THE BUBBLING ECONOMIC VOLCANO
When I entered Germany in 1915 there was plenty of food everywhere and
prices were normal. But a year later the situation had changed so that
the number of food cards--Germany's economic barometer--had increased
eight times. March and April of 1916 were the worst months in the year
and a great many people had difficulty in getting enough food to eat.
There was growing dissatisfaction with the way the Government was
handling the food problem but the people's hope was centred upon the
next harvest. In April and May the submarine issue and the American
crisis turned public attention from food to politics. From July to
October the Somme battles kept the people's minds centred upon military
operations. While the scarcity of food became greater the Government,
through inspired articles in the press, informed the people that the
harvest was so big that there would be no more food difficulties.
Germany began to pay serious attention to the food situation, when
early in the year, Adolph von Batocki, the president of East Prussia
and a big land owner, was made food dictator. At the same time there
were organised various government food departments. There was an
Imperial Bureau for collecting fats; another to take charge of the meat
supply; another to control the milk and another in charge of the
vegetables and fruit. Germany became practically a socialistic state
and in this way the Government kept abreast of the growth of Socialism
among the people. The most important step the Government took was to
organise the Zentral Einkaufgesellschaft, popularly known as the "Z. E.
G." The first object of this organisation was to purchase food in
neutral countries. Previously German merchants had been going to
Holland, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries to buy supplies.
These merchants had been bidding against each other in order to get
products for their concerns. In this way food was made much more
expensive than it would have been had one purchaser gone outside of
Germany. So the Government prohibited all firms from buying food
abroad. Travelling agents of the "Z. E. G." went to these countries
and bought all of the supplies available at a fixed price. Then these
resold to German dealers at cost.
Such drastic measures were necessitated by the public demand that every
one share alike. The Government found it extremely difficult to
control the food. Farmers and rich landowners insisted upon
slaughtering their own pigs for their own use. They insisted upon
eating the eggs their chickens laid, or, upon sending them through the
mail to friends at high prices, thereby evading the egg card
regulations. But the Government stepped in and farmers were prohibited
from killing their own cattle and from sending foods to friends and
special customers. Farmers had to sell everything to the "Z. E. G."
That was another result of State Socialism.
The optimistic statements of Herr von Batocki about the food outlook
led the people to believe that by fall conditions would be greatly
improved but instead of becoming more plentiful food supplies became
more and more organised until all food was upon an absolute ration
basis.
"Although the crops were good this year, there will be so much
organisation that food will spoil," said practically every German.
Batocki's method of confiscating food did cause a great deal to spoil
and the public blamed him any time anything disappeared from the
market. One day a carload of plums was shipped from Werder, the big
fruit district near Berlin, to the capital. The "Z. E. G." confiscated
it but did not sell the goods immediately to the merchants and the
plums spoiled. Before this was found out, a crowd of women surrounded
the train one day, which was standing on a side track, broke into a car
and found most of the plums in such rotten condition they could not be
used. So they painted on the sides of the car: "This is the kind of
plum jam the 'Z. E. G.' makes."
There was a growing scarcity of all other supplies, too. The armies
demanded every possible labouring man and woman so even the canning
factories had to close and food which formerly was canned had to be
eaten while fresh or it spoiled. Even the private German family, which
was accustomed to canning food, had to forego this practice because of
a lack of tin cans, jars and rubber bands.
The food depots are by far the most successful undertaking of the
Government. In Cologne and Berlin alone close to 500,000 poor are
being fed daily by municipal kitchens. Last October I went through the
Cologne food department with the director. The city has rented a
number of large vacant factory buildings and made them into kitchens.
Municipal buyers go through the country to buy meat and vegetables.
This is shipped to Cologne, and in these kitchens it is prepared by
women workers, under the direction of volunteers.
A stew is cooked each day and sold for 42 pfennigs (about eight cents)
a quart. The people must give up their potato, fat and meat cards to
obtain it. In Berlin and all other large cities, the same system is
used. In one kitchen in Berlin, at the main market hall, 80,000 quarts
a day are prepared.
In Cologne this food is distributed through the city streets by
municipal wagons, and the people get it almost boiling hot, ready to
eat. Were it not for these food depots there would be many thousands
of people who would starve because they could not buy and cook such
nourishing food for the price the city asks. These food kitchens have
been in use now almost a year, and, while the poor are obtaining food
here, they are becoming very tired of the supply, because they must eat
stews every day. They can have nothing fried or roasted.
In addition to these kitchens the Government has opened throughout
Germany "mittlestand kueche," a restaurant for the middle classes.
Here government employees, with small wages, the poor who do not keep
house and others with little means can obtain a meal for 10 cents,
consisting of a stew and a dessert. But it is very difficult for
people to live on this food. Most every one who is compelled by
circumstances to eat here is losing weight and feels under-nourished
all the time.
A few months ago, after one of my secretaries had been called to the
army; I employed another. He had been earning only $7 a week and had
to support his wife. On this money they ate at the middle class cafes.
In six months he had lost twenty pounds.
Because the food is so scarce and because it lacks real nourishment
people eat all the time. It used to be said before the war that the
Germans were the biggest eaters in Europe--that they ate seven meals a
day. The blockade has not made them less eaters, for they eat every
few hours all day long now, but because the food lacks fats and sugars,
they need more food.
Restaurants are doing big business because after one has eaten a "meal"
at any leading Berlin hotel at 1 o'clock in the afternoon one is hungry
by 3 o'clock and ready for another "meal."
Last winter the Socialists of Munich, who saw that the rich were having
plenty of food and that the poor were existing as best they could in
food kitchens, wrote Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg and demanded the
immediate confiscation of all food in Germany, even that in private
residences.
The Socialists' demand was, as are most others, thrown into the waste
basket because men like the Chancellor, President Batocki, of the Food
Department, wealthy bankers, statesmen and army generals have country
estates where they have stored food for an indefinite period. They
know that no matter how hard the blockade pinches the people it won't
starve them.
When the Chancellor invites people to his palace he has real coffee,
white bread, plenty of potatoes, cake and meat. Being a government
official he can get what he wants from the food department. So can
other officials. Therefore, they were willing to disregard the demand
of the Bavarian Socialists.
But the Socialists, although they don't get publicity when they start
something, don't give up until they accomplish what they set out to do.
First, they enlisted the Berlin Socialists, and the report went around
to people that the rich were going to Copenhagen and bringing back food
while the poor starved. So the Government had to prohibit all food
from coming into Germany by way of Denmark unless it was imported by
the Government.
That was the first success of the Bavarian Socialists. Now they have
had another. Batocki is reported as having announced that all food
supplies will be confiscated. The Socialists are responsible.
Excepting the very wealthy and those who have stored quantities of food
for the "siege," every German is undernourished. A great many people
are starving. The head physician of the Kaiserin Augusta Victoria
Hospital, in Berlin, stated that 80,000 children died in Berlin in 1916
from lack of food. The _Lokal-Anzeiger_ printed the item and the
Foreign Office censor prohibited me from sending it to New York.
But starvation under the blockade is a slow process, and it has not yet
reached the army. When I was on the Somme battlefields last November
and in Rumania in December the soldiers were not only well fed, but
they had luxuries which their families at home did not have. Two years
ago there was so much food at home the women sent food boxes to the
front. To-day the soldiers not only send but carry quantities of food
from the front to their homes. The army has more than the people.
It is almost impossible to say whether Germany, as a nation, can be
starved into submission. Everything depends upon the next harvest, the
length of the war and future military operations. The German
Government, I think, can make the people hold out until the coming
harvest, unless there is a big military defeat. In their present
undernourished condition the public could not face a defeat. If the
war ends this year Germany will not be so starved that she will accept
any peace terms. But if the war continues another year or two Germany
will have to give up.
I entered Germany at the beginning of the Allied blockade when one
could purchase any kind and any quantity of food in Germany. Two years
later, when I left, there were at least eighteen foodstuffs which could
not be purchased anywhere, and there were twelve kinds of food which
could be obtained only by government cards. That is what the Allied
blockade did to the food supplies. It made Germany look like a grocery
store after a closing out sale.
Suppose in the United States you wanted the simplest breakfast--coffee
and bread and butter. Suppose you wanted a light luncheon of eggs or a
sandwich, tea and fruit. Suppose for dinner you wanted a plain menu of
soup, meat, vegetables and dessert. At any grocery or lunch counter
you could get not only these plain foods, but anything else you wanted.
Not so in Germany! For breakfast you cannot have pure coffee, and you
can have only a very small quantity of butter with your butter card.
Hotels serve a coffee substitute, but most people prefer nothing. For
luncheon you may have an egg, but only one day during two weeks.
Hotels still serve a weak, highly colored tea and apples or oranges.
For dinner you may have soup without any meat or fat in it. Soups are
just a mixture of water and vegetables. Two days a week you can get a
small piece of meat with a meat card. Other days you can eat boiled
fish.
People who keep house, of course, have more food, because as a rule
they have been storing supplies. Take the Christian Scientists as an
instance. Members of this Church have organised a semi-official club.
Members buy all the extra food possible. Then they divide and store
away what they want for the "siege"--the time when food will be scarcer
than it is to-day.
Two women practitioners in Berlin, who live together, bought thirty
pounds of butter from an American who had brought it in from
Copenhagen. They canned it and planned to make this butter last one
year. Until a few weeks ago people with money could go to Switzerland,
Holland and Denmark and bring back food with them, either with or
without permission. Some wealthy citizens who import machinery and
other things from outside neutral countries have their agents smuggle
food at the same time.
While the Dutch, Danish and Swiss governments try to stop smuggling;
there is always some going through. The rich have the money to bribe
border officers and inspectors. When I was in Düsseldorf, last
October, I met the owner of a number of canal boats, who shipped coal
and iron products from the Rhine Valley to Denmark. He told me his
canal barges brought back food from Copenhagen every trip and that the
border authorities were not very careful in making an investigation of
his boats.
In Düsseldorf, too, as well as in Cologne, business men spoke about the
food they got from Belgium. They did not get great quantities, of
course, but the leakage was enough to enable them to live better than
those who had to depend upon the food in Germany.
When the food supplies began to decrease the Government instituted the
card system of distribution. Bread cards had been very successful, so
the authorities figured that meat, butter, potato and other cards would
be equally so. But their calculations were wrong.
When potato cards were issued each person was given nine pounds a week.
But the potato harvest was a big failure. The supply was so much less
than the estimates that seed potatoes had to be used to keep the people
satisfied. Even then the supply was short; and the quantity to be sold
on potato cards was cut to three pounds a week. Then transportation
difficulties arose, and potatoes spoiled before they reached Berlin,
Munich, Hamburg, Dresden, Leipsic and other large cities.
The same thing happened when the Government confiscated the fruit crop
last year.
One day I was asked on the telephone whether I wanted to buy an
11-pound ham. I asked to have it sent to my office immediately. When
it came the price was $2.50 a pound. I sent the meat back and told the
man I would not pay such a price.
"That's all right," he replied. "Dr. Stein and a dozen other people
will pay me that price. I sent it to you because I wanted to help you
out."
Dr. Ludwig Stein, one of the editors of the _Vossiche Zeitung_, paid
the price and ordered all he could get for the same money.
When I left Berlin the Government had issued an order prohibiting the
sale of all canned vegetables and fruit. It was explained that this
food would be sold when the present supplies of other foods were
exhausted. There were in Berlin many thousand cans, but no one can say
how long such food will last.
When Americans ask, "How long can Germany hold out?" I reply, "As long
as the German Government can satisfy the vanity and stimulate the
nerves of the people, and as long as the people permit the Government
to do the nation's thinking."
How long a time that will be no one can say. It was formerly believed
that whenever a nation reached the limit which Germany has reached it
would crumple up. But Germany fails to crumple. Instead of breaking
up, she fights harder and more desperately. Why can she do this? The
answer is simple: Because the German people believe in their Government
and the Government knows that as long as it can convince the people
that it is winning the war the people will fight.
Germany is to-day in the position of a man on the verge of a nervous
breakdown; in the position of a man who is under-nourished, who is
depressed, who is weighed down by colossal burdens, who is brooding
over the loss of friends and relatives, but of a man who feels that his
future health and happiness depend upon his ability to hold out until
the crisis passes.
If a physician were called in to prescribe for such a patient his first
act would in all probability be to stimulate this man's hope, to make
him believe that if he would only "hold out" he would pass the crisis
successfully. But no physician could say that his patient could stand
it for one week, a month or a year more. The doctor would have to
gamble upon that man's nerves. He would have to stimulate him daily,
perhaps hourly.
So it is with the German nation. The country is on the verge of a
nervous breakdown. Men and women, business men and generals, long ago
lost their patience. They are under-nourished. They are depressed,
distressed, suffering and anxious for peace. It is as true of the
Hamburg-American Line directors as it is true of the officers at the
front.
There have been more cases of nervous breakdowns among the people
during the last year than at any time in Germany's history. There have
been so many suicides that the newspapers are forbidden to publish
them. There have been so many losses on the battlefields that every
family has been affected not once, but two, three and four times.
Dance halls have been closed. Cafes and hotels must stop serving meals
by 11 o'clock. Theatres are presenting the most sullen plays. Rumours
spread like prairie fires. One day Hindenburg is dead. Two days later
he is alive again.
But the Kaiser has studied this war psychology. He and his ministers
know that one thing keeps the German people fighting--their hope of
ultimate victory; their belief that they have won already. The Kaiser
knows, too, that if the public mind is stimulated from day to day by
new victories, by reports of many prisoners, of new territory gained,
of enemy ships torpedoed, or by promises of reforms after the war, the
public will continue fighting.
So the Kaiser gambles from day to day with his people's nerves. For
two years he has done this, and for two years he has been supported by
a 12,000,000-man-power army and a larger army of workers and women at
home. The Kaiser believes he can gamble for a long time yet with his
people.
Just as it is impossible for a physician to say how long his patient
can be stimulated without breaking down, so is it impossible for an
observer in Germany to say how long it will be before the break-up
comes in Germany.
Many times during the war Germany has been on the verge of a collapse.
President Wilson's ultimatum after the sinking of the Sussex in the
English Channel brought about one crisis. Von Falkenhayn's defeat at
Verdun caused another. The Somme battle brought on a third. General
Brusiloff's offensive against the Austrians upset conditions throughout
the Central Powers. Rumania's declaration of war made another crisis.
But Germany passed all of these successfully.
The ability of the German Government to convince the people that Wilson
was unneutral and wanted war caused them to accept Germany's note in
the _Sussex_ case. The defeat at Verdun was explained as a tactical
success. The Somme battles, with their terrible losses, failed to
bring a break-up because the Allies stopped attacking at the critical
moment.
Von Hindenburg as chief of the General Staff of Central Europe remedied
the mistakes of the Austrians during Brusiloff's attacks by
reorganising the Dual Monarchy's army. The crisis which Rumania's
entrance on the Allies' side brought in Germany and Hungary was
forgotten after von Mackensen took Bucharest.
In each of these instances it will be noticed that the crisis was
successfully passed by "stimulation." The German mind was made to
believe what the Kaiser willed.
But what about the future? Is there a bottomless well of stimulation
in Germany?
Before these questions can be answered others must be asked: Why don't
the German people think for themselves? Will they ever think for
themselves?
An incident which occurred in Berlin last December illustrates the fact
that the people are beginning to think. After the Allies replied to
President Wilson's peace note the Kaiser issued an appeal to the German
people. One morning it was printed on the first pages of all
newspapers in boldface type. When I arrived at my office the janitor
handed me the morning papers and, pointing to the Kaiser's letter, said:
"I see the Kaiser has written US another letter. You know he never
wrote to US in peace time."
There are evidences, too, that others are beginning to think. The
Russian revolution is going to cause many Socialists to discuss the
future of Germany. They have discussed it before, but always behind
closed doors and with lowered voices. I attended one night a secret
meeting of three Socialist leaders of the Reichstag, an editor of a
Berlin paper and several business men. What they said of the Kaiser
that night would, if it were published, send every man to the military
firing squad. But these men didn't dare speak that way in public at
that time. Perhaps the Russian revolt will give them more courage.
But the Government is not asleep to these changes. The Kaiser believes
he can continue juggling public opinion, but he knows that from now on
it will be more difficult. But he will not stop. He will always hold
forth the vision of victory as the reward for German faithfulness.
Today, for instance, in the United States we hear very little about the
German submarine warfare. It is the policy of the Allies not to
publish all losses immediately; first because the enemy must not be
given any important information if possible, and, secondly, because,
losses have a bad effect upon any people.
But the German people do not read what we do. Their newspapers are
printing daily the ship losses of the Entente. Submarines are
returning and making reports. These reports are published and in a way
to give the people the impression that the submarine war is a success.
We get the opposite impression here, but we are not in a position
better to judge than the Germans, because we don't hear everything.
The important question, however, is: What are the German people being
told about submarine warfare?
Judging from past events, the Kaiser and his Navy are undoubtedly
magnifying every sinking for the purpose of stimulating the people into
believing that the victory they seek is getting nearer. The Government
knows that the public favours ruthless torpedoing of all ships bound
for the enemy, so the Government is safe in concluding that the public
can be stimulated for some months more by reports of submarine victory.
Military operations in the West are probably not arousing the
discussion in Berlin that the plans against Russia are. The Government
will see to it that the press points regularly to the possibilities of
a separate peace with Russia, or to the possibility of a Hindenburg
advance against England and France.
The people have childlike faith in von Hindenburg. If Paul von
Hindenburg says a retreat is a victory the people will take his
judgment. But all German leaders know that the time is coming when
they will have to show the German people a victory or take the
consequences themselves.
Hence it would not be surprising if, after present military operations
are concluded, either by an offensive against Russia or by an attack on
the Western line, the Chancellor again made peace proposals. The
Socialists will force the Chancellor to do it sooner or later. They
are the real power behind the throne, although they have not enough
spunk to try to oust the Kaiser and tell the people to do their own
thinking.
A big Allied military victory would, of course, change everything.
Defeat of the German army would mean defeat of von Hindenburg, the
German god. It would put an end to the Kaiser's juggling with his
people's nerves. But few people in Germany expect an Entente victory
this year, and they believe that if the Allies don't win this year they
never will win.
Germany is stronger militarily now than she has been and Germany will
be able for many months to keep many Entente armies occupied. Before
the year is passed the Entente may need American troops as badly as
France needed English assistance last year. General von Falkenhayn,
former chief of the German General Staff, told me about the same thing
last December, in Rumania.
"In war," he remarked, "nothing is certain except that everything is
uncertain, but one thing I know is certain: We will win the war."
_America's entrance, however, will have the decisive effect_. The
Allies, especially the French, appreciate this. As a high French
official remarked one day when Ambassador Gerard's party was in Paris:
"There have been two great moments in the war for France. The first
was when England declared war to support us. The second was the
breaking of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany."
The Germans don't believe this. As General von Stein, Prussian
Minister of War, said, Germany doesn't fear the United States. He said
that, of course, for its effect upon the German people. The people
must be made to believe this or they will not be able to hate America
in true German fashion.
America's participation, however, will upset Hindenburg's war plans.
American intervention can put a stop to the Kaiser's juggling with his
people's minds by helping the Allies defeat Germany. Only a big
military defeat will shake the confidence of the Germans in the Kaiser,
Hindenburg and their organised might. The people are beginning to
think now, but they will do a great deal more thinking if they are
beaten.
So the answer to the question: "How long can Germany hold out?" is
really answered by saying that Germany can keep on until she is
decisively defeated militarily.