THE PEACE DRIVE OF DECEMBER 12TH
I
Disturbed by internal political dissension and tormented by lack of
food the German ship of state was sailing troubled waters by November,
1916. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech to the Reichstag on
September 28th satisfied no one. After he had spoken the only thing
people could recall were his words:
"The mighty tasks which await us in all the domains of public, social,
economic, and political life need all the strength of the people for
their fulfilment. It is a necessity of state which will triumph over
all obstacles to utilise to the utmost those forces which have been
forged in the fire and which clamour for work and creation. _A free
path for all who are capable--that must be our watch-word_. If we
carry it out freely, without prejudice, then our empire goes to a
healthy future."
The press interpreted this as meaning that the Chancellor might some
day change his mind about the advisability of a ruthless submarine
warfare. Early in November when it appeared that the Allies would not
succeed in breaking through at the Somme peace forces were again
mobilised. But when various neutral countries sounded Germany as to
possible terms they discovered that Germany was the self-appointed
"victor" and would consider only a peace which recognised Germany as
the dominant power in Europe. The confidence of the army in the
victory was so great that the following article was printed in all the
German newspapers:
"FAITH IN VICTORY"
"Great Headquarters sends us the following:
"Since the beginning of the war, when enemies arose on all sides and
millions of troops proceeded from all directions--since then more than
two long years have brought no more eventful days than those of the
present. The unity of the front--our enemies have prepared it for a
long time past with great care and proclaimed it in loud tones. Again
and again our unexpected attacks have disturbed this boldly thought out
plan in its development, destroying its force, but now at last
something has been accomplished that realises at least part of the
intentions of our enemies and all their strength is being concentrated
for a simultaneous attack. The victory which was withheld from them on
all the theatres of war is to be accomplished by an elaborate attack
against the defensive walls of our best blood. The masses of iron
supplied them by half the world are poured on our gallant troops day
and night with the object of weakening their will and then the mass
attacks of white, yellow, brown and black come on.
"The world never experienced anything so monstrous and never have
armies kept up a resistance such as ours.
"Our enemies combine the hunger and lie campaign with that of arms,
both aimed at the head and heart of our home. The hunger campaign they
will lose as the troublesome work of just an equal administration and
distribution of the necessities of life is almost complete. And a
promising harvest has ripened on our broad fields. From the first day
of the war, we alone of all the belligerent nations published the army
reports of all of our enemies in full, as our confidence in the
constancy of those at home is unlimited. But our enemies have taken
advantage of this confidence and several times a day they send out war
reports to the world; the English since the beginning of their
offensive send a despatch every two hours. Each of these publications
is two or three times as long as our daily report and all written in a
style which has nothing in common with military brevity and simplicity.
This is no longer the language of the soldier. They are mere fantastic
hymns of victory and their parade of names and of conquered villages
and woods and stormed positions, and the number of captured guns, and
tens of thousands of prisoners is a mockery of the truth.
"Why is all this done? Is it only intended to restore the wearying
confidence of their own armies and people and the tottering faith of
their allies? Is it only intended to blind the eagerly observing eye
of the neutrals? No, this flood of telegrams is intended to pass
through the channels which we ourselves have opened to our enemy, and
to dash against the heart of the German people, undermining and washing
away our steadfastness.
"But this despicable game will not succeed. In the same manner as our
gallant troops in the field defy superior numbers, so the German people
at home will defy the enemies' legions of lies, and remember that the
German army reports cannot tell them and the world at large everything
at present, but they never publish a word the truth of which could not
be minutely sifted. With proud confidence in the concise, but
absolutely reliable publications of our own army administration,
Germany will accept these legions of enemy reports at their own value,
as wicked concoctions, attempting to rob them of calm and confidence
which the soldier must feel supporting him, if he joyfully risks his
all for the protection of those at home. Thus our enemies' legions of
lies will break against the wall of our iron faith. Our warriors defy
the iron and fire--those at home will also defy the floods of printed
paper and remain unruffled. The nation and army alike are one in their
will and faith in victory."
[Illustration: THE POPE TO PRESIDENT WILSON----"HOW CAN MY PEACE ANGEL
FLY, MR. PRESIDENT, WHEN YOU ALWAYS PUT SHELLS IN HER POCKETS?"]
This is a typical example of the kind of inspired stories which are
printed in the German newspapers from time to time to keep up the
confidence of the people. This was particularly needed last fall
because the people were depressed and melancholy over the losses at the
Somme, and because there was so much criticism and dissatisfaction over
the Chancellor's attitude towards the submarine warfare and peace.
People, too, were suffering agonies in their homes because of the
inferior quality of the food,--the lack of necessary fats and sugar
which normal people need for regular nourishment. The Socialists, who
are in closer touch with the people than any others, increased their
demands for peace while the National Liberals and the Conservatives,
who wanted a war of exhaustion against Great Britain, increased their
agitation for the submarine warfare. The Chancellor was between two
tormentors. Either he had to attempt to make peace to satisfy the
Socialists and the people, or he had to give in to the demands for
submarine warfare as outlined by the National Liberals. One day
Scheidemann went to the Chancellor's palace, after he had visited all
the big centres of Germany, and said to von Bethmann-Hollweg:
"Unless you try to make peace at once the people will revolt and I
shall lead the revolution!"
At the same time the industrial leaders of the Rhine Valley and the
Army and Navy were serving notice on the Government that there could
not possibly be a German victory unless every weapon in Germany's
possession, which included of course the submarine, was used against
Germany's so-called chief foe--England.
Confronted by graver troubles within Germany than those from the
outside, the Chancellor went to Great Headquarters to report to the
Kaiser and to discuss with von Hindenburg and Ludendorf what should be
done to unite the German nation.
While the Army had been successful in Roumania and had given the people
renewed confidence, this was not great enough to carry the people
through another hard winter.
While Germany had made promises to the United States in May that no
ships would be sunk without warning, the submarines were not adhering
very closely to the written instructions. The whole world was aroused
over Germany's repeated disregard of the rules and practice of sea
warfare. President Wilson through Ambassador Gerard had sent nine
inquiries to the Foreign Office asking for a report from Germany on the
sinking of various ships not only contrary to international law but
contrary to Germany's pledges. In an attempt to ward off many of the
neutral indictments of Germany's sea warfare the official North German
Gazette published an explanation containing the following:
"The activity of our submarines in the Atlantic Ocean and White Sea has
led the press of the entire world to producing articles as to the
waging of cruiser warfare by means of submarines. In both cases it can
be accurately stated that there is no question of submarine warfare
here, but of cruiser warfare waged with the support of submarines and
the details reported hitherto as to the activities of our submarines do
not admit of any other explanation, in spite of the endeavours of the
British press to twist and misrepresent facts. It is also strictly
correct to state that the cruiser warfare which is being waged by means
of submarines is in strict compliance with the German prize regulations
which correspond to the International Rules laid down and agreed to in
the Declaration of London which are not being any more complied with by
England. The accusations and charges brought forward by the British
press and propaganda campaign in connection with ships sunk, can be
shown as futile, as our position is both militarily and from the
standpoint of international law irreproachable. We do not sink neutral
ships per se, as was recently declared in a proclamation, but the
ammunition transports and other contraband wares conducive to the
prolongation of the war, and the rights of defensive measures as
regards this cannot be denied Germany any more than any other country.
"Based on this idea, it is clearly obvious that the real loss of the
destruction of tonnage must be attributed to the supplies sent to
England and not to the attitude displayed by Germany which has but
recourse to purely defensive measures. If the attitude displayed by
England towards neutrals during the course of this war be considered,
the manner in which it forced compulsory supplies of contraband goods,
etc., it can be further recognised that England is responsible for the
losses in ships; as it is owing to England's attitude that the cause is
to be found. . . .
"Although England has hit and crippled legitimate trade to such an
extent, Germany does not wish to act in the same manner, but simply to
stop the shipments of contraband goods calculated to lengthen the war.
England evidently is being hard hit by our defensive submarine measures
and is therefore doing all in her power to incite public opinion
against the German methods of warfare and confuse opinion in neutral
countries. . . .
"Therefore it must again be recalled that it is:
"England, which has crippled neutral trade!
"England, which has rendered the freedom of the seas impossible!
"England, which has extended the risk of contraband wares in excess of
international agreements, and now raises a cry when the same weapons
are used against herself.
"England, which has compelled the neutrals to supply these shipments of
contraband goods calculated to lengthen the war!
"As the neutrals quietly acquiesced when there was a question of
abandoning trade with the Central Powers they have remedies in hand for
the losses of ships which affect them so deeply. They need only
consider the fact that the German submarines on the high seas are able
to prevent war services to the enemy in the shipments of contraband
goods, in a manner that is both militarily and from the standpoint of
international law, irreproachable. If they agree to desist from the
shipment of contraband goods and cease yielding to British pressure
then they will not have to complain of losses in ships and can retain
the same for peaceful aims."
This was aimed especially at America. Naval critics did not permit the
opportunity to pass to call to the attention of the Government that
Germany's promises in the _Sussex_ case were only conditional and that,
therefore, they could be broken at any time. The Chancellor was in a
most difficult situation; so was von Hindenburg and the Kaiser. On
December 10th it was announced that the Reichstag would be called to a
special session on the twelfth and that the Chancellor would discuss
the international situation as it was affected by the Roumanian
campaign.
The meeting of December 12th was the best attended and most impressive
one of the Reichstag since August 4th, 1914. Before the Chancellor
left his palace he called the representatives of the neutral nations
and handed them Germany's peace proposal. The same day Germany sent to
every part of the globe through her wireless stations, Germany's note
to the Allies and the Chancellor's address.
The world was astonished and surprised at the German move but no one
knew whether it was to be taken seriously. Great Britain instructed
her embassies and legations in neutral countries to attempt to find out
whether the Chancellor really desired to make peace or whether his
statements were to be interpreted as something to quiet internal
troubles.
During the days of discussion which followed I was in close touch with
the Foreign Office, the American Embassy and the General Staff. The
first intimation I received that Germany did not expect the peace plan
to succeed was on December 14th at a meeting of the neutral
correspondents with Lieut. Col. von Haeften. When von Hindenburg
became Chief of the General Staff he reorganised the press department
in Berlin and sent von Haeften from his personal staff to Berlin to
direct the press propaganda. As a student of public opinion abroad von
Haeften was a genius and was extremely frank and honest with the
correspondents.
"We have proposed peace to our enemies," he said to the correspondents,
"because we feel that we have been victorious and because we believe
that no matter how long the war continues the Allies will not be able
to defeat us. It will be interesting to see what effect our proposal
has upon Russia. Reports which we have received, coming from
unquestionable sources, state that internal conditions in Russia are
desperate; that food is scarce; that the transportation system is so
demoralised and that it will be at least eight months before Russia can
do anything in a military way. Russia wants peace and needs peace and
we shall see now whether she has enough influence upon England to
compel England to make peace. We are prepared to go on with the war if
the Allies refuse our proposals. If we do we shall not give an inch
without making the Allies pay such a dear cost that they will not be
able to continue."
The Foreign Office was not optimistic over the possibilities of
success; officials realised that the new Lloyd-George Cabinet meant a
stronger war policy by Great Britain, but they thought the peace
proposals might shake the British confidence in the new government and
cause the overthrow of Lloyd-George and the return of Asquith and
Viscount Edward Grey.
From all appearances in Berlin it was evident to every neutral diplomat
with whom I talked that while Germany was proclaiming to the whole
world her desire for peace she had in mind only the most drastic peace
terms as far as Belgium, certain sections of northern France, Poland
and the Balkans were concerned. Neutrals observed that Germany was so
exalted over the Roumanian victory and the possibilities of that
campaign solving the food problem that she was not only ready to defy
the Allies but the neutral world unless the world was ready to bow to a
German victory. There were some people in Germany who realised that
the sooner she made peace the better peace terms she could get but the
Government was not of this opinion. The Allies, as was expected,
defiantly refused the Prussian olive branch which had been extended
like everything else from Germany with a string tied to it. For the
purposes of the Kaiser and his Government the Allies' reply was exactly
what they wanted.
The German Government was in this position: If the Allies accepted
Germany's proposal it would enable the Government to unite all factions
in Germany by making a peace which would satisfy the political parties
as well as the people. If the Allies refused, the German Government
calculated that the refusal would be so bitter that it would unite the
German people political organisations and enable the Government to
continue the war in any way it saw fit.
Nothing which had happened during the year so solidified the German
nation as the Allies' replies to Berlin and to President Wilson. It
proved to the German people that their Government was waging a
defensive war because the Allies demanded annexation, compensation and
guarantees, all of which meant a change in the map of Europe from what
it was at the beginning of the war. The interests which had been
demanding a submarine warfare saw their opportunity had come. They
knew that as a result of the Allies' notes the public would sanction an
unrestricted sea warfare against the whole world if that was necessary.
From December 12th until after Christmas, discussions of peace filled
the German newspapers. By January 1st all possibilities of peace had
disappeared. The Government and the public realised that the war would
go on and that preparations would have to be made at once for the
biggest campaign in the history of the world in 1917.
Throughout the peace discussions one thing was evident to all
Americans. Opposition to American intervention in any peace discussion
was so great that the United States would not be able to take any
leading part without being faced by the animosity of a great section of
Germany. When it was stated in the press that Joseph O. Grew, the
American Charge d'Affaires, had received the German note and
transmitted it to his Government, public indignation was so great that
the Government had to inform all of the German newspapers to explain
that Germany had not asked the United States to make peace; that
Germany had in fact not asked any neutrals to make peace but had only
handed these neutrals the German note in order to get it officially
before the Allies. At this time the defiant attitude of the whole
nation was well expressed in an editorial in the _Morgen Post_ saying:
"If Germany's hand is refused her fist will soon be felt with increased
force."
II
The Conferences at Pless
As early as September, 1916, Ambassador Gerard reported to the State
Department that the forces demanding an unrestricted submarine campaign
were gaining such strength in Germany that the Government would not be
able to maintain its position very long. Gerard saw that not only the
political difficulties but the scarcity of food and the anti-American
campaign of hate were making such headway that unless peace were made
there would be nothing to prevent a rupture with the United States.
The latter part of December when Gerard returned from the United States
after conferences with President Wilson he began to study the submarine
situation.
He saw that only the most desperate resistance on the part of the
Chancellor would be able to stem the tide of hate and keep America out
of the war. On January 7th the American Chamber of Commerce and Trade
in Berlin gave a dinner to Ambassador Gerard and invited the
Chancellor, Dr. Helfferich, Dr. Solf, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Zimmermann, prominent German bankers and business men, leading editors
and all others who a few months before during the _Sussex_ crisis had
combined in maintaining friendly relations. At this banquet Gerard
made the statement, "As long as such men as Generals von Hindenburg and
Ludendorf, as long as Admirals von Capelle, von Holtzendorff and von
Mueller headed the Navy Department, and the Chancellor von
Bethmann-Hollweg directed the political affairs there would be no
trouble with the United States." Gerard was severely criticised abroad
not only for this statement but for a further remark "That the
relations between Germany and the United States had never been better
than they were to-day." Gerard saw before he had been in Berlin a week
that Germany was desperate, that conditions were getting worse and that
with no possibilities of peace Germany would probably renew the von
Tirpitz submarine warfare. He chose desperate means himself at this
banquet to appeal to the democratic forces in Germany to side with the
Chancellor when the question of a ruthless submarine warfare again came
up.
The German Government, however, had planned its moves months in
advance. Just as every great offensive on the battlefields is planned,
even to the finest details, six months before operations begin, so are
the big moves on the political chessboard of Europe.
There are very few men in public life in Germany who have the courage
of their convictions to resign if their policies are overruled. Von
Jagow, who was Secretary of State from the beginning of the war until
December, 1916, was one of these "few." Because von Jagow had to sign
all of the foolish, explanatory and excusing notes which the German
Government sent to the United States he was considered abroad as being
weak and incapable. But when he realised early in November that the
Government was determined to renew the submarine warfare unless peace
was made von Jagow was the only man in German public life who would not
remain an official of the Government and bring about a break with
America. Zimmermann, however, was a different type of official.
Zimmermann, like the Chancellor, is ambitious, bigoted, cold-blooded
and an intriguer of the first calibre. As long as he was Under
Secretary of State he fought von Jagow and tried repeatedly to oust
him. So it was not surprising to Americans when they heard that
Zimmermann had succeeded von Jagow.
The Gerard banquet, however, came too late. The die was cast. But the
world was not to learn of it for some weeks.
On the 27th of January, the Kaiser's birthday, the Chancellor, Field
Marshal von Hindenburg, First Quartermaster General Ludendorf, Admirals
von Capelle, von Holtzendorff and von Mueller and Secretary of State
Zimmermann were invited to Great Headquarters to attend the Kaiser's
birthday dinner.
Ever since von Hindenburg has been Chief of the General Staff the Grand
Chief Headquarters of the German Army have been located at Pless, on
the estate of the Prince of Pless in Silicia. Previously, the Kaiser
had had his headquarters here, because it was said and popularly
believed that His Majesty was in love with the beautiful Princess of
Pless, an Englishwoman by birth. When von Hindenburg took his
headquarters to the big castle there, the Princess was exiled and sent
to Parkenkirchen, one of the winter resorts of Bavaria.
On previous birthdays of the Emperor and when questions of great moment
were debated the civilian ministers of the Kaiser were always invited.
But on the Kaiser's birthday in 1917 only the military leaders were
asked. Dr. Helfferich, Minister of Colonies Solf, German bankers and
business men as well as German shippers were not consulted. Germany
was becoming so desperate that she was willing to defy not only her
enemies and neutral countries but her own financiers and business men.
Previously, when the submarine issue was debated the Kaiser wanted to
know what effect such a warfare would have upon German economic and
industrial life. But this time he did not care. He wanted to know the
naval and military arguments.
In August, 1914, when the Chancellor and a very small group of people
were appealing to His Majesty not to go to war, the Kaiser sided with
General von Moltke and Admiral von Tirpitz. During the various
submarine crises with the United States it appeared that the Kaiser was
changing--that he was willing and ready to side with the forces of
democracy in his own country. President Wilson and Ambassador Gerard
thought that after the downfall of von Tirpitz and von Falkenhayn the
Kaiser would join hands with the reform forces. But in 1917 when the
final decision came the Kaiser cast his lot with his generals against
the United States and against democracy in Germany. The Chancellor,
who had impressed neutral observers as being a real leader of democracy
in Germany, sided with the Kaiser. Thus by one stroke the democratic
movement which was under way in Germany received a rude slap. The man
the people had looked upon as a friend became an enemy.
III
The Break in Diplomatic Relations
On January 30th the German Government announced its blockade of all
Allied coasts and stated that all shipping within these waters, except
on special lanes, would be sunk without notice. Germany challenged the
whole world to stay off of the ocean. President Wilson broke
diplomatic relations immediately and ordered Ambassador Gerard to
return home. Gerard called at the Foreign Office for his passports and
said that he desired to leave at once. Zimmermann informed him that as
soon as the arrangements for a train could be made he could leave.
Zimmermann asked the Ambassador to submit a list of persons he desired
to accompany him. The Ambassador's list was submitted the next day.
The Foreign Office sent it to the General Staff, but nearly a week
passed before Gerard was told he could depart and then he was
instructed that the American consuls could not accompany him, but would
have to take a special train leaving Munich a week or two later.
American correspondents, who expressed a desire to accompany the
Ambassador, were refused permission. In the meantime reports arrived
that the United States had confiscated the German ships and Count
Montgelas, Chief of the American division of the Foreign Office,
informed Gerard the American correspondents would be held as hostages
if America did this. Gerard replied that he would not leave until the
correspondents and all other Americans were permitted to leave over any
route they selected. Practically all of the correspondents had handed
in their passports to the Foreign Office, but not until four hours
before the special train departed for Switzerland were the passports
returned. When Gerard asked the Foreign Office whether his passports
were good to the United States the Foreign Office was silent and
neither would the General Staff guarantee the correspondents a safe
conduct through the German submarine zone. So the only thing the
Ambassador could do was to select a route via Switzerland, France and
Spain, to Cuba and the United States.
The train which left Berlin on the night of February 10th carried the
happiest group of Americans which had been in Europe since the war
began. Practically no one slept. When the Swiss border was reached
the Stars and Stripes were hung from the car windows and Americans
breathed again in a free land. They felt like prisoners escaping from
a penitentiary. Most of them had been under surveillance or suspicion
for months. Nearly every one had had personal experiences which proved
to them that the German people were like the Government--there was no
respect for public sentiment or moral obligation. Some of the women
had upon previous occasions, when they crossed the German frontier,
submitted to the most inhuman indignities, but they remained in Germany
because their husbands were connected in some way with United States
government or semi-public service work. They were delighted to escape
the land where everything is "verboten" except hatred and militarism.
The second day after Gerard's arrival in Berne, American Minister
Stoval gave a reception to the Ambassador and invited the Allied
diplomats. From that evening on until he sailed from Coruña, Spain,
the Ambassador felt that he was among friends. When the Americans
accompanying the Ambassador asked the French authorities in Switzerland
for permission to enter France the French replied:
"Of course you can go through France. You are exiles and France
welcomes you."
After the Americans arrived in Paris they said they were not considered
exiles but guests.
* * * * * * * *
On the Kaiser's birthday services were held in all Protestant churches
in Germany. The clergy was mobilised to encourage the people. On
January 29th I sent the following despatch, after attending the
impressive services in the Berlin Cathedral:
"Where one year ago Dr. Dryander, the quiet white-haired man who is
court preacher, pleaded for an hour for peace in the services marking
the Kaiser's birthday, this year his sermon was a fiery defence of
Germany's cause and a militant plea for Germany to steel herself for
the decisive battle every one believes is coming.
"In this changed spirit he reflected the sentiment of the German
people. His sermon of Saturday has evoked the deepest approval
everywhere.
"'We know,' be said, 'that before us is the decisive battle which can
be fought through only with the greatest sacrifices. But in all cases
of the past God has helped us, and God will fight for us to-day,
through our leaders and our soldiers. We neither willed nor wanted
this war--neither the Kaiser nor the people. We hoped for peace as the
Kaiser extended his peace proposal, but with unheard of frivolity and
insults our enemies slapped the back of the Kaiser's extended hand of
peace.
"'To such enemies there is only one voice--that of the cannon. We
continue the war with a clear conscience and with trust in God that he
will bring us victory. God cannot--he will not--permit the German
people to go down.'"
"GOD WILL NOT PERMIT THE GERMAN PEOPLE TO GO DOWN"
* * * * * * * *