WHIG DISLOYALTY IN FRENCH CRISIS
I
The most important battle of the short session of 1834-35 was waged over
Jackson’s determination to compel France to observe her obligations
under the treaty signed in Paris and Washington in July, 1831. After
futile efforts by the four preceding Administrations to bring France to
the payment of an indemnity for losses to American vessels during the
Napoleonic wars, Jackson succeeded in negotiating a treaty in which
France stipulated to pay the United States five millions in six annual
installments, and we agreed to the reduction of duties on French wines.
We immediately conformed to our agreement, but the French manifested no
such respect for their obligations. Several sessions of the French
Chamber failed to make appropriations for the payments, notwithstanding
the earnest remonstrances of Washington. Thoroughly vexed at the
contemptuous indifference of Paris, Jackson withdrew Livingston from the
State Department, and sent him to the French Court to insist upon the
discharge of the treaty obligations. Before the crisis came, he had
summoned to his side as Secretary of State the courtly and able John
Forsyth, concerning whom the American people know all too little. In
view of the tendency to picture the Jackson of the French crisis as a
bull in a china shop, it is worth while to consider the characters of
the men who were, at this time, his advisers in foreign affairs. The
character of Livingston has been described.
In the Washington of the Thirties no public man was more generally
respected and admired for ability and elegance of manner than the new
Secretary of State. This courtliness
[Illustration: JOHN FORSYTH]
of demeanor was an inheritance from his French ancestors.[799] In person
he was notably handsome, well built, with classical features; and his
manners were those of the drawing-room and the Court. One who knew him
has written that “in the times of Louis XIV he would have rivaled the
most celebrated courtier; and under the dynasty of Napoleon he would
have won the baton of France.”[800] Another has described him as “Lord
Chesterfield, minus his powdered wig and knee buckles,” and as “all duke
and all democrat.”[801] Even-tempered, seldom giving way to passion,
rich in a sense of humor, he was one of the few statesmen of his time
who could find an equal welcome in the drawing-rooms of Whigs or
Democrats. He was intensely social, and prone to fritter away valuable
time in polite conversation with the pretty women of the capital, albeit
a perfect husband, ardently devoted to the accomplished daughter of Dr.
Josiah Meigs, whom he had married.[802] Cultivated, polished, graceful,
he was the perfect gentleman and conversationalist.
As an orator, he was one of the most consummate of his time, singularly
free from the then prevailing vice of tearing a passion to tatters. With
a glance of the eye, a movement of the finger, a mild gesture of the
hand, he could convey subtle meaning, and in his expressions of contempt
he required nothing more than a twitch of the Roman nose or a scornful
curl of the lip.[803] His voice, rich and musical, was as carefully
trained as that of a prima donna. One writer compared it to a trumpet,
“clear and piercing in its tones, and yet as soft as an organ.”[804]
Another, referring to “the constant stream of pure vocalization,”
described it as “clear and resonant, always pleasant to the ear, and
perfectly modulated.”[805] A contemporary writer for the “Boston Post”
recorded that “the rhythmic accents of his voice suggested the musical
notes of the Æolian harp.”[806]
By the common verdict of all contemporaries he was the most powerful
debater of his day, and as the floor leader in the Senate, he was a
tower of strength to the Administration before entering the Cabinet. A
competent critic wrote that “as an impromptu debater to bring on an
action or to cover a retreat, he never had a superior”; was “acute, full
of resources, and ever prompt--impetuous as Murat in charge, adroit as
Soult when flanked and outnumbered,” “haughty in the presence of
enemies, and affable and winning among friends.”[807] Another thought
him as adroit a debater as ever lived--“the Ajax Telamon of his
party.”[808] When the fight was made against the confirmation of Van
Buren, the Administration rested its case against the attacks of Clay
and Webster on his presentation. In the campaign of 1832, it summoned
him to make the one speech upon the tariff, and then dismissed the topic
definitely. When, at a critical moment in the Nullification movement,
Georgia was about to be swept into the fallacy under the leadership of
Berrien, in a convention called specifically for that purpose, it was
Forsyth who was dispatched to take charge of the Administration forces,
and, under his brilliant management, the Nullifiers were defeated in the
presence of Chancellor Harper, who had been summoned from South Carolina
to witness the triumph of the sinister doctrine.[809] During the panic
session, it was upon his sarcasm that the Jacksonians largely relied to
minimize the effect of the exaggerated speeches and the lugubrious
petitions and memorials.
And yet, ardent though he was in his partisanship, he commanded the
affectionate esteem of his opponents by his manliness and fairness. When
the “bargain” charge was made against Clay, it was Forsyth who demanded
an investigation in the interest of justice, thereby incurring the
displeasure of many of his associates. Even Adams found him fair.
In many respects he fails to fit in with the Jacksonian picture. He was
temperamentally an aristocrat, like Livingston, rather cynical toward
the masses, and not at all enamoured of the Kitchen Cabinet. The letter
from his son-in-law during the first Cabinet dissensions, expressing the
hope that Jackson would “send off Lewis and Kendall,” was doubtless
written in the confidence that the sentiment would meet with the
approval of the recipient.[810] But Forsyth was too much the man of the
world to quarrel over details or personalities, and in the company of
Van Buren and Livingston, he was able to forget the Kendalls and the
Blairs.
When he entered the Cabinet, he assumed tasks that were to his taste. He
prided himself particularly upon his diplomacy, and his experience as
Minister to Madrid to negotiate the purchase of Florida justified his
confidence. This position called for great address, finesse, a knowledge
of human nature, and infinite patience, persuasiveness, and tact. The
cunning Ferdinand, who needed the money, but was loath to part with his
possession, was inclined to haggle, and, while history has given credit
for the success of the negotiations to the instructions of Adams, it was
the ingratiating qualities of Forsyth that finally overcame the scruples
of the King.
That a President so impetuous as Jackson should have been served in
foreign affairs by men of the conservatism and caution of Van Buren,
Livingston, and Forsyth seems providential. One day, after dinner,
Jackson sat before the fire in the White House smoking his pipe and
outlining plans for radical action on the Oregon boundary dispute that
would have made war inevitable. Forsyth, to whom he was speaking,
observing his dangerous mood, simulated sympathy with his indignation.
Then he began with quiet suggestions. Perhaps Jackson’s plan would seem
to be a plan to force a fight. It might put the country in the wrong
light. Then, too, he recalled that the offensive action proposed in
Parliament had been dropped on the request of the British Minister for
Foreign Affairs. Possibly the London Government did not sympathize with
the faction seeking trouble. Again, a year’s notice would have to be
given, preliminary to any action by the United States, and Jackson’s
Administration would then be drawing to a close. Possibly it might be
best to do nothing. The President sat a few moments looking into the
fire, and then, slowly refilling and lighting his pipe, he concluded--“I
reckon you’re right, Forsyth; at least you’re right now.”
Such was the man who, with the assistance of Edward Livingston, was to
grapple with the French crisis.
II
On presenting his credentials, Livingston was warmly received by Louis
Philippe, and assured that the necessary laws for the immediate
execution of the treaty would be passed at the next meeting of the
Chamber.[811] The French Government then understood the certain effect
on American public opinion of a contemptuous treatment of its
obligations. The peculiar action of the Chamber had been the subject of
a conversation between the Duc de Broglie and James Buchanan, then in
Paris, _en route_ from his mission to St. Petersburg and this had been
stressed.[812] Thanks to the clever Count Pozzo di Borgo, Russian
Minister to France, Buchanan had been able to convey to Jackson an
accurate idea of the difficulties--the weakness of the King’s
Government and the hostility and cupidity of Dupin, the President of the
Chamber.[813] Nor did it take Livingston long to discover the secret of
the apathy of the King and his Ministers. Louis’s throne was a keg of
dynamite, and he ruled in constant fear of the Deputies. He hoped to
postpone an unpleasant duty until an auspicious moment. The treaty was
described by the enemies of the dynasty as a bad bargain; the supporters
of the old régime hated America because of the Revolution, and the
Republicans hated the King because he was King. With Jackson manifesting
more and more irritation, Livingston importuned the King, remonstrated
with the Ministers, and labored with the members of the Chamber, and in
all this he had the active coöperation of Lafayette. But after six
months of conferences, the Chamber took adverse action.
The Government was seriously concerned. The King expressed his deep
regret, and a French war vessel was sent to America with instructions to
Serurier the French Minister, to assure Jackson that, as soon after the
elections as the charter would permit, the Chamber would be summoned,
the appropriation would be pressed, and the President informed of the
result in time for him to communicate the facts to the Congress at the
beginning of the session of December, 1834. This held Jackson’s
impatience in check. But the elections passed, the Chamber convened,
nothing was done, and the next session would not convene until three
weeks after the Congress would meet.
As the congressional session approached, Livingston informed Forsyth
that only a manifestation of strong national feeling in America would
force action in Paris. “This is not a mere conjecture,” he wrote. “I
know the fact.” And he reiterated that the moderate tone of the
President’s Messages had convinced the French politicians that he would
not be supported in vigorous measures, and closed with the significant
comment that “from all this you may imagine the anxiety I shall feel for
the arrival of the President’s Message.”[814]
The indignation of Jackson over this trifling, intensified by the
conviction that France would not have dared thus in the case of a
European Power, can be imagined. Many of his friends who lived in
constant terror of his temper were beside themselves at the
prospect.[815] But he had put his hand to the plough, and it was unlike
him to turn back. In the preparation of his Message a futile effort had
been made to persuade him to the employment of less emphatic language,
but the Cabinet members thought to change slightly the phrasing without
his knowledge. Forsyth, who was a master in diplomatic wording, made
slight changes in a paragraph, and the Message was sent to the “Globe”
to be put in type. When the proof reached the White House, John C.
Rives[816] was with Jackson, and Donelson, a party to the plan to
moderate, began to read as Jackson, with his pipe in his mouth, paced
the floor. All went well until the altered paragraph was reached, and
Donelson tried so to slur his reading that the change would not be
noticed. Vain hope! Jackson stopped short.
“Read that again, sir.”
This time the secretary read distinctly, and Jackson, the lion in him
thoroughly aroused, thundered:
“That, sir, is not my language; it has been changed, and I will have no
other expression of my own meaning than my own words.”
And then and there he rewrote the paragraph, making it stronger than
originally. Then, placing it in the hands of Rives, he forbade him to
print anything else “at his peril.”[817]
Reading the Message to-day it seems moderate enough in tone, without a
trace of bluster, and, compared with Cleveland’s Venezuela Message,
positively mild. The greater part is a calm, accurate, dispassionate
recital of the facts, but it closed with the request for authority for
making reprisals on French property should the next session of the
Chamber fail to make the required appropriation. “Such a measure,” he
said, “ought not to be considered by France as a menace. Her pride and
power are too well known to expect anything from her fears, and preclude
the necessity of a declaration that nothing partaking of the character
of intimidation is intended by us.”
The tone of the Message, appealing to the pride and self-respect of the
people, was embarrassing to the Whigs, who for a time hesitated as to
their course. To support Jackson might only tend to enhance his
popularity, already too great to suit; to attack his course would
certainly be disadvantageous to the country in an international
controversy.[818] Hone, the Whig diarist, however, was quite sure that
the Message “will weaken our cause with the lookers on in other
nations.”[819] A month later he was still depressed because of Jackson’s
“unnecessary threats,” but, being a praying Whig, he had hopes that
Congress would still save the country.[820] Justice Joseph Story was
quite as mournful. “The President,” he wrote, “is exceedingly warm for
war with France if he could get Congress to back him. The Senate, in
these days our sole security, it is well known, would steadily resist
him.”[821]
Meanwhile, with the Whigs of the Senate laying their plans to repudiate
the President’s position in the face of a foreign adversary, events were
moving in France. The Chamber met in the midst of excitement, the
Ministry successfully putting their popularity to the test of a vote of
confidence. Livingston was encouraged.[822] But a very little later his
optimism vanished, and he awaited hopefully the arrival of the
Presidential Message.[823] Thus concerned over the tone of the Message,
he arranged for couriers to hurry it to him on its arrival at Havre. It
reached Paris in an American newspaper at two o’clock in the morning.
The excitement was intense. Even Livingston was momentarily stunned.
“The feeling,” he wrote Forsyth, “is fostered by the language of our
Opposition papers, particularly by the ‘Intelligencer’ and the ‘New York
Courier,’ extracts from which have been sent on by Americans, declaring
them to be the sentiments of the majority of the people. These, as you
will see, are translated and republished here, with such comments as
they might have been expected and undoubtedly were intended to produce,
and if hostilities should take place between the two nations those
persons may flatter themselves with having the credit of a large share
in producing them.” He felt, however, that “the energetic language of
the Message” would “have a good effect.” And contrary to the fear of
Hone that it would degrade us in the eyes of the onlookers, he found
that “it has certainly raised us in the estimation of other Powers if we
may judge by the demeanor of their representatives here.” He was sure
that “as soon as the excitement subsides it will operate favorably on
the counsels of France.” Already “some of the papers have begun to
change their tone.” As soon as the Message was known, “the funds
experienced a considerable fall, and insurance rose.”[824]
In compliance with the request of Comte de Rigny, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Livingston personally delivered to him a copy of the
Message, and stressed the point that, under our governmental form, the
Message was a consultation between departments of our Government, and
was not directed to France. Then shifting to the offensive he added
that it was most unfortunate, in view of Serurier’s promise, that there
had not been an earlier call of the Chamber. De Rigny seemed to attach
the most serious importance to the intimation of bad faith, but the
interview was friendly. That evening, at the Austrian Minister’s,
Livingston found him all suavity; and the next night a curt note from
him announced the withdrawal of Serurier from Washington, and a
readiness to give the American diplomat his passports on
application![825] He made much of Jackson’s comments on the failure to
convene the Chamber when, as a matter of fact, the Chamber was then
actually assembled in virtue of a royal ordinance. This, while true,
could not have been known to Jackson in those days of slow
communication. He only knew the original purpose. But it pleased de
Rigny to assume an unexplainable offense, and to announce that “His
Majesty has considered it due his own dignity no longer to leave his
Minister exposed to hear language so offensive to France.”[826]
Resisting an impulse to demand his passports, lest such action seem
unnecessarily provocative, Livingston replied in a dignified note that
unless de Rigny’s letter was intended as a dismissal, he would await
instructions from his own Government.
III
Meanwhile the Whigs were planning to make political capital out of the
crisis. The “Intelligencer,” the organ of the Senate Whigs, had assumed
an attitude which, as we have seen, had given much comfort to the French
enemies of the treaty. “We trust,” it said, “that it will be universally
understood, not only at home, but everywhere abroad, that the
recommendation of the President is his own act only, and is not likely
... to receive the approbation of the Congress or the people of the
United States.” And Blair, in the “Globe,” hotly replied that “if she
[France] shall shed American blood in this controversy, and push her
injustice to actual war, the responsibility for all the destruction of
human lives ... will justly rest upon the heads of the editors of the
‘National Intelligencer.’”[827] The “National Gazette,” another
Opposition paper, compromised with the thought that Jackson “did well to
present the subject to Congress ... though we would earnestly dissuade
Congress from giving him a discretion so important as that of
reprisals.” Which, interpreted by Blair, meant that the mercantile class
and bankers were interested in French claims, and it would be well to
enforce them, “but if the national rights and honor, implicated in a
refusal to execute the treaty, should be vindicated by President
Jackson, it would add renown to the man whom it was the editors’
business to traduce.”[828]
The first act of the Whigs was to pack the Foreign Relations Committee
of the Senate with the President’s enemies, three of the five, Clay,
Mangum, and Sprague, being virulent foes. “There are certainly not three
men in the French Chamber,” wrote Blair, “more anxiously bent on
thwarting the measures of General Jackson’s Administration.”[829] Into
the hands of these was delivered that portion of the Message dealing
with the French affair, and a month later Clay offered his resolution
that “it is inexpedient at this time” to grant authority to the
President to make reprisals. In presenting his report, Clay made the
startling statement that if France was prudent “she will wait to see
whether the Message should be seconded by the Congress.” Thus, in the
face of a prospective foreign foe, patently in the wrong, the leader of
the Whigs attempted to create the impression that Jackson stood alone.
This was the cue to the politicians. The Clay report was extravagantly
praised. Poindexter, in ecstatic mood, moved that twenty thousand copies
be printed for circulation--as propaganda to isolate the President.
Calhoun favored “the largest number.” The report had delighted him.
“War was at all times to be avoided.”[830] Only two Whigs objected to
twenty thousand copies, and these on the ground that the printing of so
many would require four months.[831] Hill demanded the yeas and nays,
and by a party vote the “largest number” of Clay’s campaign document was
ordered. Thus, from the beginning, the divisions in the Senate on an
international crisis were along party lines.
On the day Livingston received the curt note from de Rigny, Clay, in
opening the discussion of his resolution, threw out the suggestion twice
that France might make the appropriation conditional on an “explanation”
from the President of the United States. He felt sure that France would
understand that Congress did not share the President’s views. The
Democratic members of the committee, in a minority report, differed from
the majority in explaining the reason for finding it “inexpedient” to
grant authority--the fact that the Chamber had been called a month
earlier than anticipated. The only vigorous attack on the majority
report, and the sole unapologetic American speech, was that of Buchanan,
who, better than any other member of the Senate, understood the
conditions in Paris. He called for an unqualified assertion of our
determination to demand the observance of the treaty. “I hope I may be
mistaken,” he concluded, “but I believe it never will be paid
before.”[832] The brief debate, heard by the fashion of the capital
packed in the galleries, was conducted with decorum, but quite
discernible beneath the surface one may read the party feeling which
even an international crisis could not obliterate. The Clay resolution
was adopted. The “National Intelligencer,” now finding its way regularly
to Paris, expressed the hope that “with this unquestionable proof of the
pacific temper of the Senate ... it will now be understood at home and
abroad that there is no morbid appetite for war among the grave and
considerate portion of the American people.”
Several weeks were to intervene before the House took action. Meanwhile
in Paris, Livingston, in seclusion, prepared his masterful and spirited
formal reply to the impudent note of the French Minister. He loftily
rebuked him for referring to the President as “General Jackson” in
official language, firmly reiterated and proved the charge of broken
faith in the matter of the Serurier pledge, and pitilessly exposed the
hypocrisy of the complaint that Jackson had misrepresented, purposely,
regarding the time of the calling of the Chamber. Had not de Rigny
himself informed him that it was constitutionally impossible to call the
session earlier when protest had been made as to the date? And yet it
had been called. When a copy of this note reached Forsyth, he summoned
Van Buren and the two repaired to the White House, where it was read and
warmly approved.[833] By this time Jackson was in no mood to compromise
or conciliate. Forsyth instructed Livingston that, if the French Chamber
again rejected the appropriation bill, a frigate was to be immediately
sent to convey him home. Ten days after these instructions were written,
Serurier was recalled, and Forsyth, in refusing an audience, coolly
informed him that he was “ready to receive in writing any communication
the Minister of France desires to have made to the Government of the
United States.”[834]
Meanwhile the French papers reaching the United States were noisily
militant. War-clouds lowered. James A. Hamilton tendered his services to
Jackson for duty “civil or military, at home or abroad.”[835] Major
Lewis, gravely concerned because of his daughter’s marriage to M. Pageot
of the French Legation, hastened to reassure Hamilton with extracts from
personal letters from governmental officials in Paris--and thus threw an
interesting side-light on the romance and tragedy of international
marriages, for these letters had been translated, for the benefit of
Jackson, in the French Legation by Madame Pageot, the wife of the First
Secretary![836]
IV
Under these ominous conditions, with offers of military service pouring
into the White House, with the French Minister on the ocean _en route_
to Paris, and with additional letters in the diplomatic duel before it,
the House of Representatives began its discussion of the crisis. With
the majority report and resolutions declaring against further
negotiations and in favor of contingent preparations, the House was
immediately engaged in an animated and acrimonious discussion indicative
of the excitement of the times. Edward Everett, the pacifist of the
session, offered a substitute coupling a declaration of adherence to the
treaty with a request for the renewal of negotiations. Adams, in ugly
temper, threw out the hint that it appeared that “the supporters of the
Administration were the only ones to be heard upon the subject.” With
some feeling, Cambreleng, in charge for the Administration, assured the
former President that he was ready to enter upon a free accommodation of
differences that a united front might be presented to the Nation’s
adversary. This little storm cleared the atmosphere, and on the next day
when the debate began in earnest it was wholesomely free from purely
partisan rancor. Then it was that Adams explained his dissent from the
phrasing. He objected to the assertion that negotiations should be
discontinued. “The only alternative compatible with the honor of nations
is war,” he said. If a continuance of the negotiations failed, he was
ready for the “hazard of war.” He realized that “the interest and honor
of the Nation” were at stake. The pledge of France had been given, and
the sole question was “whether we shall suffer the nation that made
this treaty to violate it.” We could not afford to compromise to the
extent of a penny.
“What will be the consequences,” demanded the fiery old man eloquent,
“if you give it up? Why, every nation will consider itself at liberty to
sport with all treaties that are made with us.”
And then Adams startled the Democrats, and broke with the Whigs, in his
reference to Jackson. “Whatever may be said of the imprudence of that
recommendation,” he exclaimed, “the opinion of mankind will ever be that
it was high-spirited and lofty, and such as became the individual from
whom it emanated. I say it now, and I repeat, that it is the attitude
which the Chief Magistrate will bear before the world, and before
mankind, and before posterity.”[837]
Quite different the feeling of William S. Archer, a Virginia Whig, who
looked with fear and trembling to a contest with France. Think, he
cried, of the commercial loss! Why sacrifice this with so little
involved? “It would be quixotic, and even romance scarcely presented a
precedent, unless that of Sir Lucius O’Trigger.” And even if right, why
take the chance? He had been surprised that Adams had said nothing about
fear.
“No,” shouted Adams, “the gentleman’s whole argument is fear!”
The Virginian closed by offering a resolution “that in the just
expectation that the Government of France will have made provision ...
this House will forbear at the present time to adopt any measure in
relation to that subject.”[838]
With flaming indignation, James W. Bouldin, a Virginia Democrat, replied
to Archer’s timorous speech. “The gentleman asks if we would really go
to war for five million dollars,” he said. “Will a man fight if you spit
in his face?” Already the French Chamber was boasting that we had taken
the like from others, and declaring that we were “a money-making,
money-loving people, and would never spend a hundred million to obtain
five.” And, continued Bouldin, “I have heard as much praise of foreign
nations as I want to hear.... All I want to hear at this time is whether
we intend to hold upon the treaty or give it up entirely.”[839]
Cambreleng, aroused by the sordid character of the Archer appeal,
sharply warned that “the honor and welfare of the Nation is involved,
and the measure will no longer be sacrificed to gratify the spirit of
party.”[840] To which Tristam Burges, a Rhode Island Whig, responded
with the amazing assertion that “France would be cowardly indeed if she
should pay the money under such circumstances.”[841]
Edward Everett followed with a typical pacifist appeal for peace, but it
was reserved for the eloquent Horace Binney to present the most novel
reasons for America’s consent to her humiliation. In the President’s
Message he had found “the President’s design ... impossible to
fathom.”[842] The action of the French Chamber was none of our business.
In the meantime we should not close the door on negotiations. The French
Republicans were using the treaty as a club upon the monarchy, and
should this country “strengthen the hands of a constitutional
monarchy?”[843]
Then Adams, in no conciliatory temper, rose again. “Whence come these
compliments to France?” he asked. “Are they elicited by her virtues? Is
it because she has refused the payment ... due us? Is it because she has
violated her plighted faith? Is it from the style of the dignified
debates ... where we are characterized as a nation of mercenaries--where
the basest and meanest of motives are attributed to the American
people--those of sordid avarice, speculation, and gain?... Is it on this
that the gentleman from Virginia bases his ‘just expectations’?” And,
turning to Everett: “We have heard much of war and its horrors. No man
can entertain a greater abhorrence of war than I. I would do anything
but sacrifice honor and independence to avoid it. But when I hear it
advanced that there is no such thing as national honor, that it is
merely ideal, I must take leave to say that I do not subscribe to such a
doctrine.”[844]
But the next speaker, Benjamin Hardin, though hailing from the fighting
State of Kentucky, was not impressed. Randolph had compared his wit to
“a coarse kitchen butcher knife whetted upon a brickbat,”[845] but he
now purred gently to the harsh strokes of the French Chamber. “What
would we go to war for?” he demanded. “The paltry sum of five million
dollars!” In one year war would “sweep from the ocean at least fifty
millions of our commerce.” And where would the expense fall? “Upon the
hard-working and industrious farmer.”[846]
The outcome was the adoption of a resolution which was a compromise
between that of the committee and the ideas of Adams, insisting on the
maintenance of the treaty and in favor of preparations. This was adopted
at a night session on the 2d of March, and the session was then thought
to expire at midnight on March 3d.
V
An occurrence on the last day of the session, due to partisan madness,
left the Republic all but naked to its prospective foe. Early in the
evening, during the consideration of the Fortifications Bill, an
amendment was offered in the House, appropriating three millions to be
used at the discretion of the President for emergency work in the event
France should strike during the congressional recess. It met with no
opposition in the House, but the moment it reached the Senate it was
pounced upon by the Whig leaders as another proof of Jackson’s itch for
power. Webster, assuming the leadership in the sorry business, proposed
instantly to dispose of the amendment with a motion to “adhere” to the
Senate measure. This harsh, unusual course was intended as a notice that
the Senate would not even meet the House in conference upon the subject.
Then followed a most amazing spectacle, with the Whigs assailing Jackson
and his alleged contempt for the Constitution and determination to
declare war without an Act of Congress. Senator Buchanan, protesting
against the Webster motion, pointed out the necessity for the
appropriation--the possibility of a blow from France during the recess,
the frankly expressed apprehension of Livingston. “In that event,” he
continued, “what will be our condition? Our seacoast from Georgia to
Maine will be exposed to the incursions of the enemy; our cities may be
plundered and burnt; the national character may be disgraced; and all
this whilst we have an overflowing Treasury.”[847]
King of Alabama earnestly pleaded with Webster to withdraw the harsh
motion. “In what way,” he asked, “does it violate the Constitution? Does
it give the President the power to declare war? This power belongs to
Congress alone, nor does the bill in the slightest degree impair it.
Does it authorize the raising of armies? No, not one man may be enlisted
beyond the number required to fill up the ranks of your little army.”
But Webster was deaf to the appeal. The “autocrat” and “tyrant” was
again making an onslaught on the Constitution, and he would have none of
it. And by a strict party vote, for White of Tennessee had by now
definitely joined the Opposition, the motion to adhere was adopted.
When this surprising action reached the House, it swallowed its pride
and asked for a conference. The conferees met and remained in deadlock
until midnight. Forsyth and Van Buren were at the Capitol trying without
avail to get action. Meanwhile in the Senate something very like a
filibuster was begun. Benton was impressed by the number of the
speakers, their vehemence, perseverance, provocative attacks on Jackson,
and indirectly on the House.[848]
All this time, Jackson was patiently waiting in his room at the Capitol
to sign the bill when passed. At midnight he put on his hat and returned
to the White House. The conference and debate continued, with many, who
considered the session dead at midnight,[849] leaving the Capitol, until
repeated calls of the House failed to secure a quorum. At a late hour
some of the Whig members of the House were insisting that the amendment
be abandoned, with the Democrats refusing to yield and placing the
responsibility upon the Senate. Partisan bitterness became more
pronounced as the end approached. “There are men who would willingly see
the banner of France waving over your Capitol, rather than lose an
opportunity to make a thrust at the Administration,” bitterly exclaimed
Jesse Bynum of North Carolina. “This is not a miserable Administration
or anti-Administration question,” protested Henry A. Wise, the Whig who
favored the amendment. The danger of war was real and if it came “every
fortification on your coast is liable to fall into the hands of a strong
maritime power,” he warned.[850] At intervals, motions to recede were
offered and overwhelmingly defeated.
It was two o’clock in the morning when Cambreleng returned to the House
with a compromise--$300,000 for arming the fortifications, $500,000 for
repairs and the equipping of war vessels, “an amount wholly inadequate
if it should be required, and more than necessary if it should not.” As
he entered the House, he found no quorum, and no possibility of getting
one. On a motion to adjourn, only 111 members were present and voting; a
few moments later but 75; and at three o’clock, Speaker Bell rose,
delivered a brief valedictory, and the House stood adjourned without
day. The Nation was naked to the foe, and in the midst of negotiations.
Far from weakening Jackson’s determination to maintain the dignity and
rights of the Nation, the failure of the Fortifications Bill but
strengthened his will, and two days after Congress adjourned, Forsyth
instructed Livingston to demand an explanation or qualification of an
insinuation in Serurier’s note of withdrawal that the President had
knowingly misrepresented in his Message to Congress.[851]
Meanwhile, in France, the Whigs’ campaign to picture Jackson as isolated
in his position from both Congress and the people was having its effect,
and there were Whigs in America who rejoiced in the fact. Scanning the
French newspapers, Philip Hone was delighted to find that Clay’s report
and the Senate resolution had had the effect he anticipated. He rejoiced
to find that they convinced the French that the proposal of reprisals
“are only the acts of the President” and “would not be sanctioned by the
legislature of the Nation.”[852]
And Hone was not mistaken as to the effect of Jackson’s firmness and the
Senate’s action. The money was appropriated by the Chamber with the
payment contingent on an apology or explanation from Jackson. In the
discussion of the appropriation measure, Jackson was roundly denounced,
and ridiculed as one repudiated by his own people. Boasts were made of
the ease with which France could crush the United States. “The insult
from President Jackson comes from himself alone,” said M. Henri de
Chabaulon. “This is more evident from the refusal of the American
Congress to concur with him in it.... Suppose the United States had
taken part with General Jackson, we should have had to demand
satisfaction, not from him, but from the United States; ... and we
should have had to ... entrust to our heroes of Navarino and Algiers the
task of teaching the Americans that France knows the way to Washington
as well as England.” And this insulting speech was received with
applause. “When the Americans see this long sword,” exclaimed M. Ranee,
“believe me, gentlemen, they would sooner touch your money than dare to
touch your sword.”[853] Left to his own resources by the absence of
instructions on the proviso of the measure of the Chamber, Livingston
informed the Due de Broglie that an attempt to enforce the proviso would
be repelled “by the undivided energy of the Nation.”[854] And four days
later he left Paris, with Barton, his son-in-law, at the American
Legation as Chargé d’Affaires.
From this time on to the crisis, the American Legation in Paris and the
French in Washington were under Chargés d’Affaires, and strangely enough
the wives of both were prime favorites of Jackson and intimates of the
White House circle. The beautiful and exquisite Cora Livingston,
daughter of the Minister, was long the reigning belle of the American
capital. Josiah Quincy had been infatuated with her, and the story has
come down of Van Buren trying to get her under the mistletoe. In the
White House she had come and gone with the informality of a member of
the household, and many an evening she had spent with Mrs. Donelson in
one of the private rooms of the President’s house, with Jackson sitting
at one side smoking his pipe. She had married Barton a short time before
Livingston’s departure for Paris, and it had pleased the man of iron,
with so much of tender sentiment where women were concerned, to appoint
the bridegroom Secretary of the Legation that Cora might be in Paris
with her mother. Enclosing his commission in a letter to “My Dear
Cora,” he had asked her to “present it to him with your own hand.”
Quite as closely connected with the White House circle was Madame
Pageot, known to Jackson as little Delia Lewis, daughter of one of the
members of the Kitchen Cabinet. He had known her as a child in Tennessee
where her father dwelt close to the Hermitage, and she had known and
loved the sainted Rachel. When her engagement to Pageot was announced,
Jackson had insisted that the marriage should take place in the White
House, and when her first child was born and called “Andrew Jackson,”
the christening had been in the President’s house. It was on this
occasion when the Minister, following the form, asked the infant,
“Andrew Jackson, do you renounce the Devil and all his works?” that the
President with great fervor responded, “I do most indubitably,” to the
delight of all.
Thus there was a touch to the closing days of the crisis that probably
has no parallel in the history of diplomacy.
VI
Had the French politicians been able to witness the popular ovation
accorded Livingston on his arrival in New York, they might have changed
their opinion concerning Jackson’s isolation from the people. An immense
crowd greeted him at the wharf, followed him to his lodgings, clamored
for a speech, and thronged the City Hall at the public reception. Philip
Hone, one of the Whigs who rejoiced in the demand of a foreign nation
for an apology from the American President, was gravely concerned
because he had returned in “a bad humor,” and might “infuse some of it
into the mind of the obstinate and weak old man at the head of the
Government, and so prevent an amicable arrangement.”[855] But the Whig
diarist’s greatest disgust came with Livingston’s ovation at the dinner
of the Corporation on July 4th, when at the conclusion of his brief
speech the room rang with cries of “No explanations!” “No
apology!”--dividing, as Hone records, “the echoes of the spacious dome
with equally inspiring shouts of ‘Hurrah for Jackson!’”[856] At
Philadelphia, _en route_ to Washington, Livingston was the guest of
honor at an equally enthusiastic dinner, and, thus acclaimed by his
countrymen, he reached Washington and went into conference with Jackson,
Forsyth, and Van Buren.
Calm and determined, Jackson waited patiently until in September when he
proposed to press the issue to a decision. Forsyth sent instructions to
Barton. If nothing indicative of a purpose to pay the indemnity had been
done, the Chargé was to call upon the Due de Broglie and ask for a
definite answer with the view to the regulation of his conduct. If the
Minister should fix a day for the payment, Barton was to remain in
Paris; otherwise he was to demand his passports because of the
non-execution of the treaty. And this step was to be taken in time to
permit the result to be communicated to Jackson before he prepared his
Message for the opening of Congress. In the latter part of October,
Barton had his audience with de Broglie, and handled himself with
consummate tact and caution. With studied impudence the French Minister
announced that the money would be forthcoming when an explanation or
apology had been received, and a few days later, Barton sailed for the
United States.
Meanwhile the Congress convened, and Jackson in his Message reported
progress, soberly reviewing the course of the negotiations up to the
passage of the indemnity bill by the French Chamber with its offensive
proviso, and bluntly concluding that the French Government has “received
all the explanation which honor and principle permitted.” He informed
Congress of his final instructions to Barton and of his purpose to
communicate the result when ascertained.
It was while awaiting the report of the American Chargé d’Affaires that
M. Pageot received notice of his recall, and by the time he was able to
sail the two nations were on the verge of war. Hone, noting the
departure of the Poland bearing M. Pageot and “the odds and ends of the
French Legation,” could not restrain his mirth over the prospective
discomfiture of the French Chargé in bearing back to the French Court a
young heir, bearing “the august name of Andrew Jackson.”[857]
When Barton reached New York, he hastened with all speed to Washington,
where Livingston awaited him. It was with no little anxiety that Van
Buren, Forsyth, and Livingston accompanied him to the White House. The
three older men, all devoted to Jackson, and all at some time at the
head of his Department of Foreign Affairs, were greatly concerned over
the possible effect of the report on the thoroughly aroused President.
Observing their solemnity, Barton turned upon them:
“Well, gentlemen, shall it be oil or water?”
“Oh, water, by all means,” they answered in a chorus.
To none of these, not even to Livingston, had Barton indicated the
nature of the report he had to make. Pressing the former Minister’s hand
as a token of appreciation of his confidence, Barton led the way into
the iron man’s presence.
The moment the conference was over, Jackson began the preparation of his
Message to Congress, and, on its completion, submitted it to Livingston.
In view of Hone’s fear, it is interesting to note that it was the former
Minister of State who persuaded Jackson to a moderation of its tone.
Drawing a substitute, he sent it to the White House with an ingratiating
letter.
“The characteristics of the present communication,” he wrote, “ought, in
my opinion, to be moderation and firmness. Our cause is so good that we
need not be violent. Moderation in language, firmness in purpose, will
unite all hearts at home, all opinion abroad, in our favor. Warmth and
recrimination will give arguments to false friends and real enemies,
which they may use with effect against us. On these principles I have
framed a hasty draft which I enclose. You will, with your usual
discernment, determine whether it suits the present emergency. At any
rate, I know you will do justice to the motive that has induced me to
offer it.”[858]
Jackson took the advice in good part, destroyed his declaration of war,
and prepared, with the assistance of Forsyth, another, which was
submitted to Congress on January 15th. It was an excited body of men
that listened that winter day to the reading of the Message that might
mean war. But three days before, an acrimonious debate had been
precipitated by Benton, charging the partisanship of the Senate with
responsibility for the failure of the Fortifications Bill; and only the
day before, Webster, in a spirited reply, had attempted to shift
responsibility to the Democratic House. John Quincy Adams, enraged at
Webster’s reflections upon the House, was meditating his sensational
reply. In this atmosphere the Message was read.
After reviewing the controversy up to the hour of the Message, with the
declaration that “the spirit of the American people, the dignity of the
Legislature, and the firm resolve of their Executive Government forbid”
an apology or explanation, he called upon Congress to “sustain Executive
exertion in such measures as the case requires.” This included,
according to his idea, reprisals, the exclusion of French products and
French vessels from American ports. But there was more to be done. Naval
preparations of the French intended for our seas had been announced. He
knew not the purpose. But, “come what may, the explanation which France
demands can never be accorded, and no armament, however powerful and
imposing, at a distance or on our coast, will, I trust, deter us from
discharging the high duties we owe to our constituents, our national
character, and to the world”; and he called upon the Congress “to
vindicate the faith of treaties and to promote the general interest of
peace, civilization, and improvement.”[859]
VII
Notwithstanding the seriousness of the crisis the memory of the failure
of the Fortifications Bill in the last session would not down.
Throughout the spring, summer, and autumn of 1835, the press and
politicians were engaged in bitter criminations and recriminations as to
the responsibility. It was manifestly the fault of the Senate Whigs, but
their harassed leaders bitterly retaliated on the Democratic House, and
drew upon their imagination in an effort to place responsibility upon
the Jacksonian leaders. A fantastical article, once attributed to Daniel
Webster, appeared in the “National Gazette,” charging that Van Buren and
John Forsyth had expressed the wish to Cambreleng, the Democratic leader
in the House, that the bill should fail, that the calamity might be
ascribed to the Whigs of the Senate. The people had been thoroughly
outraged at the base prostitution of the Nation’s interest to the
pettiness of party politics. During the summer, Blair called attention
in the “Globe” to Serurier’s action in sending to Paris with Jackson’s
Message the criticism of the “National Intelligencer,” with the comment
that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs would do well to read the
two together! Paris was assured by Serurier that the Whig paper had
“pretty considerable influence,” had “under the presidencies of Madison
and Monroe been the official paper,” and “has spoken energetically
against the measure” the President had proposed. The President’s sharp
reference to the unfortunate situation created by the failure of the
bill, in his Message of December, 1835, had shown a determination, on
the part of that consummate politician, to turn the popular indignation
upon the Opposition. However, with the passion of the parties
smouldering beneath the surface, there was no open fight until, on
January 12th, the pugnacious Benton, speaking on the national defense,
reviewed the failure of the Fortifications Bill, and laid the
responsibility at the Senate’s door. He closed his biting comments with
an effective reference to the approach of the French squadron, sent on
the supposition of our helplessness, and the suggestion that the Senate
should then act “under the guns of France and under the eyes of
Europe.”[860]
That was the call to battle. The irate Webster sprang to his feet to
announce that a little later he would be able to exonerate the Senate,
and the fiery Leigh of Virginia protested that “the objection to the
appropriation was not because of any distrust of the President,” but
because of the unconstitutionality of the amendment: this in delicious
disregard of the plain record of the debate. But Preston, who followed,
exposed the cloven hoof of the partisan animus. If the French fleet was
coming, why had the President kept Congress in the dark? Why had he
withdrawn our representatives from Paris? Why had we no representative
at the Court of England?--an audacious question in view of the refusal
by the Whig Senate to confirm either of two excellent appointments to
that post. Why assume that the French fleet came with hostile motives?
“It may be that this fleet is coming to protect the commerce of France,”
he thought. From this it was an easy step to the reiteration of the Whig
apologies for and defense of the action of the French Government.[861]
But the last word in defense of the Senate was reserved for Webster, who
rose twenty-four hours before the Special Message reached the Senate and
while it was being prepared. It was a laboriously wrought attempt. The
amendment to the Fortifications Bill had been offered at the eleventh
hour. The President had not requested the additional appropriation in a
Message. No department had recommended it. Nothing of which Congress was
cognizant had occurred to justify it. The Senate had passed a resolution
“reminding” the House of the bill in the closing hours. The conference
report had not been passed upon by the House. And “the bill therefore
was lost. It was lost in the House of Representatives. It died there,
and there its remains are to be found.” Had not the President announced
at one o’clock that he would receive no further communications from the
Congress? What right had he to interfere with the time Congress should
fix for adjournment?[862] And what constitutional right had Congress to
make an appropriation when there was no specification of the precise use
to be made of the money? And with true Websterian eloquence he closed
with mournful meditations on the encroachments of Jackson upon the
Constitution, and the prediction that, unless checked, men, then living,
would “write the history of this government, from its commencement to
its close.”[863]
That the Jacksonians were not impressed with the danger was shown in the
brief reply of Cuthbert of Georgia, that the great danger to Rome was
not in the kingly name they feared, but “in the patrician class, a
moneyed aristocracy, a combination of their political leaders, seeking
to establish an aristocratical government, regardless of the welfare of
the people.” But the answer to Webster was not to come from a Democrat,
but from a Whig--and that, too, a Whig from Massachusetts, who had been
defeated for reëlection to the Presidency by Andrew Jackson!
VIII
There had long been an undercurrent of hostility between Daniel Webster
and John Quincy Adams. Webster had gladly left the House during the
Adams Administration to escape the necessity of defending the President;
and the comments on the great orator, running through the famous “Diary”
of Adams, are often sarcastic, usually unfriendly, and seldom fulsome.
That this spirit of animus alone should have impelled Adams to make his
notable reply--a reply which has been strangely ignored by
historians--cannot be reconciled with his character as a public man. The
fact that Webster had assailed the House of which Adams was a leading
member, and the amendment with which Adams had had something to do, may
explain the bitterness of his retort. But no one can read the speeches
of Adams on the French controversy without being impressed with the
robust Americanism of the man, and his utter impatience with a partisan
thought in the presence of a foreign adversary.
The opportunity for Adams’s reply came one week after the Webster
speech, six days after the President’s Special Message, and when the
international crisis seemed most menacing. The “National Intelligencer”
had made an attack upon the House of Representatives, along the line of
the Webster speech, and Cambreleng, who had been personally assailed, in
resenting the article had said that “more than one member of the House,
not only on this side, but on both sides, will vindicate the proceedings
of the House in relation to the bill.” Immediately afterwards Adams
presented his resolution for an investigation, and launched into one of
the most bitter, dramatic, and sensational speeches ever heard in the
American Congress. He rose in fighting armor. Scarcely had he begun his
attack upon the Senate when he was called to order for mentioning that
body; whereupon he jauntily observed that he would “transfer the
location of the place where these things had happened from the Senate
to the office of the ‘National Intelligencer’”--and thus proceeded to
the castigation of that journal. In explaining the reasons for the
three-million-dollar amendment, he recounted the story of the resolution
adopted in the House.
“In all the debates in the ‘National Intelligencer,’” he said, “there is
no more trace of such a resolution having passed the House than if it
had never existed; no more trace than can be found on the journal of the
Senate of what they would do for the defense of the country, or to
insist on the execution of the treaty of July. But in the debate in the
‘National Intelligencer,’ I find a prodigious display of eloquence
against the constitutionality of the section appropriating $3,000,000
for the defense of the country, because it had not been recommended by
the Executive.”
The House was instantly in an uproar, and Adams was again called to
order for his reference to the Senate. The old man stood listening
calmly to the excited observations of some of his colleagues, and was
finally permitted to proceed.
“Observe, sir,” he continued, “the terms, the object, and the conditions
of that appropriation. It was to be expended, in whole or in part, under
the direction of the President of the United States--the executive head
of the Nation, sworn to the faithful execution of the laws; sworn
especially, and entrusted with the superintendence of all the defenses
of the country against the ravages of a foreign invader; it was to be
expended for the military and naval service, including fortifications
and ordnance and increase of the navy. These, sir, the natural and
appropriate instruments of defense against a foreign foe, were the sole
and exclusive objects of the appropriation. Not one dollar of it could
have been applied by him to any other purposes without making himself
liable to impeachment; not by that House of Representatives, but by us,
their successors, fresh from the constituent body, the people; yet
before the same Senate for his judges, a majority of whom were surely
not of his friends; not one dollar of it could have been expended
without giving a public account of it to the representatives of the
people and to the Nation. Nor was this all. Thus confined to specific
objects, it was to be expended, not unconditionally, but only in the
event that it should be rendered necessary for the defense of the
country prior to the then next session of Congress--an interval of nine
months--during which no other provision could have been made to defend
your soil from sudden invasion, or to protect your commerce floating
upon every sea from a sweep of a royal ordinance of France.
“And this is the appropriation, following close upon that unanimous vote
of 217 members of the House, that the execution of the Treaty of 1831
should be maintained and insisted upon. This is the appropriation so
tainted with man-worship, so corrupt, so unconstitutional, that the
indignant and patriotic eloquence of the ‘National Intelligencer’ would
sooner see a foreign foe battering down the walls of the Capitol than
agree to it.”
If this reference to the declaration of Webster caused the members of
the House to catch their breath, the next sentence brought the Democrats
to their feet with prolonged cheers and shouts.
“Sir,” Adams continued, “for a man uttering such sentiments there would
be but one step more, a natural and an easy one to take, and that would
be, with the enemy at the walls of the Capitol, to join him in battering
them down.”
With the Whigs dazed, and the Democrats shouting their approval, James
K. Polk, in the chair, was forced to hammer vigorously with his gavel
before he could restore any semblance of order--and the old man lunged
again at Webster’s argument.
“Are we to be told,” he asked, “that this and the other House must not
appropriate money unless by recommendation from the Executive? Why, sir,
the Executive has told us now that that appropriation was perfectly in
accord with his wishes. Yet here the charge is inverted, and
unconstitutional conspiracy and man-worship are imputed to this House on
account of that appropriation because it was approved and desired by the
Executive. Where was the possibility of a recommendation from the
Executive; of statements from the departments; of messages between this
and the other House, when the resolution of the House had been passed
but the day before?...”
And man-worship? Here Adams refused to follow his fellow Whigs in
withholding commendation from the patriotism of the President.
“I will appeal to the House to say whether I am a worshiper of
the Executive.... Neither the measure of issuing letters of
marque and reprisal, nor the measures of commercial interdict or
restriction--neither had that House approved; but the House, and, thank
God, the people of the country, have done homage to the spirit which
had urged to the recommendation, even of those measures which they
did not approve. Why must the House be charged with man-worship and
unconstitutional conspiracy, because they passed an appropriation of
three millions for the defense of the country, at a time when imminent
danger of war was urged, as resulting from that very resolution, which,
but the night before, passed by a unanimous vote? Because, forsooth,
that appropriation had not been asked for by the Executive; and yet
because it was approved by the Executive.”
In reviewing the action of both Senate and House on the President’s
recommendation, Adams scornfully and contemptuously dismissed the Clay
resolution in a few words: “A resolution not only declining to do that
which the President had recommended to vindicate the rights and honor of
the Nation, but positively determining to do nothing--not even to
express a sense of the wrongs which the country was enduring from
France.”
“And now, sir,” he continued, “where is all this scaffolding of
indignation and horror at the appropriation for specific purposes, for
the defense of the country, because, forsooth, it had not been
recommended by the Special Message of the Executive? Gone, sir, gone!
You shall look for it and you shall not find it. You shall find no more
trace of it than, in the tales of the ‘National Intelligencer,’ you
shall find of that vote of 217 yeas--which was the real voucher for the
purity and patriotism of that appropriation of $3,000,000--denounced to
the world by the eloquent orators of the senatorial press as so
profligate and corrupt, that an enemy at the gates of this Capitol could
not have justified a vote in its favor to arrest his arm, and stay his
hand in battering down these walls. You shall find no more trace of it
upon the journals of the Senate than you shall find of sensibility to
the wrongs which our country was enduring from France.”
The old man eloquent thence passed to the complaint that the Senate was
ignorant of the reasons impelling the House to the adoption of the
amendment, and tore it to shreds; and then on to the responsibility for
the failure of the bill. This, he contended, was due to the very spirit
of the Senate--its temper an insult to the President and the House. The
Webster motion to adhere, he said, was always considered a “challenge,”
and had never before been made at such an early stage of a difference
between the Houses. “It was a special disposition,” he said, “to cast
odium on the House, a special bravado that induced the Senate thus to
draw the sword, and throw away the scabbard--and they adhered.”
Turning then to the willingness of the Senate, when it was too late, to
accept an amendment for $800,000 instead of $3,000,000, he continued:
“Thus, sir, this horrible conspiracy against the Constitution melted
down to a mere question of dollars and cents.” And when this agreement
was reached by the Senate, the House was dead--the hour of midnight
having passed. He did not himself believe that a Congress died at
midnight, but others did, and they were conscientious. And the Senate,
knowing of that situation, had the insolence to adopt its resolution of
reminder and send it to the House. “But to complete the true character
of that message we must inquire at what time it was sent. It was sent at
two o’clock in the morning; it was sent at a time when it was known,
both in the House and the Senate, that no quorum was to be found. When
that message was delivered, I must confess, if ever a feeling of shame
and indignation had filled my bosom, it was at that moment. I felt it
was an insult to the immediate representatives of the people; and if it
had been sent at a moment when the House existed, with the power to
resent unprovoked insult, I verily believe, that, imitating the example
of our Congress in a somewhat similar case during the Revolutionary War,
I should have moved that a message be sent by two members of the House
to cast the Senate message on their floor, and tell them it was not the
custom of the House to receive insolent messages.”[864]
Thus did Adams the Whig stand forth as the special champion of the
President and the Democratic House, and tear the Webster sophistry to
tatters; thus did he serve notice that, outside the more selfish
politicians of the Whig Opposition, the Nation applauded the spirit of
Jackson and was prepared to follow him against any foreign foe. The
speech was the sensation of the day, and Adams was never forgiven. Henry
A. Wise, the brilliant Virginia Whig, followed in a remarkable medley of
gossipy charges against his colleagues, but his effort was so novel in
its irregularities that it destroyed itself--and the fight over the loss
of the Fortifications Bill is told in the speeches of Webster and Adams.
The Whigs pursued the latter with their resentment to the polls in the
autumn of that year, and he was able to record, after the election,
that he was “reëlected to the next Congress without formal opposition,
but almost without Whig votes.” And looking back at the end of the year,
and recording his impressions, he referred to his reply to Webster with
evident relish. “It demolished the speech of Webster,” he wrote, “drove
him from the field, and whipped him and his party into the rank and file
of the Nation in the quarrel with the French King.”[865] It did
something more; it disclosed the fact that the Whig leaders, in their
hate of Jackson, approached perilously near disloyalty to their country.
If Jackson won his fight, it was after battling against, not only the
Government of France, but against the party Opposition at home. And
fighting this double battle, he won.
IX
Adams spoke on January 21, 1836, while Congress was considering the
recommendations of the Special Message. Alphonse Pageot, and his wife
and son, Andrew Jackson, were in New York awaiting passage back to
France; and two days after the French Chargé left New York, Charles
Bankhead, the British Chargé d’Affaires at Washington, acting on
instructions from his Government, offered the mediation of England in
the settlement of the Franco-American dispute, in a letter to Forsyth.
Jackson and his Secretary of State took six days to deliberate on the
proposal before giving a formal answer. The note, signed, and no doubt
prepared by Forsyth, is a strong and polished review of the controversy,
a reiteration of Livingston’s contention that no nation has the right to
attempt an interference with the “consultation” of the departments of
the American Government, and an explicit reservation that the American
Government would not make the explanation or apology prescribed by the
Government of France. There is no single sign of weakening, absolutely
nothing new in the way of a concession, and only a repetition of the
Livingston notes to the Duc de Broglie.
Twelve days later, Bankhead informed Forsyth of the success of the
mediation. “The French Government,” he wrote, “has stated ... that the
frank and honorable manner in which the President has, in his recent
Message, expressed himself in regard to the points of difference between
the Governments of France and the United States, has removed those
difficulties, upon the score of national honor, which have hitherto
stood in the way of the prompt execution by France of the treaty.”[866]
This was a complete reversal. The President had “expressed himself on
the points of difference” through Livingston, in conversation, and
through notes to both de Rigny and de Broglie, and he had expressed
himself to them precisely as in “his recent Message.” And it was after
he had thus expressed himself that France had insisted that an
explanation or apology prescribed by her should be made as a condition
to the execution of the treaty. Jackson added nothing; France accepted
what she had scornfully refused before, and the triumph of Jackson was
complete. On May 10th Jackson was able to inform Congress that France
had paid the four installments due. Thus, after the failures of the
Administrations of Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and Adams to get a
settlement with France, Jackson had negotiated a treaty within two years
of his first inauguration, and had enforced the observance of the treaty
almost a year before the expiration of his last term.
The theory of some historians that Jackson, in his dealings with foreign
nations, was lacking in finesse and success, is manifestly colored by
blind prejudice. The prestige of the Nation abroad was never so high as
after his stern insistence that a treaty with the United States could no
more be disregarded than one with any of the European Powers. John Fiske
touched the real significance of the result of the controversy when he
wrote that “the days when foreign powers could safely insult us were
evidently gone by.”[867] And the same historian discloses the necessity
for the position assumed by Jackson. “In foreign affairs,” he writes,
“Jackson’s Administration won great credit through its enforcement of
the French spoliation claims. European nations which had claims for
damages against France on account of spoliations committed by French
cruisers during the Napoleonic wars, had no difficulty after the Peace
of 1815 in obtaining payment; but the claims of the United States had
been superciliously neglected.”[868] And so pronounced a partisan as
John W. Foster, Secretary of State under the second Harrison, has
recorded the deliberate judgment that “in its foreign relations his
Administration maintained a dignified and creditable attitude.”[869]
The Whig leaders in the Senate and the press, the Clays and Websters and
the Gales, had permitted their bitterness against Jackson to lead them
to the verge of disloyalty to country, and the indignant protest of
Adams was a true reflection of the popular opinion. The clever
politicians of the Kitchen Cabinet were not slow to see the opportunity
again to picture Jackson as the patriotic hero, for the second time
leading his people in a fight against a foreign adversary.