29. Supposing then that the pleasure does not accompany the good, but
that anterior to pleasure there have existed something which would
have naturally given rise to it (because of its goodness); why then
might not the good be considered lovable? But the mere assertion that
good is lovable, already implies that it is accompanied by pleasure.
But supposing now that the good could exist without being lovable
(and consequently not accompanied by pleasure). In that case, even in
presence of the good, the being that possesses sensibility will not
know that the good is present. What would however hinder a being from
knowing the presence of the good without feeling any emotion at its
possession, which would exactly represent the case of the temperate
man who lacks nothing? The result would be that pleasure could not be
suitable to the First (being), not only because He is simple, but also
because pleasure results from the acquisition of what is lacking (and
the First lacks nothing, therefore could not feel pleasure).