2. Holding as we do that the world-Essence is not one, we must face
the question whether the number of beings is determinate, or infinite.
To say that world-Essence is not one, however, is to say that it is
both one and multiple, a varied unity that embraces a multitude. It is
therefore necessary that the One, so conceived, be one so far as it
forms a single genus, containing as species the essences by which it is
simultaneously one and multiple; or there must be several genera, but
that they all be subsumed under the single one; or again, that there
be several genera which however be not mutually subsumed, of which
each, being independent of the others, may contain what is below it,
consisting of less extended genera, or species below which there are no
more than individuals; so that all these things may contribute to the
constitution of a single nature, together making up the organization of
the intelligible world, which we call world-Essence (or "being").