IF "WHERE" AND "PLACE" ARE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES, MANY MORE MIGHT BE
ADDED.
14. The Aristotelians (while treating of this category) say, Where? For
instance, "to the Lyceum," or, "to the Academy." The Academy and the
Lyceum are then places and parts of places, as the "top," the "bottom,"
and "here" are parts or classes of place. The only difference consists
in a greater determination. If then the top, the bottom, and the middle
be places, as, for instance, "Delphi is the middle of the earth," and,
"the Lyceum and other countries are near the middle of the earth," what
else but place do we have to seek, since we have just said that each
of these things denotes a place? If, when we say "where?" we assert
that one thing is in another place, we are not expressing something
single and simple. Besides, each time that we affirm that such a man
is there, we are creating a double relation, namely, the relation of
the man who is there, with the place where he is, and the relation of
the containing place and the contained man. Why therefore should we not
reduce this to the class of relations, since the relation of both terms
with each other produces something? Besides, what is the difference
between "here" and "at Athens?" The Aristotelians grant that "here"
indicates the place; consequently, the same is true of "in Athens." If,
"in Athens" be equivalent to "being in Athens," this latter expression
contains two categories, that of place, and that of being. Now, this
should not be the case; for as one should not say "Quality exists,"
but only, "quality." Besides, if being in place and being in time
presuppose categories other than place and time, why would "being in a
vase" not also constitute a separate category? Why would it not be so
with "being in matter," with "being in the subject," and in general of
a part "being in the whole," or the "whole in the parts," the "genus in
the species," and the "species in the genus?" In this manner we would
have a far greater number of categories.