THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant has now had the opportunity of looking
at the log of _U-37_. Was it not your practice in May 1940 to see
personally the logs of all U-boats when they arrived?
DÖNITZ: I had the commanders of submarines report verbally to me every
time. The logs, which arrived or were finished several weeks later or
some time after the entries were made since they had to be written in
the port, were only submitted to me by my Chief of Staff if they
contained something special in addition to the verbal report.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you remember seeing the log of _U-37_ that
was involved in this incident?
DÖNITZ: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you now observe that the _Sheaf Mead_ was not
sailing in convoy?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I know that. And I know that she was an armed ship and
that, according to the orders which the commander had, he was justified
in sinking her as an armed ship. It also appears from his log that he
could not decide on firing the torpedo until he had ascertained that the
ship was armed. That is very clearly expressed here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May I please explain to His Lordship that I am
not on the question of sinking. I am on the question of survivors. Did
you take any action with the U-boat commander, Kapitänleutnant Ernst,
for not having assisted in the rescue of survivors?
DÖNITZ: No. But I did tell him that if he was on the spot where this
rescue went on he should also have helped.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was he not simply carrying out your Order 154 of
November or December 1939?
DÖNITZ: No, he was not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now...
DÖNITZ: I have already stated to which waters it applied and that it
only applied to ships which were protected.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you look at Page 34 in the
English document book, Page 69 in the German document book. That is the
report of the conversation between Hitler and Oshima, and you say that
you were told nothing about it. Now I want you just to follow about
halfway down, halfway through the extract, where it says:
“After having given further explanations on the map, the Führer
pointed out that however many ships the United States built, one
of its main problems would be the lack of personnel. For that
reason merchant ships would be sunk without warning, with the
intention of killing as many of the crew as possible. Once it
gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings,
the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new
people. The training of seagoing personnel takes a long time.”
Now, did you agree with that argument of Hitler’s that once it gets
around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans
would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people? Did you think that
that was a sound argument on the question of sea warfare against the
United States?
DÖNITZ: I have already given my answer to that question in writing to
the Foreign Office, and I clearly stated my opinion, which was that I
did not believe that it would take a long time to train seamen, and that
America had no lack of them. Consequently I would also not be of the
opinion that this would serve as a deterrent if they had enough men.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you do not agree with the Führer’s reasoning
on that point?
DÖNITZ: No, I do not agree with the last part, namely, that there would
be a shortage of seamen.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, it is the first point that I want your
opinion on expressly: “Once it gets around that most of the seamen are
lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in
enlisting new people.” That is, I suggest to you, that the new people
would be scared off by the news of the sinking and killing of the first
people. Did you agree that that was a sound argument? That is what I
want your view on.
DÖNITZ: That is his personal point of view. Whether they would be scared
off or not is an American matter which I cannot judge.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at your own document book, Volume
I, Page 29 in the English version, which is your report to the Führer on
14 May 1942. Do you see the last sentence where you are advocating a
range pistol? You say:
“A range pistol will also have the great advantage that the crew
will not be able to rescue themselves on account of the quick
sinking of the torpedoed ship. This greater loss of crews will
no doubt cause difficulties for the assignment of crews for the
great American construction program.”
DÖNITZ: It is perfectly clear, it is correct. If I have not got the old
crews any more, I have to have new ones. It makes it more difficult. It
says nothing about scaring off there, but the positive fact is stated
that new crews have to be trained.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So are we to take it that you did not think that
would have any frightening or terrorizing effect on the getting of new
crews, if the old crews were sunk under conditions where they would
probably lose their lives.
DÖNITZ: That is a matter of opinion, it depends on the courage, the
bravery of the people. The American Secretary Knox said that if in
peacetime—in 1941—the sinkings of German U-boats were not published he
expected it would have a deterrent effect on my U-boats. That was his
opinion. I can only say that the silent disappearance through American
sinkings in peacetime did not scare off my U-boats. It is a matter of
taste.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, on 14 May the Führer was pressing you to
take action against the crews after the vessel was sunk. Is that not so?
DÖNITZ: Yes. He asked whether we could not take action against the crew
and I have already said, after I heard of the Oshima discussion here,
that I believe this question to Grossadmiral Raeder and myself was the
result of that Oshima discussion.
My answer to that, of course, is known; it was “no.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your answer was “no,” it would be far better to
have a range pistol and kill them while they were still on the boat.
That was your answer, was it not?
DÖNITZ: No. My answer was: Taking action against shipwrecked personnel
is out of the question, but it is taken for granted that in a fight one
must use the best possible weapon. Every nation does that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but the object of your weapon, as quite
clearly set out, was that the crew would not be able to rescue
themselves on account of the quick sinking of the ship. That is why you
wanted to use the range pistol.
DÖNITZ: Yes. And also of course, because we considered the crews of the
steamers as combatants since they were fighting with weapons.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am not going back to deal with that
point again, but that was in your mind. Now, the Führer raised this
point again on 5 September 1942, as is shown in your document book,
Volume II, Page 81.
DÖNITZ: I do not have it. Where is it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It begins with the discussion in the OKW on 5
September 1942. It is Exhibit Dönitz-39, Page 81, and it is in the
English document book, Volume II.
DÖNITZ: Yes, I have it now.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It arises out of an incident of the sinking of
the mine boat, _Ulm_, and there is a question of whether British
destroyers had fired with machine arms on soldiers in lifeboats; and the
Führer gave orders to the Naval Command to issue an order, according to
which “our warships would use reprisals”; and if you look a little lower
down, you will see that the matter had been investigated by your
operations staff, and it is stated:
“It could not be proved beyond a doubt that the fire had been
aimed at the crew boarding the lifeboats. The enemy fire was
evidently aimed at the ship itself.”
Then you discuss the question of applying reprisals, at the foot of that
page, and you say:
“It is the opinion of the Naval Operations Staff that before
issuing reprisal orders, one should take into consideration
whether such measures, if applied by the enemy against us, would
not in the end be more harmful to us than to the enemy. Even now
our boats are able only in a few cases to rescue shipwrecked
enemy crews by towing the lifeboats, _et cetera_, whereas the
crews of sunken German U-boats and merchant vessels have so far,
as a rule, been picked up by the enemy. The situation could
therefore only change in our favor if we were to receive orders,
as a measure of reprisal, that shipwrecked enemy crews should
not only not be saved, but that they should be subdued by fire.
It is significant in this respect that so far it could not be
proved that in the cases on record where the enemy used arms
against shipwrecked Germans such action was the result of, or
was covered by, an order of an official British agency. We
should therefore bear in mind the fact that knowledge of such a
German order would be used by enemy propaganda in such a manner
that its consequences could not easily be foreseen.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I object against this manner
of procedure. The document about which this cross-examination is being
made is a document from me, and I have not submitted it yet. I do not
know whether it is customary in this Trial that exhibits of the Defense
are submitted by the Prosecution. For this reason I had suggested at the
time to begin with the documentary evidence so that the Prosecution
should also have an opportunity to use my exhibits in cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any objection to the document which is in your
document book being offered in evidence?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I only want to avoid having my documents
presented by the Prosecution in cross-examination because this upsets my
entire documentary evidence. This particular case does not play a
decisive role for me, but if the Prosecution proposes to present other
documents of mine which have not yet been submitted, I should like to
ask that the cross-examination be interrupted and I first be afforded an
opportunity to submit my documents.
THE PRESIDENT: That will only waste time, will it not? It would not do
any good; it would only waste time.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I do not think it would be a
waste of time if I, as Defense Counsel, ask that I be allowed to submit
my own documents to the Tribunal myself and that they shall not be
quoted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution from my document book, because
the manner of presentation and the questions asked by the Prosecution
do, of course, give these documents a quite definite meaning.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal thinks there is no
objection to the course that is being taken. You have had the
opportunity already of putting this document to the witness. You will
have a further opportunity of putting it to him again in re-examination.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that there was fresh pressure put on you to
take this course, that is, to fire on the crews of sunken vessels and
that in September, was there not?
DÖNITZ: No, that is not correct. I only learned of this document of the
naval war here; I was not under pressure, therefore; but it is true
that, in accordance with this document, the Naval Operations Staff had
apparently had orders from the OKW to compile a list of all such cases
and that the Naval Operations Staff very correctly took the point of
view that one would have to be very careful in judging these cases and
that it advised against reprisal measures. It appears to me that the
compilation of this document served to convince us that in principle one
should keep away from these reprisal measures.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that on the instructions of Hitler
the OKW had put through an inquiry to the naval war command on this
point in September?
DÖNITZ: No, I did not know that. I just said I do not know about this
entry in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff and the appendix
which is attached to it. I first heard of it here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You first heard of it here?
DÖNITZ: I did not know about the entry in the War Diary of the Naval
Operations Staff. That was done in Berlin, and I was Commander of the
Submarine Fleet in France at the time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you tell the Tribunal that you did not
know about it in September, then we will pass on to another document.
That is what you say, that you did not know about it in September 1942?
DÖNITZ: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like you—I do not want to
take you through the _Laconia_ in any detail, but I want you just to
tell me about one, I think, one or two entries. I think it is Page 40 of
your own document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that not on Page 41?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very much obliged to Your Lordship.
[_Turning to the defendant._] It is Page 41, at the bottom. It is on 20
September, 1320 hours. That is your wireless message to the U-boat
_Schacht_. Do you see that?
DÖNITZ: Yes, and I explained that in great detail yesterday.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to know: Is it true what is stated
in your wireless message that the boat was dispatched to rescue Italian
allies, not for the rescue and care of Englishmen and Poles? Is that
true?
DÖNITZ: That is correct, because the vessel had reported to me that it
had four boats in tow—and it says on Page 40, “...with British in tow.”
It was clear, considering the whole situation, that a submarine with
vessels in tow could not remain on the surface without the greatest
danger to itself. Hence on Page 40 under heading 2 the order and the
instructions given, “Boats with British and Poles to be cast adrift.” I
wanted to get rid of the boats. That was the only reason. And it was
only afterwards—Page 41—when a long radio message came from him, which
in itself was a repetition but which was interpreted to mean that after
the two air attacks had taken place he had again endangered his boat by
stopping and picking up men, only then did he receive this wireless
message, after it had gradually dawned on me—during the first four
days, or perhaps three days, I had nothing against rescuing the
British—that the Italians, who after all were our allies, were getting
the worst of it, which indeed proved to be the case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have given a long explanation. Now, is that
wireless message true, that the boat was dispatched to rescue Italian
allies, not for the rescue and care of Englishmen and Poles? Is that
true or not true?
DÖNITZ: Of course; this wireless message contained both instructions and
it becomes unequivocally clear from these two instructions as well as
from the impression I had that the British who were rescued far
outnumbered the Italians, who were left to drown.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, there is one point I want you to make a
little clearer. When you were interrogated about this matter, you said
that you were under great pressure at the time; and, I think, that the
pressure came to you from Hitler only through Captain Fricke. Is that
right?
DÖNITZ: No, “only” is not correct. It was “also.” The pressure, as I
have very clearly explained here, was due to worry and anxiety regarding
the fate of my submarines, because I knew that they were now being
greatly jeopardized. We had evidence of that already from the bombing
attacks; secondly, of course, from the Führer’s orders which Fricke
gave. But I have also stated here that in spite of that order, even if
it was not militarily correct to act in this way, I continued rescuing.
However, the pressure, my worry and anxiety, were mostly caused by the
fate of the submarines themselves.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that at this time you had had the report to
the Führer on 14 May; you had then had the _Laconia_ incident, and
during that incident you had had the pressure from the Führer. Now, was
it not because of this...
DÖNITZ: I beg your pardon, but...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Allow me to ask my question.
DÖNITZ: I think there is an error that has crept in here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well, I will correct it. You had had the
report to the Führer on 14 May. You have told me that. There was then
the _Laconia_...
DÖNITZ: That has nothing to do with the Führer’s order in the case of
the _Laconia_. In the case of the _Laconia_ the Führer had given orders,
and quite rightly, that no boats should be endangered by the rescue.
That is something quite different from the subject of 14 May.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am trying to assemble for the moment what
matters you had to deal with. You had had the 14th of May, the _Laconia_
incident, and then an order to stop, coming through from the Führer.
DÖNITZ: No, in the case of the _Laconia_ incident I never thought at all
of the order or of the discussion of 14 May with the Führer, and I could
not, because that was an entirely different subject. This is quite
another matter, here it was purely a matter of rescue. There is no
connection whatsoever between the two.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will see about that. Turn to Page 36 in the
British document book, or Pages 71 to 75 in the German document book.
Now, you have told us that what mainly concerned you was the safety of
your own boats and of your own personnel.
DÖNITZ: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you put into the order, “The elementary
demands of warfare for the destruction of ships and crews are contrary
to rescuing”? What was the point of putting these words in, unless you
meant to encourage people to destroy enemy ships and crews?
DÖNITZ: I explained that in great detail yesterday. I preached during
all these years: You must not rescue when your own safety is in danger.
In the case of the _Laconia_ I myself in my anxiety and worry wirelessed
that to the troops many times. Apart from that, I found again and again
that submarine commanders were taking the danger from the air too
lightly. I also showed how that is to be explained psychologically. I
described yesterday the overwhelming increase of the air force, and
consequently in no circumstances would I have again given my people as a
reason that, if there is danger from the air, or since you are being
endangered from the air, _et cetera_, you must not rescue, or rescuing
would be contrary to the elementary demands of warfare; because I did
not want to leave it to my commanders to discuss whether there was
danger from the air or not. After all my experience of the losses
suffered and in view of the ever-present air force, which as history has
shown was becoming stronger and stronger, I had to give a clear-cut
order to the commanders based on that experience: “You cannot go on like
that, or while we rescue the enemy we shall be attacked and killed by
the enemy.” Therefore this reasoning must not enter into it. I did not
wish to give the commanders another opportunity of deliberating or
discussing. I told you already yesterday that I could have added, “If
now, in view of the danger from the air, we are killed by that self-same
enemy while rescuing him, then rescue is contrary to the elementary
demands of warfare.” I did not want to do that, because I did not want
any more discussion. We all had the impression that this refrain, “Do
not rescue if there is danger from the air,” was outworn, because this
would have meant that the commanders would nevertheless lose their
liberty of action, and might slip into this thing.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if you had simply said, “You are forbidden
to rescue,” and if you had wanted to give a reason, “You are forbidden
to rescue because in view of the Allied air cover it is a matter of too
great danger for the safety of yourself and your boat ever to rescue at
all,” that would have been quite clear. Why did you not put it that way?
DÖNITZ: No, that is just what I could not do. I have just said so,
because some commander in some naval theater might get the idea that
there was no danger from the air, and the next moment the plane would
appear and he would be struck down. I have already said all that in
reply to your suggestion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you had two experienced staff officers with
you at the time that you got this order out—Captains Godt and Hessler,
had you not?
DÖNITZ: Yes, that is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And both Captain Godt and Captain Hessler
advised you strongly against the issue of this order, did they not?
DÖNITZ: As far as I can remember, they said something like this, “The
bulk of the submarines”—I have said that here—“the bulk of the
U-boats, that is, more than 90 percent of the U-boats, are already
fighting the convoys, so that such an order is out of the question for
them.”
That was the question: Should we issue such a general order at all, and
would not the further developments which forced us all the time to issue
new orders, namely, “Remain on the surface as little as possible,” make
such an order superfluous? However, since I was responsible for warding
off every possible danger to a submarine, I had to give this order and
my staff agreed with me perfectly as far as this measure was concerned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you not say when you were interrogated on 22
October and on other occasions: “Godt and Hessler told me, ‘Do not send
this wireless message—you see, one day there may be a wrong impression
about it; there may be a misinterpretation of that.’” Did you not say
that?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I said that, and it is true too that such a remark may have
been made. But it was not misinterpreted by the U-boats; nobody thought
of that or we would not have issued the order. But we were thinking of
the effects on the outside world.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And was not the effect that you wanted to
produce: That you would have an order which could be argued was merely a
prohibition of rescue, and would encourage the submarine commanders who
felt that way to annihilate the survivors of the crews?
DÖNITZ: No, that is absolutely wrong, and it is also proved by the
documents which we have submitted.
Apart from the Möhle case, nobody misunderstood this order and when we
compiled the order we were aware of that fact. That becomes clear from
the communications which we had with U-boat commanders, and it becomes
clear from my searching inquiries when I asked whether they had in any
way thought of that. The order does not show that at all, neither does
the reason which led to it. The fact is that we were rescuing for all we
were worth. The question was, “to rescue or not to rescue,” and nothing
else. That is the key to the _Laconia_ case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said that “we issued the order.” Do you
remember saying this in an interrogation on 6 October: “I am completely
and personally responsible for it, because Captains Godt and Hessler
both expressly stated that they considered the telegram as ambiguous or
likely to be misinterpreted.”
Do you remember saying that, “I am completely and personally
responsible” because both your staff officers had pointed out that it
was ambiguous? Did you say that?
DÖNITZ: I do not think so. I cannot think I said it that way. I am not
sure, but I will say the following:
During the interrogation I was told that Captains Godt and Hessler made
this order, and in reply to that I said, “It is quite immaterial, I am
responsible for the order.” Moreover, the main point of discussion on
that order was whether one ought to issue such an order. That it should
ever have entered Captain Godt’s or Captain Hessler’s mind that such an
order could be misunderstood by us—by the U-boats—is completely
erroneous. I emphatically stated that, too, during the interrogation. I
clearly stated that this consideration and the discussion of the
question whether the order was to be issued or not had nothing whatever
to do with it as far as these two gentlemen were concerned. That is
quite clear; and that also was contained in the interrogation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were making clear that it was the first
occasion. I made it clear that you were not blaming your junior officer
who had advised you against this, and you were taking the responsibility
on this occasion yourself. That is true, these junior officers advised
you against it? In your own words, they both expressly stated that they
considered the telegram ambiguous and liable to be misinterpreted; that
is right, is it not, they did say that?
DÖNITZ: I did not see the discussion after it was put down, and I did
not sign it. I can tell you quite clearly—and this is clear from
another discussion—that I said that I myself will assume full
responsibility. For me that was the essential thing. The only reason why
the whole question came up was because the interrogating officer told me
these officers had drafted the order, and then, as I recall it, the idea
was that on no account should these officers be held responsible for my
order. That was the point of the matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, at any rate, you are not changing what you
said a few minutes ago that both Captain Godt and Captain Hessler
advised you against issuing this order, are you?
DÖNITZ: According to my recollection, at first both advised against it.
I have now heard that both are saying they did not advise against it,
but that perhaps I or somebody else might have advised against it. I do
not know for certain. I recollect that at first both advised me against
issuing such an order at a time when 90 percent of our submarines were
already engaged in fighting convoys and when we were being forced under
the water anyway and it was absolutely impossible to make any more
rescues since we were below the surface; and I said, “No; there will
surely still be cases where such a thing can happen and where the
commander will be faced with an awkward situation and in that case I
want to relieve him of such a decision.” That was the reason and the
meaning of the discussion, nothing else.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will continue. That is the first part of the
order. Now take Paragraph 2, “Orders for bringing in captains and chief
engineers still apply.” Now, Defendant, you know perfectly well that in
order to find the captain or chief engineer, the U-boat has got to go
around the lifeboats or wreckage and make inquiries, “Where is the
captain?” And you know very well that the usual practice of the British
merchant navy was to try and hide the captain and prevent them finding
out who he was. Is that not the practical position that had to be met,
that you had to go around the lifeboats asking for the captain if you
wanted to bring him in? Is that not so?
DÖNITZ: Not exactly, no. I stated quite clearly yesterday that, first,
the risk of taking aboard one man was much less as far as time was
concerned, and would not limit the crashdiving ability of the boat,
whereas rescuing activities would limit severely the crashdiving
ability. Secondly, that that had a military aim ordered by the Naval
Operations Staff for which, as is always the case in war, a certain risk
would have to be taken; and, thirdly, that the significance of that
paragraph appeared to all of us to be unimportant, the results being
always poor. This order, if you want to construe it like this and take
it out of its context, militates against your contention that I wanted
to destroy these people; because I wanted to take prisoners, and if I
intended to kill somebody first, then I certainly could not have taken
him prisoner.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am putting it to you that the second part of
the order is that you are to bring in captains and chief engineers to
find out what you can from them.
Look at the third paragraph: “Rescue ship crews only if their statements
will be of importance for U-boats,” that is, of importance for you to
learn from them the position of Allied ships or the measures the Allies
are taking against submarines. That is the point against two and three,
is it not? You are only to take prisoners if you can find out some
useful thing from them?
DÖNITZ: I think it is taken for granted that we should try to get as
much information as possible, and since I cannot take the whole crew as
prisoners on a U-boat, I have to confine myself to the most important
persons. Therefore I remove these people from further engagement,
whereas the others may engage again. Of course, in view of the limited
room on a U-boat, I do not take unimportant people but the important
ones.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not want to take up a lot of time, but I
want you to tell me this: Did I understand your explanation of the word
“again” in the War Diary to be that you had drawn the attention of
certain submarine commanders to your telegrams during the _Laconia_
incident, is that your explanation?
DÖNITZ: No, it did not refer to U-boat commanders; and I believe the
word “again,” as my staff says, referred to those four wireless messages
which we have read as meaning this during the last few days and which
were submitted to the Tribunal yesterday.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put to you a moment ago a question and you
said the “again” refers to the messages you sent out during the
_Laconia_ incident. I think you agree with that, do you not? Do not be
afraid to agree with what I say. When was that?
DÖNITZ: Yesterday it was explained to me that there were four wireless
messages, and I assumed that the person was summarizing the whole event,
and that was probably his way of putting it. He was a chief petty
officer and I do not know what he meant when he used the word “again.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now you say you had never heard of the Hitler
and Oshima conversations which I put to you a few moments ago?
DÖNITZ: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Therefore, one may assume, may one not, that
Lieutenant Heisig, who gave evidence, had not heard of the Hitler and
Oshima conversations either; do you not think he could not have heard
about it?
DÖNITZ: I assume it was out of the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you notice that Heisig said in his evidence
that during a lecture he heard you put forward the same argument as
Hitler put forward in his conversations with Oshima?
DÖNITZ: First of all I want to state that Heisig here in this witness
box said something different from what he said during his interrogation.
During cross-examination he has admitted here that I have not said
anything about fighting against shipwrecked personnel; secondly,
everything else he said is so vague that I do not attach much value to
its credibility; thirdly, he stated quite clearly that I did not say
this in a lecture but during a discussion, which is in itself of no
importance; and fourthly, it may well be that the subject of America’s
new construction program and the manning of the new ships by trained
crews was discussed. It was possible during that discussion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you now say you agree you never opened any
discussion having reference to the American shipbuilding program and the
difficulty of finding crews? Do you agree with Heisig on that?
DÖNITZ: The German press was full of that. Everybody read and knew about
the shipbuilding program. Pictures were made...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But the argument I am suggesting to you, you
know, was that the building program would be useless if you could
destroy or frighten off sufficient merchant navy crews. That is the
point in Hitler’s conversation, and that Heisig said you said. Did you
say that?
DÖNITZ: I have always taken the view that losses of crews would make
replacement difficult, and this is stated in my war diary together with
similar ideas, and perhaps I said something of the kind to my
midshipmen.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Page 37 of the Prosecution
document book, Page 76 in the German translation? It is an order dated 7
October 1943 (Document Number D-663, Exhibit Number GB-200). I just want
you to look at the last sentence: “In view of the desired destruction of
ships’ crews, their sinking is of great value.”
DÖNITZ: I have read it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “In view of the desired destruction of ships’
crews, their sinking is of great value,” and it is continually pressing,
the need for ships’ crews.
DÖNITZ: Yes, of course, but in the course of fighting. It is perfectly
clear that these rescue ships were heavily armed. They had aircraft and
could be sunk just like other convoy ships. If there were steamer crews
on hand it was naturally our desire to sink them since we were justified
in sinking such crews. Moreover they were used as U-boat traps near the
steamers.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On the question of the rightness or wrongness of
sinking rescue ships, the destruction of ships’ crews, now, I want to
ask you one or two questions about Möhle. He commanded the U-boat
Flotilla from 1942 until the end of the war. That is nearly three years;
and as he told us, he has a number of decorations for gallant service.
Are you telling the Tribunal that Commander Möhle went on briefing
submarine commanders on a completely mistaken basis for three years
without any of your staff or yourself discovering this? You saw every
U-boat commander when he came back.
DÖNITZ: I am sorry that Korvettenkapitän Möhle, being the only one who
said he had doubts in connection with this order, as he declared here,
did not report this right away. I could not know that he had these
doubts. He had every opportunity of clearing up these doubts and I did
not know, and nobody on my staff had any idea, that he had these
thoughts.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I have a letter here, a letter from a widow
of one of your submarine commanders. I cannot get the commander and this
is a letter from his widow. I want you to say what you think of a
passage in it.
She says—in the second paragraph—“Captain Möhle says he has not found
one U-boat commander who objected to the order to fire at helpless
seamen who were in distress in the water.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I object to the use of this letter. I think
this is the sort of letter which cannot be used as an exhibit. It is not
sworn, and it is a typical example of the kind of letter which Mr.
Justice Jackson has already repeatedly characterized.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The only point I make is this: The man himself
has not come back. His widow can give information as to how he
understood his orders before he went out. I should have submitted it
with probative value. I think it occurs in Article 19. I will not use it
if there is the slightest doubt about it before the Tribunal.
DÖNITZ: It is full of incorrect statements, too. It says there that he,
Prien, died in a concentration camp, which is not true.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait just a minute.
DÖNITZ: It is not true.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I have only just finished
reading the whole letter.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal is considering the matter at the
moment.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: May I state one argument in this connection
first?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have heard your argument and we are considering
the matter.
The Tribunal thinks that it is undesirable and that this document should
not be used.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As Your Lordship pleases.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now I want to deal just for one moment
with a passage in your own document book which Dr. Kranzbühler put to
you yesterday. It is Volume II, Page 92, Exhibit 42. Before I ask you a
question about it, there is one point that I would like you to help me
on. In your interrogation you said that on 22 October that about two
months after that order of 17 September you issued orders forbidding
U-boats to surface at all. Is that right? You gave orders forbidding
U-boats to surface, is that right?
DÖNITZ: So far as it is possible for a submarine not to do so at all. We
were always making changes, day and night, and it depended upon the
degree of danger and weather conditions whether we gave orders for the
U-boats to surface and recharge when on the move.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They were not to surface after attacks, were not
to surface at all before or after attacks; is that not the effect of
your order?
DÖNITZ: Of course submarines, for example at night, had to be on the
surface for attacks, but the main thing was to avoid every risk when on
the move.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then two months later there was an order that
they were to surface as little as possible, and you tell me it was your
order?
DÖNITZ: As far as possible they were to try by all means to avoid danger
from the air.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you give orders as to surfacing?
DÖNITZ: I gave them quite a number of orders, as I have already said,
according to the weather, according to what part of the sea they were
in, and whether it was day or night. The orders were different according
to these factors, because the danger depended on these elements and
varied accordingly. There were changes too; if we had bad experiences,
if we found that night was more dangerous than day, then we surfaced
during the day. We had the impression that in the end it was better to
surface during the day, because then one could at least locate
beforehand the aircraft attacking by direction-finding, so we changed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it is a fact that quite soon after this
order the Allied air cover became so heavy that—I quote your own words;
you say, “Two months later submarines were no longer in a position to
surface.” That is, as I understood it, surfacing became very difficult
in view of the heavy nature of Allied air attacks, is that right?
DÖNITZ: Yes, they did not have a chance to come to the surface in
certain waters without being attacked immediately. That is just the
point. The submarines were however in readiness, in the highest degree
of readiness—and that is the big difference, for in rescue work
readiness is disrupted; yet these heavy losses and difficulties occurred
at the height of readiness.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to look at Page 93. It is the
page after the one I referred you to in Volume II of your document book;
do you see Paragraph 1?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “The percentage of merchant vessels sunk
out of convoys in 1941 amounted to 40 percent; in the entire
year of 1942 to barely 30 percent; in the last quarter of 1942
to 57 percent; in January 1943, to about 65 percent; in February
to about 70 percent; and in March to 80 percent.”
Your worst period was the first three quarters of 1942, is that not so?
That appears from your own figures.
DÖNITZ: Which “worst period”? What do you mean? I do not understand.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, it is Page 93, Paragraph 1.
DÖNITZ: Yes, but how do you mean, “worst period”?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the percentage of sunk merchant vessels in
convoys in 1941 amounted to 40 percent.
DÖNITZ: You mean merchant ships?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I am reading your own war diary, or rather
the naval war staff War Diary. “In the entire year of 1942 to barely 30
percent...”
DÖNITZ: From convoys?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Convoys, yes. So that the worst period that you
had was the first three quarters of 1942?
DÖNITZ: No. In 1942, as I have already said in my description of the
entire situation, a large number of submarines were just outside the
ports, they were off New York, off Trinidad, _et cetera_, so that they
are not mentioned here. In this list only the sinkings carried out by
those packs which were attacking the convoys in the North Atlantic are
mentioned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But is it not right that these figures mean that
your worst period was the first three quarters of 1942? It must have
been around 30 percent.
DÖNITZ: No, my most successful period was the year 1942.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, how can you call it the most successful
period if for the entire year of 1942 your percentage of sunk merchant
vessels in convoys is only 30 percent, whereas in January and February
and March 1943, it got up to 65, 70, and 80 percent?
DÖNITZ: Quite right, that is so. Of the merchant ships sunk in 1942, 30
percent were sunk in the Atlantic, but the total figure was much larger
than, for instance, in 1943, when 65 and 70 percent were sunk; and that
is simply because at that time in 1943 we could no longer remain outside
a port like New York. This indicates percentages of sinkings in the
Atlantic from convoys only.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see what I am putting to you is this, that
in 1942, when your percentage from convoys was low, when you had had
that pressure that I have gone into with you before, there was every
reason for you to issue an unequivocal order which would have the effect
of getting submarine commanders to destroy the crews of the ships. In
1943 your U-boats were not surfacing, your convoy proportions had gone
up, and there was not any reason to make your order more explicit. That
is what I am suggesting to you, Defendant.
DÖNITZ: I consider that that is quite wrong.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I just want to...
DÖNITZ: It was like this. As I already said, from the summer of 1942
onwards we found that the danger from the air suddenly increased. This
danger from the air was making itself felt in all waters, also in those
waters where submarines were not fighting convoys or were not fighting
just outside the ports.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I just want you to help me on one other
point. Dr. Kranzbühler put to you yesterday that Kapitänleutnant Eck
said that if he had come back he would not have expected you to have
objected or been angry with him for shooting up the crew of the
_Peleus_. You said you knew that Eck was carrying this order of yours in
his locker when he did shoot up the crew of the _Peleus_?
DÖNITZ: Yes, but I also know that this order did not have the slightest
effect on his decision but that, as Eck has expressly said, his decision
was to shoot up the wreckage; and he had quite a different aim, namely,
to remove the wreckage because he was afraid for his boat which would
have been smashed to pieces just like other boats in those wakes. He
stated clearly that there was no connection whatsoever in his mind
between the order with reference to the _Laconia_, which he had on board
quite accidentally, and his decision.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now you know there are two other cases before
the Tribunal, the _Noreen Mary_ and the _Antonico_, which are on Pages
47 and 52 of the Prosecution’s document book, where witnesses give
specific evidence of the U-boat carrying out attacks on them when they
are in one case on wreckage and in the other case in the lifeboat. Will
you look at the _Noreen Mary_ on Page 47 of the document book? The
testament of the survivor is on Pages 49 and 50. He deals with this
point; he says in the fourth paragraph—Page 85 of the German book...
DÖNITZ: I have the English document book.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Page 50 of the English one; I have got the
English document:
“I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our
lifeboat, which was upside down, and managed to scramble on top
of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge but deliberately
steamed in my direction and when only about 60 to 70 yards away
fired directly at me with a short burst from the machine gun. As
their intention was quite obvious I fell into the water and
remained there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged,
after which I climbed back on to the bottom of the boat.”
The statement by the Brazilian gentleman you will find on Page 52. Have
you got it?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I have got it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Fifteen lines from the foot, he says, “...the
enemy ruthlessly machine-gunned the defenseless sailors in Number 2
lifeboat...”
Assuming—of course one has to assume—that Mr. McAllister and Senhor de
Oliveira Silva are speaking the truth, are you saying that these U-boat
officers were acting on their own?
DÖNITZ: It is possible that the men might have imagined these
happenings. I want to point out, however, that in a night fight—let us
take the case of the _Antonico_ first—which lasted 20 minutes, it could
very easily have been imagined that these were shots, or that shots
directed against the ship hit a lifeboat. At any rate, if someone makes
a report on a night attack lasting 20 minutes, then it is a subjective
report and everyone who knows how these reports vary, knows how easily a
seaman can make a mistake. If, during such a night fight, the U-boat had
wanted to destroy these people, then it would not have left after 20
minutes, particularly as the person states that he could not see the
submarine in the darkness. These are certainly all very vague
statements.
The case of the _Noreen Mary_ is quite similar. A large number of
statements are made in this deposition which certainly are not true; for
instance, that the submarine bore a swastika. Not a single submarine
went to sea painted in any way. If someone is on some wreckage or in a
lifeboat and there are shots nearby, then he very easily feels that he
is being shot at. It was for this very reason that quite a number of
cases of the Anglo-American side have been mentioned by us; not because
we wanted to make an accusation, but because we wanted to show how very
skeptical one has to be regarding these individual reports.
And the only cases in 5½ years of war, during several thousand attacks,
are the ones brought up here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, and of course for the 2½ of these years
that the submarine commanders have been shooting up survivors, you are
not likely to get many cases, are you? I just want to ask you one other
point...
DÖNITZ: Submarine commanders with the exception of the case of Eck have
never shot up shipwrecked persons. There is not a single instance. That
is not true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what you say.
DÖNITZ: In no case is that proved. On the contrary, they made the utmost
efforts to rescue. No order to proceed against shipwrecked people has
ever been given the U-boat force, with the exception of the case of Eck,
and for that there was a definite reason. That is a fact.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, tell me this: Did you know that the
log of the _Athenia_ was faked, after she came in?
DÖNITZ: No, it was not faked, but there was a clear order that the case
of the _Athenia_ should be kept secret for political reasons and, as a
result, the log had to be changed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. You do not like the word “faked.” Well, I
will use the word “changed”; that a page was cut out of the log and a
false page had been put in. Did you know about that?
DÖNITZ: I cannot tell you that today. It is possible. Probably Captain
Lemp received the order either from me or my staff: “The case is to be
kept secret.” And following that, he or the flotilla took the log, which
went to ten different departments of the Navy, and altered it. What else
could he do? He could not do otherwise.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to know, was it your order and with your
knowledge that that log was altered from, I suppose, the truth into the
falsity in which it exists today? That is a simple question. Can you
answer it?
DÖNITZ: Yes. Either it was done by my order or, if it had not been done,
then I would have ordered it, because the political instructions existed
that “it must be kept secret.” The fighting men had no other choice,
therefore, but to alter the log. The U-boat commanders never received
the order to make a false entry, but in the particular case of the
_Athenia_, where it was ordered afterwards that it must be kept secret,
it was not noted in the log.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now I have only one other point to deal
with you, and I can deal with it quite shortly. You were a firm adherent
of ideological education for service personnel, were you not?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I have explained my reasons.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just want to get this, and then you can
explain your reasons afterwards. You thought it nonsense that a soldier
should have no politics, did you not? If you want to...
DÖNITZ: Of course. The soldier had nothing to do with politics; but, on
the other hand, he naturally had to stand by his country during the war.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you wanted your commanders to indoctrinate
the Navy with Nazi ideology, did you not?
DÖNITZ: I wanted the troops’ commanders to tell them that the unity of
the German people as it existed then was a source of strength for our
conduct of the war and that consequently, since we enjoyed the
advantages of this unity, we also should see to it that the unity should
continue, because during the World War we had had very bad experiences
precisely because of that. Any lack of unity among the people would have
necessarily affected the conduct of the war.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look at Page 7 in the English document book
(Document Number D-640, Exhibit Number GB-186). I think it puts it
almost exactly as in my question. The last sentence:
“From the very start the whole of the officers’ corps must be so
indoctrinated that it feels itself coresponsible for the
National Socialist State in its entirety. The officer is the
exponent of the State. The idle chatter that the officer is
nonpolitical is sheer nonsense.”
That is your view, is it not?
DÖNITZ: I said that. But you have also got to read from the beginning,
where it says that our discipline and our fighting strength is miles
above that of 1918 and the reason is because the people as a whole are
behind us, and if that had not been the case then our troops would have
become disintegrated long ago; that is the reason why I said that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me, how many men were you attempting to
apply this to, or how many men had you got in the Navy on the 15th of
February 1944? I want to see what body you were trying to affect. How
many? A quarter of a million?
DÖNITZ: 600,000 or 700,000.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like you to turn to the next
page, Page 8 in the British document book, which gives your speech on
Heroes’ Day, 12 March 1944. You say this:
“What would have become of our country today if the Führer had
not united us under National Socialism? Split parties, beset
with the spreading poison of Jewry, and vulnerable to it because
we lacked the defense of our present uncompromising ideology, we
would long since have succumbed under the burden of this war and
delivered ourselves up to the enemy who would have mercilessly
destroyed us.” (Document Number 2878-PS)
What did you mean by the “spreading poison of Jewry”?
DÖNITZ: I meant that we were living in a state of unity and that this
unity represented strength and that all elements and all forces...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is not what I asked. I am asking you,
what did you mean by the “spreading poison of Jewry”? It is your phrase,
and you tell us what you meant by it.
DÖNITZ: I could imagine that it would be very difficult for the
population in the towns to hold out under the stress of heavy bombing
attacks if such an influence was allowed to work, that is what I meant.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, can you tell me again; what do you
mean by the “spreading poison of Jewry?”
DÖNITZ: It means that it might have had a disintegrating effect on the
people’s power of endurance, and in this life-and-death struggle of our
country I, as a soldier, was especially anxious about this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is what I want to know. You were
the Supreme Commander and indoctrinated 600,000 or 700,000 men. Why were
you conveying to them that Jews were a spreading poison in party
politics? Why was that? What was it that you objected to in Jews that
made you think that they had a bad effect on Germany?
DÖNITZ: That statement was made during my memorial speech on Heroes’
Day. It shows that I was of the opinion that the endurance, the power to
endure, of the people, as it was composed, could be better preserved
than if there were Jewish elements in the nation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This sort of talk, “spreading poison of Jewry,”
produced the attitude in the mind which caused the death of five or six
million Jews in these last few years. Do you say that you knew nothing
about the action and the intention to do away with and exterminate the
Jews?
DÖNITZ: Yes, of course I say that. I did not know anything at all about
it and if such a statement was made, then that does not furnish evidence
that I had any idea of any murders of Jews. That was in the year 1943.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, what I am putting to you is that you are
joining in the hunt against this unfortunate section of your community
and leading six or seven hundred thousand of the Navy on the same hunt.
Now, just look at Page 76 of the document book in this last reference to
you...
DÖNITZ: Nobody among my men thought of using violence against Jews, not
one of them, and nobody can draw that conclusion from that sentence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just look at Page 76. This is where
you are dealing with the promotion of under officers and men who have
shown themselves to be personalities in warfare. You first of all say:
“I want the leaders of units responsible for ratings and the
flotilla commanders and other commanders superior to them to
interest themselves more in the promotion of those petty
officers and men who have shown in special situations in the war
that, thanks to their inner attitude and firmness, their
energetic and inner drive, in short, owing to their personal
qualities, they are capable of taking the right decisions
independently and of carrying them out without wavering in their
aim and with willing acceptance of responsibility.
“One example: On the auxiliary cruiser _Cormoran_, which was
used as a place of detention in Australia, a warrant officer,
acting as senior camp officer, had all communists who made
themselves noticeable among the inmates of the camps
systematically and unobtrusively done away with. This petty
officer is sure of my full recognition for his decision and its
execution; and after his return I shall do everything I can to
promote him, as he has, shown he is fitted to be a leader.”
Was that your idea of leadership in this National Socialist
indoctrinated Navy; that he should murder political opponents in a way
that would not be found out by the guards?
DÖNITZ: No, it was not so. It has been reported to me that there was an
informer there who, when new crews were brought in, was smuggled into
the camp and, after listening around, passed information on to the
enemy. The result was that on the strength of that information U-boats
were lost. And it was then that the senior man in the camp, a petty
officer, decided to remove that man as a traitor. That is what was
reported to me and what I shall prove by a witness. In my opinion, and
every nation will recognize that, the man acted like anyone else who
finds himself in an extremely difficult situation and he had to...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you not say that, Defendant? If you had
stated that this man had killed a spy, who by the spreading of
information was dangerous, I would not have put this to you. But what
you say is that it was communists who made themselves noticeable, and
this man had killed them without knowledge of the guard. Why do you put
communists in your order if you mean a spy?
DÖNITZ: I think this is an order from a Baltic station. I had been told
that it concerned a spy, and it is something that a witness will prove.
If there were reasons—perhaps intelligence reasons—for not divulging
that...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you putting the responsibility for this
order on one of your junior officers? Are you saying it was one of your
junior officers who put the order out like this? It was not what you
meant at all? Is that what you are saying?
DÖNITZ: I have merely said how the order came about; up to now, I have
not once shirked the responsibility.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further cross-examination?
COLONEL POKROVSKY: My Lord, the Soviet Prosecution has several questions
to ask the Defendant Dönitz.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant Dönitz, your address to the
German people and your order to the Armed Forces in connection with
Hitler’s death were drafted by you on 30 April 1945, is that not so?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: In these documents you informed the people that Hitler’s
successor, appointed by Hitler himself, was you. That is correct, is it
not?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did you ask yourself then for what particular reason
Hitler selected you?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I put that question to myself when I received that
telegram, and came to the conclusion that after the Reich Marshal had
been removed, I was the senior officer of an independent branch of the
Armed Forces, and that that was the reason.
COL. POKROVSKY: In your address to the Army and to the people, you
demanded the continuation of military operations, and all those who were
opposed to resistance were called traitors and cowards, is that not so?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: A few days afterwards, you gave an order to Keitel to
capitulate unconditionally, is that not right?
DÖNITZ: Yes. I said quite clearly in the first order that I would fight
in the East until troops and refugees could be rescued from the East and
brought to the West and that I would not fight one moment longer. That
was my intention, and that is also clearly expressed in that order.
COL. POKROVSKY: By the way, there was not a word about it in this order,
but that is not so important. Do you agree that on 30 April...