and arise from this very circumstance, that it violates hereditary
right, and places on the throne a prince to whom birth gave no title
to that dignity. It is evident to any one who considers the history
of this island that the privileges of the people have during the last
two centuries been continually upon the increase, by the division of
the church-lands, by the alienations of the barons’ estates, by the
progress of trade, and above all by the happiness of our situation,
which for a long time gave us sufficient security without any standing
army or military establishment. On the contrary, public liberty
has, almost in every other nation of Europe, been during the same
period extremely upon the decline, while the people were disgusted
at the hardships of the old feudal militia, and chose rather to
entrust their prince with mercenary armies, which he easily turned
against themselves. It was nothing extraordinary, therefore, that
some of our British sovereigns mistook the nature of the
constitution and genius of the people; and as they embraced all the
favourable precedents left them by their ancestors, they overlooked
all those which were contrary, and which supposed a limitation in our
government. They were encouraged in this mistake by the example of all
the neighbouring princes, who, bearing the same title or appellation,
and being adorned with the same ensigns of authority, naturally led
them to claim the same powers and prerogatives.[110] The flattery
of courtiers further blinded them, and above all that of the
clergy, who from several passages of Scripture, and these wrested too,
had erected a regular and avowed system of tyranny and despotic power.
The only method of destroying at once all these exorbitant claims and
pretensions was to depart from the true hereditary line, and choose
a prince who, being plainly a creature of the public, and receiving
the crown on conditions, expressed and avowed, found his authority
established on the same bottom with the privileges of the people.
By electing him in the royal line we cut off all hopes of ambitious
subjects who might in future emergencies disturb the government by
their cabals and pretensions; by rendering the crown hereditary in
his family we avoided all the inconveniences of elective monarchy;
and by excluding the lineal heir we secured all our constitutional
limitations, and rendered our government uniform and of a piece. The
people cherish monarchy because protected by it, the monarch favours
liberty because created by it. And thus every advantage is obtained
by the new establishment, as far as human skill and wisdom can extend
itself.
These are the separate advantages of fixing the succession, either in
the house of Stuart or in that of Hanover. There are also disadvantages
on each establishment, which an impartial patriot would ponder and
examine, in order to form a just judgment upon the whole.
The disadvantages of the Protestant Succession consist in the foreign
dominions which are possessed by the princes of the Hanover line, and
which it might be supposed would engage us in the intrigues and wars of
the Continent, and lose us in some measure the inestimable advantage we
possess of being surrounded and guarded by the sea which we command.
The disadvantages of recalling the abdicated family consist
chiefly in their religion, which is more prejudicial to society than
that established among us is contrary to it, and affords no toleration,
or peace, or security to any other religion.
It appears to me that all these advantages and disadvantages are
allowed on both sides; at least, by every one who is at all susceptible
of argument or reasoning. No subject, however loyal, pretends to deny
that the disputed title and foreign dominions of the present royal
family are a loss; nor is there any partisan of the Stuart family but
will confess that the claim of hereditary, indefeasible right, and the
Roman Catholic religion, are also disadvantages in that family. It
belongs, therefore, to a philosopher alone, who is of neither party,
to put all these circumstances in the scale and to assign to each of
them its proper poise and influence. Such a one will readily, at first,
acknowledge that all political questions are infinitely complicated,
and that there scarce ever occurs in any deliberation a choice which
is either purely good or purely ill. Consequences, mixed and varied,
may be foreseen to flow from every measure—and many consequences
unforeseen do always, in fact, result from it. Hesitation, and reserve,
and suspense are therefore the only sentiment he brings to this essay
or trial; or if he indulges any passion it is that of derision and
ridicule against the ignorant multitude, who are always clamorous and
dogmatical even in the nicest questions, of which, from want of temper,
perhaps still more than of understanding, they are altogether unfit
judges.
But to say something more determinate on this head, the following
reflections will, I hope, show the temper, if not the understanding of
a philosopher.
Were we to judge merely by first appearances and by past experience, we
must allow that the advantages of a parliamentary title of the house of
Hanover are much greater than those of an undisputed hereditary title
in the house of Stuart, and that our fathers acted wisely in preferring
the former to the latter. So long as the house of Stuart reigned in
Britain, which, with some interruption, was above eighty years,
the government was kept in a continual fever by the contentions between
the privileges of the people and the prerogatives of the crown. If
arms were dropped, the noise of disputes continued; or, if these were
silenced, jealousy still corroded the heart, and threw the nation into
an unnatural ferment and disorder. And while we were thus occupied in
domestic contentions, a foreign power, dangerous, if not fatal, to
public liberty, erected itself in Europe without any opposition from
us, and even sometimes with our assistance.
But during these last sixty years, when a parliamentary establishment
has taken place, whatever factions may have prevailed either among the
people or in public assemblies, the whole force of our constitution
has always fallen to one side, and an uninterrupted harmony has been
preserved between our princes and our parliaments. Public liberty, with
internal peace and order, has flourished almost without interruption;
trade and manufactures and agriculture have increased; the arts and
sciences and philosophy have been cultivated. Even religious parties
have been necessitated to lay aside their mutual rancour, and the glory
of the nation has spread itself all over Europe; while we stand the
bulwark against oppression, and the great antagonist of that power
which threatens every people with conquest and subjection. So long
and so glorious a period no nation almost can boast of; nor is there
another instance in the whole history of mankind that so many millions
of people have during such a space of time been held together in a
manner so free, so rational, and so suitable to the dignity of human
nature.
But though this recent instance seems clearly to decide in favour of
the present establishment, there are some circumstances to be thrown
into the other scale, and it is dangerous to regulate our judgment by
one event or example.
We have had two rebellions during the flourishing period above
mentioned, besides plots and conspiracies without number; and, if none
of these have produced any very fatal event, we may ascribe
our escape chiefly to the narrow genius of those princes who disputed
our establishment, and may esteem ourselves so far fortunate. But the
claims of the banished family, I fear, are not yet antiquated, and
who can foretell that their future attempts will produce no greater
disorder?
The disputes between privilege and prerogative may easily be composed
by laws, and votes, and conferences, and concessions, where there is
tolerable temper or prudence on both sides, or on either side. Among
contending titles the question can only be determined by the sword, and
by devastation, and by civil war.
A prince who fills the throne with a disputed title dares not arm his
subjects, the only method of securing a people fully, both against
domestic oppression and foreign conquest.
Notwithstanding all our riches and renown, what a critical escape
did we lately make from dangers, which were owing, not so much to
bad conduct and ill success in war, as to the pernicious practice of
mortgaging our finances, and the still more pernicious maxim of never
paying off our encumbrances? Such fatal measures could never have been
embraced had it not been to secure a precarious establishment.[111]
But to convince us that an hereditary title is to be embraced rather
than a parliamentary one, which is not supported by any other views
or motives, a man needs only transport himself back to the era of the
Restoration, and suppose that he had had a seat in that Parliament
which recalled the royal family, and put a period to the greatest
disorders that ever arose from the opposite pretensions of prince and
people. What would have been thought of one that had proposed at that
time to set aside Charles II. and settle the crown on the Duke of York
or Gloucester, merely in order to exclude all high claims like those of
their father and grandfather? Would not such a one have been
regarded as a very extravagant projector, who loved dangerous remedies,
and could tamper and play with a government and national constitution
like a quack with a sickly patient?
The advantages which result from a parliamentary title, preferably
to an hereditary one, though they are great, are too refined ever to
enter into the conception of the vulgar. The bulk of mankind would
never allow them to be sufficient for committing what would be regarded
as an injustice to the prince. They must be supported by some gross,
popular, and familiar topics; and wise men, though convinced of their
force, would reject them in compliance with the weakness and prejudices
of the people. An encroaching tyrant or deluded bigot alone, by his
misconduct, is able to enrage the nation and render practicable what
was always perhaps desirable.
In reality, the reason assigned by the nation for excluding the race
of Stuart, and so many other branches of the royal family, is not on
account of their hereditary title (which, however just in itself,
would, to vulgar apprehensions, have appeared altogether absurd),
but on account of their religion, which leads us to compare the
disadvantages above mentioned of each establishment.
I confess that, considering the matter in general, it were much to be
wished that our prince had no foreign dominions, and could confine all
his attention to the government of this island. For, not to mention
some real inconveniences that may result from territories on the
Continent, they afford such a handle for calumny and defamation as is
greedily seized by the people, who are always disposed to think ill
of their superiors. It must, however, be acknowledged that Hanover
is perhaps the spot of ground in Europe the least inconvenient for a
King of Britain. It lies in the heart of Germany, at a distance from
the Great Powers which are our natural rivals; it is protected by the
laws of the Empire as well as by the arms of its own sovereign, and it
serves only to connect us more closely with the house of Austria, which
is our natural ally.
In the last war it has been of service to us, by furnishing us with a
considerable body of auxiliary troops, the bravest and most faithful
in the world. The Elector of Hanover is the only considerable prince
in the Empire who has pursued no separate end, and has raised up no
stale pretensions during the late commotions of Europe, but has acted
all along with the dignity of a King of Britain. And ever since the
accession of that family it would be difficult to show any harm we have
ever received from the electoral dominions, except that short disgust
in 1718, with Charles XII., who, regulating himself by maxims very
different from those of other princes, made a personal quarrel of every
public injury.[112]
The religious persuasion of the house of Stuart is an inconvenience
of a much deeper dye, and would threaten us with much more dismal
consequences. The Roman Catholic religion, with its huge train of
priests and friars, is vastly more expensive than ours. Even though
unaccompanied with its natural attendants of inquisitors, and stakes,
and gibbets, it is less tolerating; and not contented with dividing
the sacerdotal from the regal office (which must be prejudicial to
any state), it bestows the former on a foreigner, who has always a
separate, and may often have an opposite interest to that of the public.
But were this religion ever so advantageous to society, it is contrary
to that which is established among us, and which is likely to keep
possession for a long time of the minds of the people; and though it
is much to be hoped that the progress of reason and philosophy will,
by degrees, abate the virulent acrimony of opposite religions all over
Europe, yet the spirit of moderation has as yet made too slow advances
to be entirely trusted. The conduct of the Saxon family, where the
same person can be a Catholic King and Protestant Elector, is perhaps
the first instance in modern times of so reasonable and prudent a
behaviour. And the gradual progress of the Catholic superstition does,
even there, prognosticate a speedy alteration; after which it
is justly to be apprehended that the persecutions will put a speedy
period to the Protestant religion in the place of its nativity.
Thus, upon the whole, the advantages of the settlement in the family
of Stuart, which frees us from a disputed title, seem to bear some
proportion with those of the settlement in the family of Hanover,
which frees us from the claims of prerogative; but at the same time
its disadvantages, by placing on the throne a Roman Catholic, are much
greater than those of the other establishment, in settling the crown on
a foreign prince. What party an impartial patriot, in the reign of King
William or Queen Anne, would have chosen amidst these opposite views
may perhaps to some appear hard to determine. For my part, I esteem
liberty so invaluable a blessing in society, that whatever favours its
progress and security can scarce be too fondly cherished by every one
who is a lover of humankind.
But the settlement in the house of Hanover has actually taken place.
The princes of that family, without intrigue, without cabal, without
solicitation on their part, have been called to mount our throne by
the united voice of the whole legislative body. They have, since their
accession, displayed in all their actions the utmost mildness, equity,
and regard to the laws and constitution. Our own ministers, our own
parliaments, ourselves have governed us, and if aught ill has befallen
us we can only blame fortune or ourselves. What a reproach must we
become among nations if, disgusted with a settlement so deliberately
made, and whose conditions have been so religiously observed, we should
throw everything again into confusion, and by our levity and rebellious
disposition prove ourselves totally unfit for any state but that of
absolute slavery and subjection?
The greatest inconvenience attending a disputed title is that it brings
us in danger of civil wars and rebellions. What wise man, to avoid this
inconvenience, would run directly upon a civil war and rebellion? Not
to mention that so long possession, secured by so many laws, must ere
this time, in the apprehension of a great part of the nation,
have begot a title in the house of Hanover independent of their present
possession, so that now we should not, even by a revolution, obtain the
end of avoiding a disputed title.
No revolution made by national forces will ever be able, without some
other great necessity, to abolish our debts and encumbrances, in which
the interest of so many persons is concerned. And a revolution made
by foreign forces is a conquest—a calamity with which the precarious
balance of power threatens us, and which our civil dissensions are
likely, above all other circumstances, to bring upon us.
NOTES, OF THE PROTESTANT SUCCESSION.
[110] It appears from the speeches and proclamations and whole train
of King James I.’s actions, as well as his son’s, that they considered
the English government as a simple monarchy, and never imagined that
any considerable part of their subjects entertained a contrary idea.
This made them discover their pretensions without preparing any force
to support them, and even without reserve or disguise, which are always
employed by those who enter upon any new project, or endeavour to
innovate in any government. King James told his Parliament plainly,
when they meddled in State affairs, “Ne sutor ultra crepidam.” He used
also at his table, in promiscuous companies, to advance his notions in
a manner still more undignified, as we may learn from a story told in
the life of Mr. Waller, and which that poet used frequently to repeat.
When Mr. Waller was young, he had the curiosity to go to court; and
he stood in the circle and saw King James dine where, amongst other
company, there sat at table two bishops. The King, openly and aloud,
proposed this question: “Whether he might not take his subjects’ money,
when he had occasion for it, without all this formality of Parliament?”
The one bishop readily replied, “God forbid you should not, for you are
the breath of our nostrils.” The other bishop declined answering, and
said he was not skilled in Parliamentary cases; but upon the King’s
urging him, and saying he would admit of no evasion, his lordship
replied very pleasantly, “Why, then, I think your Majesty may lawfully
take my brother’s money, for he offers it.” In Sir Walter Raleigh’s
preface to the _History of the World_ there is this remarkable passage:
“Philip II., by strong hand and main force, attempted to make himself
not only an absolute monarch over the Netherlands, like unto the kings
and sovereigns of England and France, but, Turk-like, to tread under
his feet all their natural and fundamental laws, privileges and ancient
rights.” Spenser, speaking of some grants of the English kings to the
Irish corporations, says: “All which, though at the time of their first
grant they were tolerable, and perhaps reasonable, yet now are most
unreasonable and inconvenient. But all these will easily be cut off
with the superior power of her Majesty’s prerogative, against which her
own grants are not to be pleaded or enforced.” (_State of Ireland_, p.
1537, edit. 1706.)
As these were very common, if not perhaps the universal notions of
the times, the two first princes of the house of Stuart were the more
excusable for their mistake. And Rapin, suitable to his usual malignity
and partiality, seems to treat them with too much severity upon account
of it.
[111] Those who consider how universal this pernicious practice of
funding has become all over Europe may perhaps dispute this last
opinion, but we lay under less necessity than other States.
[112] This was published in the year 1752.
IDEA OF A PERFECT COMMONWEALTH.
Of all mankind there are none so pernicious as political projectors, if
they have power, nor so ridiculous if they want it; as, on the other
hand, a wise politician is the most beneficial character in nature if
accompanied with authority; and the most innocent, and not altogether
useless, even if deprived of it. It is not with forms of government
as with other artificial contrivances, where an old engine may be
rejected, if we can discover another more accurate and commodious, or
where trials may safely be made, even though the success be doubtful.
An established government has an infinite advantage, by that very
circumstance of its being established; the bulk of mankind being
governed by authority, not reason, and never attributing authority
to anything that has not the recommendation of antiquity. To tamper,
therefore, in this affair, or try projects merely upon the credit of
supposed argument and philosophy, can never be the part of a wise
magistrate, who will bear a reverence to what carries the marks of
age; and though he may attempt some improvements for the public good,
yet will he adjust his innovations as much as possible to the
ancient fabric, and preserve entire the chief pillars and supports of
the constitution.
The mathematicians in Europe have been much divided concerning that
figure of a ship which is the most commodious for sailing; and Huygens,
who at last determined this controversy, is justly thought to have
obliged the learned, as well as commercial world; though Columbus had
sailed to America, and Sir Francis Drake made the tour of the world,
without any such discovery. As one form of government must be allowed
more perfect than another, independent of the manners and humours of
particular men, why may we not inquire what is the most perfect of all,
though the common botched and inaccurate governments seem to serve
the purposes of society, and though it be not so easy to establish a
new government as to build a vessel upon a new plan? The subject is
surely the most worthy curiosity of any the wit of man can possibly
devise. And who knows, if this controversy were fixed by the universal
consent of the learned, but in some future age an opportunity might be
afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a dissolution
of the old governments, or the combination of men to form a new one in
some distant part of the world? In all cases it must be advantageous
to know what is most perfect in the kind, that we may be able to bring
any real constitution or form of government as near it as possible,
by such gentle alterations and innovations as may not give too great
disturbance to society.
All I pretend to in the present essay is to revive this subject of
speculation, and therefore I shall deliver my sentiments in as few
words as possible. A long dissertation on that head would not, I
apprehend, be very acceptable to the public, who will be apt to regard
such disquisitions both as useless and chimerical.
All plans of government which suppose great reformation in the manners
of mankind are plainly imaginary. Of this nature are the _Republic_ of
Plato and the _Utopia_ of Sir Thomas More. The _Oceana_ is the only
valuable model of a commonwealth that has as yet been offered to the
public.
The chief defects of the _Oceana_ seem to be these—First, its rotation
is inconvenient, by throwing men, of whatever ability, by intervals,
out of public employments. Secondly, its Agrarian is impracticable.
Men will soon learn the art, which was practised in ancient Rome,
of concealing their possessions under other people’s names, till at
last the abuse will become so common, that they will throw off even
the appearance of restraint. Thirdly, the _Oceana_ provides not a
sufficient security for liberty, or the redress of grievances. The
senate must propose, and the people consent; by which means the
senate have not only a negative upon the people, but, what is of
infinitely greater consequence, their negative goes before the votes
of the people. Were the king’s negative of the same nature in the
English constitution, and could he prevent any bill from coming into
Parliament, he would be an absolute monarch. As his negative follows
the votes of the Houses, it is of little consequence; such a difference
is there in the manner of placing the same thing. When a popular bill
has been debated in the two Houses, is brought to maturity, all its
conveniences and inconveniences weighed and balanced, if afterwards
it be presented for the Royal assent, few princes will venture to
reject the unanimous desire of the people. But could the king crush
a disagreeable bill in embryo (as was the case, for some time, in
the Scots Parliament, by means of the Lords of the Articles) the
British Government would have no balance, nor would grievances ever
be redressed. And it is certain that exorbitant power proceeds not,
in any government, from new laws so much as from neglecting to remedy
the abuses which frequently rise from the old ones. A government, says
Machiavel, must often be brought back to its original principles. It
appears then, that in the _Oceana_ the whole legislature may be said to
rest in the senate; which Harrington would own to be an inconvenient
form of government, especially after the Agrarian is abolished.