TWO IS NOT AN ADDITION TO ONE, BUT A CHANGE (REFUTATION OF ARISTOTLE).

The objection that unity, without itself experiencing anything, by the

mere addition of something else, is no longer one, but becomes double,

is a mistake.[32] The one has not become two, and is not that which

has been added to it, nor that to which something has been added. Each

of them remains one, such as it was; but two can be asserted of their

totality, and one of each of them separately. Two therefore, not any

more than "pair," is by nature a relation. If the pair consisted in

the union (of two objects), and if "being united" were identical with

"to duplicate," in this case the union, as well as the pair, would

constitute two. Now a "pair" appears likewise in a state contrary (to

that of the reunion of two objects); for two may be produced by the

division of a single object. Two, therefore, is neither reunion nor

division, as it would have to be in order to constitute a relation.

OBJECTS PARTICIPATE IN NUMBERS JUST AS THEY PARTICIPATE IN ALL

INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES.

What then is the principal cause (by virtue of which objects

participate in numbers)? A being is one by the presence of one; double,

because of the presence of the pair; just as it is white because of the

presence of whiteness; beautiful, because of the presence of beauty;

and just by that of justice. If that be not admitted, we shall be

reduced to asserting that whiteness, beauty and justice are nothing

real, and that their only causes are simple relations; that justice

consists in some particular relation with some particular being; that

beauty has no foundation other than the affection that we feel; that

the object which seems beautiful possesses nothing capable of exciting

this affection either by nature, or by acquirement. When you see an

object that is one, and that you call single, it is simultaneously

great, beautiful, and susceptible of receiving a number of other

qualifications. Now why should unity not inhere in the object as

well as greatness and magnitude, sweetness and bitterness, and other

qualities? We have no right to admit that quality, whatever it be,

forms part of the number of beings, whilst quantity is excluded; nor

to limit quantity to continuous quantity, while discrete quantity is

excluded from the conception of quantity; and that so much the less as

continuous quantity is measured by discrete quantity. Thus, just as

an object is great because of the presence of magnitude, as it is one

by the presence of unity; so is it double because of the presence of

being a pair, and so forth.[33]

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 26 / 442 题