6. How then did we previously refer liberty to volition, saying that
"that which depends on us, our responsibility, is that which occurs
according to our will"? Yes, but we added, "or does not occur." If
indeed we be right, and if we continue to support our former opinion,
we shall have to recognize that virtue and intelligence are their
own mistresses, and that it is to them that we must refer our free
will and independence. Since they have no master, we shall admit that
(our) intelligence remains within itself, that virtue must equally
remain calm in itself, regulating the soul so as to make her good,
and that in this respect it itself is both free, and enfranchises the
soul. If passions or necessary actions arise, (virtue) directs them
automatically; nevertheless she still preserves her independence (or,
freedom) by getting into relations with everything. For instance,
(virtue) does not engage in exterior things to save the body in times
of danger; on the contrary, she abandons it, if it seem advisable;
she orders the man to renounce even life, wealth, children, and
fatherland; for her object is to be honorable, relinquishing anything
beneath her dignity. This evidently shows that our liberty of action
and independence do not refer to practical matters, nor to external
occupations, but to interior activity, to thought, to the contemplation
of virtue itself. This virtue must be considered as a kind of
intelligence, and must not be confused with the passions that dominate
and govern reason; for these, as (Plato[185]) says, seem to derive
something from the body, though trained by exercise and habit.