those who defend the minister. Is our constitution so excellent? Then a
change of ministry can be no such dreadful event, since it is essential
to such a constitution, in every ministry, both to preserve itself
from violation and to prevent all enormities in the administration.
Is our constitution very bad? Then so extraordinary a jealousy and
apprehension on account of changes is ill-placed, and a man should no
more be anxious in this case than a husband, who had married a wife
from the stews, should be watchful to prevent her infidelity. Public
affairs in such a constitution must necessarily go to confusion,
by whatever hands they are conducted, and the zeal of patriots is
much less requisite in that case than the patience and submission of
philosophers. The virtue and good intentions of Cato and Brutus are
highly laudable, but to what purpose did their zeal serve? To nothing
but to hasten the fatal period of the Roman government, and render its
convulsions and dying agonies more violent and painful.
I would not be understood to mean that public affairs deserve no care
and attention at all. Would men be moderate and consistent, their
claims might be admitted—at least might be examined. The country-party
might still assert that our constitution, though excellent, will admit
of mal-administration to a certain degree, and therefore, if the
minister be bad, it is proper to oppose him with a suitable degree of
zeal. And, on the other hand, the court-party may be allowed, upon the
supposition that the minister were good, to defend, and with some zeal
too, his administration. I would only persuade men not to contend,
as if they were fighting _pro aris et focis_, and change a good
constitution into a bad one by the violence of their factions.[115]
I have not here considered anything that is personal in the present
controversy. In the best civil constitution, where every man is
restrained by the most rigid laws, it is easy to discover either the
good or bad intentions of a minister, and to judge whether his personal
character deserves love or hatred. But such questions are of little
importance to the public, and lay those who employ their pens upon them
under a just suspicion either of malevolence or flattery.
NOTES, POLITICS REDUCED TO A SCIENCE.
[113]
“For forms of government let fools contest;
Whate’er is best administer’d is best.”
_Essay on Man_, Book iii.
[114] I have taken it for granted, according to the supposition of
Machiavel, that the ancient Persians had no nobility, though there is
reason to suspect that the Florentine secretary, who seems to have
been better acquainted with the Roman than the Greek authors, was
mistaken in this particular. The more ancient Persians, whose manners
are described by Xenophon, were a free people, and had nobility. Their
ὁμοτιμοι were preserved even after the extending of their conquests
and the consequent change of their government. Arrian mentions them in
Darius’s time (_De exped. Alex._, lib. 2). Historians also speak often
of the persons in command as men of family. Tygranes, who was general
of the Medes under Xerxes, was of the race of Achmænes (Herod., lib.
7, cap. 62). Artachæas, who directed the cutting of the canal about
Mount Athos, was of the same family (_id._, cap. 117). Megabyzus was
one of the seven eminent Persians who conspired against the Magi. His
son Zopyrus was in the highest command under Darius, and delivered
Babylon to him. His grandson Megabyzus commanded the army defeated at
Marathon. His great grandson Zopyrus was also eminent, and was banished
Persia (Herod., lib. 3; Thuc., lib. 1). Rosaces, who commanded an army
in Egypt under Artaxerxes, was also descended from one of the seven
conspirators (Diod. Sic., lib. 16). Agesilaus (in Xenophon, _Hist.
Græc._ lib. 4), being desirous of making a marriage betwixt King Cotys,
his ally, and the daughter of Spithridates, a Persian of rank who had
deserted to him, first asks Cotys what rank Spithridates is of. One of
the most considerable in Persia, says Cotys. Ariæus, when offered the
sovereignty by Clearchus and the ten thousand Greeks, refused it as
of too low a rank, and said that so many eminent Persians would never
endure his rule (_id._, _De exped._ lib. 2). Some of the families,
descended from the seven Persians above mentioned, remained during
all Alexander’s successors; and Mithridates, in Antiochus’s time, is
said by Polybius to be descended from one of them (lib. 5, cap. 43).
Artabazus was esteemed, as Arrian says, εν τοις πρωτοις Περσων (lib.
3). And when Alexander married in one day eighty of his captains to
Persian women, his intention plainly was to ally the Macedonians with
the most eminent Persian families (_id._, lib. 7). Diodorus Siculus
says they were of the most noble birth in Persia (lib. 17). The
government of Persia was despotic, and conducted in many respects after
the Eastern manner, but was not carried so far as to extirpate all
nobility, and confound all ranks and orders. It left men who were still
great, by themselves and their family, independent of their office and
commission. And the reason why the Macedonians kept so easily dominion
over them was owing to other causes easy to be found in the historians,
though it must be owned that Machiavel’s reasoning was in itself just,
however doubtful its application to the present case.
[115] What our author’s opinion was of the famous minister here pointed
at may be learned from that essay, printed in the former editions,
under the title of “A Character of Sir Robert Walpole.” It was as
follows:—“There never was a man whose actions and character have been
more earnestly and openly canvassed than those of the present minister,
who, having governed a learned and free nation for so long a time,
amidst such mighty opposition, may make a large library of what has
been written for and against him, and is the subject of above half the
paper that has been blotted in the nation within these twenty years.
I wish, for the honour of our country, that any one character of him
had been drawn with such judgment and impartiality as to have credit
with posterity, and to show that our liberty has, once at least, been
employed to good purpose. I am only afraid of failing in the former
quality of judgment; but if it should be so, it is but one page more
thrown away, after a hundred thousand, upon the same subject, that have
perished and become useless. In the meantime, I shall flatter myself
with the pleasing imagination that the following character will be
adopted by future historians:—
“Sir Robert Walpole, Prime Minister of Great Britain, is a man of
ability, not a genius; good-natured, not virtuous; constant, not
magnanimous; moderate, not equitable.[116] His virtues, in some
instances, are free from the alloy of those vices which usually
accompany such virtues. He is a generous friend, without being a bitter
enemy. His vices, in other instances, are not compensated by those
virtues which are nearly allied to them: his want of enterprise is not
attended with frugality. The private character of the man is better
than the public, his virtues more than his vices, his fortune greater
than his fame. With many good qualities he has incurred the public
hatred; with good capacity he has not escaped ridicule. He would have
been esteemed more worthy of his high station had he never possessed
it; and is better qualified for the second than for the first place in
any Government. His ministry has been more advantageous to his family
than to the public, better for this age than for posterity, and more
pernicious by bad precedents than by real grievances. During his time
trade has flourished, liberty declined, and learning gone to ruin. As I
am a man, I love him; as I am a scholar, I hate him; as I am a Briton,
I calmly wish his fall. And were I a member of either House I would
give my vote for removing him from St. James’s, but should be glad to
see him retire to Houghton Hall, to pass the remainder of his days in
ease and pleasure.”
The author is pleased to find that after animosities are laid, and
calumny has ceased, the whole nation almost have returned to the
same moderate sentiments with regard to this great man, if they
are not rather become more favourable to him, by a very natural
transition from one extreme to another. The author would not oppose
those humane sentiments towards the dead, though he cannot forbear
observing that the not paying more of our public debts was, as hinted
in this character, a great, and the only great error in that long
administration.
[116] Moderate in the exercise of power, not equitable in engrossing it.
OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT.
Nothing is more surprising to those who consider human affairs with
a philosophical eye, than to see the easiness with which the many
are governed by the few; and to observe the implicit submission with
which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their
rulers. When we inquire by what means this wonder is brought about, we
shall find that, as force is always on the side of the governed, the
governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore
on opinion only that government is founded, and this maxim extends
to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to
the most free and most popular. The Soldan of Egypt, or the Emperor
of Rome, might drive his harmless subjects like brute beasts against
their sentiments and inclination; but he must, at least, have led his
mamalukes, or prætorian bands, like men, by their opinion.
Opinion is of two kinds—viz., opinion of interest and opinion of
right. By opinion of interest, I chiefly understand the sense of the
public advantage which is reaped from government, together with the
persuasion that the particular government which is established is
equally advantageous with any other that could easily be settled. When
this opinion prevails among the generality of a state, or among
those who have the force in their hands, it gives great security to any
government.
Right is of two kinds—right to power and right to property. What
prevalence opinion of the first kind has over mankind may easily be
understood by observing the attachment which all nations have to
their ancient government, and even to those names which have had the
sanction of antiquity. Antiquity always begets the opinion of right,
and whatever disadvantageous sentiments we may entertain of mankind,
they are always found to be prodigal both of blood and treasure in
the maintenance of public justice. This passion we may denominate
enthusiasm, or we may give it what appellation we please; but a
politician who should overlook its influence on human affairs would
prove himself but of a very limited understanding. There is, indeed,
no particular in which at first sight there may appear a greater
contradiction in the frame of the human mind than the present. When men
act in a faction they are apt, without any shame or remorse, to neglect
all the ties of honour and morality in order to serve their party;
and yet when a faction is formed upon a point of right or principle,
there is no occasion where men discover a greater obstinacy and a more
determined sense of justice and equity. The same social disposition of
mankind is the cause of both these contradictory appearances.
It is sufficiently understood that the opinion of right to property is
of the greatest moment in all matters of government. A noted author
has made property the foundation of all government; and most of our
political writers seem inclined to follow him in that particular. This
is carrying the matter too far; but still it must be owned that the
opinion of right to property has a great influence in this subject.
Upon these three opinions, therefore, of public interest, of right to
power, and of right to property, are all governments founded, and all
authority of the few over the many. There are indeed other principles
which add force to these, and determine, limit, or alter their
operation; such as self-interest, fear, and affection. But
still we may assert that these other principles can have no influence
alone, but suppose the antecedent influence of those opinions above
mentioned. They are therefore to be esteemed the secondary, not the
original principles of government.
For, first, as to self-interest, by which I mean the expectation of
particular rewards, distinct from the general protection which we
receive from government, it is evident that the magistrate’s authority
must be antecedently established, or at least be hoped for, in order
to produce this expectation. The prospect of reward may augment the
authority with regard to some particular persons, but can never give
birth to it with regard to the public. Men naturally look for the
greatest favours from their friends and acquaintance, and therefore the
hopes of any considerable number of the state would never centre in any
particular set of men if these men had no other title to magistracy,
and had no separate influence over the opinions of mankind. The same
observation may be extended to the other two principles of fear and
affection. No man would have any reason to fear the fury of a tyrant
if he had no authority over any but from fear; since as a single man
his bodily force can reach but a small way, and all further power he
possesses must be founded either on our opinion or on the presumed
opinion of others. And though affection to wisdom and virtue in a
sovereign extends very far and has great influence, yet he must be
antecedently supposed invested with a public character, otherwise the
public esteem will serve him in no stead, nor will his virtue have any
influence beyond a narrow sphere.
A government may endure for several ages, though the balance of power
and the balance of property do not agree. This chiefly happens where
any rank or order of the state has acquired a large share of the
property, but from the original constitution of the government has no
share of the power. Under what pretext would any individual of that
order assume authority in public affairs? As men are commonly much
attached to their ancient government, it is not to be expected
that the public would ever favour such usurpations. But where the
original constitution allows any share of power, though small, to an
order of men who possess a large share of the property, it is easy for
them gradually to stretch their authority and bring the balance of
power to coincide with that of property. This has been the case with
the House of Commons in England.
Most writers who have treated of the British Government have supposed
that as the House of Commons represents all the commons of Great
Britain, so its weight in the scale is proportioned to the property
and power of all whom it represents. But this principle must not be
received as absolutely true. For though the people are apt to attach
themselves more to the House of Commons than to any other member of the
constitution—that House being chosen by them as their representatives
and as the public guardians of their liberty—yet are there instances
where the House, even when in opposition to the Crown, has not been
followed by the people; as we may particularly observe of the Tory
House of Commons in the reign of King William. Were the members of the
House obliged to receive instructions from their constituents, like the
Dutch deputies, this would entirely alter the case; and if such immense
power and riches as those of the whole commons of Britain were brought
into the scale, it is not easy to conceive that the Crown could either
influence the multitude of people or withstand that overbalance of
property. It is true the Crown has great influence over the collective
body of Britain in the elections of members; but were this influence,
which at present is only exerted once in seven years, to be employed in
bringing over the people to every vote, it would soon be wasted, and
no skill, popularity or revenue, could support it. I must, therefore,
be of opinion that an alteration in this particular would introduce a
total alteration in our government, and would soon reduce it to a pure
republic; and perhaps to a republic of no inconvenient form. For though
the people collected in a body like the Roman tribes be quite unfit for
government, yet when dispersed in small bodies they are more
susceptible both of reason and order; the force of popular currents
and tides is in a great measure broken; and the public interest may be
pursued with some method and constancy. But it is needless to reason
any further concerning a form of government which is never likely to
have place in Britain, and which seems not to be the aim of any party
amongst us. Let us cherish and improve our ancient government as much
as possible, without encouraging a passion for such dangerous novelties.
OF POLITICAL SOCIETY.
Had every man sufficient sagacity to perceive at all times the strong
interest which binds him to the observance of justice and equity, and
strength of mind sufficient to persevere in a steady adherence to a
general and a distant interest, in opposition to the allurements of
present pleasure and advantage—there had never, in that case, been any
such thing as government or political society, but each man following
his natural liberty had lived in entire peace and harmony with all
others. What need of positive laws where natural justice is, of itself,
a sufficient restraint? Why create magistrates where there never arises
any disorder or iniquity? Why abridge our native freedom when, in every
instance, the utmost exertion of it is found innocent and beneficial?
It is evident that if government were totally useless it never could
have place, and that the sole foundation of the duty of allegiance is
the advantage which it procures to society by preserving peace and
order among mankind.
When a number of political societies are erected, and maintain a
great intercourse together, a new set of rules are immediately
discovered to be useful in that particular situation, and
accordingly take place under the title of “Laws of Nations.” Of this
kind are the sacredness of the persons of ambassadors, abstaining from
poisoned arms, quarter in war, with others of that kind, which are
plainly calculated for the advantage of states and kingdoms in their
intercourse with each other.
The rules of justice, such as prevail among individuals, are not
entirely suspended among political societies. All princes pretend a
regard to the rights of others; and some, no doubt, without hypocrisy.
Alliances and treaties are every day made between independent states,
which would only be so much waste of parchment if they were not found,
by experience, to have some influence and authority. But here is the
difference between kingdoms and individuals. Human nature cannot by
any means subsist without the association of individuals; and that
association never could have place were no regard paid to the laws
of equity and justice. Disorder, confusion, the war of all against
all, are the necessary consequences of such a licentious conduct.
But nations can subsist without intercourse. They may even subsist,
in some degree, under a general war. The observance of justice,
though useful among them, is not guarded by so strong a necessity as
among individuals; and the moral obligation holds proportion with
the usefulness. All politicians will allow, and most philosophers,
that reasons of state may, in particular emergencies, dispense with
the rules of justice, and invalidate any treaty or alliance where
the strict observance of it would be prejudicial in a considerable
degree to either of the contracting parties. But nothing less than the
extremest necessity, it is confessed, can justify individuals in a
breach of promise, Or an invasion of the properties of others.
In a confederated commonwealth, such as the Achæan Republic of old, or
the Swiss Cantons and United Provinces in modern times; as the league
has here a peculiar utility, the conditions of union have a peculiar
sacredness and authority, and a violation of them would be equally
criminal, Or even more criminal than any private injury or injustice.
The long and helpless infancy of man requires the combination of
parents for the subsistence of their young, and that combination
requires the virtue of chastity or fidelity to the marriage-bed.
Without such a utility, it will readily be owned that such a virtue
would never have been thought of.
An infidelity of this nature is much more pernicious in women than in
men; hence the laws of chastity are much stricter over the one sex than
over the other.
These rules have all a reference to generation, and yet women past
child-bearing are no more supposed to be exempted from them than those
in the flower of their youth and beauty. General rules are often
extended beyond the principle whence they first arise, and this holds
in all matters of taste and sentiment. It is a vulgar story at Paris
that during the rage of the Mississippi a hump-backed fellow went
every day into the Rue de Quincempoix, where the stock-jobbers met in
great crowds, and was well paid for allowing them to make use of his
hump as a desk in order to sign their contracts upon it. Would the
fortune which he raised by this invention make him a handsome fellow,
though it be confessed that personal beauty arises very much from ideas
of utility? The imagination is influenced by association of ideas,
which, though they arise at first from the judgment, are not easily
altered by every particular exception that occurs to us. To which we
may add, in the present case of chastity, that the example of the old
would be pernicious to the young, and that women, continually thinking
that a certain time would bring them the liberty of indulgence, would
naturally advance that period and think more lightly of this whole duty
so requisite to society.
Those who live in the same family have such frequent opportunities of
licence of this kind that nothing could preserve purity of manners were
marriage allowed among the nearest relations, or were any intercourse
of love between them ratified by law and custom. Incest, therefore,
being pernicious in a superior degree, has also a superior turpitude
and moral deformity annexed to it.
What is the reason why, by the Athenian laws, one might marry a
half-sister by the father but not by the mother? Plainly this:—The
manners of the Athenians were so reserved that a man was never
permitted to approach the women’s apartment, even in the same family,
unless where he visited his own mother. His step-mother and her
children were as much shut up from him as the women of any other
family, and there was as little danger of any criminal correspondence
between them. Uncles and nieces, for a like reason, might marry at
Athens, but neither these nor half-brothers and sisters could contract
that alliance at Rome, where the intercourse was more open between the
sexes. Public utility is the cause of all these variations.
To repeat to a man’s prejudice anything that escaped him in private
conversation, or to make any such use of his private letters, is highly
blamed. The free and social intercourse of minds must be extremely
checked where no such rules of fidelity are established.
Even in repeating stories, whence we can see no ill consequences
to result, the giving one’s authors is regarded as a piece of
indiscretion, if not of immorality. These stories, in passing from hand
to hand and receiving all the usual variations, frequently come about
to the persons concerned and produce animosities and quarrels among
people whose intentions are the most innocent and inoffensive.
To pry into secrets, to open or even read the letters of others, to
play the spy upon their words and looks and actions—what habits more
inconvenient in society? what habits, of consequence, more blameable?
This principle is also the foundation of most of the laws of good
manners, a kind of lesser morality calculated for the ease of company
and conversation. Too much or too little ceremony are both blamed,
and everything which promotes ease without an indecent familiarity is
useful and laudable.