1. (2). How shall we define the aeon (or, eternity)? Shall we say
that it is the intelligible "being" (or, nature) itself, just as
we might say that time is the heaven and the universe, as has been
done, it seems, by certain (Pythagorean) philosophers?[439] Indeed,
as we conceive and judge that the aeon (eternity) is something very
venerable, we assert the same of intelligible "being," and yet it is
not easy to decide which of the two should occupy the first rank;
as, on the other hand, the principle which is superior to them (the
One) could not be thus described, it would seem that we would have
the right to identify intelligible "being" (or, nature), and the aeon
(or, eternity), so much the more as the intelligible world and the
aeon (age, or eternity), comprise the same things. Nevertheless, were
we to place one of these principles within the other, we would posit
intelligible nature ("being") within the aeon (age, or eternity).
Likewise, when we say that an intelligible entity is eternal, as
(Plato) does:[346] "the nature of the model is eternal," we are
thereby implying that the aeon (age or eternity) is something distinct
from intelligible nature ("being"), though referring thereto, as
attribute or presence. The mere fact that both the aeon (eternity) and
intelligible nature ("being"), are both venerable does not imply their
identity; the venerableness of the one may be no more than derivative
from that of the other. The argument that both comprise the same
entities would still permit intelligible nature ("being") to contain
all the entities it contains as parts, while the aeon (or age, or
eternity) might contain them as wholes, without any distinctions as
parts; it contains them, in this respect, that they are called eternal
on its account.
FAULTS OF THE DEFINITION THAT ETERNITY IS AT REST, WHILE TIME IS IN
MOTION.
Some define eternity as the "rest"[440] of intelligible nature
("being"), just like time is defined as "motion" here below. In this
case we should have to decide whether eternity be identical with
rest in general, or only in such rest as would be characteristic of
intelligible nature ("being"). If indeed eternity were to be identified
with rest in general, we would first have to observe that rest could
not be said to be eternal, any more than we can say that eternity is
eternal, for we only call eternal that which participates in eternity;
further, under this hypothesis, we should have to clear up how movement
could ever be eternal; for if it were eternal, it would rest (or, it
would stop). Besides, how could the idea of rest thus imply the idea
of perpetuity, not indeed of that perpetuity which is in time, but of
that of which we conceive when speaking of the aeonial (or, eternal)?
Besides, if the rest characteristic of intelligible "being" in itself
alone contain perpetuity, this alone would exclude from eternity the
other genera (or categories) of existence. Further yet, eternity has to
be conceived of as not only in rest, but (according to Plato[438]) also
in unity, which is something that excludes every interval--otherwise,
it would become confused with time;--now rest does not imply the idea
of unity, nor that of an interval. Again, we assert that eternity
resides in unity; and therefore participates in rest without being
identified therewith.