13. To begin with, it is unreasonable to insist that the notion of
the subject one comes to us from the subject itself (which is one),
from the visible man, for instance, or from some other animal, or
even some stone. Evidently the visible man and the One are things
entirely different, which could not be identified[28]; otherwise,
our judgment would not be able (as it is) to predicate unity of the
non-man. Besides, as the judgment does not operate on emptiness for
the right side, and other such things, seeing a difference of position
when it tells us that an object is here, or there; likewise, it also
sees something when it says that an object is one; for it does not
experience there an affection that is vain, and it does not affirm
unity without some foundation. It cannot be believed that the judgment
says that an object is one because it sees that it is alone, and that
there is no other; for, while saying that there is no other, the
judgment implicitly asserts that the other is one. Further, the notions
of "other" and "different" are notions posterior to that of unity;
if the judgment did not rise to unity, it would not assert either
the "other" nor the "different"; when it affirms that an object is
alone, it says, "there is one only object"; and therefore predicates
unity before "only." Besides, the judgment which affirms is itself a
substantial (being) before affirming unity of some other (being); and
the (being) of which it speaks is one likewise before the judgment
either asserts or conceives anything about it. Thus (being) must be one
or many; if it be many, the one is necessarily anterior, since, when
the judgment asserts that plurality is present, it evidently asserts
that there is more than one; likewise, when it says that an army is
a multitude, it conceives of the soldiers as arranged in one single
corps. By this last example, it is plain that the judgment (in saying
one body), does not let the multitude remain multitude, and that it
thus reveals the existence of unity; for, whether by giving to the
multitude a unity which it does not possess, or by rapidly revealing
unity in the arrangement (which makes the body of the multitude), the
judgment reduces multitude to unity. It does not err here about unity,
any more than when it says of a building formed by a multitude of
stones that it is a unity; for, besides, a building is more unified
than an army.[29] If, further, unity inhere in a still higher degree in
that which is continuous, and in a degree still higher in what is not
divisible,[30] evidently that occurs only because the unity has a real
nature, and possesses existence; for there is no greater or less in
that which does not exist.
UNITY, THOUGH BY PARTICIPATION EXISTING IN SENSE-OBJECTS, IS
INTELLIGIBLE.
Just as we predicate being of every sense-thing, as well as of every
intelligible thing, we predicate it in a higher degree of intelligible
things, attributing a higher degree (of substantiality) to the (beings
that are veritable than to sense-objects), and to sense-objects than
to other genera (of physical objects); likewise, clearly seeing
unity in sense-objects in a degree higher than in the intelligible
(essences), we recognize the existence of unity in all its modes, and
we refer them all to Unity in itself. Besides, just as "being and
essence"[31] are nothing sensual, though sense-objects participate
therein, so unity, though by participation it inhere in sense-objects,
is not any the less an intelligible Unity. Judgment grasps it by an
intellectual conception; by seeing one thing (which is sensual) it also
conceives another which it does not see (because it is intelligible);
it therefore knew this thing in advance; and if judgment knew it in
advance, judgment was this thing, and was identical with that whose
existence it asserted. When it says, "a certain" object, it asserts the
unity, as, when it speaks of "certain" objects, it says that they are
two or more. If then one cannot conceive of any object whatever without
"one," "two," or some other number, it becomes possible to insist that
the thing without which nothing can be asserted or conceived, does not
at all exist. We cannot indeed deny existence to the thing without
whose existence we could not assert or conceive anything. Now that
which is everywhere necessary to speak and to conceive must be anterior
to speech and conception, so as to contribute to their production. If,
besides, this thing be necessary to the hypostatic existence of every
essence--for there is no essence that lacks unity--it must be anterior
to being, and being must be begotten by it. That is why we say "an
essence" instead of first positing "essence," and "a" only thereafter,
for there must be "one" in essence, to make "several" possible; but
(the converse is not true; for) unity does not contain essence, unless
unity itself produce it by applying itself to the begetting of it.
Likewise, the word "that" (when employed to designate an object) is
not meaningless; for instead of naming the object, it proclaims its
existence, its presence, its "being," or some other of its kinds of
"essence." The word "that" does not therefore express something without
reality, it does not proclaim an empty conception, but it designates an
object as definitely as some proper name.
UNITY ONLY AN ACCIDENT IN SENSE-THINGS, BUT SOMETHING IN ITSELF IN THE
INTELLIGIBLE.
14. As to those who consider unity as relative, they might be told
that unity could not lose its proper nature merely as a result of
the affection experienced by some other being without itself being
affected. It cannot cease being one without experiencing the privation
of unity by division into two or three. If, on being divided, a mass
become double without being destroyed in respect to its being a mass,
evidently, besides the subject, there existed unity; and the mass lost
it because the unity was destroyed by the division. So this same thing
which now is present, and now disappears, should be classified among
essences wherever it be found; and we must recognize that, though it
may be an accident of other objects, it nevertheless exists by itself,
whether it manifest in sense-objects, or whether it be present in
intelligent entities; it is only an accident in posterior (beings,
namely, the sense-objects); but it exists in itself in the intelligible
entities, especially in the first Essence, which is One primarily, and
only secondarily essence.