"PIRATES SINK ANOTHER NEUTRAL SHIP"
On February 4th, 1915, the _Reichsanzeiger_, the official newspaper of
Germany, published an announcement declaring that from the 18th of
February "all the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland as well
as the entire English channel are hereby declared to be a war area.
All ships of the enemy mercantile marine found in these waters will be
destroyed and it will not always be possible to avoid danger to the
crews and passengers thereon.
"_Neutral shipping is also in danger in the war area_, as owing to the
secret order issued by the British Admiralty January 31st, 1915,
regarding the misuse of neutral flags, and the chances of naval
warfare, it can happen that attacks directed against enemy ships may
damage neutral vessels.
"The shipping route around the north of The Shetlands in the east of
the North Sea and over a distance of thirty miles along the coast of
The Netherlands will not be dangerous."
Although the announcement was signed by Admiral von Pohl, Chief of the
Admiralty Staff, the real author of the blockade was Grand Admiral von
Tirpitz. In explanation of the announcement the Teutonic-Allied,
neutral and hostile powers were sent a memorandum which contained the
following paragraph:
"The German Government announces its intention in good time so that
hostile _as well as neutral_ ships can take necessary precautions
accordingly. Germany expects that the neutral powers will show the
same consideration for Germany's vital interests as for those of
England, and will aid in keeping their citizens and property from this
area. This is the more to be expected, as it must be to the interests
of the neutral powers to see this destructive war end as soon as
possible."
On February 12th the American Ambassador, James W. Gerard, handed
Secretary of State von Jagow a note in which the United States said:
"This Government views these possibilities with such grave concern that
it feels it to be its privilege, and indeed its duty in the
circumstances, to request the Imperial German Government to consider
before action is taken the critical situation in respect of the
relations between this country and Germany which might arise were the
German naval officers, in carrying out the policy foreshadowed in the
Admiralty's proclamation, to destroy any merchant vessel of the United
States or cause the death of American citizens.
"It is of course unnecessary to remind the German Government that the
sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels on the high
seas is limited to visit and search, unless a blockade is proclaimed
and effectively maintained, which the Government of the United States
does not understand to be proposed in this case. To declare and
exercise the right to attack and destroy any vessel entering a
prescribed area of the high seas without first accurately determining
its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of its cargo,
would be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government
is reluctant to believe that the Imperial German Government in this
case contemplates it as possible."
I sailed from New York February 13th, 1915, on the first American
passenger liner to run the von Tirpitz blockade. On February 20th we
passed Queenstown and entered the Irish Sea at night. Although it was
moonlight and we could see for miles about us, every light on the ship,
except the green and red port and starboard lanterns, was extinguished.
As we sailed across the Irish Sea, silently and cautiously as a muskrat
swims on a moonlight night, we received a wireless message that a
submarine, operating off the mouth of the Mersey River, had sunk an
English freighter. The captain was asked by the British Admiralty to
stop the engines and await orders. Within an hour a patrol boat
approached and escorted us until the pilot came aboard early the next
morning. No one aboard ship slept. Few expected to reach Liverpool
alive, but the next afternoon we were safe in one of the numerous snug
wharves of that great port.
A few days later I arrived in London. As I walked through Fleet street
newsboys were hurrying from the press rooms carrying orange-coloured
placards with the words in big black type: "Pirates Sink Another
Neutral Ship."
Until the middle of March I remained in London, where the wildest
rumours were afloat about the dangers off the coast of England, and
where every one was excited and expectant over the reports that Germany
was starving. I was urged by friends and physicians not to go to
Germany because it was universally believed in Great Britain that the
war would be over in a very short time. On the 15th of March I crossed
from Tilbury to Rotterdam. At Tilbury I saw pontoon bridges across the
Thames, patrol boats and submarine chasers rushing back and forth
watching for U-boats, which might attempt to come up the river. I
boarded the _Batavia IV_ late at night and left Gravesend at daylight
the next morning for Holland. Every one was on deck looking for
submarines and mines. The channel that day was as smooth as a small
lake, but the terrible expectation that submarines might sight the
Dutch ship made every passenger feel that the submarine war was as real
as it was horrible.
On the 17th of March, arriving at the little German border town of
Bentheim, I met for the first time the people who were already branded
as "Huns and Barbarians" by the British and French. Officers and
people, however, were not what they had been pictured to be. Neither
was Germany starving. The officials and inspectors were courteous and
patient and permitted me to take into Germany not only British
newspapers, but placards which pictured the Germans as pirates. Two
days later, while walking down Unter den Linden, poor old women, who
were already taking the places of newsboys, sold German extras with
streaming headlines: "British Ships Sunk. Submarine War Successful."
In front of the _Lokal Anzeiger_ building stood a large crowd reading
the bulletins about the progress of the von Tirpitz blockade.
For luncheon that day I had the choice of as many foods as I had had in
London. The only thing missing was white bread, for Germany, at the
beginning of the war, permitted only Kriegsbrot (war bread) to be baked.
All Berlin streets were crowded and busy. Military automobiles,
auto-trucks, big moving vans, private automobiles, taxi-cabs and
carriages hurried hither and thither. Soldiers and officers, seemingly
by the thousands, were parading up and down. Stores were busy. Berlin
appeared to be as normal as any other capital. Even the confidence of
Germany in victory impressed me so that in one of my first despatches I
said:
"Germany to-day is more confident than ever that all efforts of her
enemies to crush her must prove in vain. With a threefold offensive,
in Flanders, in Galicia and in northwest Russia, being successfully
prosecuted, there was a spirit of enthusiasm displayed here in both
military and civilian circles that exceeded even the stirring days
immediately following the outbreak of the war.
"Flags are flying everywhere to-day; the Imperial standards of Germany
and Austria predominate, although there is a goodly showing of the
Turkish Crescent. Bands are playing as regiment after regiment passes
through the city to entrain for the front. Through Wilhelmstrasse the
soldiers moved, their hats and guns decorated with fragrant flowers and
with mothers, sisters and sweethearts clinging to and encouraging them."
A few weeks before I arrived the Germans were excited over the shipment
of arms and ammunitions from the United States to the Allies, but by
the time I was in Berlin the situation seemed to have changed. On
April 4th I telegraphed the following despatch which appeared in the
_Evening Sun_, New York:
"The spirit of animosity towards Americans which swept Germany a few
weeks ago seems to have disappeared. The 1,400 Americans in Berlin and
those in the smaller cities of Germany have little cause to complain of
discourteous treatment. Americans just arriving in Berlin in
particular comment upon the friendliness of their reception. The
Germans have been especially courteous, they declare, on learning of
their nationality. Feeling against the United States for permitting
arms to be shipped to the Allies still exists, but I have not found
this feeling extensive among the Germans. Two American doctors
studying in German clinics declare that the wounded soldiers always
talk about 'Amerikanische keugel' (American bullets), but it is my
observation that the persons most outspoken against the sale of
ammunition to the Allies by American manufacturers are the American
residents of Berlin."
Two weeks later the situation had changed considerably. On the 24th I
telegraphed: "Despite the bitter criticism of the United States by
German newspapers for refusing to end the traffic in munitions, it is
semi-officially explained that this does not represent the real views
of the German Government. The censor has been instructed to permit the
newspapers to express themselves frankly on this subject and on
Secretary Bryan's reply to the von Bernstorff note, but it has been
emphasised that their views reflect popular opinion and the editorial
side of the matter and not the Government.
"The _Lokal Anzeiger_, following up its attack of yesterday, to-day
says:
"'The answer of the United States is no surprise to Germany and
naturally it fails to convince Germany that a flourishing trade in
munitions of war is in accord with strict neutrality. The German
argument was based upon the practice of international law, but the
American reply was based upon the commercial advantages enjoyed by the
ammunition shippers.'"
April 24th was von Tirpitz day. It was the anniversary of the entrance
of the Grand Admiral in the German Navy fifty years before, and the
eighteenth anniversary of his debut in the cabinet, a record for a
German Minister of Marine. There was tremendous rejoicing throughout
the country, and the Admiral, who spent his Prussian birthday at the
Navy Department, was overwhelmed with congratulations. Headed by the
Kaiser, telegrams came from every official in Germany. The press paid
high tribute to his blockade, declaring that it was due to him alone
that England was so terror-stricken by submarines.
I was not in Germany very long until I was impressed by the remarkable
control the Government had on public opinion by censorship of the
press. People believe, without exception, everything they read in the
newspapers. And I soon discovered that the censor was so accustomed to
dealing with German editors that he applied the same standards to the
foreign correspondents. A reporter could telegraph not what he
observed and heard, but what the censors desired American readers to
hear and know about Germany.
[Illustration: A Berlin "Extra"]
I was in St. Quentin, France (which the Germans on their 1917
withdrawal set on fire) at the headquarters of General von Below, when
news came May 8th that the _Lusitania_ was torpedoed. I read the
bulletins as they arrived. I heard the comments of the Germans who
were waging war in an enemy country. I listened as they spoke of the
loss of American and other women and children. I was amazed when I
heard them say that a woman had no more right on the _Lusitania_ than
she would have on an ammunition wagon on the Somme. The day before I
was in the first line trenches on the German front which crossed the
road running from Peronne to Albert. At that time this battlefield,
which a year and a half later was destined to be the scene of the
greatest slaughter in history, was as quiet and beautiful as this
picturesque country of northern France was in peace times. Only a few
trenches and barbed wire entanglements marred the scene.
On May 9th I left St. Quentin for Brussels. Here I was permitted by
the General Government to send a despatch reflecting the views of the
German army in France about the sinking of the _Lusitania_. I wrote
what I thought was a fair article. I told how the bulletin was posted
in front of the Hotel de Ville; how the officers and soldiers marching
to and away from the front stopped, read, smiled and congratulated each
other because the Navy was at last helping the Army "win the war."
There were no expressions of regret over the loss of life. These
officers and soldiers had seen so many dead, soldiers and civilians,
men and women, in Belgium and France that neither death nor murder
shocked them.
The telegram was approved by the military censor and forwarded to
Berlin. I stayed in Belgium two days longer, went to Louvain and Liége
and reached Berlin May 12th. The next day I learned at the Foreign
Office that my despatch was stopped because it conflicted with the
opinions which the German Government was sending officially by wireless
to Washington and to the American newspapers. I felt that this was
unfair, but I was subject to the censorship and had no appeal.
I did not forget this incident because it showed a striking difference
of opinion between the army, which was fighting for Germany, and the
Foreign Office, which was explaining and excusing what the Army and
Navy did. The Army always justified the events in Belgium, but the
Foreign Office did not. And this was the first incident which made me
feel that even in Germany, which was supposed to be united, there were
differences of opinion.
In September, 1915, while the German army was moving against Russia
like a surging sea, I was invited to go to the front near Vilna.
During the intervening months I had observed and recorded as much as
possible the growing indignation in Germany because the United States
permitted the shipment of arms and ammunition to the Allies. In June I
had had an interview with Secretary of State von Jagow, in which he
protested against the attitude of the United States Government and said
that America was not acting as neutral as Germany did during the
Spanish-American war. He cited page 168 of Andrew D. White's book in
which Ambassador White said he persuaded Germany not to permit a German
ship laden with ammunition and consigned for Spain to sail. I thought
that if Germany had adopted such an attitude toward America, that in
justice to Germany Washington should adopt the same position. After
von Jagow gave me the facts in possession of the Foreign Office and
after he had loaned me Mr. White's book, I looked up the data. I found
to my astonishment that Mr. White reported to the State Department that
a ship of ammunition sailed from Hamburg, and that he had not
protested, although the Naval Attaché had requested him to do so. The
statements of von Jagow and Mr. White's in his autobiography did not
agree with the facts. Germany did send ammunition to Spain, but
Wilhelmstrasse was using Mr. White's book as proof that the Krupp
interests did not supply our enemy in 1898. The latter part of
September I entered Kovno, the important Russian fortress, eight days
after the army captured it. I was escorted, together with other
foreign correspondents, from one fort to another and shown what the 42
cm. guns had destroyed. I saw 400 machine guns which were captured and
1,300 pieces of heavy artillery. The night before, at a dinner party,
the officers had argued against the United States because of the
shipment of supplies to Russia. They said that if the United States
had not aided Russia, that country would not have been able to resist
the invaders. I did not know the facts, but I accepted their
statements. When I was shown the machine guns, I examined them and
discovered that every one of the 400 was made at Essen or Magdeburg,
Germany. Of the 1,300 pieces of artillery every cannon was made in
Germany except a few English ship guns. Kovno was fortified by
_German_ artillery, not American.
A few days later I entered Vilna; this time I was moving with the
advance column. At dinner that night with General von Weber, the
commander of the city, the subject of American arms and ammunition was
again brought up. The General said they had captured from the Russians
an American machine gun. He added that they were bringing it in from
Smorgon to show the Americans. When it reached us the stamp, written
in English, showed that it was manufactured by Vickers Limited,
England. Being unable to read English, the officer who reported the
capture thought the gun was made in the United States.
In Roumania last December I followed General von Falkenhayn's armies to
the forts of Bucharest. On Thanksgiving Day I crossed by automobile
the Schurduck Pass. The Roumanians had defended, or attempted to
defend, this road by mounting armoured guns on the crest of one of the
mountain ranges in the Transylvanian Alps. I examined a whole position
here and found all turrets were made in Germany.
I did not doubt that the shipment of arms and ammunition to the Allies
had been a great aid to them. (I was told in Paris, later, on my way
to the United States that if it had not been for the American
ammunition factories France would have been defeated long ago.) But
when Germany argued that the United States was not neutral in
permitting these shipments to leave American ports, Germany was
forgetting what her own arms and munition factories had done _for
Germany's enemies_. When the Krupp works sold Russia the defences for
Kovno, the German Government knew these weapons would be used against
Germany some day, because no nation except Germany could attack Russia
by way of that city. When Krupps sold war supplies to Roumania, the
German Government knew that if Roumania joined the Allies these
supplies would be used against German soldiers. But the Government was
careful not to report these facts in German newspapers. And, although
Secretary of State von Jagow acknowledged to Ambassador Gerard that
there was nothing in international law to justify a change in
Washington's position, von Jagow's statements were not permitted to be
published in Germany.
To understand Germany's resentment over Mr. Wilson's interference with
the submarine warfare, three things must be taken into consideration.
1. The Allies' charge that all Germans are "Huns and Barbarians."
2. The battle of the Marne and the shipment of arms and ammunition from
the United States.
3. The intrigue and widening breach between the Army and Navy and the
Foreign Office.
I
One weapon the Allies used against Germany, which was more effective
than all others, was the press. When the English and French indicted
the Germans as "Barbarians and Huns," as "pirates," and "uncivilised"
Europeans, it cut the Germans to the quick; it affected men and women
so terribly that Germans feared these attacks more than they did the
combined military might of their enemies. This is readily understood
when one realises that before the war the thing the Germans prided
themselves on was their commerce and their civilisation,--their Kultur.
Before the war, the world was told by every German what the nation had
done for the poor; what strides the scientists had made in research
work and what progress the business men had made in extending their
commerce at the expense of competitors.
While some government officials foresaw the disaster which would come
to Germany if this national vanity was paraded before the whole world,
their advice and counsel were ignored. Consul General Kiliani, the
Chief German official in Australia before the war, told me he had
reported repeatedly to the Foreign Office that German business men were
injuring their own opportunities by bragging so much of what they had
done, and what they would do. He said if it continued the whole world
would be leagued against Germany; that public opinion would be so
strong against German goods that they would lose their markets.
Germany made the whole world fear her commercial might by this foolish
bragging.
So when the war broke out and Germans were attacked for being
uncivilised in Belgium, for breaking treaties and for disregarding the
opinion of the world, it was but natural that German vanity should
resent it. Germans feared nothing but God and public opinion. They
had such exalted faith in their army they believed they could gain by
Might what they had lost in prestige throughout the world. This is one
of the reasons the German people arose like one man when war was
declared. They wished and were ready to show the world that they were
the greatest people ever created.
II
The German explanation of why they lost the battle of the Marne is
interesting, not alone because of the explanation of the defeat, but
because it shows why the shipment of arms and ammunition from the
United States was such a poisonous pill to the army. Shortly after my
arrival in Berlin Dr. Alfred Zimmermann, then Under Secretary of State,
said the greatest scandal in Germany after the war would be the
investigation of the reasons for the shortage of ammunition in
September, 1914. He did not deny that Germany was prepared for a great
war. He must have known at the time what the Director of the Post and
Telegraph knew on the 2nd of August, 1914, when he wrote Announcement
No. 3. The German Army must have known the same thing and if it had
prepared for war, as every German admits it had, then preparations were
made to fight nine nations. But there was one thing which Germany
failed to take into consideration, Zimmermann said, and that was the
shipment of supplies from the United States. Then, he added, there
were two reasons why the battle of the Marne was lost: one, because
there was not sufficient ammunition; and, two, because the reserves
were needed to stop the Russian invasion of East Prussia. I asked him
whether Germany did not have enormous stores of ammunition on hand when
the war began. He said there was sufficient ammunition for a short
campaign, but that the Ministry of War had not mobilised sufficient
ammunition factories to keep up the supplies. He said this was the
reason for the downfall of General von Herringen, who was Minister of
War at the beginning of hostilities.
After General von Kluck was wounded and returned to his villa in
Wilmersdorf, a suburb of Berlin, I took a walk with him in his garden
and discussed the Marne. He confirmed what Zimmermann stated about the
shortage of ammunition and added that he had to give up his reserves to
General von Hindenburg, who had been ordered by the Kaiser to drive the
Russians from East Prussia.
III
At the very beginning of the war, although no intimations were
permitted to reach the outside world, there was a bitter controversy
between the Foreign Office, as headed by the Chancellor von
Bethmann-Hollweg; the Navy Department, headed by Grand Admiral von
Tirpitz, and General von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff. The
Chancellor delayed mobilisation of the German Army three days. For
this he never has and never will be forgiven by the military
authorities. During those stirring days of July and August, when
General von Moltke, von Tirpitz, von Falkenhayn, Krupps and the Rhine
Valley Industrial leaders were clamouring for war and for an invasion
of Belgium, the Kaiser was being urged by the Chancellor and the
Foreign Office to heed the proposals of Sir Edward Grey for a Peace
Conference. But the Kaiser, who was more of a soldier than a
statesman, sided with his military friends. The war was on, not only
between Germany and the Entente, but between the Foreign Office and the
Army and Navy. This internal fight which began in July, 1914, became
Germany's bitterest struggle and from time to time the odds went from
one side to another. The Army accused the diplomats of blundering in
starting the war. The Foreign Office replied that it was the lust for
power and victory which poisoned the military leaders which caused the
war. Belgium was invaded against the counsel of the Foreign Office.
But when the Chancellor was confronted with the actual invasion and the
violation of the treaty, he was compelled by force of circumstance, by
his position and responsibility to the Kaiser to make his famous speech
in the Reichstag in which he declared: "Emergency knows no law."
But when the allied fleet swept German ships from the high seas and
isolated a nation which had considered its international commerce one
of its greatest assets, considerable animosity developed between the
Army and Navy. The Army accused the Navy of stagnation. Von Tirpitz,
who had based his whole naval policy upon a great navy, especially upon
battleship and cruiser units, was confronted by his military friends
with the charge that he was not prepared. As early as 1908 von Tirpitz
had opposed the construction of submarines. Speaking in the Reichstag
when naval appropriations were debated, he said Germany should rely
upon a battleship fleet and not upon submarines. But when he saw his
great inactive Navy in German waters, he switched to the submarine idea
of a blockade of England. In February, 1915, he announced his
submarine blockade of England with the consent of the Kaiser, but
without the approval of the Foreign Office.
By this time the cry, "Gott strafe England," had become the most
popular battle shout in Germany. The von Tirpitz blockade announcement
made this battlecry real. It made him the national hero. The German
press, which at that time was under three different censors, turned its
entire support over night to the von Tirpitz plan. The Navy
Department, which even then was not only anti-British but
anti-American, wanted to sink every ship on the high seas. When the
United States lodged its protests on February 12th the German Navy
wanted to ignore it. The Foreign Office was inclined to listen to
President Wilson's arguments. Even the people, while they were
enthusiastic for a submarine war, did not want to estrange America if
they could prevent it. The von Tirpitz press bureau, which knew that
public opposition to its plan could be overcome by raising the cry that
America was not neutral in aiding the Allies with supplies, launched an
anti-American campaign. It came to a climax one night when Ambassador
Gerard was attending a theatre party. As he entered the box he was
recognised by a group of Germans who shouted insulting remarks because
he spoke English. Then some one else remarked that America was not
neutral by shipping arms and ammunition.
The Foreign Office apologised the next day but the Navy did not. And,
instead of listening to the advice of Secretary of State von Jagow, the
Navy sent columns of inspired articles to the newspapers attacking
President Wilson and telling the German people that the United States
had joined the Entente in spirit if not in action.