4. We might ask how that which is produced by a desire could be
autocratically free, since the desire implies a need, and drags us
towards something exterior; for whoever desires really yields to an
inclination, even though the latter should lead him to the Good. We
might further ask whether intelligence, doing that which is in its
nature to do, in a manner conformable to its nature, is free and
independent, since it could have done the opposite. Further, we may ask
whether we have the right to attribute free will to that which does not
do any deeds; last, whether that which does a deed, is not, by the mere
fact that every action has a purpose, subject to an external necessity.
How indeed could one attribute freedom to a being that obeys its nature?
We (might answer), how can one say of this being that it obeys, if it
be not constrained to follow something external? How would the being
that directs itself towards the Good be constrained, if its desire be
voluntary, if it direct itself towards the Good, knowing that it is
such? Only involuntarily does a being depart from the Good, only by
constraint does it direct itself towards that which is not its good;
that is the very nature of servitude, not to be able to reach one's
own good, and to be thwarted by a superior power to which obedience
is compulsory. Servitude displeases us, not because it deprives us of
the liberty to do evil, but because it hinders us going towards our
own, from ensuing our own good, forced as we are to work at the good
of someone else. When we speak of "obeying our nature," we distinguish
(in the being that obeys its nature) two principles, the one which
commands, and the other which obeys.[182]
But when a principle has a simple nature, when it is a single
actualization, when it is not other in potentiality than it is in
actualization, how would it not be free? It cannot be said to be acting
conformably to its nature, because its actualization is not different
from its being, and because, within it, essence and action coincide.
It surely is free, if it act neither for another, nor in dependence on
another. If the word "independent" be not suitable here, if it be too
weak, we must at least understand that this Principle does not depend
on any other, does not recognize it as the ruler of its actions, any
more than of its being, since it itself is principle.
Indeed, if Intelligence depend upon a further principle, at least this
one is not external, but is the Good itself. If then it be in the Good
itself that it finds its welfare, so much the more does it itself
possess independence and liberty, since it seeks them only in view
of the Good. When therefore Intelligence acts in conformity with the
Good, it has a higher degree of independence; for it possesses already
the "conversion to the Good," inasmuch as it proceeds from the Good,
and the privilege of being in itself, because Intelligence is turned
towards the Good; now it is better for Intelligence to remain within
itself, since it is thus turned towards the Good.