15. The Aristotelians hold that number and quantity, and other things
referring to being should be subordinated to being; thus they classify
quantity as in a genus different from being. Quality also refers to
being, it also is erected into a separate genus. Consequently, as
action also refers to being, it is also considered a separate genus.
Must then "acting," or rather "action," from which "acting" is derived,
be considered a separate genus, as we consider that quality, from
which qualification is derived, is a separate genus? (As to these
derivations), it might be asked whether there were no distinction
between "action," "to act," and "active," or between "to act," and
"action?" "To act" expresses the idea of "active," while "action" does
not express it. "To act" means "to be in some action;" or rather, "in
actualization." Consequently, "actualization" expresses a category
rather than "action;" since actualization is predicated of being, like
quality, as was said above; and actualization, like movement, also
relates to being; but movement necessarily constitutes a class of
essence. How indeed could we admit that quantity, quality and relation
each form a genus, in respect to being, and yet refuse to movement,
which equally refers to being, the privilege of also forming a genus of
being?