22. The cause that a being undergoes an experience is that it contains
the kind of movement called alteration, whichever way it modify him;
on the contrary, action means to have in oneself a definite movement,
derived from oneself, or a movement which has its goal in some other
being, and its origin in self. In both cases there is movement;
but with this distinction: that action, so far as it is action, is
impassible; while an experience consists in the experiencer's reception
of a disposition new to him, without the reception of anything that
contributes towards his being; so as to avoid (the case of the statue,
above, where) the experience happened to one being (the metal), while
it was another being that was produced (the statue). Consequently, the
same thing will in one state be an action, and in other, an experience.
Thus the same movement will in one being be an action, because it
is considered from a certain viewpoint; and from another it will be
an experience, because it is disposed some other way. Action and
experience seem therefore to be relative, if one consider the action
in its relation with experience, since the same thing is action in the
one, and experience in the other. Also, because neither of these two
can be considered in itself, but only in him who acts, or experiences,
when the one moves, and the other is moved. Each of these terms
therefore implies two categories; one gives the movement, the other
receives it; consequently we have transmission and reception, which
result in relation. If he who received the movement possesses it as
he possesses color, why could it not also be said that he possessed
movement? Absolute movements, such as walking (and thinking) possess
steps and thought.
PREDICTION AND RESPONSIVENESS TO IT DO NOT FALL UNDER DEFINITION FOR
ACTION AND EXPERIENCE.
Let us now consider whether prediction be an action, and whether
adapting one's course to the prediction of somebody else would
constitute experiencing; for prediction comes from one being and
applies to another. However, although prediction apply to some other,
we would not consider prediction an action, nor being directed by the
prediction of somebody else an experience. In general, not even thought
is an action; thought, indeed, does not pass in to the object thought,
but functions within itself; it is not at all an action. Actualizations
are not at all actions, and not all of them perform actions; indeed,
they may do so only accidentally. It might be objected that a man who
was walking would certainly impress on the ground the trace of his
steps, and would thereby perform an action. Such an action would be the
consequence of something else, or the man would act accidentally; and
it would be accidental, because the man was not thinking of it. It is
in this way that even inanimate things perform some action, that fire
heats, and medicine cures. But enough of this.