The categories of place and time are just as unable to figure among the
primary genera. To be in a place, is to be in something foreign; which
implies two consequences:[319] a genus must be single, and admits of
no compositeness. Place, therefore, is no primary genus. For here we
are dealing only with veritable essences.
As to time, does it possess a veritable characteristic? Evidently
not. If time be a measure, and not a measure pure and simple, but the
measure of movement,[320] it also is something double, and consequently
composite. (This, as with place, would debar it from being ranked
among the primary genera, which are simple). Besides, it is something
posterior to movement; so that it could not even be ranked along with
movement.
ACTION, EXPERIENCE, POSSESSION AND LOCATION ARE SIMILARLY
UNSATISFACTORY.
Action and experience equally depend on movement. Now, as each of
them is something double, each of them, consequently, is something
composite. Possession also is double. Location, which consists in
something's being in some definite way in something else, actually
comprises three elements. (Therefore possession and location, because
composite, are not simple primary genera).