17. But why should not the Good, beauty, virtues, science, or
intelligence be considered primary genera? If by "good" we understand
the First, whom we call the Good itself, of whom indeed we could not
affirm anything, but whom we call by this name, because we have none
better to express our meaning, He is not a genus; for He cannot be
affirmed of anything else. If indeed there were things of which He
could be predicated, each of them would be the Good Himself. Besides,
the Good does not consist in "being," and therefore is above it. But if
by "good" we mean only the quality (of goodness), then it is evident
that quality cannot be ranked with primary genera. Does this imply that
Essence is not good? No; it is good, but not in the same manner as the
First, who is good, not by a quality, but by Himself.
It may however be objected that, as we saw above, essence contains
other genera, and that each of these is a genus because it has
something in common, and because it is found in several things. If then
the Good be found in each part of "being" or essence, or at least, in
the greater number of them, why would not also the Good be a genus, and
one of the first genera? Because the Good is not the same in all parts
of Essence, existing within it in the primary or secondary degree; and
because all these different goods are all subordinate to each other,
the last depending on the first, and all depending from a single Unity,
which is the supreme Good; for if all participate in the Good, it is
only in a manner that varies according to the nature of each.