TEXT OF THE RESTRICTIONS.

“1st.—Longwood, with the road by Hut’s Gate, along the hill, as far as

the signal-post near Alarm-House, are to be fixed as boundaries.“

OBSERVATION. Sir Hudson Lowe’s predecessor had extended the boundary

line to the summits of the hills; but in about a fortnight, he perceived

that, by removing the sentinels to a little further distance, the house

and garden of Secretary-general Brook would be included within the

boundaries, and he immediately gave orders for the change.

At about forty fathoms from the road-side is Corbett’s garden, which

contains about eight or ten oak trees and a fountain; thus affording a

cool and agreeable shade.[32] According to the new restrictions, which

confined him to the high-road, a line is substituted for a surface, and

the secretary’s house and Corbett’s garden are excluded from the

boundaries.

Footnote 32:

In the very spot here described by Napoleon is his grave.

“2d.—Sentinels will mark the boundary lines, which nobody must pass to

approach the house or grounds of Longwood, without the Governor’s

permission.”

OBSERVATION. By the regulations which were first laid down, respecting

our establishment at St. Helena, and which were approved by the English

Governor, persons were admitted to Longwood in the following manner: The

Governor, the Admiral, the Colonel commanding the regiment and the camp,

the two members of the East India Company’s Council, and the

Secretary-general, who were the persons highest in authority on the

island, might pass the line of sentinels without any order or permission

whatever. The inhabitants of the Island were required to have a pass

from the Governor; naval men to be furnished with one from their

Admiral, and military with one from their colonel; and finally, the

inhabitants, sailors, and officers might all come to Longwood by the

permission of Count Bertrand, when the Emperor wished to receive them.

This arrangement, which continued for eight months, was attended by no

inconvenience. By the present regulation (which has been in force since

the month of August, though it was not formally communicated to us until

we were furnished with the list of new restrictions,) we may be said to

be kept in solitary confinement, and cut off from all intercourse with

the inhabitants. The latter, the officers and seamen are all equally

averse to the idea of being obliged to solicit the Governor’s permission

to visit Longwood, and to subject themselves to an interrogatory

respecting the motive of their visit. Strangers, whether civil or

military, officers, touching at St. Helena on their passage from India,

and who might be desirous of seeing the Emperor, usually applied to

Count Bertrand, who appointed the day and the hour when they would be

received. During their stay in the island they were regarded as

citizens, and with the permission of Count Bertrand, they might when

they pleased visit Longwood; and it may once more be observed that this

arrangement subsisted for eight months without being attended by any

inconvenience. If any strangers touching at the island might excite the

suspicion of the Governor, he could prevent them from landing, or

passing the first post. Finally, the Governor, by the report of the

sentinels, was daily made acquainted with the names of the persons who

visited Longwood. But in the month of August, the Governor sought to

impose on us the obligation of receiving strangers, to whom he wished to

render himself agreeable, and also of receiving them at the time he

might think proper to appoint. This was putting the finishing stroke to

all his offensive conduct! To put a stop to all these insults, the

Emperor found himself obliged to declare that he would in future receive

no one.

“3d.—The road to the left of Hut’s Gate, which turns off by Woodridge to

Longwood, never having been frequented by General Bonaparte since the

arrival of the Governor, the post by which it was observed, will be in a

great measure withdrawn. But whenever the General may wish to ride on

horseback in this direction, on giving timely notice to the officer he

will experience no obstacle.“

OBSERVATION.—In the first observation it was proved that the limits had

been contracted in this quarter; and, by this third article, they are

still more circumscribed. To say that the valley has not been frequented

for six months is a strange reason for adopting this decision. It is

certainly true that Napoleon has for several months declined going out,

in consequence of the harassing conduct of the Governor; but it must

also be observed that one part of the valley is not accessible in rainy

weather, and that in the other part a camp has been formed. Yet Lord

Bathurst stated, in his speech in Parliament, that “this road had been

prohibited, when it was found that he (General Bonaparte) had abused the

confidence which had been reposed in him, and had endeavoured to corrupt

the inhabitants of the island.” But here Lord Bathurst contradicts Sir

Hudson Lowe. The offer of permission to ride in the valley, whenever it

may be wished, is a mere pretence; the forms prescribed for the

attainment of this permission render it impossible. This offer never has

been, and never can be, fulfilled. The ride in the valley being thus

prohibited, it has become impossible to visit Miss Mason’s garden, in

which there are some large trees which afford agreeable shade. Within

the boundaries to which the captives are now restricted, there is not a

single spot in which they can enjoy the sight of trees or water:

sentinels are posted at different distances throughout the boundaries;

and, under the pretence of misunderstanding in the orders, &c., any

individual may be arrested. This has frequently happened to the French

officers.

“4th. If he (General Bonaparte) should wish to prolong his ride in any

other directions, an officer of the Governor’s staff (if he receives

timely notice) will be in readiness to attend him. If the notice should

be short, the officer on duty at Longwood may take the place of the

staff-officer.

“The inspecting officer has orders not to approach General Bonaparte, at

least unless he be asked for; and not to watch him in his rides, except

so far as his duty requires; that is to say, he must observe that the

established rules are not violated; and if they should be transgressed,

he must intimate the circumstance in a respectful way”

OBSERVATION. This regulation is useless. The Emperor will not go out so

long as he sees there is a wish to subject him to direct and public

inspection. Besides, the staff-officers have orders to report all that

the French may say when in conversation with them. This affords

opportunities for calumny. Several English officers have refused to act

this dishonourable part, declaring that they would not degrade

themselves to the level of spies, and repeat the conversations that may

take place in the unguarded confidence of a ride or walk.

“5th. The rules already in force, for preventing communications with any

one whatever, without the Governor’s permission, must be strictly

enforced. Consequently, it is requisite that General Bonaparte should

abstain from entering into any conversation (except such as the

interchange of customary salutations may demand) with the persons whom

he may happen to meet, unless it be in the presence of an English

officer.“

OBSERVATION.—Hitherto this extremity of insult had been avoided. The

Emperor does not acknowledge, either in the Governor or his agents, the

right of imposing any restrictions on him. But what is the object of

this article? To insult and degrade the character of the captives!—to

give rise to disputes between them and the sentinels. To prohibit them

from speaking to any one, or entering any house, is, in fact, a moral

annulment of the circuit allowed them. This is so extraordinary that we

are now actually induced to believe, what many persons have already

suspected, that Sir Hudson Lowe is occasionally subject to fits of

lunacy.

“6th.—Those persons who, with the consent of General Bonaparte, may

receive the Governor’s permission to visit him, must not communicate

with any individual of his suite, unless a permission to that effect be

specially expressed.”

OBSERVATION.—This is useless; for nobody has been received since the

present Governor abolished the regulations which were established by his

predecessor. However, the consequence of this restriction is that, if

Napoleon should receive a stranger, as none of his officers can be

present, and none of his servants in attendance, he would be reduced to

the necessity of opening the doors himself. Besides, as the Emperor does

not understand English, it follows, if the individual admitted to him

should not speak French, that they must both remain mute, and thus the

interview would be reduced to a mere exhibition.

“7th.—At sunset, the garden round Longwood is to be regarded as the

extent of the boundaries. At that time sentinels will be posted at the

limits of the garden; but so as not to incommode General Bonaparte by

observing his motions, should he wish to continue his walks. During the

night, sentinels will be stationed close to the house, as they formerly

were; and all admission must be prohibited until the sentinels are

withdrawn from the house and garden on the following morning.”

OBSERVATION.—During the excessively hot season, the only time when it is

possible to walk is after sun-set. In order to avoid meeting the

sentinels, the Emperor finds it necessary to return to the house while

it is still broad day-light; though the heat of the sun has rendered it

impossible for him to go out during the day, as the grounds round

Longwood are without shade, water, or verdure. According to this new

restriction, the Emperor cannot enjoy a walk in the evening; while he is

likewise deprived of the exercise of riding on horseback. He is confined

in a small house, in all respects insufficient for his accommodation,

badly built, unwholesomely situated, and without a supply of water; and,

in addition to all this, every opportunity is taken to expose him to

insult and disrespect. His constitution, though naturally robust, is

very much enfeebled by the treatment he experiences.

“8th.—Every letter for Longwood will be enclosed by the Governor in a

sealed envelope, and forwarded to the officer on duty, to be delivered,

sealed, to the officer of General Bonaparte’s suite to whom it is

addressed, who by this means will be assured that nobody except the

Governor knows its contents.

“In like manner, letters from any of the residents of Longwood must be

delivered to the officer on duty, enclosed in a second sealed envelope

and addressed to the Governor, which will be a security that no

individual except the latter can peruse its contents.

“No letter can be written or sent, and no communication of any kind

whatever can be made, except in the manner above mentioned. No

correspondence can be maintained with any individual in the island,

except for the necessary communications to the purveyor. The notes

containing these communications must be delivered open to the officer on

duty, who will forward them to the proper quarter.

“The above-mentioned restrictions will be observed from the date of the

10th inst.

“H. LOWE.“

“_St. Helena, October 9th, 1816._“

OBSERVATION.—This last restriction has no reference to the Emperor, who

neither writes nor receives letters. A simple explanation is, therefore,

all that is required. Will the observations that may be contained in the

confidential letters from the Emperor’s officers to their friends be

regarded as offensive? When those who may read these letters shall be

convinced that they are in no way hostile to the safety or policy of the

state, will they forget their contents, so that they may never become

the subject of conversation or abuse? This explanation will decide

whether all correspondence is, or is not, to be considered as

prohibited. The seizure of the person of Count Las Cases completely

justifies this observation.

The object of the 8th article of the restrictions, as the inquisitorial

system established on the island sufficiently proves, is to prevent the

European journals from giving publicity to the criminal conduct that is

pursued here. A vast deal of trouble is taken to secure this object: it

would have been far easier to have acted in such a way as to render

concealment unnecessary. A letter addressed to Count Bertrand, dated the

1st of July, 1816, goes to still greater lengths; for it prohibits even

verbal communications with the inhabitants of the island. This is the

delirium of fury and hatred; or rather, it may be said to be a proof of

downright madness. The regulation here alluded to is but a trifling

example of the vexations to which we are exposed, and the invention of

which seems to be the sole occupation of the present Governor. Can Lord

Bathurst now affirm that Sir H. Lowe has imposed no restriction; that

the instructions of the English ministry were of a nature advantageous

to Napoleon and his suite, and had no other object than that of securing

their safe custody? In consequence of this absurd and insulting

treatment, the Emperor has not enjoyed exercise without doors for

several months. His medical attendants foresee that this confinement

will prove fatal to his constitution. It is a more certain, and far more

inhuman, mode of assassination, than poison or the sword. [What a

horrible prophecy!]

ANXIETY OCCASIONED BY THE NEW RESTRICTIONS.—ANECDOTES OF

CAMPO-FORMIO.—MM. DE COBENTZEL, GALLO, AND CLARKE.—THE COUNT

D’ANTRAIGUES.

10th.—This morning we had agreed to meet together at the Grand

Marshal’s, to deliberate on the restrictions which the Governor had

recently transmitted to us, and to adopt a uniform resolution. I was

unwell, and could not attend. I, however, wrote down my opinion: I

stated that in the delicate situation in which I was placed I could do

nothing; I could arrive at no positive conclusion; I always found 0—0.

The point in question was, indeed, of the most serious and difficult

nature. We were required to subject ourselves to new restrictions, to

place ourselves under the dependence of the Governor, who shamefully

abused his power, employed the most insulting language towards the

Emperor, and announced that we must submit to every grievance, under

pain of being immediately separated from Napoleon, sent to the Cape, and

thence to Europe.

On the other hand, the Emperor, indignant at the mortifications to which

we were exposed on his account, insisted that we should no longer submit

to them. He urged us rather to quit him, and to return to Europe, to

bear witness that we had seen him absolutely buried alive.

But how could we for a moment endure this thought! Death was preferable

to separation from him whom we served, admired, and loved; to whom we

daily became more and more attached, through his personal qualities, and

the miseries which injustice and hatred had accumulated upon him. This

was the real state of the question. In these distressing circumstances,

we knew not what determination to adopt. I closed my letter by stating

that, if left to myself alone, I would sign, without scruple, any thing

that the Governor might present to me; and that, if a collective

resolution were taken, I would implicitly adopt it.

The Governor had now found out a method of attacking us in detail: he

declared his intention of removing any individual of Napoleon’s suite

according to his will and caprice.

The Emperor was indisposed: the Doctor has observed incipient scurvy. He

desired me to attend him, and we conversed on the subjects which chiefly

occupied our attention at the moment. He wanted something to amuse him,

and he took up the chapter of Leoben, which happened to be beside him.

When he had finished reading it, the conversation turned on the

conferences which brought about the treaty of Campo-Formio. I refer to

the chapters on that subject for the portrait and character of the first

Austrian negotiator, M. de Cobentzel, whom Napoleon surnamed the “_great

northern bear_,” on account of the influence which, he said, his heavy

paw had exercised on the green table of the conferences.

“M. de Cobentzel was at that time,” said the Emperor, “the agent of the

Austrian monarchy, the main spring of its plans, and the director of its

diplomacy. He had been appointed on all the principal European

embassies, and had been long at the Court of Catharine, whose peculiar

favour he enjoyed. Proud of his rank and importance, he doubted not that

his dignified and courtly manners would easily overawe a General who had

just issued from the revolutionary camp. Thus,” observed Napoleon, “he

shewed a want of respect in addressing the French General; but the first

words uttered by the latter sufficed to reduce him to his proper level,

above which he never afterwards attempted to rise.”

The conferences at first proceeded very slowly; for M. de Cobentzel,

according to the custom of the Austrian Cabinet, proved himself very

skilful in the art of retarding business. The French General, however,

determined to bring matters to an issue: the conference, which he had

declared should be the last, was maintained with great warmth. Napoleon

came, resolved to have a decisive answer to his propositions; they were

rejected. He then rose in a fit of passion, and exclaimed energetically:

“You wish for war then?—You shall have it:” and laying his hands on a

magnificent piece of porcelain (which M. de Cobentzel used with great

complacency to boast of having received as a present from the great

Catharine), he dashed it with all his force on the ground, where it was

broken into a thousand pieces. “There,” he exclaimed, “such, I promise

you, will be the fate of your Austrian monarchy in less than three

months:” and so saying, he rushed out of the apartment. M. de Cobentzel

stood petrified; but M. de Gallo, who was of a more conciliatory temper,

followed the French General to his carriage, endeavouring to detain him.

“He almost dragged me back by main force,” said the Emperor, “and with

so pitiable an air, that, in spite of my apparent anger, I could not

refrain from laughing in my sleeve.”

M. de Gallo was the ambassador from Naples to Vienna, whither he had

conducted the Neapolitan Princess, the second wife of the Emperor

Francis. He possessed the full confidence of the Princess, and she, in

her turn, ruled her husband: thus the ambassador enjoyed great influence

at the Court of Vienna. When the army of Italy, marching on Vienna,

dictated the armistice of Leoben, the Empress, at this critical

juncture, cast her eyes on her confident, and charged him to avert the

danger. He was to gain an interview with the French General, as if

accidentally, and to endeavour to prevail on him to accept his services

as a negotiator. Napoleon, who was well acquainted with every

circumstance, determined to turn his knowledge to a good account.

Accordingly, on receiving M. de Gallo, he inquired who he was. The

favourite courtier, disconcerted to find himself under the necessity of

telling his name, replied that he was the Marquess de Gallo, and that he

had been charged by the Emperor of Austria to make overtures to

Napoleon. “But,” said the latter, “your name is not German.” “True,”

replied M. de Gallo,” I am the Neapolitan ambassador.” “And how happens

it,” said Napoleon drily, “that I have to treat with Naples? We are at

peace. Has the Emperor of Austria no negotiators of the old school? Is

the old aristocracy of Vienna extinct?” M. de Gallo, alarmed at the idea

of such observations being officially communicated to the Cabinet of

Vienna, now became intent on ingratiating himself into the favour of the

young General.

Napoleon enquired what news had been received from Vienna, and spoke of

the armies of the Rhine, the Sambre, and the Meuse. He obtained all the

intelligence he could; and, when he was about to withdraw, M. de Gallo,

in the most suppliant tone, inquired whether he might hope to be

accepted as a negotiator, and whether he should proceed to Vienna to

obtain full powers. Napoleon had no wish to decline this proposal; he

had gained an advantage which he was not willing to lose. M. de Gallo,

who subsequently became ambassador from Naples to the First Consul, and

also ambassador from Joseph to the Emperor Napoleon, frequently

mentioned this scene, and frankly avowed that he had never been so

frightened in the whole course of his life.

In the French negotiations, Clarke acted the same kind of secondary part

which M. de Gallo maintained with regard to Austria. “Clarke,” said the

Emperor, “had been sent to Italy by the Directory, which had begun to

consider me as dangerous. He was charged with an ostensible and public

mission; but he had secret orders to keep an eye upon me, and to

ascertain if, in case of necessity, it would be possible to arrest me.

But little reliance could have been placed on the officers of my army,

in an affair of this kind, and therefore the first inquiries were

addressed to the Cisalpine Directory. The answer was that it would be as

well to spare trouble on this point, and to give up all idea of it. As

soon as I was made acquainted with Clarke’s real instructions, I frankly

told him all I knew; at the same time assuring him that I should concern

myself but very little about any reports that might be made. He was soon

convinced of this. When, on his mission to Austria, he was dismissed, by

that Power, I offered to find employment for him, and he afterwards

remained with me; though perhaps there was, in reality, but little

sympathy between us. I should undoubtedly have again taken him into my

service, after my return, if I had found him in the ranks along with the

rest. You know that I could not easily rid myself of those to whom I had

become accustomed: when people had once embarked with me, I could never

prevail on myself to throw them overboard. Nothing but absolute

necessity could force me to such a course. Clarke’s chief merit was that

of being a good man of business.”

After Brumaire, Clarke naturally came in contact with the First Consul

as his aid-de-camp, &c. There was then little etiquette observed at the

palace; the duties were not distinctly separated, and the whole

presented a kind of family circle. The officers immediately connected

with the Consul dined at a general table. Clarke, who was extremely

susceptible and punctilious, got involved in quarrels with one of these

persons. The circumstance having reached the ears of the First Consul,

he appointed Clarke ambassador to Florence, to the court of the Queen of

Etruria. This post was in itself highly agreeable; but Clarke had been

appointed to it by way of disgrace. He urgently solicited his recal;

and, at length, to his great satisfaction, he received an order to

return to France. But his punishment was not yet at an end. The First

Consul took but little notice of him: he sent him to the Tuileries, to

St. Cloud, and to the camp of Boulogne, without explaining his

intentions, or granting him any thing. Clarke, in despair, told one of

his friends that he had no alternative but to throw himself into the

Seine, as he could no longer endure the contempt to which he was

exposed, added to the mortification of being deprived of his situation.

Just at this time he was unexpectedly made Secretary of the

Topographical Cabinet, Councillor of State, and appointed to some other

posts, which altogether produced him a salary of 60 or 80,000 francs.

This was Napoleon’s way: his first favour was usually followed

immediately by several others. In these cases his bounty was

overwhelming. But it was necessary to take advantage of the interval of

favour; it might be endless, or it might be instantly and irretrievably

lost.

I knew General Clarke well; he had been my comrade at the Military

School. He informed me that, some days before the battle of Jena, the

Emperor, from whose dictation he had just written numerous orders and

instructions, entering into a familiar conversation, while he walked up

and down his chamber, said: “In three or four days I will fight a

battle, which I shall gain: it will bring me at least as far as the

Elbe, and perhaps to the Vistula. There I will fight a second battle,

which I shall also gain. Then ... then ...,” said he, with a meditative

air, and placing his hand on his forehead ... “but that is enough; it is

useless to invent romances,—Clarke, in a month you will be Governor of

Berlin; and history will record that, in the space of one year, and in

two different wars, you were Governor of Vienna and Berlin; that is to

say, of the Austrian and Prussian monarchies. By the bye,” continued he,

smiling, “what did Francis give you for governing his capital?”—“Nothing

at all, Sire.”—“How, nothing at all?—That was hard indeed! Well, in that

case, I must pay his debt.” And he gave him, as far as I can recollect,

a sum sufficient to purchase an hotel in Paris, or a country house in

the vicinity of the capital.

The course of events exceeded even Napoleon’s expectations. He fought

but one battle, which brought him to Berlin, and enabled him to advance

to the Vistula.

“Clarke,” said Napoleon, “possessed a strong taste for family

parchments. At Florence he spent a great portion of his time in

investigating my genealogy. He also took great pains to trace out his

own, and I believe he at length persuaded himself that he was related to

the whole Faubourg Saint-Germain. Doubtless he has a much higher opinion

of his own dignity, now that he is the Minister of a legitimate King

than he had when he was merely the Minister of an upstart Emperor. It is

said that he at present enjoys great favour; I wish it may last. It

commenced a few days before my arrival at Paris, when the cause of the

King was desperate. It certainly appeared useless to accept a ministry

when all was lost; but I have nothing to say against that. This sort of

conduct may have its fair side; yet it is necessary to observe some

degree of decorum, and in that Clarke was wholly wanting. However, I

willingly forgive him in all that concerns me.... In 1813 and 1814 some

persons endeavoured to inspire me with doubts of Clarke’s fidelity; but

I never would listen to any thing of the kind. I always believed him to

be an honest man.” The intimate friends of the Duke de Feltre can bear

witness that Napoleon was correct in the opinion he had formed of the

character of his minister.

The Duke de Feltre, on communicating to the Emperor the intelligence of

the arrival of the Count d’Artois in Switzerland, advised him to make

peace. Napoleon replied, under date of 22d of February, 1814:—“As to

your advice of making peace, it is too absurd: it is by cherishing such

notions as this that public spirit is destroyed. Besides, it is

supposing me either mad or stupid to imagine that, if I could conclude

peace, I would not immediately do it. To the prevailing notion that it

has been in my power to make peace for four months past, but that I

declined doing so, must be attributed all the misfortunes of France. I

expected, at least, to have been spared the pain of hearing such

sentiments expressed.”

The Emperor, reverting to the events of Campo-Formio, alluded to the

arrest of the Count d’Antraigues, the papers that were found upon him,

and the discoveries to which they gave rise; he also mentioned the

indulgence which the Count experienced, and the treachery with which

that indulgence was repaid.

The Count d’Antraigues, who was a man of considerable talent, fond of

intrigue, and endowed with personal advantages, had acquired a certain

degree of importance at the commencement of our Revolution. He was a

member of the right hand side of the Constituent Assembly, and he

emigrated at the time of its dissolution. At the period when the French

were about to assail Venice, the Count d’Antraigues was residing there,

where he held a diplomatic appointment from the Russian Government, and

was the main spring and agent of all the machinations that were plotting

against France. On seeing the danger of the Venetian Republic, he

attempted to escape; but he fell in with one of our posts, and was

seized, with all his papers. The General-in-chief appointed a special

commission to examine these documents, and the secrets which they

unfolded were the subject of great astonishment. They contained, among

other things, full proof of the treason of Pichegru, who had sacrificed

his troops to facilitate the operations of the enemy. “Pichegru,”

exclaimed the Emperor indignantly, “was guilty of the most odious crime

that can possibly be conceived, that of coldly sacrificing the men whose

lives had been entrusted to his honour and discretion.”

The Count d’Antraigues, finding that all his secrets were discovered,

conducted himself with so much address and apparent candour, that

Napoleon, conceiving he had gained him over, or, to speak more properly,

suffering himself to be gained over by the Count, treated him with the

utmost indulgence. He defended him against the proceedings of the

Directory, which insisted on having him shot, and the Count was allowed

to proceed to Milan on his parole. But what was Napoleon’s surprise on

learning that M. d‘Antraigues had escaped to Switzerland, and had

published an infamous libel against him, reproaching him with

ill-treatment, and complaining of having been confined in chains? These

falsehoods occasioned so much indignation that several foreign

diplomatists, who knew how Napoleon had really acted towards the Count,

spontaneously made a public declaration of what they had witnessed.

So late as the year 1814, the Count d‘Antraigues died in England, in a

horrible way, being assassinated by his valet-de-chambre in the presence

of his wife, who was the celebrated singer Saint Huberti.

At the time of the seizure of the Count d‘Antraigues‘ papers, Pichegru

was at the head of the Legislative Body, and was almost at open war with

the Directory. It may well be supposed that the members of the Directory

were highly gratified by thus obtaining important and authentic

documents against their adversaries. This discovery greatly influenced

Napoleon in the course which he adopted in the events of Fructidor: it

was one of the principal causes of his famous proclamation, which

brought about the triumph of the Directory.

Desaix, who was serving under Moreau in the army of the Rhine, having

taken advantage of the armistice to introduce himself to the

General-in-chief of the army of Italy, for whom he had conceived the

highest admiration, was with Napoleon at the time of the important

discovery above mentioned. Napoleon having informed him of the treason

of Pichegru, Desaix observed; “But we knew all this on the Rhine three

months ago. A waggon, belonging to General Klinglin’s corps, which fell

into our hands, furnished us with all Pichegru’s correspondence with the

enemies of the Republic.”—“And did Moreau give no intimation of this to

the Directory?” “No.”—“Then he is very blameable,” exclaimed Napoleon;

“when the safety of one’s country is at stake silence is guilt!” After

Pichegru’s fall, Moreau communicated to the Directory all he knew

respecting the conspiracy, at the same time pronouncing a severe

reprobation on those who were concerned in it. “This was but another

instance of misconduct,” said Napoleon; “by not speaking earlier, he

betrayed his country; and by speaking so late, he merely struck a blow

at one who was already fallen.”

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