THE GULF BETWEEN KIEL AND BERLIN
At the beginning of the war, even the Socialist Party in the Reichstag
voted the Government credits. The press and the people unanimously
supported the Government because there was a very terrorising fear that
Russia was about to invade Germany and that England and France were
leagued together to crush the Fatherland. Until the question of the
submarine warfare came up, the division of opinion which had already
developed between the Army and Navy clique and the Foreign Office was
not general among the people. Although the army had not taken Paris, a
great part of Belgium and eight provinces of Northern France were
occupied and the Russians had been driven from East Prussia. The
German people believed they were successful. The army was satisfied
with what it had done and had great plans for the future. Food and
economic conditions had changed very little as compared to the changes
which were to take place before 1917. Supplies were flowing into
Germany from all neutral European countries. Even England and Russia
were selling goods to Germany indirectly through neutral countries.
Considerable English merchandise, as well as American products, came in
by way of Holland because English business men were making money by the
transaction and because the English Government had not yet discovered
leaks in the blockade. Two-thirds of the butter supply in Berlin was
coming from Russia. Denmark was sending copper. Norway was sending
fish and valuable oils. Sweden was sending horses and cattle. Italy
was sending fruit. Spanish sardines and olives were reaching German
merchants. There was no reason to be dissatisfied with the way the war
was going. And, besides, the German people hated their enemies so that
the leaders could count upon continued support for almost an indefinite
period. The cry of "Hun and Barbarian" was answered with the battle
cry "Gott strafe England."
The latter part of April on my first trip to the front I dined at Great
Headquarters (Grosse Haupt Quartier) in Charleville, France, with Major
Nicolai, Chief of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff.
The next day, in company with other correspondents, we were guests of
General von Moehl and his staff at Peronne. From Peronne we went to
the Somme front to St. Quentin, to Namur and Brussels. The soldiers
were enthusiastic and happy. There was plenty of food and considerable
optimism. But the confidence in victory was never so great as it was
immediately after the sinking of the _Lusitania_. That marked the
crisis in the future trend of the war.
Up to this time the people had heard very little about the fight
between the Navy and the Foreign Office. But gradually rumours spread.
While there was previously no outlet for public opinion, the
_Lusitania_ issue was debated more extensively and with more vigour
than the White Books which were published to explain the causes of the
war.
With the universal feeling of self confidence, it was but natural that
the people should side with the Navy in demanding an unrestricted
submarine warfare. When Admiral von Bachmann gave the order to First
Naval Lieutenant Otto Steinbrink to sink the Lusitania, he knew the
Navy was ready to defy the United States or any other country which
might object. He knew, too, that von Tirpitz was very close to the
Kaiser and could count upon the Kaiser's support in whatever he did.
The Navy believed the torpedoing of the Lusitania would so frighten and
terrorise the world that neutral shipping would become timid and enemy
peoples would be impressed by Germany's might on the seas. Ambassador
von Bernstorff had been ordered by the Foreign Office to put notices in
the American papers warning Americans off these ships. The Chancellor
and Secretary von Jagow knew there was no way to stop the Admiralty,
and they wanted to avoid, if possible, the loss of American lives.
The storm of indignation which encircled the globe when reports were
printed that over a thousand people lost their lives on the Lusitania,
found a sympathetic echo in the Berlin Foreign Office. "Another navy
blunder," the officials said--confidentially. Foreign Office officials
tried to conceal their distress because the officials knew the only
thing they could do now was to make preparation for an apology and try
to excuse in the best possible way what the navy had done. On the 17th
of May like a thunderbolt from a clear sky came President Wilson's
first Lusitania note.
"Recalling the humane and enlightened attitude hitherto assumed by the
Imperial German Government in matters of international life,
particularly with regard to the freedom of the seas; having learned to
recognise German views and German influence in the field of
international obligations as always engaged upon the side of justice
and humanity;" the note read, "and having understood the instructions
of the Imperial German Government to its naval commanders to be upon
the same plane of human action as those prescribed by the naval codes
of other nations, the government of the United States is loath to
believe--it cannot now bring itself to believe--that these acts so
absolutely contrary to the rules and practices and spirit of modern
warfare could have the countenance or sanction of that great
government. . . . Manifestly submarines cannot be used against
merchantmen as the last few weeks have shown without an inevitable
violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity. American
citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their ships and
in travelling wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the
high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be a well justified
confidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts done in
clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations
and certainly in the confidence that their own government will sustain
them in the exercise of their rights."
And then the note which Mr. Gerard handed von Jagow concluded with
these words:
"It (The United States) confidently expects therefore that the Imperial
German Government will disavow the acts of which the United States
complains, that they will make reparation as far as reparation is
possible for injuries which are without measure, and that they will
take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously
subversive of the principles of warfare, for which the Imperial German
Government in the past so wisely and so firmly contended. The
Government and people of the United States look to the Imperial German
Government for just, prompt and enlightened action in this vital
matter. . . . Expressions of regret and offers of reparation in the
case of neutral ships sunk by mistake, while they may satisfy
international obligations if no loss of life results, cannot justify or
excuse a practice, the natural necessary effect of which is to subject
neutral nations or neutral persons to new and immeasurable risks. The
Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United
States to omit any word, or any act, necessary to the performance of
its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its
citizens, and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."
Never in history had a neutral nation indicted another as the United
States did Germany in its first _Lusitania_ note without immediately
going to war. Because the Foreign Office feared the reaction it might
have upon the people, the newspapers were not permitted to publish the
text until the press bureaus of the Navy and the Foreign Office had
mobilised the editorial writers and planned a publicity campaign to
follow the note's publication. But the Navy and Foreign Office could
not agree on what should be done. The Navy wanted to ignore Wilson.
Naval officers laughed at President Wilson's impertinence and, when the
Foreign Office sent to the Admiralty for all data in possession of the
Navy Department regarding the sinking of the _Lusitania_ the Navy
refused to acknowledge the request.
During this time I was in constant touch with the Foreign Office and
the American Embassy. Frequently I went to the Navy Department but was
always told they had nothing to say. When it appeared, however, that
there might he a break in diplomatic relations over the Lusitania the
Kaiser called the Chancellor to Great Headquarters for a conference.
Meanwhile Germany delayed her reply to the American note because the
Navy and Foreign Office were still at loggerheads. On the 31st of May
von Jagow permitted me to quote him in an interview saying:
"America can hardly expect us to give up any means at our disposal to
fight our enemy. It is a principle with us to defend ourselves in
every possible way. I am sure that Americans will be reasonable enough
to believe that our two countries cannot discuss the _Lusitania_ matter
_until both have the same basis of facts_."
The American people were demanding an answer from Germany and because
the two branches of the Government could not agree on what should be
said von Jagow had to do something to gain time. Germany, therefore,
submitted in her reply of the 28th of May certain facts about the
_Lusitania_ for the consideration of the American Government saying
that Germany reserved final statements of its position with regard "to
the demands made in connection with the sinking of the _Lusitania_
until a reply was received from the American Government." After the
note was despatched the chasm between the Navy and Foreign Office was
wider than ever. Ambassador Gerard, who went to the Foreign Office
daily, to try to convince the officials that they were antagonising the
whole world by their attitude on the _Lusitania_ question, returned to
the Embassy one day after a conference with Zimmermann and began to
prepare a scrap book of cartoons and clippings from American
newspapers. Two secretaries were put to work pasting the comments,
interviews, editorials and cartoons reflecting American opinion in the
scrap book. Although the German Foreign Office had a big press
department its efforts were devoted more to furnishing the outside
world with German views than with collecting outside opinions for the
information of the German Government. Believing that this information
would be of immeasurable benefit to the German diplomats in sounding
the depths of public sentiment in America, Gerard delivered the book to
von Jagow personally.
In the meantime numerous conferences were held at Great Headquarters.
Financiers, business men and diplomats who wanted to keep peace with
America sided with the Foreign Office. Every anti-American influence
in the Central Powers joined forces with the Navy. The _Lusitania_
note was printed and the public discussion which resulted was greater
than that which followed the first declarations of war in August, 1914.
The people, who before had accepted everything their Government said,
began to think for themselves. One heard almost as much criticism as
praise of the _Lusitania_ incident. For the first time the quarrel,
which had been nourished between the Foreign Office and the Admiralty,
became nation-wide and forces throughout Germany lined up with one side
or the other. But the Navy Department was the cleverer of the two.
The press bureau sent out inspired stories that the submarines were
causing England a loss of a million dollars a week. They said that
every week the Admiralty was launching two U-boats. It was stated that
reliable reports to Admiral von Tirpitz proved the high toll taken by
the submarines in two weeks had struck terror to the hearts of English
ship-owners. The newspapers printed under great headlines: "Toll of
Our Tireless U-Boats," the names and tonnage of ships lost. The press
bureau pointed to the rise in food prices in Great Britain and France.
The public was made to feel a personal pride in submarine exploits.
And at the same time the Navy editorial writers brought up the old
issue of American arms and ammunition to further embitter the people.
Thus the first note which President Wilson wrote in the _Lusitania_
case not only brought the quarrel between the Navy and Foreign Office
to a climax but it gave the German people the first opportunity they
had had seriously to discuss questions of policy and right.
In the Rhine Valley, where the ammunition interests dominated every
phase of life, the Navy found its staunchest supporters. In
educational circles, in shipping centres, such as Hamburg and Bremen,
in the financial districts of Frankfort and Berlin, the Foreign Office
received its support. Press and Reichstag were divided. Supporting
the Foreign Office were the _Lokal Anzeiger_, the _Berliner Tageblatt_,
the _Cologne Gazette_, the _Frankforter Zeitung_, the _Hamburger
Fremdemblatt_, and the _Vorwärts_.
The Navy had the support of Count Reventlow, Naval Critic of the
_Deutsche Tageszeitung_, the _Täglische Rundscha_, the _Vossische
Zeitung_, the _Morgen Post_, the _B. Z. Am Mittag_, the _Münchener
Neueste Nachrichten_, the _Rheinische Westfälische Zeitung_, and the
leading Catholic organ, the _Koelnische Volks-Zeitung_.
Government officials were also divided. Chancellor von
Bethmann-Hollweg led the party which demanded an agreement with the
United States. He was supported by von Jagow, Zimmermann, Dr. Karl
Helfferich, Secretary of the Treasury; Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister;
Dr. Siegfried Heckscher, Vice Chairman of the Reichstag Committee on
Foreign Relations; and Philip Scheidemann, leader of the majority of
the Socialists in the Reichstag.
The opposition was led by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz. He was supported
by General von Falkenhayn, Field Marshal von Mackensen and all army
generals; Admirals von Pohl and von Bachmann; Major Bassermann, leader
of the National Liberal Party in the Reichstag; Dr. Gustav Stressemann,
member of the Reichstag and Director of the North German Lloyd
Steamship Company; and von Heydebrand, the so-called "Uncrowned King of
Prussia," because of his control of the Prussian Diet.
With these forces against each other the internal fight continued more
bitter than ever. President Wilson kept insisting upon definite
promises from Germany but the Admiralty still had the upper hand.
There was nothing for the Foreign Office to do except to make the best
possible excuses and depend upon Wilson's patience to give them time to
get into the saddle. The Navy Department, however, was so confident
that it had the Kaiser's support in everything it did, that one of the
submarines was instructed to sink the _Arabic_.
President Wilson's note in the _Arabic_ case again brought the
submarine dispute within Germany to a head. Conferences were again
held at Great Headquarters. The Chancellor, von Jagow, Helfferich, von
Tirpitz and other leaders were summoned by the Kaiser. On the 28th of
August I succeeded in sending by courier to The Hague the following
despatch:
"With the support of the Kaiser, the German Chancellor, Dr. von
Bethmann-Hollweg, is expected to win the fight he is now making for a
modification of Germany's submarine warfare that will forever settle
the difficulties with America over the sinking of the _Lusitania_ and
the _Arabic_. Both the Chancellor and von Jagow are most anxious to
end at once and for all time the controversies with Washington desiring
America's friendship." (Published in the Chicago _Tribune_, August
29th, 1915.)
"The Marine Department, headed by von Tirpitz, creator of the submarine
policy, will oppose any disavowal of the action of German's submarines.
But the Kaiser is expected to approve the steps the Chancellor and
Foreign Secretary contemplate taking, swinging the balance in favour of
von Bethmann-Hollweg's contention that ships in the future must be
warned before they are torpedoed."
One day I went to the Foreign Office and told one of the officials I
believed that if the American people knew what a difficult time the
Foreign Office was having in trying to win out over the Admiralty that
public opinion in the United States might be mobilised to help the
Foreign Office against the Admiralty. I took with me a brief despatch
which I asked him to pass. He censored it with the understanding that
I would never disclose his name in case the despatch was read in
Germany.
A few days later the Manchester, England, _Guardian_ arrived containing
my article, headed as follows:
HOLLWEG'S CHANGE OF TUNE
Respect for Scraps of Paper
LAW AT SEA
Insists on Warning by Submarines
TIRPITZ PARTY BEATEN
Kaiser Expected to Approve New Policy
"New York, Sunday.
"Cables from Mr. Carl W. Ackerman, Berlin correspondent of the United
Press published here, indicate that the real crisis following the
_Arabic_ is in Germany, not America. He writes:
"The Berlin Foreign Office is unalterably opposed to submarine
activity, such as evidenced by the _Arabic_ affair, and it was on the
initiative of this Government department that immediate steps were
taken with Mr. Gerard the American Ambassador. The nature of these
negotiations is still unknown to the German public.
"It is stated on the highest authority that Herr von Jagow, Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, and Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg are unanimous
in their anxiety to settle American difficulties once and for all,
retaining the friendship of the United States in any event.
"The Kaiser is expected to approve the course suggested by the Imperial
Chancellor, despite open opposition to any disavowal of submarine
activities which constantly emanates from the German Admiralty.
"The Chancellor is extremely desirous of placing Germany on record as
an observer of international law as regards sea warfare, and in this
case will win his demand that submarines in the future shall thoroughly
warn enemy ships before firing their torpedoes or shells.
"There is considerable discussion in official circles as to whether the
Chancellor's steps create a precedent, but it is agreed that it will
probably close all complications with America, including the
_Lusitania_ case, which remained unsettled following President Wilson's
last note to Germany.
"Thus if the United States approves the present attitude of the
Chancellor this step will aid in clearing the entire situation and will
materially strengthen the policy of von Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow,
which is a deep desire for peace with America."
After this despatch was printed I was called to the home of Fran von
Schroeder, the American-born wife of one of the Intelligence Office of
the General Staff. Captain Vanselow, Chief of the Admiralty
Intelligence Department, was there and had brought with him the
Manchester _Guardian_. He asked me where I got the information and who
had passed the despatch. He said the Navy was up in arms and had
issued orders to the General Telegraph Office that, inasmuch as Germany
was under martial law, no telegrams were to be passed containing the
words submarines, navy, admiralty or marine or any officers of the Navy
without having them referred to the Admiralty for a second censoring.
This order practically nullified the censorship powers of the Foreign
Office. I saw that the Navy Department was again in the saddle and
that the efforts of the Chancellor to maintain peace might not be
successful after all. But the conferences at Great Headquarters lasted
longer than any one expected. The first news we received of what had
taken place was that Secretary von Jagow had informed the Kaiser he
would resign before he would do anything which might cause trouble with
the United States.
Germany was split wide open by the submarine issue. For a while it
looked as if the only possible adjustment would be either for von
Tirpitz to go and his policies with him, or for von Jagow and the
Chancellor to go with the corresponding danger of a rupture with
America. But von Tirpitz would not resign. He left Great Headquarters
for Berlin and intimated to his friends that he was going to run the
Navy to suit himself. But the Chancellor who had the support of the
big shipping interests and the financiers, saw a possible means of
checkmating von Tirpitz by forcing Admiral von Pohl to resign as Chief
of the Admiralty Staff. They finally persuaded the Kaiser to accept
his resignation and appoint Admiral von Holtzendorff as his successor.
Von Holtzendorff's brother was a director of the Hamburg-American Line
and an intimate friend of A. Ballin, the General Director of the
company. The Chancellor believed that by having a friend of his as
Chief of the Admiralty Staff, no orders would be issued to submarine
commanders contrary to the wishes of the Chancellor, because according
to the rules of the German Navy Department the Chief of the Admiralty
Staff must approve all naval plans and sign all orders to fleet
commanders.
Throughout this time the one thing which frightened the Foreign Office
was the fear that President Wilson might break off diplomatic relations
before the Foreign Office had an opportunity to settle the differences
with the United States. For this reason Ambassador Gerard was kept
advised by Wilhelmstrasse of the internal developments in Germany and
asked to report them fully but confidentially to Wilson. So, during
this crisis when Americans were demanding a break with Germany because
of Germany's continued defiance of President Wilson's notes, the
American Government knew that if the Foreign Office was given more time
it had a good chance of succeeding in cleaning house. A rupture at
that time would have destroyed all the efforts of the Foreign Office to
keep the German military machine within bounds. It would have
over-thrown von Jagow and von Bethmann-Hollweg and put in von Tirpitz
as Chancellor and von Heydebrand, the reactionary leader of the
Prussian Diet, as Secretary of State. At that time, all the democratic
forces of Germany were lined up with the Foreign Office. The people
who blushed for Belgium, the financiers who were losing money, the
shipping interests whose tonnage was locked in belligerent or neutral
harbours, the Socialists and people who were anxious and praying for
peace, were looking to the Foreign Office and to Washington to avoid a
break.