COL. POKROVSKY: First listen to my question and then answer. Do you
agree with the fact that on 30 April also, right on the day when you
published the two documents that we are talking about now, it was
absolutely clear that further resistance of Hitlerite Germany was
absolutely aimless and useless?
Do you understand my question? Do you agree with that?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I understood the question. May I say the following: I had
to continue fighting in the East in order to rescue the refugees who
were moving to the West. That is certainly very clearly stated. I said
that we would continue to fight in the East only until the hundreds and
thousands of families from the German eastern area could be safely
transferred to the West.
COL. POKROVSKY: Still you did not answer my question, Dönitz, did you,
even though it was very clearly put. I repeat it once again so that you
can manage to understand it. Do you agree with the fact that already on
30 April it was fully clear that further resistance of Hitlerite Germany
was absolutely aimless and useless? Answer me “yes” or “no.”
DÖNITZ: No, that was not clear. From the military point of view the war
was absolutely lost, and there was then only the problem of saving as
many human beings as possible, and therefore we had to continue
resistance in the East. Therefore that resistance in the East had a
purpose.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, I understand you, but will you deny that your
order, which called for a continuation of the war, led to further
bloodshed?
DÖNITZ: That is extremely small, compared to the one or two millions
which otherwise would have been lost.
COL. POKROVSKY: One moment, please; will you wait. Do not try and make
any comparisons. First answer and then explain. That is the order that
we have to follow here all the time. First “yes” or “no,” and then an
explanation, please.
DÖNITZ: Of course, in the fighting in the East during those few days
there might be further losses, but they were necessary in order to save
hundreds of thousands of refugees.
COL. POKROVSKY: You did not answer my question. I shall repeat it for
the third time.
THE PRESIDENT: He did answer; he said “yes,” that bloodshed would be
caused. That is an answer to your question.
COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I would like you to explain exactly the
question of whether you look upon yourself, first and foremost, as a
politician, or do you look upon yourself as a soldier who obeyed direct
orders of his own superiors without any analysis of the political
meaning and content of such orders?
DÖNITZ: I do not understand that question completely. As head of State,
from 1 May on, I was a political man.
COL. POKROVSKY: And before that time?
DÖNITZ: Purely a soldier.
COL. POKROVSKY: On 8 May 1946, at 1635 hours, in this room you
mentioned, “As a soldier I did not have in mind such political
considerations as might have been in existence.” On 10 May, at 1235
hours, here, you said, when the question of submarine warfare was taken
up, “All this concerns political aims; but I, as a soldier, was
concerned with military problems.” Is that not so?
DÖNITZ: Yes, it is quite correct. I said that before 1 May 1945 I was
purely a soldier. As soon as I became the head of State I relinquished
the High Command of the Navy because I became the head of State and
therefore a political personality.
COL. POKROVSKY: Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, about 15 minutes ago, addressed
you also and referred to two documents, and in particular to Document
GB-186, D-640; and he cited one sentence from this, one sentence which
grossly contradicts what you said just now. You remember this sentence
“idle chatter”?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I know exactly what you mean.
COL. POKROVSKY: I want to ask you: How can you reconcile these two
extremely contradictory statements, the statement about “idle chatter,”
about the fact that the officer is not a politician. This statement took
place on 15 February 1944, at the time when you were not the supreme
head of the State. Is that not so?
DÖNITZ: If a soldier during the war stands firmly behind his nation and
his government, that does not make him a politician; that is said in
that sentence and that was meant by that sentence.
COL. POKROVSKY: All right. We will be more exact about whether this is
really the fact. Several times, in a very definite manner, you testified
here before the Tribunal that for many years before the war and during
the war you were indoctrinating the Navy in the spirit of pure idealism
and firm respect for the customs and laws of war. Is that so?
DÖNITZ: Right; yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: In particular, on 9 May, yesterday, at 1254 hours, you
said, “I educated the submarine fleet in the pure idealism and I
continued such education during the war. It was necessary for me in
order to achieve high fighting morale.” Five minutes later on the same
day, you said, when speaking about the Navy, “I never would have
tolerated that orders were given to these people which would be
contradictory to such morale, and it is out of the question that I
myself could have given such an order.” You acknowledge that those were
your words, or approximately your words, allowing for the possible
inexactness of translation; is that not so?
DÖNITZ: Of course, that is what I said.
COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to take a look at the document which is
in your possession now, the document presented by your defense counsel
as Dönitz-91. In this document your defense counsel presents an excerpt
from the testimony, the affidavit made by Dr. Joachim Rudolphi. In order
not to waste the Tribunal’s time, I would like you to tell us briefly in
one word, “yes” or “no,” whether Rudolphi is correct in his testimony;
that you always strongly opposed the introduction into the German Armed
Forces of the Hitlerite so-called “People’s Courts.” Did you understand
me?
DÖNITZ: I was against handing over legal cases from the Navy to other
courts. I said that, if one bears the responsibility for a branch of the
Armed Forces, one also must have court-martial jurisdiction. That is
what it says.
COL. POKROVSKY: And you are familiar with Rudolphi’s affidavit?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I know it.
COL. POKROVSKY: You remember that on the first page of that excerpt
presented to the Tribunal it says:
“Early in the summer of 1943, the first threatening attempt to
undermine the nonpolitical jurisdiction of the Armed Forces was
made.”
Is Rudolphi correct in explaining this question and is it true that you
were against this attempt to introduce special political courts into the
Navy and Armed Forces? Is that correct?
DÖNITZ: According to my recollection, my resistance began in the summer
1943. It may be that already in the spring the jurisdiction of the
Wehrmacht was threatened. That may be, but I did not learn of it.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you acknowledge, Dönitz, or not, that these so-called
“People’s Courts” were to deal, as Rudolphi puts it, with anything that
smacked, even remotely, of politics? That is his sentence which you can
find on the first page of Document D-91.
DÖNITZ: As I have already stated, my point of view was the following: I
wanted to keep my soldiers under my own jurisdiction. I could not judge
proceedings outside the Navy, because I did not know the legal
procedure. My point was that my soldiers should remain with me and be
sentenced by me.
COL. POKROVSKY: For all kinds of crimes, including political crimes, is
that not so? Did I understand you correctly?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I meant that; I have stated that I was of the opinion that
they should remain under Navy jurisdiction.
COL. POKROVSKY: Will you deny, Dönitz, that you were always preaching
and always encouraging in every way the murder of defenseless people
from among the members of the German Armed Forces for purely political
reasons and that you always looked upon such murders as acts of military
valor and heroism?
DÖNITZ: I do not understand you. I do not know what you mean.
COL. POKROVSKY: You did not understand my question?
DÖNITZ: No, I have not understood the meaning of your question at all.
COL. POKROVSKY: I can repeat it. Perhaps it will be clearer to you. I am
asking you: Will you deny the fact that you preached in favor of the
murder of members of the German Armed Forces, by other members of the
German Armed Forces and purely for political reasons? Now, is the
question clear to you?
DÖNITZ: How do you come to ask this question?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not find your question quite clear.
COL. POKROVSKY: What I have in mind, My Lord, is the Order Number 19 for
the Baltic Fleet, which in part was dealt with by Sir David
Maxwell-Fyfe. There is one point of this order which elucidates, with
absolute precision, the motives for publishing and promulgating this
order. One idea is expressed there in a very clear manner—and with your
permission I shall read one paragraph from this document. “One
example”—it says in Order Number 19, last paragraph but one—“On the
auxiliary cruiser _Cormoran_, which was used as a place of detention in
Australia a warrant officer...”
THE PRESIDENT: Which paragraph?
COL. POKROVSKY: The last paragraph but one of Document D-650, Page 4 of
the English text. I beg your pardon, Page 4 of the German text, and the
last paragraph on the third page of the English copy.
THE PRESIDENT: It was read already in cross-examination.
COL. POKROVSKY: This particular part was not read in the
cross-examination, and it is really very important for the case.
THE PRESIDENT: We have just heard this very question, this very example,
read by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, not half an hour ago.
COL. POKROVSKY: But Sir David, in reading this example, did not read one
particular sentence which is of great importance to me and which
clarifies Dönitz’ position; and that is the reason why I permitted
myself to come back to this particular passage. It is only one sentence
which interests me.
THE PRESIDENT: What sentence are you referring to?
COL. POKROVSKY: The first sentence in the second paragraph from the end.
It is the paragraph which begins, “One example: In a prisoner-of-war
camp...”
THE PRESIDENT: You are entirely wrong. He read the whole of the
paragraph. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe read the whole of the paragraph.
COL. POKROVSKY: When, with your permission, I shall read these few
words, then you will convince yourself, Sir, that these particular words
were not read.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I have a note in my notebook made at
the time, which shows that the whole of this was read; that the
defendant was cross-examined about the meaning of the word “communist”;
and that he explained it by saying that he was referring to a spy among
the crew who might give away submarine secrets. The whole matter was
gone into fully by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, and the Tribunal does not
wish to hear any more about it.
COL. POKROVSKY: It is absolutely necessary for me to read two
expressions from this sentence which were not read into the record here,
and I ask your permission to read these two words.
THE PRESIDENT: Which two words do you say were not read? State the two
words.
COL. POKROVSKY: “Systematically” and “unobtrusively,” that is, according
to plan. They are not talking about one particular instance, but they
are talking about the whole definite plan, about the system.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but that was all read, Colonel Pokrovsky. You must
have missed it.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am not saying that Sir David has omitted that.
THE PRESIDENT: That was read by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe and put to the
witness, to the defendant.
COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps Sir David may have accidentally omitted this,
but it is really very important for me, because Dönitz testified here to
the killing of only one spy; but what is really meant here is that there
was a plan to exterminate all communists, or rather men who were
supposed to be communists, according to the idea of some petty officer.
THE PRESIDENT: It is exactly what Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe put to the
witness. He said, “How can you say that this refers to a case of spies
or one spy, when it is referring to all communists”? It is exactly the
question he put to him.
COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps I did not understand quite correctly what our
interpreter translated, but in our translation this was not mentioned.
Then with your permission I will go to the next question.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you deny, Dönitz, that in this order,
as the one example of high military valor—that military valor which
serves as the basis or the reason for extraordinary promotion of
noncommissioned officers and officers—you used, as one example, the
treacherous and systematic murder of people for political reasons? Do
you deny that this order was correctly understood?
DÖNITZ: No, that is quite wrong. This order refers to one incident in a
prisoner-of-war camp, and it should be considered in what serious
dilemma the senior member of the camp found himself and that he acted in
a responsible and correct manner by removing in the interests of our
warfare as a traitor that communist who was at the same time a spy. It
would have been easier for him if he had just let things take their
course, which would have harmed the U-boats and caused losses. He knew
that after his return home he would have to account for it. That is the
reason why I gave this order.
COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps you will agree that the incidents, as you
explain them now, are absolutely different from what is written in your
order.
THE PRESIDENT: I have already told you that the Tribunal does not wish
to hear further cross-examination upon this subject. You are now
continuing to do that, and I must draw your attention again clearly to
the ruling of the Tribunal that the Tribunal will not hear further
cross-examination upon this subject.
COL. POKROVSKY: In the light of this document, I ask you how do you
explain your statements about your alleged objections in principle to
special political courts being introduced into the Navy, that is, the
considerations in principle which were testified to by Dr. Rudolphi? How
do you explain this contradiction?
DÖNITZ: I did not understand what you said.
COL. POKROVSKY: You say here that the document does not deal with
political acts, whereas the order is formulated very precisely and Dr.
Rudolphi testified to the fact that you were against introducing
political courts into the Army and the Navy. Obviously there is a
contradiction in terms here, and I would like to have this contradiction
explained.
DÖNITZ: I do not see any contradiction, because Dr. Rudolphi says that I
was against handing over legal cases to courts outside of the Navy and
because the case of the _Cormoran_ deals with an action by the senior
camp member, far away in a prisoner-of-war camp in a foreign land. He
decided on this action only after grave deliberation, knowing that at
home he would have to answer for it before a military court. He did this
because he considered it necessary, in the interests of the conduct of
the war, to stop the loss of submarines by treason. Those are two
entirely different things. Here we deal with an individual case in the
_Cormoran_ camp.
COL. POKROVSKY: What you are testifying to now is a repetition of what
you said before; and, as you heard, the Tribunal does not want to listen
to it any more. This is really not an answer to my question.
DÖNITZ: Yes. In answering your question I cannot say anything but the
truth, and this is what I have done.
COL. POKROVSKY: Of course our ideas of truth may be altogether
different. I, for instance, look upon this question in an altogether
different manner. This fact...
DÖNITZ: Will you excuse me. I am under oath here, and you do not want to
accuse me of telling an untruth, do you?
COL. POKROVSKY: We are not talking about false testimony, but we are
talking about a different approach to the idea of truth. I, for
instance, consider that by this order you revealed yourself as a real...
DÖNITZ: No, I cannot agree with that.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly put the question if you want to put a
question?
COL. POKROVSKY: I want to ask him one question, My Lord, and I must
explain to him why I am asking this question.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I consider this order a revelation of your
loyalty, your fanatical loyalty, to fascism; and in this connection I
want to ask you whether you consider that it was because of the fact
that you showed yourself to be a fanatical follower of fascism and
fascist ideas that Hitler chose you to be his successor—because you
were known to Hitler as a fanatical follower who was capable of inciting
the Army to any crime in the spirit of the Hitlerite conspirators and
that you would still call these crimes pure idealism. Do you understand
my question?
DÖNITZ: Well, I can only answer to that that I do not know. I have
already explained to you that the legitimate successor would have been
the Reich Marshal; but through a regrettable misunderstanding a few days
before his appointment, he was no longer in the game, and I was the next
senior officer in command of an independent branch of the Wehrmacht. I
believe that was the determining factor. That fact that the Führer had
confidence in me may also have had something to do with it.
COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution, My Lord, has no more questions
to ask of this defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, do you want to re-examine?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to put a few more questions,
Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, during the cross-examination by
Sir David you were asked about your knowledge of conditions in
concentration camps; and you wanted to make an additional statement,
which you could not do at the time. What personal connections did you
have with any inmates of concentration camps, or did you have any
connections at all?
DÖNITZ: I had no connections with anybody who had been sent to a
concentration camp; with the exception of Pastor Niemöller. Pastor
Niemöller was a former comrade of mine from the Navy. When my last son
was killed, he expressed his sympathy; and on that occasion I asked him
how he was.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When was that?
DÖNITZ: That was in the summer of 1944, and I received the answer that
he was all right.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you write him directly, or how did it
happen?
DÖNITZ: No. I received this information through a third person.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was that the only message you received from
a concentration camp?
DÖNITZ: The only one I received.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the cross-examination a report by Captain
Assmann was presented about a conference with the Führer in May 1943.
You remember its contents. You are alleged to have said that in view of
the present naval war situation, it was desirable that Germany should
get possession of Spain and Gibraltar. Did you make a positive
suggestion in that direction? One cannot see that from the document.
DÖNITZ: Of course, when I discussed the situation, I mentioned the
danger of the narrow strip along the Bay of Biscay; and I said that it
would be more favorable to us if we could start our U-boats from a wider
area. At that time nobody even contemplated a move against Spain, either
with the consent of Spain or in the form of an attack. It was quite
obvious that our forces were in no way sufficient for that. On the other
hand, it is quite understandable that, in showing my concern about that
narrow strip, I should say that it would have been better if the area
had been larger. That is what I meant by that statement. I was referring
to U-boat warfare and not to any move against Spain on land. It
certainly would have been impossible for me as a naval officer to make a
suggestion to attack Spain.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In connection with the sinking of the
_Athenia_ it has been hinted that your statement was considered an
excuse; that is, that the commanding officer of the submarine confused
the _Athenia_ with an auxiliary cruiser. Therefore, I should like to put
to you an excerpt from the war diary of the officer commanding in that
action and I want you to confirm that it is really by the same
commanding officer. I shall read from the document of the Prosecution,
Exhibit GB-222, on Page 142 of my document book, Volume III. It is the
war diary of the submarine U-30. The excerpt is dated 11 September 1939,
Page 142 in document book, Volume III.
“Sighted a blacked-out vessel. Got on its trail. In zigzag
course recognized as merchant ship. Requested to stop by morse
lantern. Steamer signals ‘not understood,’ tries to escape in
the thick squall and sends out SOS ‘chased by submarine’ and
position by radiotelegraphy.
“Gave ‘stop’ signal by radio and morse lantern.
“Ran ahead. First 5 shots with machine gun C/30 across the bow.
Steamer does not react. Turns partly, about 90°, directly toward
the boat. Sends ‘still chased.’ Therefore, fire opened from aft
bearing with 8.8 cm. English steamer _Blairlogie_, 4,425 tons.
“After 18 shots and three hits, steamer stops. Crew boards
boats. Last message by radio, ‘Shelled, taking to boats.’ Fire
immediately ceased when emergency light was shown and steamer
stopped.
“Went over to lifeboats, gave orders to pull away toward south.
Steamer sunk by torpedo. Afterwards both boat crews supplied
with Steinhäger and cigarettes. 32 men in two boats. Fired red
stars until dawn. Since American steamer, _American Skipper_,
was nearby, we departed. Crew was rescued.”
Can you confirm, Admiral, that this was an entry by the same commanding
officer who nine days before had torpedoed the _Athenia_?
DÖNITZ: Yes, that is the same commander of the same operation who
shortly before had committed this error.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the cross-examination it was once more
maintained, and very definitely, that you had sent an order to destroy
to the commanders. I should like to put to you a letter which is signed
by various U-boat commanders. You know the letter and know the
signatures, and I should like to ask you to tell me whether the U-boat
commanders who signed were taken prisoner before September 1942, that
is, before your alleged orders to destroy, or whether they were captured
afterwards.
I am reading from the document book, Volume II, Page 99, Dönitz-53,
which I submit to the Tribunal. It is addressed to the camp commander of
the prisoner-of-war camp, Camp 18, in the Featherstone Park camp in
England. I received it through the British War Ministry and the General
Secretary of the Court. I read under the date of 18 January 1946, and
the text is as follows:
“The undersigned commanders, who are now here in this camp and
whose U-boats were active on the front, wish to make the
following statement before you, Sir, and to express the request
that this statement should be forwarded to the International
Military Tribunal in Nürnberg.
“From the press and radio we learn that Grossadmiral Dönitz is
charged with having issued the order to destroy survivors from
the crews of torpedoed ships and not to take any prisoners. The
undersigned state under oath that neither in writing nor orally
was such an order ever given by Grossadmiral Dönitz. There was
an order that for reasons of security of the boat, because of
increased danger through defense measures of all kinds, we were
not to surface after torpedoing. The reason for that was that
experience had shown that if the boat surfaced for a rescue
action, as was done in the first years of the war, we had to
expect our own destruction. This order could not be
misunderstood. It has never been regarded as an order to
annihilate shipwrecked crews.
“The undersigned declare that the German Navy has always been
trained by its leaders to respect the written and unwritten laws
and rules of the sea. We have always regarded it as our honor to
obey these laws and to fight chivalrously while at sea.”
Then come the signatures of 67 German submarine commanders who are at
present prisoners of war in British hands.
I ask you, Admiral—you know these signatures—were these commanders
captured before September 1942 or after September 1942?
DÖNITZ: Most of them beyond doubt were made prisoner after September
1942. In order to examine that exactly from both sides, I should like to
see the list again. But most of them beyond doubt were captured after
September 1942.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is enough. I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to clarify only one point
which came up during the cross-examination.
Admiral, during the cross-examination you have stated that you were
present at the situation conferences on 19 and 20 February 1945, and you
said...
DÖNITZ: No, that this date...
DR. LATERNSER: I made a note of it and you will recognize the conference
at once. During the situation conference of 19 February, Hitler is
alleged to have made the suggestion to leave the Geneva Convention. I
ask you now to tell me: Which high military leaders were present during
that situation conference?
DÖNITZ: I believe there is a mistake here. I did not hear this question
or suggestion of the Führer from his own lips, but I was told about it
by a naval officer who regularly took part in these situation
conferences. Therefore I do not know for certain whether the date is
correct, and I also do not know who was present when the Führer first
made that statement. In any case, I remember the matter was again
discussed the next day or two days later; and then I believe the Reich
Marshal, and of course Jodl and Field Marshal Keitel, were present. At
any rate, the whole of the Wehrmacht were unanimously against it; and to
my recollection, the Führer, because he saw our objection, did not come
back to this question again.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.
[_The defendant left the stand._]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, after the experience of the
cross-examination of today, I consider it proper to submit my documents
to the Tribunal now, if it pleases the Tribunal, before I call further
witnesses. I believe that I can thereby shorten the questioning of the
witness and that it will be more easily understood.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Kranzbühler.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: May I first remind the Tribunal that the
Prosecution Exhibits GB-224 and GB-191 contain the same general
accusations against U-boat warfare as are referred to in many of my
following documents. The documents dealing with these general
accusations are in Document Books 3 and 4.
First, I submit Document Dönitz-54 which contains the German declaration
of adherence to the London Submarine Protocol. I do not need to read it
because it has already been mentioned repeatedly.
Then, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the German Prize
Ordinance, an excerpt of which can be found on Page 137. I should like
to point out that Article 74 agrees word for word with the regulations
of the London Protocol.
May I point out at the same time that, as shown on Page 138, this Prize
Ordinance was not signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. That is
a contribution to the question as to whether the Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy was a member of the Reich Government. He had no authority to
sign this ordinance.
The next document which I submit is Dönitz-55. That is the order of 3
September 1939, with which the U-boats entered the war. I do not know
whether these documents are so well known to the Tribunal that I need
merely sum them up or whether it is better to read parts of them.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you might mention them together, really,
specifying shortly what they relate to.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. The order of 3 September directs the
boats to pay strict attention to all the rules of naval warfare. It
orders the war to be conducted according to the Prize Ordinance.
Furthermore, it provides for a preparatory order for the intensification
of economic warfare, because of the arming of enemy merchant ships. This
order is on Page 140. Since I shall refer to that later when examining a
witness, I need not read it now.
I should like to read to the Tribunal from an English document, to show
that the boats were really acting according to these orders. It is
Exhibit Number GB-191. It is in the original on Page 5, Mr. President.
That sentence is not in the English excerpt, and that is why I will read
it in English from the original:
“Thus the Germans started with the Ordinance which was, at any
rate, a clear, reasonable, and not inhuman document.
“German submarine commanders, with some exceptions, behaved in
accordance with its provisions during the first months of the
war. Indeed, in one case, a submarine had ordered the crew of a
trawler to take to their boat as the ship was to be sunk. But
when the commander saw the state of the boat, he said: ‘Thirteen
men in that boat! You English are no good, sending a ship to sea
with a boat like that.’ And the skipper was told to re-embark
his crew on the trawler and make for home at full speed, with a
bottle of German gin and the submarine commander’s compliments.”
That is an English opinion taken out of a document of the Prosecution.
My next document is Dönitz-56, an excerpt from the War Diary of the
Naval Operations Staff of 9 September 1939, on Page 141.
“English information office disseminates the news through
Reuters that Germany has opened total U-boat warfare.”
Then, as Dönitz-57, on Page 143, I should like to submit to the Tribunal
an account of the experiences which the Naval Operations Staff had in
U-boat warfare up to that date. It is an entry of 21 September 1939 in
the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. I read under Figure 2:
“The commanders of U-boats which have returned report the
following valuable experiences:
“...(b) English, partly also neutral steamers, sharp zigzags,
partly blacked-out. English steamers, when stopped, immediately
radio SOS with exact position. Thereupon English planes come in
to fight U-boats.
“(c) English steamers have repeatedly tried to escape. Some
steamers are armed, one steamer returned fire.
“(d) Up to now no cases of abuse by neutral steamers.”
The document on Page 144 of the document book is already in evidence. It
is an excerpt from Exhibit GB-222, war diary of the U-boat U-30, of 14
September. I will only read a few sentences from the beginning:
“Smoke clouds. Steamer on sharp zigzag course. Easterly course.
Ran towards her. When recognized, turns to counter-course and
signals SOS.
“English steamer _Fanad Head_, 5200 tons, bound for Belfast.
“Pursued at full speed. Since steamer does not react to order to
stop, one shot fired across her bows from a distance of 2,000
meters. Steamer stops. Crew takes to the boats. Boats pulled out
of the danger zone.”
I summarize the following: It shows how the U-boat, as a result of the
wireless message from the steamer, was attacked by airplanes, what
difficulties it had in getting the prize crew on board again, and how,
in spite of the bombing attacks of the planes, it did not sink the
steamer until two English officers who were still on deck had jumped
overboard and had been rescued by the U-boat. The depth charge pursuit
lasted for ten hours.
The next document, Dönitz-58, shows that merchant ships acted
aggressively against U-boats; and that also is an excerpt from the War
Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. I read the entry of 24 September:
“Commander, Submarine Fleet, reports that on 6 September the
English steamer _Manaar_, on being told to stop by _U-38_ after
a warning shot, tried to escape. Steamer sent wireless message
and opened fire from rear gun. Abandoned ship only after four or
five hits, then sank it.”
Then, another message of 22 September:
“English reports that, when the English steamer _Akenside_ was
sunk, a German U-boat was rammed by a steam trawler.”
From the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-193, which is copied on
Page 147, I should only like to point out the opinion from the point of
view of the Naval Operations Staff as to radio messages. I read from
Figure 2, two sentences, beginning with the second:
“In almost every instance English steamers, on sighting U-boats,
have sent out wireless SOS messages and given their positions.
Following these SOS messages from the ship, after a certain time
English airplanes always appeared which makes it clear that with
the English it is a matter of a military measure and organized
procedure. The SOS call together with the giving of the position
may therefore be considered as the giving of military
information, even as resistance.”
The next document, Dönitz-59, shows the approval of the entry submitted
by the Commander of the Submarine Fleet that ships which used their
wireless when stopped should be sunk. I read the entry of 24 November
1939. It is quite at the bottom, Figure 4:
“On the basis of the Führer’s approval, the following order is
given to Groups and Commander, Submarine Fleet:
“4) Armed force should be employed against all merchant vessels
using wireless when ordered to stop. They are subject to seizure
or sinking without exception. Efforts should be made to rescue
the crew.”
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 May 1946, at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED
AND TWENTY-SEVENTH DAY
Saturday, 11 May 1946
_Morning Session_
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I continue to submit
documents concerning naval warfare. My next document is printed on Page
149 of Document Book Number 3. It is a declaration of 26 September 1939
by the British First Lord of the Admiralty concerning the arming of the
British merchant fleet. In this declaration he announces that within a
short time the entire British merchant fleet will be armed. Then he
speaks about the training of the crews, and in conclusion he thanks his
predecessors for the care with which they prepared that work before the
beginning of the war.
I submit Document Dönitz-60. Dönitz-60 is a large collection of
documents concerning laws of naval warfare. It contains altogether 550
documents. In accordance with the request of the President, I have given
special numbers to the later documents.
I come now to some documents which deal with the treatment of ships
which acted suspiciously and were for that reason attacked by U-boats.
The first document of this series is Dönitz-61, Page 150. It is a
warning to neutral shipping against suspicious tactics. That warning was
sent in a note to all neutral missions. At the end it points out that
ships should avoid being mistaken for enemy warships or auxiliary
cruisers, especially during the night. There is a warning against all
suspicious tactics, for instance, changing course, use of wireless on
sighting German naval forces, zig-zagging, blacking-out, not stopping
upon demand, and the acceptance of enemy escort.
That warning is repeated in Document Dönitz-62, which is on Page 153, a
renewed note of 19 October 1939 to the neutral governments. Document 63
is an example of how a neutral government, namely the Danish Government,
in accordance with the German notes, warned its merchant shipping
against suspicious conduct. It is found on Page 154. I should like to
remind you again that the first warning was given on 28 September.
My next Document, Dönitz-64, shows that on 2 October the order was
issued to the submarines to attack blacked-out vessels in certain
operational areas close to the British coast. That order is particularly
significant in view of the cross-examination of yesterday where the
question was put as to whether an order of that kind had been issued at
all, or whether that subject was transmitted to the commanders orally
with instructions to falsify their logs. I read the order of 2 October
1939 on Page 155.
“Order by the SKL (Naval Operations Staff) to the Front:
“Inasmuch as it must be assumed that blacked-out vessels
encountered on the English and French coasts are warships or
auxiliary warships, full armed action is authorized against
blacked-out vessels in the following waters.”
An area around the British coast follows. The excerpt under it is taken
from the War Diary of Commander of Submarines of the same date and shows
the transmission of this order to the submarines.
The readiness of British merchant shipping to commit aggression against
German submarines is motivated or furthered by the next document which I
am going to show. It is numbered Dönitz-101 and is on Page 156. The old
number was Dönitz-60, Mr. President. It is an announcement by the
British Admiralty, which I will read:
“The British Admiralty circulated the following warning to the
British merchant marine on 1 October:
“Within the last few days some German U-boats have been attacked
by British merchant marine vessels. In this connection the
German radio announces that the German U-boats have so far
observed the rules of international law in warning the merchant
marine vessels before attacking them.
“Now, however, Germany intends to retaliate by considering every
British merchant marine vessel as a warship. While the
first-mentioned fact is absolutely untrue, it may indicate an
immediate change in the policy of German submarine warfare.
“Be prepared to meet it. Admiralty.”
On Page 157 there is a second report of the same date. “The British
Admiralty announces that German submarines are pursuing a new strategy.
English boats are called upon to ram every German submarine.”
The next document, Dönitz-65, contains orders issued as a result of the
armament of, and armed resistance by, merchant vessels. I read the order
of 4 October 1939, which was issued by the SKL to the Front.
“Immediate attack in any manner available is permitted
submarines against enemy merchant vessels which are obviously
armed or have been proclaimed as such on the basis of conclusive
evidence received by the Naval Operations Staff. As far as
circumstances permit, measures are to be taken to save the crew
after every possibility of danger for the submarine has been
eliminated. Passenger ships not used to transport troops are
still not to be attacked, even if armed.”
The excerpt below shows the transmission of the order to the submarines.
The experiences gained in the war up to that period are summarized in a
document on Page 159, which is an excerpt from the Prosecution’s Exhibit
GB-196, “Standing War Order 171,” by Commander of Submarines. I should
only like to read from Paragraph 4, the first sentence:
“Tactics of Enemy Merchant Vessels. The following instructions
have been issued for British shipping...”
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this document?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The document was issued before May 1940. I
shall have to call on a witness to give the correct date, Mr. President;
I assume it was in October 1939:
“The British Merchant Navy has received the following
instructions:
“(a) To fight every German submarine with all the means at hand,
to ram it or attack it with depth charges, if equipped to do
so.”
Further details follow.
Experiences drawn, from the entire operations of the British Merchant
Service are summarized in the next document in an order. It has been
numbered Dönitz-66, and is on Page 161. I shall read the order, which is
dated 17 October 1939:
“At 1500 hours the following order was issued to Commander of
Submarines:
“Submarines are permitted immediate and full use of armed force
against all merchant vessels recognizable with certainty as
being of enemy nationality, as in every case attempts to ram or
other forms of active resistance may be expected. Exceptions to
be made as hitherto in the case of enemy passenger boats.”
On Page 162 I have reproduced another part of Document Dönitz-62, which
has been submitted already. It is a note to the neutral countries dated
22 October 1939, defining conduct on the part of ships which is,
according to German opinion, incompatible with the peaceful character of
a merchant ship. I read from the long paragraph, the second sentence:
“According to previous experiences such tactics may be expected
with certainty from English and French boats, particularly when
sailing in convoys: inadmissible use of wireless, sailing
without lights, and in addition armed resistance and aggressive
action.”
In the next, the German Government warns neutral nations against the use
of enemy ships for this reason. The German orders were issued in
consequence of the experiences gained by our U-boats.
I have already submitted the next document, Dönitz-67, on Page 163 _et
sequentes_ and I only wish to explain on the basis of a report made by
the British Admiralty, which is on Page 163, that the orders for
merchant shipping were published in the _Handbook for the Defense of
Merchant Ships_ of January 1938—they were issued before the war.
Now I come to several documents dealing with the treatment of passenger
ships. They have an important bearing on the _Athenia_ case, since the
_Athenia_ was a passenger ship.
Document Dönitz-68 presents some evidence on the treatment of passenger
ships. First comes an order issued on 4 September 1939, which I should
like to read:
“On the Führer’s orders, no hostile action is to be taken
against passenger ships for the time being, even when in
convoy.”
The next excerpt from the same page contains reports on the use of
passenger ships as troop transports.
I will now read an excerpt from the Directives for the Conduct of the
War against Merchant Shipping, from October to the middle of November
1939, Page 3. As the fullest possible use was made of enemy passenger
boats for the transport of troops, it was no longer possible to justify
their being spared, at least when they were sailing in convoy. The
following order was issued on 29 October: I will read the order, which
is dated 29 October. It is at the bottom of the page:
“Passenger liners in enemy convoys may be subjected to immediate
unrestricted armed attack by U-boats.”
The next document, Dönitz-69, on Page 170, is to show that in November
and December the German press issued a warning against the use of armed
passenger ships by publishing lists of these ships.
The next document is Dönitz-70, on Page 171. It is an order issued on 7
November 1939 by the SKL to Commander of U-boats. I read the order:
“U-boats are permitted to attack immediately with all weapons at
their command all passenger ships which can be identified with
certainty as enemy ships and whose armament is detected or is
already known.”
That was about 6 weeks after permission to attack other armed ships had
been given.
Dönitz-71 shows that the U-boats were also not permitted to attack
blacked-out passenger ships until as late as 23 February 1940, 5
months—no, 4 months—after they were given permission to attack other
ships.
Now I come to the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-224, which is reproduced on
Pages 199 to 203 in Volume IV of my document book. I should like to
emphasize again that the object of this document was to incriminate
Admiral Raeder in particular; and that it was described by the
Prosecution as a cynical denial of international law. I should like to
point out, to begin with, that according to the title it concerns
deliberations by the Naval Operations Staff on the possibilities of
intensifying economic warfare against England. I shall read a few
paragraphs, or give a short account of them, to show that a very
thorough investigation of international law was made. The first
paragraph is headed “War Aims.”
“The Führer’s proposal to restore a just and honorable peace and
establish a new political order in Central Europe has been
rejected. The enemy powers want war, with Germany’s destruction
as the goal. In the struggle in which Germany is now forced to
defend her existence and rights, Germany must employ her weapons
ruthlessly while fully respecting the rules of soldierly conduct
in warfare.”
Then there follows a paragraph in which it is stated that the enemy is
also ruthless in carrying out his plans. On the next page, Page 200,
there are a few sentences of basic importance which I should like to
read. I read from the paragraph “Military Requirements” the fourth
sentence:
“It is still desirable to base military measures on the existing
principle of international law; but military measures recognized
as necessary must be taken if they seem likely to lead to
decisive military successes, even if they are not admitted by
international law. For that reason, the military weapon which
effectively breaks the enemy’s powers of resistance must on
principle be given a legal base, even if new rules of naval
warfare have to be created for the purpose.
“After weighing political, military, and economic considerations
with regard to the war as a whole, Supreme War Command must
decide on the military procedure and legal rules of warfare to
be applied.”
Then there are a number of excerpts to show the way in which the Naval
Operations Staff investigated the legal aspect of the situation; that is
to say, the present legal aspect of the situation, the situation which
would arise in the case of a siege of England or a blockade against
England. The end, which is on Page 203, emphasizes the political
character of the final decision. I shall read it:
“The decision as to the form to be taken by the intensification
of economic warfare and the time fixed for changing over to the
most intensified and therefore final form of naval warfare in
this war is of far-reaching political importance. It can be made
only by the Supreme War Command, which will weigh the military,
political, and economic requirements against each other.”