5. Do autocratic freedom and independence inhere in pure and thinking
Intelligence exclusively, or are they also found in the soul which
applies its contemplative activity to intelligence, and its practical
activity to virtue? If we grant liberty to the practical activity of
the soul, we will not extend it to its results; for of this we are not
always masters. But if liberty is attributed to the soul which does
good, and which, in everything acts by herself, we are near the truth.
How would that depend on us? As it depends on us to be courageous when
there is a war. Nevertheless, admitting that it then depends on us
to be courageous, I observe that, if there were no war, we could not
perform any action of this nature. Likewise, in all other virtuous
deeds, virtue always depends on accidental circumstances which force
us to do some particular thing.[182] Now if we were to give virtue
the liberty of deciding whether it desired a war, so as to be able to
offer a proof of courage; or desired injustices, as opportunities to
define and to respect rights; or wished that people might be poor to be
able to show forth its liberality; or whether it preferred to remain
at rest, because everything was in order; might virtue not prefer to
remain inactive in case nobody needed her services.[183] Similarly a
good physician, such as Hippocrates, for instance, would wish that his
professional services should not be needed by anybody. If then virtue
when applied to actions be forced to engage in such activities, how
could it possess independence in all its purity? Should we not say
that actions are subject to Necessity, whilst the preliminary volition
and reasoning are independent? If this be so, and since we locate free
will in that which precedes its execution, we shall also have to locate
autocratic freedom and independence of virtue outside of the (actual)
deed.