MAN AS A SOUL SUBSISTING IN A SPECIAL REASON.

5. Man must therefore have as "reason" (or, as essence), something else

than the soul. Still, in this case, man might be something composite;

that is, the soul would subsist in a particular "reason," admitting

that this "reason" was a certain actualization of the soul, though this

actualization could not exist without its producing principle. Now such

is the nature of the "seminal reasons." They do not exist without the

soul; for the generating reasons are not inanimate; and nevertheless

they are not the soul purely and simply. There is therefore nothing

surprising in the statement that these (human) beings are ("seminal)

reasons."

THESE REASONS ARE THE ACTUALIZATIONS OF THE SOUL WHICH BEGETS THE

ANIMAL.

Of which soul are these reasons,[79] which do not beget the man

(though they do beget the animal), then the actualization? Not of the

vegetative soul; they are the actualizations of the (reasonable) soul

which begets the animal,[80] which is a more powerful, and therefore

a more living soul. Man is constituted[81] by the soul disposed in

some manner, when present to matter disposed in some particular

fashion--since the soul is some particular thing, according as she is

in some particular disposition--even in the body. In the bodies, she

fashions a resembling form. So far as the nature of the body allows

it, she thus produces an image of the man, as the painter himself

makes an image of the body; she produces, I repeat, an inferior man

(the sense-man, the animal), which possesses the form of man, his

reasons, morals, dispositions, faculties, although in an imperfect

manner, because he is not the first man (the intellectual man). He has

sensations of another kind; sensations which, though they seem clear,

are obscure, if they be compared to the superior sensations of which

they are the images. The superior man (the reasonable man) is better,

has a diviner soul, and clearer sensations. It is he doubtless to whom

Plato refers (when he says, Man is the soul[82]); in his definition he

adds, "which makes use of the body," because the diviner man dominates

the soul which uses the body, and thus uses the body only in an

indirect manner.[83]

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 88 / 442 题