt broke out. Yazīd was
powerless to prevent the expulsion of his residents from Chaghāniān and
Lower _T_ukhāristān, and Mūsā is said to have refrained from invading
Khurāsān only from fear that it would fall into the hands of Thābit and
_H_urayth. Even the success claimed for Yazīd in Bādghīs can have been
of little effect[39]. Fortunately for the Arabs, Mūsā’s jealousy of
Thābit and _H_urayth caused a division in the ranks of their enemies, but
though the brothers both fell in battle, the danger remained acute. The
son of Pērōz still lingered in _T_ukhāristān, and even at Damascus there
was some uneasiness about the situation in Khurāsān[40].
To _H_ajjāj it was obvious that the first essential was to reunite
the Arabs and that so long as Yazīd was in power that was impossible.
The only difficulty was to find a governor acceptable to Qays and to
substitute him without risking a revolt of Azd. It was solved with
admirable ingenuity. By ordering Yazīd to transfer his authority to
his weaker brother Mufa_dd_al, _H_ajjāj at one stroke removed the man
from whom he had most to fear and prevented him from uniting Azd in
opposition, although Yazīd realised that the fall of his house was
imminent. At the same time the Caliph’s permission was sought for the
nomination of Qutayba ibn Muslim as governor of Khurāsān. Belonging to
the neutral tribe of Bāhila, Qutayba was reckoned as allied to Qays,
but might be trusted to hold the scales evenly between the factions; he
had already distinguished himself in ʿIrāq and in his governorship of
Rayy, and was the more devoted to _H_ajjāj in that he was protected by
no strong party of his own. The accepted belief that _H_ajjāj took no
steps to remove the family of Muhallab until Mūsā was put out of the way
is based on a remark attributed to Muhallab in the Mūsā-legend, which is
frequently contradicted elsewhere both expressly and by implication.
Mufa_dd_al, during his nine months of office in 85/704, seems to have
endeavoured to impress _H_ajjāj by a show of military activity against
the rebels in Bādghīs. At the same time, acting in concert with the local
princes (magnified in the legend to “_T_arkhūn and as-Sabal”), he sent
an expedition to Tirmidh under ʿOthmān b. Ma_s_ʿūd. Mūsā was cut off and
killed in a sortie and his nephew Sulaymān surrendered at discretion,
_H_ajjāj’s first exclamation on hearing the news is said to have been
one of anger at the insult to Qays, but the last hindrance to the
appointment of the new governor was now removed and towards the close of
the year Qutayba b. Muslim arrived in Merv.