considerable objection,
Let Great Britain and Ireland, or any territory of equal extent,
be divided into a hundred counties, and each county into a hundred
parishes, making in all ten thousand. If the country purposed to be
erected into a commonwealth be of more narrow extent, we may diminish
the number of counties; but never bring them below thirty. If it be of
greater extent, it were better to enlarge the parishes, or throw more
parishes into a county, than increase the number of counties.
Let all the freeholders of ten pounds a year in the country, and all
the householders worth two hundred pounds in the town parishes, meet
annually in the parish church, and choose, by ballot, some freeholder
of the county for their member, whom we shall call the county
representative.
Let the hundred county representatives, two days after their election,
meet in the county-town, and choose by ballot, from their own body, ten
county magistrates and one senator. There are, therefore, in the whole
commonwealth, one hundred senators, eleven hundred county magistrates,
and ten thousand county representatives; for we shall bestow on all
senators the authority of county magistrates, and on all county
magistrates the authority of county representatives.
Let the senators meet in the capital, and be endowed with the whole
executive power of the commonwealth; the power of peace and war, of
giving orders to generals, admirals, and ambassadors, and, in short,
all the prerogatives of a British king, except his negative.
Let the county representatives meet in their particular counties, and
possess the whole legislative power of the commonwealth; the greatest
number of counties deciding the question; and where these are equal,
let the senate have the casting vote.
Every new law must first be debated in the senate; and though rejected
by it, if ten senators insist and protest, it must be sent down to the
counties. The senate may join to the copy of the law their reasons for
receiving or rejecting it.
Because it would be troublesome to assemble all the county
representatives for every trivial law that may be requisite, the
senate have their choice of sending down the law either to the county
magistrates or county representatives.
The magistrates, though the law be referred to them, may, if they
please, call the representatives, and submit the affair to their
determination.
Whether the law be referred by the senate to the county magistrates
or representatives, a copy of it, and of the senate’s reasons, must
be sent to every representative eight days before the day appointed
for the assembling, in order to deliberate concerning it. And though
the determination be, by the senate, referred to the magistrates, if
five representatives of the county order the magistrates to assemble
the whole court of representatives, and submit the affair to their
determination, they must obey.
Either the county magistrates or representatives may give to the
senator of the county the copy of a law to be proposed to the senate;
and if five counties concur in the same order, the law, though
refused by the senate, must come either to the county magistrates or
representatives, as is contained in the order of the five counties.
Any twenty counties, by a vote either of their magistrates or
representatives, may throw any man out of all public offices for a
year. Thirty counties for three years.
The senate has a power of throwing out any member or number of members
of its own body, not to be re-elected for that year. The senate cannot
throw out twice in a year the senator of the same county.
The power of the old senate continues for three weeks after the
annual election of the county representatives. Then all the new
senators are shut up in a conclave, like the cardinals, and by an
intricate ballot, such as that of Venice or Malta, they choose the
following magistrates:—A protector, who represents the dignity of the
commonwealth and presides in the senate, two secretaries of state,
these six councils: a council of state, a council of religion and
learning, a council of trade, a council of laws, a council
of war, a council of the admiralty, each council consisting of five
persons; together with six commissioners of the treasury and a first
commissioner. All these must be senators. The senate also names all the
ambassadors to foreign courts, who may either be senators or not.
The senate may continue any or all of these, but must re-elect them
every year.
The protector and two secretaries have session and suffrage in the
council of state. The business of that council is all foreign politics.
The council of state has session and suffrage in all the other councils.
The council of religion and learning inspects the universities and
clergy. That of trade inspects everything that may affect commerce.
That of laws inspects all the abuses of laws by the inferior
magistrates, and examines what improvements may be made of the
municipal law. That of war inspects the militia and its discipline,
magazines, stores, etc., and when the republic is in war, examines into
the proper orders for generals. The council of admiralty has the same
power with regard to the navy, together with the nomination of the
captains and all inferior officers.
None of these councils can give orders themselves, except where
they receive such powers from the senate. In other cases, they must
communicate everything to the senate.
When the senate is under adjournment, any of the councils may assemble
it before the day appointed for its meeting.
Besides these councils or courts, there is another called the court
of competitors, which is thus constituted:—If any candidates for the
office of senator have more votes than a third of the representatives,
that candidate who has most votes next to the senator elected,
becomes incapable for one year of all public offices, even of being a
magistrate or representative; but he takes his seat in the court of
competitors. Here then is a court which may sometimes consist of a
hundred members, sometimes have no members at all, and by that means be
for a year abolished.
The court of competitors has no power in the commonwealth. It has
only the inspection of the public accounts and the accusing any man
before the senate. If the senate acquit him, the court of competitors
may, if they please, appeal to the people, either magistrates or
representatives. Upon that appeal the magistrates or representatives
meet at the day appointed by the court of competitors, and choose in
each county three persons, from which number every senator is excluded.
These to the number of three hundred meet in the capital, and bring the
person accused to a new trial.
The court of competitors may propose any law to the senate, and if
refused, may appeal to the people—that is to the magistrates or
representatives, who examine it in their counties. Every senator who is
thrown out of the senate by a vote of the court, takes his seat in the
court of competitors.
The senate possesses all the judicative authority of the House of
Lords—that is, all the appeals from the inferior courts. It likewise
nominates the Lord Chancellor and all the officers of the law.
Every county is a kind of republic within itself, and the
representatives may make county-laws, which have no authority until
three months after they are voted. A copy of the law is sent to the
senate and to every other county. The senate or any single county may
at any time annul any law of another county.
The representatives have all the authority of the British justices of
peace in trials, commitments, etc.
The magistrates have the nomination of all the officers of the revenue
in each county. All causes with regard to the revenue are appealed
ultimately to the magistrates. They pass the accounts of all the
officers, but must have all their own accounts examined and passed at
the end of the year by the representatives.
The magistrates name rectors or ministers to all the parishes.
The Presbyterian government is established, and the highest
ecclesiastical court is an assembly or synod of all the presbyters of
the county. The magistrates may take any cause from this court, and
determine it themselves.
The magistrates may try and depose or suspend any presbyter.
The militia is established in imitation of that of Switzerland, which,
being well known, we shall not insist upon it. It will only be proper
to make this addition, that an army of 20,000 men be annually drawn out
by rotation, paid and encamped during six weeks in summer, that the
duty of a camp may not be altogether unknown.
The magistrates nominate all the colonels and downwards. The senate all
upwards. During war, the general nominates the colonel and downwards,
and his commission is good for a twelvemonth; but after that, it must
be confirmed by the magistrates of the county to which the regiment
belongs. The magistrates may break any officer in the county regiment,
and the senate may do the same to any officer in the service. If the
magistrates do not think proper to confirm the general’s choice, they
may nominate another officer in the place of him they reject.
All crimes are tried within the county by the magistrates and a jury;
but the senate can stop any trial, and bring it before themselves.
Any county may indict any man before the senate for any crime.
The protector, the two secretaries, the council of state, with any
five more that the senate appoints on extraordinary emergencies, are
possessed of dictatorial power for six months.
The protector may pardon any person condemned by the inferior courts.
In time of war, no officer of the army that is in the field can have
any civil office in the commonwealth.
The capital, which we shall call London, may be allowed four
members in the senate. It may therefore be divided into four
counties. The representatives of each of these choose one senator
and ten magistrates. There are therefore in the city four
senators, forty-four magistrates, and four hundred representatives.
The magistrates have the same authority as in the counties. The
representatives also have the same authority; but they never meet in
one general court. They give their votes in their particular county or
division of hundreds.
When they enact any city-law, the greatest number of counties or
divisions determines the matter; and where these are equal, the
magistrates have the casting vote.
The magistrates choose the mayor, sheriff, recorder, and other officers
of the city.
In the commonwealth, no representative, magistrate, or senator, as
such, has any salary. The protector, secretaries, councils, and
ambassadors have salaries.
The first year in every century is set apart to correct all
inequalities which time may have produced in the representative. This
must be done by the legislature.
The following political aphorisms may explain the reason of these
orders.
The lower sort of people and small proprietors are good enough judges
of one not very distant from them in rank or habitation, and therefore,
in their parochial meetings, will probably choose the best, or nearly
the best representative; but they are wholly unfit for county-meetings
and for electing into the higher offices of the republic. Their
ignorance gives the grandees an opportunity of deceiving them.
Ten thousand, even though they were not annually elected, are a large
enough basis for any free government. It is true the nobles in Poland
are more than 10,000, and yet these oppress the people; but as power
continues there always in the same persons and families, this makes
them, in a manner, a different nation from the people. Besides, the
nobles are there united under a few heads of families.
All free governments must consist of two councils, a less and a
greater; or, in other words, of a senate and people. The people, as
Harrington observes, would want wisdom without the senate; the senate
without the people would want honesty.
A large assembly of 1000, for instance, to represent the people,
if allowed to debate, would fall into disorder. If not allowed to
debate, the senate has a negative upon them, and the worst kind of
negative—that before resolution.
Here therefore is an inconvenience which no government has yet fully
remedied, but which is the easiest to be remedied in the world. If the
people debate, all is confusion; if they do not debate, they can only
resolve, and then the senate carves for them. Divide the people into
many separate bodies, and then they may debate with safety, and every
inconvenience seems to be prevented.
Cardinal de Retz says that all numerous assemblies, however composed,
are mere mob, and swayed in their debates by the least motive. This we
find confirmed by daily experience. When an absurdity strikes a member,
he conveys it to his neighbour, and so on till the whole be infected.
Separate this great body, and though every member be only of middling
sense, it is not probable that anything but reason can prevail over the
whole. Influence and example being removed, good sense will always get
the better of bad among a number of people. Good sense is one thing;
but follies are numberless, and every man has a different one. The only
way of making a people wise is to keep them from uniting into large
assemblies.
There are two things to be guarded against in every senate—its
combination and its division. Its combination is most dangerous, and
against this inconvenience we have provided the following remedies:—1.
The great dependence of the senators on the people by annual election,
and that not by an undistinguishing rabble, like the English electors,
but by men of fortune and education. 2. The small power they are
allowed. They have few offices to dispose of. Almost all are given by
the magistrates in the counties. 3. The court of competitors which,
being composed of men that are their rivals next to them in interest
and uneasy in their present situation, will be sure to take all
advantages against them.
The division of the senate is prevented—1. By the smallness
of their number. 2. As faction supposes a combination to a separate
interest, it is prevented by their dependence on the people. 3. They
have a power of expelling any factious member. It is true when another
member of the same spirit comes from the county, they have no power of
expelling him; nor is it fit they should, for that shows the humour to
be in the people, and probably arises from some ill-conduct in public
affairs. 4. Almost any man in a senate so regularly chosen by the
people may be supposed fit for any civil office. It would be proper,
therefore, for the senate to form some general resolutions with regard
to the disposing of offices among the members, which resolutions would
not confine them in critical times, when extraordinary parts on the one
hand, or extraordinary stupidity on the other, appears in any senator;
but yet they would be sufficient to prevent intrigue and faction, by
making the disposal of the offices a thing of course. For instance, let
it be a resolution:—That no man shall enjoy any office till he has sat
four years in the senate; that, except ambassadors, no man shall be in
office two years following; that no man shall attain the higher offices
but through the lower; that no man shall be protector twice, etc. The
senate of Venice govern themselves by such resolutions.
In foreign politics the interest of the senate can scarce ever be
divided from that of the people, and therefore it is fit to make
the senate absolute with regard to them, otherwise there could be
no secrecy nor refined policy. Besides, without money no alliance
can be executed, and the senate is still sufficiently dependent. Not
to mention that the legislative power being always superior to the
executive, the magistrates or representatives may interpose, whenever
they think proper.
The chief support of the British Government is the Opposition of
interests; but that, though in the main serviceable, breeds endless
factions. In the foregoing plan, it does all the good without any of
the harm. The competitors have no power of controlling the senate; they
have only the power of accusing and appealing to the people.
It is necessary, likewise, to prevent both combination and division in
the thousand magistrates. This is done sufficiently by the separation
of places and interests.
But lest that should not be enough, their dependence on the 10,000 for
their elections serves to the same purpose.
Nor is that all: for the 10,000 may resume the power whenever they
please; and not only when they all please, but when any five of a
hundred please, which will happen upon the very first suspicion of a
separate interest.
The 10,000 are too large a body either to unite or divide, except
when they meet in one place, and fall under the guidance of ambitious
leaders. Not to mention their annual election by the whole body of the
people that are of any consideration.
A small commonwealth is the happiest government in the world within
itself, because everything lies under the eye of the rulers; but it may
be subdued by great force from without. This scheme seems to have all
the advantages both of a great and a little commonwealth.
Every county-law may be annulled either by the senate or another
county, because that shows an opposition of interest: in which case no
part ought to decide for itself. The matter must be referred to the
whole, which will best determine what agrees with general interest.
As to the clergy and militia, the reasons of these orders are obvious.
Without the dependence of the clergy on the civil magistrates, and
without a militia, it is folly to think any free government will ever
have security or stability.
In many governments the inferior magistrates have no rewards but what
arise from their ambition, vanity, or public spirit. The salaries of
the French judges amount not to the interest of the sums they pay
for their offices. The Dutch burgomasters have little more immediate
profit than the English justices of peace, or the members of the
House of Commons formerly. But lest any should suspect that this
would beget negligence in the administration (which is little to be
feared, considering the natural ambition of mankind), let the
magistrates have competent salaries. The senators have access to so
many honourable and lucrative offices that their attendance needs not
be bought. There is little attendance required of the representatives.
That the foregoing plan of government is practicable no one can
doubt, who considers the resemblance it bears to the commonwealth of
the United Provinces, formerly one of the wisest and most renowned
governments in the world. The alterations in the present scheme are all
evidently to the better. 1. The representation is more equal. 2. The
unlimited power of the burgomasters in the towns, which forms a perfect
aristocracy in the Dutch commonwealth, is corrected by a well-tempered
democracy, in giving to the people the annual election of the county
representatives. 3. The negative, which every province and town has
upon the whole body of the Dutch republic, with regard to alliances,
peace and war, and the imposition of taxes, is here removed. 4. The
counties, in the present plan, are not so independent of each other,
nor do they form separate bodies so much as the seven provinces; where
the jealousy and envy of the smaller provinces and towns against the
greater, particularly Holland and Amsterdam, have frequently disturbed
the government. 5. Larger powers, though of the safest kind, are
entrusted to the senate than the States-General possess; by which means
the former may become more expeditious and secret in their resolutions
than it is possible for the latter.
The chief alterations that could be made on the British Government, in
order to bring it to the most perfect model of living monarchy, seem to
be the following:—First, The plan of the Republican Parliament ought
to be restored, by making the representation equal, and by allowing
none to vote in the county elections who possess not a property of 200
pounds value. Secondly, As such a House of Commons would be too weighty
for a frail House of Lords like the present, the bishops and Scots
peers ought to be removed, whose behaviour, in former Parliaments,
destroyed entirely the authority of that House. The number of the
Upper House ought to be raised to three or four hundred; their
seats not hereditary, but during life. They ought to have the election
of their own members; and no commoner should be allowed to refuse a
seat that was offered him. By this means the House of Lords would
consist entirely of the men of chief credit, ability, and interest
of the nation; and every turbulent leader in the House of Commons
might be taken off and connected in interest with the House of Peers.
Such an aristocracy would be a splendid barrier both to the monarchy
and against it. At present the balance of our Government depends in
some measure on the ability and behaviour of the sovereign, which are
variable and uncertain circumstances.
I allow that this plan of limited monarchy, however corrected, is still
liable to three great inconveniences. First, it removes not entirely,
though it may soften, the parties of court and country; secondly, the
king’s personal character must still have a great influence on the
Government; thirdly, the sword is in the hands of a single person,
who will always neglect to discipline the militia, in order to have a
pretence for keeping up a standing army. It is evident that this is
a mortal distemper in British Government, of which it must at last
inevitably perish. I must, however, confess that Sweden seems in some
measure to have remedied this inconvenience, and to have a militia,
with its limited monarchy, as well as a standing army, which is less
dangerous than the British.
We shall conclude this subject with observing the falsehood of the
common opinion that no large state, such as France or Britain,
could ever be modelled into a commonwealth, but that such a form
of government can only take place in a city or small territory.
The contrary seems evident. Though it is more difficult to form a
republican government in an extensive country than in a city, there
is more facility, when once it is formed, of preserving it steady and
uniform, without tumult and faction. It is not easy for the distant
parts of a large state to combine in any plan of free government; but
they easily conspire in the esteem and reverence of a single
person, who, by means of this popular favour, may seize the power,
and forcing the more obstinate to submit, may establish a monarchical
government. On the other hand, a city readily concurs in the same
notions of government, the natural equality of property favours
liberty, and the nearness of habitation enables the citizens mutually
to assist each other. Even under absolute princes the subordinate
government of cities is commonly republican; while that of counties
and provinces is monarchical. But these same circumstances, which
facilitate the erection of commonwealths in cities, render their
constitution more frail and uncertain. Democracies are turbulent. For
however the people may be separated or divided into small parties,
either in their votes or elections, their near habitation in a
city will always make the force of popular tides and currents very
sensible. Aristocracies are better adapted for peace and order, and
accordingly were most admired by ancient writers; but they are jealous
and oppressive. In a large government, which is modelled with masterly
skill, there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy from
the lower people, who may be admitted into the first elections or first
concoction of the commonwealth to the higher magistrates who direct all
the movements. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote
that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion,
to hurry them into any measures against the public interest.