27. The Stoics did well, indeed, to assign the principle of everything
to the first rank; but they should not have recognized as principle,
and accepted as "being" what was shapeless, passive, devoid of life
and intelligence, dark, and indefinite. Because of the universe's
beauty, they are forced to introduce within it a divinity; but
the latter derives His very essence from matter; He is composite
and posterior (to matter); rather, He is no more than "modified
matter."[288] Consequently, if matter be the subject, there must
necessarily be outside of it some other principle which, acting upon
matter, makes of it the subject of the qualities which He imparts
thereto. If this principle resided in matter, and Himself were the
subject; if, in other words, He were contemporaneous with matter, He
could not reduce matter to the state of a subject. Now it is entirely
impossible (for this principle) to constitute a subject concurrently
with matter; for in such a case both would have to serve as subject
to something higher; and what could it be, since there could be no
further principle to make a subject of them, if all things had already
been absorbed into this (concurrent) subject? A subject is necessarily
subject to something; not to what it has in itself, but to that whose
action it undergoes. Now, it undergoes the action of that which itself
is not subject by itself; consequently, of that which is outside of
itself. This point has evidently been overlooked by the Stoics.
IF EVERYTHING BE DERIVED FROM MATTER, MATTER CAN NO LONGER BE THEIR
SUBJECT.
On the other hand, if matter and the active principle need nothing
exterior, if the subject that they constitute can itself become all
things by assuming different forms, as a dancer, who can assume all
possible attitudes, this subject would no longer be a subject, but
He will be all things. Just as the dancer is not the subject of the
attitudes (for they are his actualizations), likewise the "matter"
of the Stoics will no longer be the subject of all things, if all
things proceed from matter; or rather, the other things will no longer
really exist, they will be nothing but "modified matter," just as the
attitudes are nothing but the "modified dancer." Now if the other
things no longer really exist, matter is no longer a subject; it is
no longer the matter of the essences, but is matter exclusively. It
will no longer even be matter, because what is matter must be matter
of something; but that which refers to something else belongs to the
same classification as that thing, just as half belongs to the same
classification as the double, and is not the being of the double. But
how could non-essence, except by accident, refer to essence? But the
absolute Essence and matter itself refer to essence by virtue of being
essence. Now if that which is to be is a simple potentiality, it cannot
constitute "being," which consequently matter could not be.[289]